A history of China., [3d ed. rev. and enl.]

by Wolfram Eberhard

(C) The Manchu Dynasty (1644-1911)

1 Installation of Manchus

The Manchus had gained the mastery over China owing rather to China's internal situation than to their military superiority. How was it that the dynasty could endure for so long, although the Manchus were not numerous, although the first Manchu ruler (Fu Lin, known under the rule name Shun-chih; 1644-1662) was a psychopathic youth, although there were princes of the Ming dynasty ruling in South China, and although there were strong groups of rebels all over the country? The Manchus were aliens; at that time the national feeling of the Chinese had already been awakened; aliens were despised. In addition to this, the Manchus demanded that as a sign of their subjection the Chinese should wear pigtails and assume Manchurian clothing (law of 1645). Such laws could not but offend national pride. Moreover, marriages between Manchus and Chinese were prohibited, and a dual government was set up, with Manchus always alongside Chinese in every office, the Manchus being of course in the superior position. The Manchu soldiers were distributed in military garrisons among the great cities, and were paid state pensions, which had to be provided by taxation. They were the master race, and had no need to work. Manchus did not have to attend the difficult state examinations which the Chinese had to pass in order to gain an appointment. How was it that in spite of all this the Manchus were able to establish themselves?

The conquering Manchu generals first went south from eastern China, and in 1645 captured Nanking, where a Ming prince had ruled. The region round Nanking was the economic centre of China. Soon the Manchus were in the adjoining southern provinces, and thus they conquered the whole of the territory of the landowning gentry, who after the events of the beginning of the seventeenth century had no longer trusted the Ming rulers. The Ming prince in Nanking was just as incapable, and surrounded by just as evil a clique, as the Ming emperors of the past. The gentry were not inclined to defend him. A considerable section of the gentry were reduced to utter despair; they had no desire to support the Ming any longer; in their own interest they could not support the rebel leaders; and they regarded the Manchus as just a particular sort of "rebels". Interpreting the refusal of some Sung ministers to serve the foreign Mongols as an act of loyalty, it was now regarded as shameful to desert a dynasty when it came to an end and to serve the new ruler, even if the new régime promised to

be better. Many thousands of officials, scholars, and great landowners committed suicide. Many books, often really moving and tragic, are filled with the story of their lives. Some of them tried to form insurgent bands with their peasants and went into the mountains, but they were unable to maintain themselves there. The great bulk of the élite soon brought themselves to collaborate with the conquerors when they were offered tolerable conditions. In the end the Manchus did not interfere in the ownership of land in central China.

At the time when in Europe Louis XIV was reigning, the Thirty Years War was coming to an end, and Cromwell was carrying out his reforms in England, the Manchus conquered the whole of China. Chang Hsien-chung and Li Tzŭ-ch'êng were the first to fall; the pirate Coxinga lasted a little longer and was even able to plunder Nanking in 1659, but in 1661 he had to retire to Formosa. Wu San-kui, who meanwhile had conquered western China, saw that the situation was becoming difficult for him. His task was to drive out the last Ming pretenders for the Manchus. As he had already been opposed to the Ming in 1644, and as the Ming no longer had any following among the gentry, he could not suddenly work with them against the Manchus. He therefore handed over to the Manchus the last Ming prince, whom the Burmese had delivered up to him in 1661. Wu San-kui's only possible allies against the Manchus were the gentry. But in the west, where he was in power, the gentry counted for nothing; they had in any case been weaker in the west, and they had been decimated by the insurrection of Chang Hsien-chung. Thus Wu San-kui was compelled to try to push eastwards, in order to unite with the gentry of the Yangtze region against the Manchus. The Manchus guessed Wu San-kui's plan, and in 1673, after every effort at accommodation had failed, open war came. Wu San-kui made himself emperor, and the Manchus marched against him. Meanwhile, the Chinese gentry of the Yangtze region had come to terms with the Manchus, and they gave Wu San-kui no help. He vegetated in the south-west, a region too poor to maintain an army that could conquer all China, and too small to enable him to last indefinitely as an independent power. He was able to hold his own until his death, although, with the loss of the support of the gentry, he had had no prospect of final success. Not until 1681 was his successor, his grandson Wu Shih-fan, defeated. The end of the rule of Wu San-kui and his successor marked the end of the national governments of China; the whole country was now under alien domination, for the simple reason that all the opponents of the Manchus had failed. Only the Manchus were accredited with the ability to

bring order out of the universal confusion, so that there was clearly no alternative but to put up with the many insults and humiliations they inflicted—with the result that the national feeling that had just been aroused died away, except where it was kept alive in a few secret societies. There will be more to say about this, once the works which were suppressed by the Manchus are published.

In the first phase of the Manchu conquest the gentry had refused to support either the Ming princes or Wu San-kui, or any of the rebels, or the Manchus themselves. A second phase began about twenty years after the capture of Peking, when the Manchus won over the gentry by desisting from any interference with the ownership of land, and by the use of Manchu troops to clear away the "rebels" who were hostile to the gentry. A reputable government was then set up in Peking, free from eunuchs and from all the old cliques; in their place the government looked for Chinese scholars for its administrative posts. Literati and scholars streamed into Peking, especially members of the "Academies" that still existed in secret, men who had been the chief sufferers from the conditions at the end of the Ming epoch. The young emperor Sheng Tsu (1663-1722; K'ang-hsi is the name by which his rule was known, not his name) was keenly interested in Chinese culture and gave privileged treatment to the scholars of the gentry who came forward. A rapid recovery quite clearly took place. The disturbances of the years that had passed had got rid of the worst enemies of the people, the formidable rival cliques and the individuals lusting for power; the gentry had become more cautious in their behaviour to the peasants; and bribery had been largely stamped out. Finally, the empire had been greatly expanded. All these things helped to stabilize the regime of the Manchus.

2 Decline in the eighteenth century

The improvement continued until the middle of the eighteenth century. About the time of the French Revolution there began a continuous decline, slow at first and then gathering speed. The European works on China offer various reasons for this: the many foreign wars (to which we shall refer later) of the emperor, known by the name of his ruling period, Ch'ien-lung, his craze for building, and the irruption of the Europeans into Chinese trade. In the eighteenth century the court surrounded itself with great splendour, and countless palaces and other luxurious buildings were erected, but it must be borne in mind that so great an empire as the China of that day possessed very considerable financial strength, and could support this luxury. The wars were certainly not inexpensive,

as they took place along the Russian frontier and entailed expenditure on the transport of reinforcements and supplies; the wars against Turkestan and Tibet were carried on with relatively small forces. This expenditure should not have been beyond the resources of an ordered budget. Interestingly enough, the period between 1640 and 1840 belongs to those periods for which almost no significant work in the field of internal social and economic developments has been made; Western scholars have been too much interested in the impact of Western economy and culture or in the military events. Chinese scholars thus far have shown a prejudice against the Manchu dynasty and were mainly interested in the study of anti-Manchu movements and the downfall of the dynasty. On the other hand, the documentary material for this period is extremely extensive, and many years of work are necessary to reach any general conclusions even in one single field. The following remarks should, therefore, be taken as very tentative and preliminary, and they are, naturally, fragmentary.

(Chart) POPULATION GROWTH OF CHINA

14 Aborigines of South China, of the 'Black Miao' tribe, at a festival. China-ink drawing of the eighteenth century.
Collection of the Museum für Völkerkunde, Berlin. No. ID 8756, 68.

15 Pavilion on the 'Coal Hill' at Peking, in which the last Ming emperor committed suicide.
Photo Eberhard.

The decline of the Manchu dynasty began at a time when the European trade was still insignificant, and not as late as after 1842, when China had had to submit to the foreign Capitulations. These cannot have been the true cause of the decline. Above all, the

decline was not so noticeable in the state of the Exchequer as in a general impoverishment of China. The number of really wealthy persons among the gentry diminished, but the middle class, that is to say the people who had education but little or no money and property, grew steadily in number.

One of the deeper reasons for the decline of the Manchu dynasty seems to lie in the enormous increase in the population. Here are a few Chinese statistics:

Year	Population
1578 (before the Manchus)	10,621,463	families or	60,692,856	individuals
1662	19,203,233	families	100,000,000	individuals *
1710	23,311,236	families	116,000,000	individuals *
1729	25,480,498	families	127,000,000	individuals *
1741	143,411,559			individuals
1754	184,504,493			individuals
1778	242,965,618			individuals
1796	275,662,414			individuals
1814	374,601,132			individuals
1850	414,493,899			individuals
(1953)			(601,938,035	individuals)
* Approximately

It may be objected that these figures are incorrect and exaggerated. Undoubtedly they contain errors. But the first figure (for 1578) of some sixty millions is in close agreement with all other figures of early times; the figure for 1850 seems high, but cannot be far wrong, for even after the great T'ai P'ing Rebellion of 1851, which, together with its after-effects, costs the lives of countless millions, all statisticians of today estimate the population of China at more than four hundred millions. If we enter these data together with the census of 1953 into a chart (see p. [273]), a fairly smooth curve emerges; the special features are that already under the Ming the population was increasing and, secondly, that the high rate of increase in the population began with the long period of internal peace since about 1700. From that time onwards, all China's wars were fought at so great a distance from China proper that the population was not directly affected. Moreover, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the Manchus saw to the maintenance of the river dykes, so that the worst inundations were prevented. Thus there were not so many of the floods which had often cost the lives of many million people in China; and there were no internal wars, with their heavy cost in lives.

But while the population increased, the tillage failed to increase in the needed proportion. I have, unfortunately, no statistics for

all periods; but the general tendency is shown by the following table:

Date	Cultivated area	mou per person
	in mou
1578	701,397,600	11.6
1662	531,135,800
1719	663,113,200
1729	878,176,000	6.1
(1953)	(1,627,930,000)	(2.7)

Six mou are about one acre. In 1578, there were 66 mou land per family of the total population. This was close to the figures regarded as ideal by Chinese early economists for the producing family (100 mou) considering the fact that about 80 per cent of all families at that time were producers. By 1729 it was only 35 mou per family, i.e. the land had to produce almost twice as much as before. We have shown that the agricultural developments in the Ming time greatly increased the productivity of the land. This then, obviously resulted in an increase of population. But by the middle of the eighteenth century, assuming that production doubled since the sixteenth century, population pressure was again as heavy as it had been then. And after c. 1750, population pressure continued to build up to the present time.

Internal colonization continued during the Manchu time; there was a continuous, but slow flow of people into Kwangsi, Kweichou, Yünnan. In spite of laws which prohibited emigration, Chinese also moved into South-East Asia. Chinese settlement in Manchuria was allowed only in the last years of the Manchus. But such internal colonization or emigration could allevitate the pressure only in some areas, while it continued to build up in others.

In Europe as well as in Japan, we find a strong population increase; in Europe at almost the same time as in China. But before population pressure became too serious in Europe or Japan, industry developed and absorbed the excess population. Thus, farms did not decrease too much in size. Too small farms are always and in many ways uneconomical. With the development of industries, the percentage of farm population decreased. In China, however, the farm population was still as high as 73.3 per cent of the total population in 1932 and the percentage rose to 81 per cent in 1950.

From the middle of the seventeenth century on, commercial activities, especially along the coast, continued to increase and we

find gentry families who equip sons who were unwilling or not capable to study and to enter the ranks of the officials, but who were too unruly to sit in villages and collect the rent from the tenants of the family, with money to enter business. The newly settled areas of Kwangtung and Kwangsi were ideal places for them: here they could sell Chinese products to the native tribes or to the new settlers at high prices. Some of these men introduced new techniques from the old provinces of China into the "colonial" areas and set up dye factories, textile factories, etc., in the new towns of the south. But the greatest stimulus for these commercial activities was foreign, European trade. American silver which had flooded Europe in the sixteenth century, began to flow into China from the beginning of the seventeenth century on. The influx was stopped not until between 1661 and 1684 when the government again prohibited coastal shipping and removed coastal settlements into the interior in order to stop piracy along the coasts of Fukien and independence movements on Formosa. But even during these twenty-three years, the price of silver was so low that home production was given up because it did not pay off. In the eighteenth century, silver again continued to enter China, while silk and tea were exported. This demand led to a strong rise in the prices of silk and tea, and benefited the merchants. When, from the late eighteenth century on, opium began to be imported, the silver left China again. The merchants profited this time from the opium trade, but farmers had to suffer: the price of silver went up, and taxes had to be paid in silver, while farm products were sold for copper. By 1835, the ounce of silver had a value of 2,000 copper coins instead of one thousand before 1800. High gains in commerce prevented investment in industries, because they would give lower and later profits than commerce. From the nineteenth century on, more and more industrial goods were offered by importers which also prevented industrialization. Finally, the gentry basically remained anti-industrial and anti-business. They tried to operate necessary enterprises such as mining, melting, porcelain production as far as possible as government establishments; but as the operators were officials, they were not too business-minded and these enterprises did not develop well. The businessmen certainly had enough capital, but they invested it in land instead of investing it in industries which could at any moment be taken away by the government, controlled by the officials or forced to sell at set prices, and which were always subject to exploitation by dishonest officials. A businessman felt secure only when he had invested in land, when he had received an official title upon the payment of large sums of money, or when he succeeded to push at least one of his

sons into the government bureaucracy. No doubt, in spite of all this, Chinese business and industry kept on developing in the Manchu time, but they did not develop at such a speed as to transform the country from an agrarian into a modern industrial nation.

3 Expansion in Central Asia; the first State treaty

The rise of the Manchu dynasty actually began under the K'ang-hsi rule (1663-1722). The emperor had three tasks. The first was the removal of the last supporters of the Ming dynasty and of the generals, such as Wu San-kui, who had tried to make themselves independent. This necessitated a long series of campaigns, most of them in the south-west or south of China; these scarcely affected the population of China proper. In 1683 Formosa was occupied and the last of the insurgent army commanders was defeated. It was shown above that the situation of all these leaders became hopeless as soon as the Manchus had occupied the rich Yangtze region and the intelligentsia and the gentry of that region had gone over to them.

A quite different type of insurgent commander was the Mongol prince Galdan. He, too, planned to make himself independent of Manchu overlordship. At first the Mongols had readily supported the Manchus, when the latter were making raids into China and there was plenty of booty. Now, however, the Manchus, under the influence of the Chinese gentry whom they brought, and could not but bring, to their court, were rapidly becoming Chinese in respect to culture. Even in the time of K'ang-hsi the Manchus began to forget Manchurian; they brought tutors to court to teach the young Manchus Chinese. Later even the emperors did not understand Manchurian! As a result of this process, the Mongols became alienated from the Manchurians, and the situation began once more to be the same as at the time of the Ming rulers. Thus Galdan tried to found an independent Mongol realm, free from Chinese influence.

The Manchus could not permit this, as such a realm would have threatened the flank of their homeland, Manchuria, and would have attracted those Manchus who objected to sinification. Between 1690 and 1696 there were battles, in which the emperor actually took part in person. Galdan was defeated. In 1715, however, there were new disturbances, this time in western Mongolia. Tsewang Rabdan, whom the Chinese had made khan of the Ölöt, rose against the Chinese. The wars that followed, extending far into Turkestan and also involving its Turkish population together with the Dzungars, ended with the Chinese conquest of the whole

of Mongolia and of parts of eastern Turkestan. As Tsewang Rabdan had tried to extend his power as far as Tibet, a campaign was undertaken also into Tibet, Lhasa was occupied, a new Dalai Lama was installed there as supreme ruler, and Tibet was made into a protectorate. Since then Tibet has remained to this day under some form of Chinese colonial rule.

This penetration of the Chinese into Turkestan took place just at the time when the Russians were enormously expanding their empire in Asia, and this formed the third problem for the Manchus. In 1650 the Russians had established a fort by the river Amur. The Manchus regarded the Amur (which they called the "River of the Black Dragon") as part of their own territory, and in 1685 they destroyed the Russian settlement. After this there were negotiations, which culminated in 1689 in the Treaty of Nerchinsk. This treaty was the first concluded by the Chinese state with a European power. Jesuit missionaries played a part in the negotiations as interpreters. Owing to the difficulties of translation the text of the treaty, in Chinese, Russian, and Manchurian, contained some obscurities, particulary in regard to the frontier line. Accordingly, in 1727 the Russians asked for a revision of the old treaty. The Chinese emperor, whose rule name was Yung-cheng, arranged for the negotiations to be carried on at the frontier, in the town of Kyakhta, in Mongolia, where after long discussions a new treaty was concluded. Under this treaty the Russians received permission to set up a legation and a commercial agency in Peking, and also to maintain a church. This was the beginning of the foreign Capitulations. From the Chinese point of view there was nothing special in a facility of this sort. For some fifteen centuries all the "barbarians" who had to bring tribute had been given houses in the capital, where their envoys could wait until the emperor would receive them—usually on New Year's Day. The custom had sprung up at the reception of the Huns. Moreover, permission had always been given for envoys to be accompanied by a few merchants, who during the envoy's stay did a certain amount of business. Furthermore the time had been when the Uighurs were permitted to set up a temple of their own. At the time of the permission given to the Russians to set up a "legation", a similar office was set up (in 1729) for "Uighur" peoples (meaning Mohammedans), again under the control of an office, called the Office for Regulation of Barbarians. The Mohammedan office was placed under two Mohammedan leaders who lived in Peking. The Europeans, however, had quite different ideas about a "legation", and about the significance of permission to trade. They regarded this as the opening of diplomatic relations between states on terms of equality, and the

carrying on of trade as a special privilege, a sort of Capitulation. This reciprocal misunderstanding produced in the nineteenth century a number of serious political conflicts. The Europeans charged the Chinese with breach of treaties, failure to meet their obligations, and other such things, while the Chinese considered that they had acted with perfect correctness.

4 Culture

In this K'ang-hsi period culture began to flourish again. The emperor had attracted the gentry, and so the intelligentsia, to his court because his uneducated Manchus could not alone have administered the enormous empire; and he showed great interest in Chinese culture, himself delved deeply into it, and had many works compiled, especially works of an encyclopaedic character. The encyclopaedias enabled information to be rapidly gained on all sorts of subjects, and thus were just what an interested ruler needed, especially when, as a foreigner, he was not in a position to gain really thorough instruction in things Chinese. The Chinese encyclopaedias of the seventeenth and especially of the eighteenth century were thus the outcome of the initiative of the Manchurian emperor, and were compiled for his information; they were not due, like the French encyclopaedias of the eighteenth century, to a movement for the spread of knowledge among the people. For this latter purpose the gigantic encyclopaedias of the Manchus, each of which fills several bookcases, were much too expensive and were printed in much too limited editions. The compilations began with the great geographical encyclopaedia of Ku Yen-wu (1613-1682), and attained their climax in the gigantic eighteenth-century encyclopaedia T'u-shu chi-ch'eng, scientifically impeccable in the accuracy of its references to sources. Here were already the beginnings of the "Archaeological School", built up in the course of the eighteenth century. This school was usually called "Han school" because the adherents went back to the commentaries of the classical texts written in Han time and discarded the orthodox explanations of Chu Hsi's school of Sung time. Later, its most prominent leader was Tai Chen (1723-1777). Tai was greatly interested in technology and science; he can be regarded as the first philosopher who exhibited an empirical, scientific way of thinking. Late nineteenth and early twentieth century Chinese scholarship is greatly obliged to him.

The most famous literary works of the Manchu epoch belong once more to the field which Chinese do not regard as that of true literature—the novel, the short story, and the drama. Poetry did

exist, but it kept to the old paths and had few fresh ideas. All the various forms of the Sung period were made use of. The essayists, too, offered nothing new, though their number was legion. One of the best known is Yüan Mei (1716-1797), who was also the author of the collection of short stories Tse-pu-yü ("The Master did not tell"), which is regarded very highly by the Chinese. The volume of short stories entitled Liao-chai chich-i, by P'u Sung-lin (1640-1715?), is world-famous and has been translated into every civilized language. Both collections are distinguished by their simple but elegant style. The short story was popular among the greater gentry; it abandoned the popular style it had had in the Ming epoch, and adopted the polished language of scholars.

The Manchu epoch has left to us what is by general consent the finest novel in Chinese literature, Hung-lou-meng ("The Dream of the Red Chamber"), by Ts'ao Hsüeh-ch'in, who died in 1763. It describes the downfall of a rich and powerful family from the highest rank of the gentry, and the decadent son's love of a young and emotional lady of the highest circles. The story is clothed in a mystical garb that does something to soften its tragic ending. The interesting novel Ju-lin wai-shih ("Private Reports from the Life of Scholars"), by Wu Ching-tzŭ (1701-1754), is a mordant criticism of Confucianism with its rigid formalism, of the social system, and of the examination system. Social criticism is the theme of many novels. The most modern in spirit of the works of this period is perhaps the treatment of feminism in the novel Ching-hua-yüan, by Li Yu-chên (d. 1830), which demanded equal rights for men and women.

The drama developed quickly in the Manchu epoch, particularly in quantity, especially since the emperors greatly appreciated the theatre. A catalogue of plays compiled in 1781 contains 1,013 titles! Some of these dramas were of unprecedented length. One of them was played in 26 parts containing 240 acts; a performance took two years to complete! Probably the finest dramas of the Manchu epoch are those of Li Yü (born 1611), who also became the first of the Chinese dramatic critics. What he had to say about the art of the theatre, and about aesthetics in general, is still worth reading.

About the middle of the nineteenth century the influence of Europe became more and more marked. Translation began with Yen Fu (1853-1921), who translated the first philosophical and scientific books and books on social questions and made his compatriots acquainted with Western thought. At the same time Lin Shu (1852-1924) translated the first Western short stories and novels. With these two began the new style, which was soon elaborated by Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, a collaborator of Sun Yat-sen's,

and by others, and which ultimately produced the "literary revolution" of 1917. Translation has continued to this day; almost every book of outstanding importance in world literature is translated within a few months of its appearance, and on the average these translations are of a fairly high level.

Particularly fine work was produced in the field of porcelain in the Manchu epoch. In 1680 the famous kilns in the province of Kiangsi were reopened, and porcelain that is among the most artistically perfect in the world was fired in them. Among the new colours were especially green shades (one group is known as famille verte), and also black and yellow compositions. Monochrome porcelain also developed further, including very fine dark blue, brilliant red (called "ox-blood"), and white. In the eighteenth century, however, there began an unmistakable decline, which has continued to this day, although there are still a few craftsmen and a few kilns that produce outstanding work (usually attempts to imitate old models), often in small factories.

In painting, European influence soon shows itself. The best-known example of this is Lang Shih-ning, an Italian missionary whose original name was Giuseppe Castiglione (1688-1766); he began to work in China in 1715. He learned the Chinese method of painting, but introduced a number of technical tricks of European painters, which were adopted in general practice in China, especially by the official court painters: the painting of the scholars who lived in seclusion remained uninfluenced. Dutch flower-painting also had some influence in China as early as the eighteenth century.

The missionaries played an important part at court. The first Manchu emperors were as generous in this matter as the Mongols had been, and allowed the foreigners to work in peace. They showed special interest in the European science introduced by the missionaries; they had less sympathy for their religious message. The missionaries, for their part, sent to Europe enthusiastic accounts of the wonderful conditions in China, and so helped to popularize the idea that was being formed in Europe of an "enlightened", a constitutional, monarchy. The leaders of the Enlightenment read these reports with enthusiasm, with the result that they had an influence on the French Revolution. Confucius was found particularly attractive, and was regarded as a forerunner of the Enlightenment. The "Monadism" of the philosopher Leibniz was influenced by these reports.

The missionaries gained a reputation at court as "scientists", and in this they were of service both to China and to Europe. The behaviour of the European merchants who followed the missions, spreading gradually in growing numbers along the coasts of China,

was not by any means so irreproachable. The Chinese were certainly justified when they declared that European ships often made landings on the coast and simply looted, just as the Japanese had done before them. Reports of this came to the court, and as captured foreigners described themselves as "Christians" and also seemed to have some connection with the missionaries living at court, and as disputes had broken out among the missionaries themselves in connection with papal ecclesiastical policy, in the Yung-cheng period (1723-1736; the name of the emperor was Shih Tsung) Christianity was placed under a general ban, being regarded as a secret political organization.

5 Relations with the outer world

During the Yung-cheng period there was long-continued guerrilla fighting with natives in south-west China. The pressure of population in China sought an outlet in emigration. More and more Chinese moved into the south-west, and took the land from the natives, and the fighting was the consequence of this.

At the beginning of the Ch'ien-lung period (1736-1796), fighting started again in Turkestan. Mongols, now called Kalmuks, defeated by the Chinese, had migrated to the Ili region, where after heavy fighting they gained supremacy over some of the Kazaks and other Turkish peoples living there and in western Turkestan. Some Kazak tribes went over to the Russians, and in 1735 the Russian colonialists founded the town of Orenburg in the western Kazak region. The Kalmuks fought the Chinese without cessation until, in 1739, they entered into an agreement under which they ceded half their territory to Manchu China, retaining only the Ili region. The Kalmuks subsequently reunited with other sections of the Kazaks against the Chinese. In 1754 peace was again concluded with China, but it was followed by raids on both sides, so that the Manchus determined to enter on a great campaign against the Ili region. This ended with a decisive victory for the Chinese (1755). In the years that followed, however, the Chinese began to be afraid that the various Kazak tribes might unite in order to occupy the territory of the Kalmuks, which was almost unpopulated owing to the mass slaughter of Kalmuks by the Chinese. Unrest began among the Mohammedans throughout the neighbouring western Turkestan, and the same Chinese generals who had fought the Kalmuks marched into Turkestan and captured the Mohammedan city states of Uch, Kashgar, and Yarkand.

The reinforcements for these campaigns, and for the garrisons which in the following decades were stationed in the Ili region and

in the west of eastern Turkestan, marched along the road from Peking that leads northward through Mongolia to the far distant Uliassutai and Kobdo. The cost of transport for one shih (about 66 lb.) amounted to 120 pieces of silver. In 1781 certain economies were introduced, but between 1781 and 1791 over 30,000 tons, making some 8 tons a day, was transported to that region. The cost of transport for supplies alone amounted in the course of time to the not inconsiderable sum of 120,000,000 pieces of silver. In addition to this there was the cost of the transported goods and of the pay of soldiers and of the administration. These figures apply to the period of occupation, of relative peace: during the actual wars of conquest the expenditure was naturally far higher. Thus these campaigns, though I do not think they brought actual economic ruin to China, were nevertheless a costly enterprise, and one which produced little positive advantage.

In addition to this, these wars brought China into conflict with the European colonial powers. In the years during which the Chinese armies were fighting in the Ili region, the Russians were putting out their feelers in that direction, and the Chinese annals show plainly how the Russians intervened in the fighting with the Kalmuks and Kazaks. The Ili region remained thereafter a bone of contention between China and Russia, until it finally went to Russia, bit by bit, between 1847 and 1881. The Kalmuks and Kazaks played a special part in Russo-Chinese relations. The Chinese had sent a mission to the Kalmuks farthest west, by the lower Volga, and had entered into relations with them, as early as 1714. As Russian pressure on the Volga region continually grew, these Kalmuks (mainly the Turgut tribe), who had lived there since 1630, decided to return into Chinese territory (1771). During this enormously difficult migration, almost entirely through hostile territory, a large number of the Turgut perished; 85,000, however, reached the Ili region, where they were settled by the Chinese on the lands of the eastern Kalmuks, who had been largely exterminated.

In the south, too, the Chinese came into direct touch with the European powers. In 1757 the English occupied Calcutta, and in 1766 the province of Bengal. In 1767 a Manchu general, Ming Jui, who had been victorious in the fighting for eastern Turkestan, marched against Burma, which was made a dependency once more in 1769. And in 1790-1791 the Chinese conquered Nepal, south of Tibet, because Nepalese had made two attacks on Tibet. Thus English and Chinese political interests came here into contact.

For the Ch'ien-lung period's many wars of conquest there seem to have been two main reasons. The first was the need for security.

The Mongols had to be overthrown because otherwise the homeland of the Manchus was menaced; in order to make sure of the suppression of the eastern Mongols, the western Mongols (Kalmuks) had to be overthrown; to make them harmless, Turkestan and the Ili region had to be conquered; Tibet was needed for the security of Turkestan and Mongolia—and so on. Vast territories, however, were conquered in this process which were of no economic value, and most of which actually cost a great deal of money and brought nothing in. They were conquered simply for security. That advantage had been gained: an aggressor would have to cross great areas of unproductive territory, with difficult conditions for reinforcements, before he could actually reach China. In the second place, the Chinese may actually have noticed the efforts that were being made by the European powers, especially Russia and England, to divide Asia among themselves, and accordingly they made sure of their own good share.

6 Decline; revolts

The period of Ch'ien-lung is not only that of the greatest expansion of the Chinese empire, but also that of the greatest prosperity under the Manchu regime. But there began at the same time to be signs of internal decline. If we are to fix a particular year for this, perhaps it should be the year 1774, in which came the first great popular rising, in the province of Shantung. In 1775 there came another popular rising, in Honan—that of the "Society of the White Lotus". This society, which had long existed as a secret organization and had played a part in the Ming epoch, had been reorganized by a man named Liu Sung. Liu Sung was captured and was condemned to penal servitude. His followers, however, regrouped themselves, particularly in the province of Anhui. These risings had been produced, as always, by excessive oppression of the people by the government or the governing class. As, however, the anger of the population was naturally directed also against the idle Manchus of the cities, who lived on their state pensions, did no work, and behaved as a ruling class, the government saw in these movements a nationalist spirit, and took drastic steps against them. The popular leaders now altered their programme, and acclaimed a supposed descendant from the Ming dynasty as the future emperor. Government troops caught the leader of the "White Lotus" agitation, but he succeeded in escaping. In the regions through which the society had spread, there then began a sort of Inquisition, of exceptional ferocity. Six provinces were affected, and in and around the single city of Wuch'ang in four months more than

20,000 people were beheaded. The cost of the rising to the government ran into millions. In answer to this oppression, the popular leaders tightened their organization and marched north-west from the western provinces of which they had gained control. The rising was suppressed only by a very big military operation, and not until 1802. There had been very heavy fighting between 1793 and 1802—just when in Europe, in the French Revolution, another oppressed population won its freedom.

The Ch'ien-lung emperor abdicated on New Year's Day, 1795, after ruling for sixty years. He died in 1799. His successor was Jen Tsung (1796-1821; reign name: Chia-ch'ing). In the course of his reign the rising of the "White Lotus" was suppressed, but in 1813 there began a new rising, this time in North China—again that of a secret organization, the "Society of Heaven's Law". One of its leaders bribed some eunuchs, and penetrated with a group of followers into the palace; he threw himself upon the emperor, who was only saved through the intervention of his son. At the same time the rising spread in the provinces. Once more the government succeeded in suppressing it and capturing the leaders. But the memory of these risings was kept alive among the Chinese people. For the government failed to realize that the actual cause of the risings was the general impoverishment, and saw in them a nationalist movement, thus actually arousing a national consciousness, stronger than in the Ming epoch, among the middle and lower classes of the people, together with hatred of the Manchus. They were held responsible for every evil suffered, regardless of the fact that similar evils had existed earlier.

7 European Imperialism in the Far East

With the Tao-kuang period (1821-1850) began a new period in Chinese history, which came to an end only in 1911.

In foreign affairs these ninety years were marked by the steadily growing influence of the Western powers, aimed at turning China into a colony. Culturally this period was that of the gradual infiltration of Western civilization into the Far East; it was recognized in China that it was necessary to learn from the West. In home affairs we see the collapse of the dynasty and the destruction of the unity of the empire; of four great civil wars, one almost brought the dynasty to its end. North and South China, the coastal area and the interior, developed in different ways.

Great Britain had made several attempts to improve her trade relations with China, but the mission of 1793 had no success, and that of 1816 also failed. English merchants, like all foreign merchants,

were only permitted to settle in a small area adjoining Canton and at Macao, and were only permitted to trade with a particular group of monopolists, known as the "Hong". The Hong had to pay taxes to the state, but they had a wonderful opportunity of enriching themselves. The Europeans were entirely at their mercy, for they were not allowed to travel inland, and they were not allowed to try to negotiate with other merchants, to secure lower prices by competition.

The Europeans concentrated especially on the purchase of silk and tea; but what could they import into China? The higher the price of the goods and the smaller the cargo space involved, the better were the chances of profit for the merchants. It proved, however, that European woollens or luxury goods could not be sold; the Chinese would probably have been glad to buy food, but transport was too expensive to permit profitable business. Thus a new article was soon discovered—opium, carried from India to China: the price was high and the cargo space involved was very small. The Chinese were familiar with opium, and bought it readily. Accordingly, from 1800 onwards opium became more and more the chief article of trade, especially for the English, who were able to bring it conveniently from India. Opium is harmful to the people; the opium trade resulted in certain groups of merchants being inordinately enriched; a great deal of Chinese money went abroad. The government became apprehensive and sent Lin Tsê-hsü as its commissioner to Canton. In 1839 he prohibited the opium trade and burned the chests of opium found in British possession. The British view was that to tolerate the Chinese action might mean the destruction of British trade in the Far East and that, on the other hand, it might be possible by active intervention to compel the Chinese to open other ports to European trade and to shake off the monopoly of the Canton merchants. In 1840 British ships-of-war appeared off the south-eastern coast of China and bombarded it. In 1841 the Chinese opened negotiations and dismissed Lin Tsê-hsü. As the Chinese concessions were regarded as inadequate, hostilities continued; the British entered the Yangtze estuary and threatened Nanking. In this first armed conflict with the West, China found herself defenceless owing to her lack of a navy, and it was also found that the European weapons were far superior to those of the Chinese. In 1842 China was compelled to capitulate: under the Treaty of Nanking Hong Kong was ceded to Great Britain, a war indemnity was paid, certain ports were thrown open to European trade, and the monopoly was brought to an end. A great deal of opium came, however, into China through smuggling—regrettably, for the state lost the customs revenue!

This treaty introduced the period of the Capitulations. It contained the dangerous clause which added most to China's misfortunes—the Most Favoured Nation clause, providing that if China granted any privilege to any other state, that privilege should also automatically be granted to Great Britain. In connection with this treaty it was agreed that the Chinese customs should be supervised by European consuls; and a trade treaty was granted. Similar treaties followed in 1844 with France and the United States. The missionaries returned; until 1860, however, they were only permitted to work in the treaty ports. Shanghai was thrown open in 1843, and developed with extraordinary rapidity from a town to a city of a million and a centre of world-wide importance.

The terms of the Nanking Treaty were not observed by either side; both evaded them. In order to facilitate the smuggling, the British had permitted certain Chinese junks to fly the British flag. This also enabled these vessels to be protected by British ships-of-war from pirates, which at that time were very numerous off the southern coast owing to the economic depression. The Chinese, for their part, placed every possible obstacle in the way of the British. In 1856 the Chinese held up a ship sailing under the British flag, pulled down its flag, and arrested the crew on suspicion of smuggling. In connection with this and other events, Britain decided to go to war. Thus began the "Lorcha War" of 1857, in which France joined for the sake of the booty to be expected. Britain had just ended the Crimean War, and was engaged in heavy fighting against the Moguls in India. Consequently only a small force of a few thousand men could be landed in China; Canton, however, was bombarded, and also the forts of Tientsin. There still seemed no prospect of gaining the desired objectives by negotiation, and in 1860 a new expedition was fitted out, this time some 20,000 strong. The troops landed at Tientsin and marched on Peking; the emperor fled to Jehol and did not return; he died in 1861. The new Treaty of Tientsin (1860) provided for (a) the opening of further ports to European traders; (b) the session of Kowloon, the strip of land lying opposite Hong Kong; (c) the establishment of a British legation in Peking; (d) freedom of navigation along the Yangtze; (e) permission for British subjects to purchase land in China; (f) the British to be subject to their own consular courts and not to the Chinese courts; (g) missionary activity to be permitted throughout the country. In addition to this, the commercial treaty was revised, the opium trade was permitted once more, and a war indemnity was to be paid by China. In the eyes of Europe, Britain had now succeeded in turning China not actually into a colony, but at all events into a semi-colony; China must be expected soon to share the

fate of India. China, however, with her very different conceptions of intercourse between states, did not realize the full import of these terms; some of them were regarded as concessions on unimportant points, which there was no harm in granting to the trading "barbarians", as had been done in the past; some were regarded as simple injustices, which at a given moment could be swept away by administrative action.

But the result of this European penetration was that China's balance of trade was adverse, and became more and more so, as under the commercial treaties she could neither stop the importation of European goods nor set a duty on them; and on the other hand she could not compel foreigners to buy Chinese goods. The efflux of silver brought general impoverishment to China, widespread financial stringency to the state, and continuous financial crises and inflation. China had never had much liquid capital, and she was soon compelled to take up foreign loans in order to pay her debts. At that time internal loans were out of the question (the first internal loan was floated in 1894): the population did not even know what a state loan meant; consequently the loans had to be issued abroad. This, however, entailed the giving of securities, generally in the form of economic privileges. Under the Most Favoured Nation clause, however, these privileges had then to be granted to other states which had made no loans to China. Clearly a vicious spiral, which in the end could only bring disaster.

The only exception to the general impoverishment, in which not only the peasants but the old upper classes were involved, was a certain section of the trading community and the middle class, which had grown rich through its dealings with the Europeans. These people now accumulated capital, became Europeanized with their staffs, acquired land from the impoverished gentry, and sent their sons abroad to foreign universities. They founded the first industrial undertakings, and learned European capitalist methods. This class was, of course, to be found mainly in the treaty ports in the south and in their environs. The south, as far north as Shanghai, became more modern and more advanced; the north made no advance. In the south, European ways of thought were learnt, and Chinese and European theories were compared. Criticism began. The first revolutionary societies were formed in this atmosphere in the south.

8 Risings in Turkestan and within China: the T'ai P'ing Rebellion

But the emperor Hsüan Tsung (reign name Tao-kuang), a man in poor health though not without ability, had much graver anxieties

than those caused by the Europeans. He did not yet fully realize the seriousness of the European peril.

16 The imperial summer palace of the Manchu rulers, at Jehol.
Photo H. Hammer-Morrisson.

17 Tower on the city wall of Peking.
Photo H. Hammer-Morris son.

In Turkestan, where Turkish Mohammedans lived under Chinese rule, conditions were far from being as the Chinese desired. The Chinese, a fundamentally rationalistic people, regarded religion as a purely political matter, and accordingly required every citizen to take part in the official form of worship. Subject to that, he might privately belong to any other religion. To a Mohammedan, this was impossible and intolerable. The Mohammedans were only ready to practise their own religion, and absolutely refused to take part in any other. The Chinese also tried to apply to Turkestan in other matters the same legislation that applied to all China, but this proved irreconcilable with the demands made by Islam on its followers. All this produced continual unrest.

Turkestan had had a feudal system of government with a number of feudal lords (beg), who tried to maintain their influence and who had the support of the Mohammedan population. The Chinese had come to Turkestan as soldiers and officials, to administer the country. They regarded themselves as the lords of the land and occupied themselves with the extraction of taxes. Most of the officials were also associated with the Chinese merchants who travelled throughout Turkestan and as far as Siberia. The conflicts implicit in this situation produced great Mohammedan risings in the nineteenth century. The first came in 1825-1827; in 1845 a second rising flamed up, and thirty years later these revolts led to the temporary loss of the whole of Turkestan.

In 1848, native unrest began in the province of Hunan, as a result of the constantly growing pressure of the Chinese settlers on the native population; in the same year there was unrest farther south, in the province of Kwangsi, this time in connection with the influence of the Europeans. The leader was a quite simple man of Hakka blood, Hung Hsiu-ch'üan (born 1814), who gathered impoverished Hakka peasants round him as every peasant leader had done in the past. Very often the nucleus of these peasant movements had been a secret society with a particular religious tinge; this time the peasant revolutionaries came forward as at the same time the preachers of a new religion of their own. Hung had heard of Christianity from missionaries (1837), and he mixed up Christian ideas with those of ancient China and proclaimed to his followers a doctrine that promised the Kingdom of God on earth. He called himself "Christ's younger brother", and his kingdom was to be called T'ai P'ing ("Supreme Peace"). He made his first comrades, charcoal makers, local doctors, peddlers and farmers, into kings, and made himself emperor. At bottom the movement,

like all similar ones before it, was not religious but social; and it produced a great response from the peasants. The programme of the T'ai P'ing, in some points influenced by Christian ideas but more so by traditional Chinese thought, was in many points revolutionary: (a) all property was communal property; (b) land was classified into categories according to its fertility and equally distributed among men and women. Every producer kept of the produce as much as he and his family needed and delivered the rest into the communal granary; (c) administration and tax systems were revised; (d) women were given equal rights: they fought together with men in the army and had access to official position. They had to marry, but monogamy was requested; (e) the use of opium, tobacco and alcohol was prohibited, prostitution was illegal; (f) foreigners were regarded as equals, capitulations as the Manchus had accepted were not recognized. A large part of the officials, and particularly of the soldiers sent against the revolutionaries, were Manchus, and consequently the movement very soon became a nationalist movement, much as the popular movement at the end of the Mongol epoch had done. Hung made rapid progress; in 1852 he captured Hankow, and in 1853 Nanking, the important centre in the east. With clear political insight he made Nanking his capital. In this he returned to the old traditions of the beginning of the Ming epoch, no doubt expecting in this way to attract support from the eastern Chinese gentry, who had no liking for a capital far away in the north. He made a parade of adhesion to the ancient Chinese tradition: his followers cut off their pigtails and allowed their hair to grow as in the past.

He did not succeed, however, in carrying his reforms from the stage of sporadic action to a systematic reorganization of the country, and he also failed to enlist the elements needed for this as for all other administrative work, so that the good start soon degenerated into a terrorist regime.

Hung's followers pressed on from Nanking, and in 1853-1855 they advanced nearly to Tientsin; but they failed to capture Peking itself.

The new T'ai P'ing state faced the Europeans with big problems. Should they work with it or against it? The T'ai P'ing always insisted that they were Christians; the missionaries hoped now to have the opportunity of converting all China to Christianity. The T'ai P'ing treated the missionaries well but did not let them operate. After long hesitation and much vacillation, however, the Europeans placed themselves on the side of the Manchus. Not out of any belief that the T'ai P'ing movement was without justification, but because they had concluded treaties with the Manchu

government and given loans to it, of which nothing would have remained if the Manchus had fallen; because they preferred the weak Manchu government to a strong T'ai P'ing government; and because they disliked the socialistic element in many of the measured adopted by the Tai P'ing.

At first it seemed as if the Manchus would be able to cope unaided with the T'ai P'ing, but the same thing happened as at the end of the Mongol rule: the imperial armies, consisting of the "banners" of the Manchus, the Mongols, and some Chinese, had lost their military skill in the long years of peace; they had lost their old fighting spirit and were glad to be able to live in peace on their state pensions. Now three men came to the fore—a Mongol named Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, a man of great personal bravery, who defended the interests of the Manchu rulers; and two Chinese, Tsêng Kuo-fan (1811-1892) and Li Hung-chang (1823-1901), who were in the service of the Manchus but used their position simply to further the interests of the gentry. The Mongol saved Peking from capture by the T'ai P'ing. The two Chinese were living in central China, and there they recruited, Li at his own expense and Tsêng out of the resources at his disposal as a provincial governor, a sort of militia, consisting of peasants out to protect their homes from destruction by the peasants of the T'ai P'ing. Thus the peasants of central China, all suffering from impoverishment, were divided into two groups, one following the T'ai P'ing, the other following Tsêng Kuo-fan. Tsêng's army, too, might be described as a "national" army, because Tsêng was not fighting for the interests of the Manchus. Thus the peasants, all anti-Manchu, could choose between two sides, between the T'ai P'ing and Tsêng Kuo-fan. Although Tsêng represented the gentry and was thus against the simple common people, peasants fought in masses on his side, for he paid better, and especially more regularly. Tsêng, being a good strategist, won successes and gained adherents. Thus by 1856 the T'ai P'ing were pressed back on Nanking and some of the towns round it; in 1864 Nanking was captured.

While in the central provinces the T'ai P'ing rebellion was raging, China was suffering grave setbacks owing to the Lorcha War of 1856; and there were also great and serious risings in other parts of the country. In 1855 the Yellow River had changed its course, entering the sea once more at Tientsin, to the great loss of the regions of Honan and Anhui. In these two central provinces the peasant rising of the so-called "Nien Fei" had begun, but it only became formidable after 1855, owing to the increasing misery of the peasants. This purely peasant revolt was not suppressed by the

Manchu government until 1868, after many collisions. Then, however, there began the so-called "Mohammedan risings". Here there are, in all, five movements to distinguish: (1) the Mohammedan rising in Kansu (1864-5); (2) the Salar movement in Shensi; (3) the Mohammedan revolt in Yünnan (1855-1873); (4) the rising in Kansu (1895); (5) the rebellion of Yakub Beg in Turkestan (from 1866 onward).

While we are fairly well informed about the other popular risings of this period, the Mohammedan revolts have not yet been well studied. We know from unofficial accounts that these risings were suppressed with great brutality. To this day there are many Mohammedans in, for instance, Yünnan, but the revolt there is said to have cost a million lives. The figures all rest on very rough estimates: in Kansu the population is said to have fallen from fifteen millions to one million; the Turkestan revolt is said to have cost ten million lives. There are no reliable statistics; but it is understandable that at that time the population of China must have fallen considerably, especially if we bear in mind the equally ferocious suppression of the risings of the T'ai P'ing and the Nien Fei within China, and smaller risings of which we have made no mention.

The Mohammedan risings were not elements of a general Mohammedan revolt, but separate events only incidentally connected with each other. The risings had different causes. An important factor was the general distress in China. This was partly due to the fact that the officials were exploiting the peasant population more ruthlessly than ever. In addition to this, owing to the national feeling which had been aroused in so unfortunate a way, the Chinese felt a revulsion against non-Chinese, such as the Salars, who were of Turkish race. Here there were always possibilities of friction, which might have been removed with a little consideration but which swelled to importance through the tactless behaviour of Chinese officials. Finally there came divisions among the Mohammedans of China which led to fighting between themselves.

All these risings were marked by two characteristics. They had no general political aim such as the founding of a great and universal Islamic state. Separate states were founded, but they were too small to endure; they would have needed the protection of great states. But they were not moved by any pan-Islamic idea. Secondly, they all took place on Chinese soil, and all the Mohammedans involved, except in the rising of the Salars, were Chinese. These Chinese who became Mohammedans are called Dungans. The Dungans are, of course, no longer pure Chinese, because

Chinese who have gone over to Islam readily form mixed marriages with Islamic non-Chinese, that is to say with Turks and Mongols.

The revolt, however, of Yakub Beg in Turkestan had a quite different character. Yakub Beg (his Chinese name was An Chi-yeh) had risen to the Chinese governorship when he made himself ruler of Kashgar. In 1866 he began to try to make himself independent of Chinese control. He conquered Ili, and then in a rapid campaign made himself master of all Turkestan.

His state had a much better prospect of endurance than the other Mohammedan states. He had full control of it from 1874. Turkestan was connected with China only by the few routes that led between the desert and the Tibetan mountains. The state was supported against China by Russia, which was continually pressing eastward, and in the south by Great Britain, which was pressing towards Tibet. Farther west was the great Ottoman empire; the attempt to gain direct contact with it was not hopeless in itself, and this was recognized at Istanbul. Missions went to and fro, and Turkish officers came to Yakub Beg and organized his army; Yakub Beg recognized the Turkish sultan as Khalif. He also concluded treaties with Russia and Great Britain. But in spite of all this he was unable to maintain his hold of Turkestan. In 1877 the famous Chinese general Tso Tsung-t'ang (1812-1885), who had fought against the T'ai P'ing and also against the Mohammedans in Kansu, marched into Turkestan and ended Yakub Beg's rule.

Yakub was defeated, however, not so much by Chinese superiority as by a combination of circumstances. In order to build up his kingdom he was compelled to impose heavy taxation, and this made him unpopular with his own followers: they had had to pay taxes under the Chinese, but the Chinese collection had been much less rigorous than that of Yakub Beg. It was technically impossible for the Ottoman empire to give him any aid, even had its internal situation permitted it. Britain and Russia would probably have been glad to see a weakening of the Chinese hold over Turkestan, but they did not want a strong new state there, once they had found that neither of them could control the country while it was in Yakub Beg's hands. In 1881 Russia occupied the Ili region, Yakub's first conquest. In the end the two great powers considered it better for Turkestan to return officially into the hands of the weakened China, hoping that in practice they would be able to bring Turkestan more and more under their control. Consequently, when in 1880, three years after the removal of Yakub Beg, China sent a mission to Russia with the request for the return of the Ili region to her, Russia gave way, and the Treaty of Ili was concluded, ending for the time the Russian penetration of Turkestan.

In 1882 the Manchu government raised Turkestan to a "new frontier" (Sinkiang) with a special administration.

This process of colonial penetration of Turkestan continued. Until the end of the first world war there was no fundamental change in the situation in the country, owing to the rivalry between Great Britain and Russia. But after 1920 a period began in which Turkestan became almost independent, under a number of rulers of parts of the country. Then, from 1928 onward, a more and more thorough penetration by Russia began, so that by 1940 Turkestan could almost be called a Soviet Republic. The second world war diverted Russian attention to the West, and at the same time compelled the Chinese to retreat into the interior from the Japanese, so that by 1943 the country was more firmly held by the Chinese government than it had been for seventy years. After the creation of the People's Democracy mass immigration into Sinkiang began, in connection with the development of oil fields and of many new industries in the border area between Sinkiang and China proper. Roads and air communications opened Sinkiang. Yet, the differences between immigrant Chinese and local, Muslim Turks, continue to play a role.

9 Collision with Japan; further Capitulations

The reign of Wen Tsung (reign name Hsien-feng 1851-1861) was marked throughout by the T'ai P'ing and other rebellions and by wars with the Europeans, and that of Mu Tsung (reign name T'ung-chih: 1862-1874) by the great Mohammedan disturbances. There began also a conflict with Japan which lasted until 1945. Mu Tsung came to the throne as a child of five, and never played a part of his own. It had been the general rule for princes to serve as regents for minors on the imperial throne, but this time the princes concerned won such notoriety through their intrigues that the Peking court circles decided to entrust the regency to two concubines of the late emperor. One of these, called Tzŭ Hsi (born 1835), of the Manchu tribe of the Yehe-Nara, quickly gained the upper hand. The empress Tzŭ Hsi was one of the strongest personalities of the later nineteenth century who played an active part in Chinese political life. She played a more active part than any emperor had played for many decades.

Meanwhile great changes had taken place in Japan. The restoration of the Meiji had ended the age of feudalism, at least on the surface. Japan rapidly became Westernized, and at the same time entered on an imperialist policy. Her aims from 1868 onward were clear, and remained unaltered until the end of the second

World War: she was to be surrounded by a wide girdle of territories under Japanese domination, in order to prevent the approach of any enemy to the Japanese homeland. This girdle was divided into several zones—(1) the inner zone with the Kurile Islands, Sakhalin, Korea, the Ryukyu archipelago, and Formosa; (2) the outer zone with the Marianne, Philippine, and Caroline Islands, eastern China, Manchuria, and eastern Siberia; (3) the third zone, not clearly defined, including especially the Netherlands Indies, Indo-China, and the whole of China, a zone of undefined extent. The outward form of this subjugated region was to be that of the Greater Japanese Empire, described as the Imperium of the Yellow Race (the main ideas were contained in the Tanaka Memorandum 1927 and in the Tada Interview of 1936). Round Japan, moreover, a girdle was to be created of producers of raw materials and purchasers of manufactures, to provide Japanese industry with a market. Japan had sent a delegation of amity to China as early as 1869, and a first Sino-Japanese treaty was signed in 1871; from then on, Japan began to carry out her imperialistic plans. In 1874 she attacked the Ryukyu islands and Formosa on the pretext that some Japanese had been murdered there. Under the treaty of 1874 Japan withdrew once more, only demanding a substantial indemnity; but in 1876, in violation of the treaty and without a declaration of war, she annexed the Ryukyu Islands. In 1876 began the Japanese penetration into Korea; by 1885 she had reached the stage of a declaration that Korea was a joint sphere of interest of China and Japan; until then China's protectorate over Korea had been unchallenged. At the same time (1876) Great Britain had secured further Capitulations in the Chefoo Convention; in 1862 France had acquired Cochin China, in 1864 Cambodia, in 1874 Tongking, and in 1883 Annam. This led in 1884 to war between France and China, in which the French did not by any means gain an indubitable victory; but the Treaty of Tientsin left them with their acquisitions.

Meanwhile, at the beginning of 1875, the young Chinese emperor died of smallpox, without issue. Under the influence of the two empresses, who still remained regents, a cousin of the dead emperor, the three-year-old prince Tsai T'ien was chosen as emperor Tê Tsung (reign name Kuang-hsü: 1875-1909). He came of age in 1889 and took over the government of the country. The empress Tzŭ Hsi retired, but did not really relinquish the reins.

In 1894 the Sino-Japanese War broke out over Korea, as an outcome of the undefined position that had existed since 1885 owing to the imperialistic policy of the Japanese. China had created a North China squadron, but this was all that can be

regarded as Chinese preparation for the long-expected war. The Governor General of Chihli (now Hopei—the province in which Peking is situated), Li Hung-chang, was a general who had done good service, but he lost the war, and at Shimonoseki (1895) he had to sign a treaty on very harsh terms, in which China relinquished her protectorate over Korea and lost Formosa. The intervention of France, Germany, and Russia compelled Japan to content herself with these acquisitions, abandoning her demand for South Manchuria.

10 Russia in Manchuria

After the Crimean War, Russia had turned her attention once more to the East. There had been hostilities with China over eastern Siberia, which were brought to an end in 1858 by the Treaty of Aigun, under which China ceded certain territories in northern Manchuria. This made possible the founding of Vladivostok in 1860. Russia received Sakhalin from Japan in 1875 in exchange for the Kurile Islands. She received from China the important Port Arthur as a leased territory, and then tried to secure the whole of South Manchuria. This brought Japan's policy of expansion into conflict with Russia's plans in the Far East. Russia wanted Manchuria in order to be able to pursue a policy in the Pacific; but Japan herself planned to march into Manchuria from Korea, of which she already had possession. This imperialist rivalry made war inevitable: Russia lost the war; under the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905 Russia gave Japan the main railway through Manchuria, with adjoining territory. Thus Manchuria became Japan's sphere of influence and was lost to the Manchus without their being consulted in any way. The Japanese penetration of Manchuria then proceeded stage by stage, not without occasional setbacks, until she had occupied the whole of Manchuria from 1932 to 1945. After the end of the second world war, Manchuria was returned to China, with certain reservations in favour of the Soviet Union, which were later revoked.

11 Reform and reaction: the Boxer Rising

China had lost the war with Japan because she was entirely without modern armament. While Japan went to work at once with all her energy to emulate Western industrialization, the ruling class in China had shown a marked repugnance to any modernization; and the centre of this conservatism was the dowager empress Tzŭ Hsi. She was a woman of strong personality, but too uneducated—in

the modern sense—to be able to realize that modernization was an absolute necessity for China if it was to remain an independent state. The empress failed to realize that the Europeans were fundamentally different from the neighbouring tribes or the pirates of the past; she had not the capacity to acquire a general grasp of the realities of world politics. She felt instinctively that Europeanization would wreck the foundations of the power of the Manchus and the gentry, and would bring another class, the middle class and the merchants, into power.

There were reasonable men, however, who had seen the necessity of reform—especially Li Hung-chang, who has already been mentioned. In 1896 he went on a mission to Moscow, and then toured Europe. The reformers were, however, divided into two groups. One group advocated the acquisition of a certain amount of technical knowledge from abroad and its introduction by slow reforms, without altering the social structure of the state or the composition of the government. The others held that the state needed fundamental changes, and that superficial loans from Europe were not enough. The failure in the war with Japan made the general desire for reform more and more insistent not only in the country but in Peking. Until now Japan had been despised as a barbarian state; now Japan had won! The Europeans had been despised; now they were all cutting bits out of China for themselves, extracting from the government one privilege after another, and quite openly dividing China into "spheres of interest", obviously as the prelude to annexation of the whole country.

In Europe at that time the question was being discussed over and over again, why Japan had so quickly succeeded in making herself a modern power, and why China was not succeeding in doing so; the Japanese were praised for their capacity and the Chinese blamed for their lassitude. Both in Europe and in Chinese circles it was overlooked that there were fundamental differences in the social structures of the two countries. The basis of the modern capitalist states of the West is the middle class. Japan had for centuries had a middle class (the merchants) that had entered into a symbiosis with the feudal lords. For the middle class the transition to modern capitalism, and for the feudal lords the way to Western imperialism, was easy. In China there was only a weak middle class, vegetating under the dominance of the gentry; the middle class had still to gain the strength to liberate itself before it could become the support for a capitalistic state. And the gentry were still strong enough to maintain their dominance and so to prevent a radical reconstruction; all they would agree to were a

few reforms from which they might hope to secure an increase of power for their own ends.

In 1895 and in 1898 a scholar, K'ang Yo-wei, who was admitted into the presence of the emperor, submitted to him memoranda in which he called for radical reform. K'ang was a scholar who belonged to the empiricist school of philosophy of the early Manchu period, the so-called Han school. He was a man of strong and persuasive personality, and had such an influence on the emperor that in 1898 the emperor issued several edicts ordering the fundamental reorganization of education, law, trade, communications, and the army. These laws were not at all bad in themselves; they would have paved the way for a liberalization of Chinese society. But they aroused the utmost hatred in the conservative gentry and also in the moderate reformers among the gentry. K'ang Yo-wei and his followers, to whom a number of well-known modern scholars belonged, had strong support in South China. We have already mentioned that owing to the increased penetration of European goods and ideas, South China had become more progressive than the north; this had added to the tension already existing for other reasons between north and south. In foreign policy the north was more favourable to Russia and radically opposed to Japan and Great Britain; the south was in favour of co-operation with Britain and Japan, in order to learn from those two states how reform could be carried through. In the north the men of the south were suspected of being anti-Manchu and revolutionary in feeling. This was to some extent true, though K'ang Yo-wei and his friends were as yet largely unconscious of it.

When the empress Tzŭ Hsi saw that the emperor was actually thinking about reforms, she went to work with lightning speed. Very soon the reformers had to flee; those who failed to make good their escape were arrested and executed. The emperor was made a prisoner in a palace near Peking, and remained a captive until his death; the empress resumed her regency on his behalf. The period of reforms lasted only for a few months of 1898. A leading part in the extermination of the reformers was played by troops from Kansu under the command of a Mohammedan, Tung Fu-hsiang. General Yüan Shih-k'ai, who was then stationed at Tientsin in command of 7,000 troops with modern equipment, the only ones in China, could have removed the empress and protected the reformers; but he was already pursuing a personal policy, and thought it safer to give the reformers no help.

There now began, from 1898, a thoroughly reactionary rule of the dowager empress. But China's general situation permitted no

breathing-space. In 1900 came the so-called Boxer Rising, a new popular movement against the gentry and the Manchus similar to the many that had preceded it. The Peking government succeeded, however, in negotiations that brought the movement into the service of the government and directed it against the foreigners. This removed the danger to the government and at the same time helped it against the hated foreigners. But incidents resulted which the Peking government had not anticipated. An international army was sent to China, and marched from Tientsin against Peking, to liberate the besieged European legations and to punish the government. The Europeans captured Peking (1900); the dowager empress and her prisoner, the emperor, had to flee; some of the palaces were looted. The peace treaty that followed exacted further concessions from China to the Europeans and enormous war indemnities, the payment of which continued into the 1940's, though most of the states placed the money at China's disposal for educational purposes. When in 1902 the dowager empress returned to Peking and put the emperor back into his palace-prison, she was forced by what had happened to realize that at all events a certain measure of reform was necessary. The reforms, however, which she decreed, mainly in 1904, were very modest and were never fully carried out. They were only intended to make an impression on the outer world and to appease the continually growing body of supporters of the reform party, especially numerous in South China. The south remained, nevertheless, a focus of hostility to the Manchus. After his failure in 1898, K'ang Yo-wei went to Europe, and no longer played any important political part. His place was soon taken by a young Chinese physician who had been living abroad, Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), who turned the reform party into a middle-class revolutionary party.

12 End of the dynasty

Meanwhile the dowager empress held her own. General Yüan Shih-k'ai, who had played so dubious a part in 1898, was not impeccably loyal to her, and remained unreliable. He was beyond challenge the strongest man in the country, for he possessed the only modern army; but he was still biding his time.

In 1908 the dowager empress fell ill; she was seventy-four years old. When she felt that her end was near, she seems to have had the captive emperor Tê Tsung assassinated (at 5 p.m. on November 14th); she herself died next day (November 15th, 2 p.m.): she was evidently determined that this man, whom she had ill-treated and oppressed all his life, should not regain independence. As Tê

Tsung had no children, she nominated on the day of her death the two-year-old prince P'u Yi as emperor (reign name Hsüan-t'ung, 1909-1911).

The fact that another child was to reign and a new regency to act for him, together with all the failures in home and foreign policy, brought further strength to the revolutionary party. The government believed that it could only maintain itself if it allowed Yüan Shih-k'ai, the commander of the modern troops, to come to power. The chief regent, however, worked against Yüan Shih-k'ai and dismissed him at the beginning of 1909; Yüan's supporters remained at their posts. Yüan himself now entered into relations with the revolutionaries, whose centre was Canton, and whose undisputed leader was now Sun Yat-sen. At this time Sun and his supporters had already made attempts at revolution, but without success, as his following was as yet too small. It consisted mainly of young intellectuals who had been educated in Europe and America; the great mass of the Chinese people remained unconvinced: the common people could not understand the new ideals, and the middle class did not entirely trust the young intellectuals.

The state of China in 1911 was as lamentable as could be: the European states, Russia, America, and Japan regarded China as a field for their own plans, and in their calculations paid scarcely any attention to the Chinese government. Foreign capital was penetrating everywhere in the form of loans or railway and other enterprises. If it had not been for the mutual rivalries of the powers, China would long ago have been annexed by one of them. The government needed a great deal of money for the payment of the war indemnities, and for carrying out the few reforms at last decided on. In order to get money from the provinces, it had to permit the viceroys even more freedom than they already possessed. The result was a spectacle altogether resembling that of the end of the T'ang dynasty, about A.D. 900: the various governors were trying to make themselves independent. In addition to this there was the revolutionary movement in the south.

The government made some concession to the progressives, by providing the first beginnings of parliamentary rule. In 1910 a national assembly was convoked. It had a Lower House with representatives of the provinces (provincial diets were also set up), and an Upper House, in which sat representatives of the imperial house, the nobility, the gentry, and also the protectorates. The members of the Upper House were all nominated by the regent. It very soon proved that the members of the Lower House, mainly representatives of the provincial gentry, had a much more practical outlook than the routineers of Peking. Thus the Lower House grew

in importance, a fact which, of course, brought grist to the mills of the revolutionary movement.

In 1910 the first risings directed actually against the regency took place, in the province of Hunan. In 1911 the "railway disturbances" broke out in western China as a reply of the railway shareholders in the province of Szechwan to the government decree of nationalization of all the railways. The modernist students, most of whom were sons of merchants who owned railway shares, supported the movement, and the government was unable to control them. At the same time a great anti-Manchu revolution began in Wuch'ang, one of the cities of which Wuhan, on the Yangtze, now consists. The revolution was the result of government action against a group of terrorists. Its leader was an officer named Li Yüan-hung. The Manchus soon had some success in this quarter, but the other provincial governors now rose in rapid succession, repudiated the Manchus, and declared themselves independent. Most of the Manchu garrisons in the provinces were murdered. The governors remained at the head of their troops in their provinces, and for the moment made common cause with the revolutionaries, from whom they meant to break free at the first opportunity. The Manchus themselves failed at first to realize the gravity of the revolutionary movement; they then fell into panic-stricken desperation. As a last resource, Yüan Shih-k'ai was recalled (November 10th, 1911) and made prime minister.

Yüan's excellent troops were loyal to his person, and he could have made use of them in fighting on behalf of the dynasty. But a victory would have brought no personal gain to him; for his personal plans he considered that the anti-Manchu side provided the springboard he needed. The revolutionaries, for their part, had no choice but to win over Yüan Shih-k'ai for the sake of his troops, since they were not themselves strong enough to get rid of the Manchus, or even to wrest concessions from them, so long as the Manchus were defended by Yüan's army. Thus Yüan and the revolutionaries were forced into each other's arms. He then began negotiations with them, explaining to the imperial house that the dynasty could only be saved by concessions. The revolutionaries—apart from their desire to neutralize the prime minister and general, if not to bring him over to their side—were also readier than ever to negotiate, because they were short of money and unable to obtain loans from abroad, and because they could not themselves gain control of the individual governors. The negotiations, which had been carried on at Shanghai, were broken off on December 18th, 1911, because the revolutionaries demanded a republic, but the imperial house was only ready to grant a constitutional monarchy.

Meanwhile the revolutionaries set up a provisional government at Nanking (December 29th, 1911), with Sun Yat-sen as president and Li Yüan-hung as vice-president. Yüan Shih-k'ai now declared to the imperial house that the monarchy could no longer be defended, as his troops were too unreliable, and he induced the Manchu government to issue an edict on February 12th, 1912, in which they renounced the throne of China and declared the Republic to be the constitutional form of state. The young emperor of the Hsüan-t'ung period, after the Japanese conquest of Manchuria in 1931, was installed there. He was, however, entirely without power during the melancholy years of his nominal rule, which lasted until 1945.

In 1912 the Manchu dynasty came in reality to its end. On the news of the abdication of the imperial house, Sun Yat-sen resigned in Nanking, and recommended Yüan Shih-k'ai as president.

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Chapter Eleven

THE REPUBLIC (1912-1948)

1 Social and intellectual position

In order to understand the period that now followed, let us first consider the social and intellectual position in China in the period between 1911 and 1927. The Manchu dynasty was no longer there, nor were there any remaining real supporters of the old dynasty. The gentry, however, still existed. Alongside it was a still numerically small middle class, with little political education or enlightenment.

The political interests of these two groups were obviously in conflict. But after 1912 there had been big changes. The gentry were largely in a process of decomposition. They still possessed the basis of their existence, their land, but the land was falling in value, as there were now other opportunities of capital investment, such as export-import, shareholding in foreign enterprises, or industrial undertakings. It is important to note, however, that there was not much fluid capital at their disposal. In addition to this, cheaper rice and other foodstuffs were streaming from abroad into China, bringing the prices for Chinese foodstuffs down to the world market prices, another painful business blow to the gentry. Silk had to meet the competition of Japanese silk and especially of rayon; the Chinese silk was of very unequal quality and sold with difficulty. On the other hand, through the influence of the Western capitalistic system, which was penetrating more and more into China, land itself became "capital", an object of speculation for people with capital; its value no longer depended entirely on the rents it could yield but, under certain circumstances, on quite other things—the construction of railways or public buildings, and so on. These changes impoverished and demoralized the gentry, who in the course of the past century had grown fewer in number. The gentry were not in a position to take part fully in the capitalist manipulations, because they had never possessed much capital;

their wealth had lain entirely in their land, and the income from their rents was consumed quite unproductively in luxurious living.

Moreover, the class solidarity of the gentry was dissolving. In the past, politics had been carried on by cliques of gentry families, with the emperor at their head as an unchangeable institution. This edifice had now lost its summit; the struggles between cliques still went on, but entirely without the control which the emperor's power had after all exercised, as a sort of regulative element in the play of forces among the gentry. The arena for this competition had been the court. After the destruction of the arena, the field of play lost its boundaries: the struggles between cliques no longer had a definite objective; the only objective left was the maintenance or securing of any and every hold on power. Under the new conditions cliques or individuals among the gentry could only ally themselves with the possessors of military power, the generals or governors. In this last stage the struggle between rival groups turned into a rivalry between individuals. Family ties began to weaken and other ties, such as between school mates, or origin from the same village or town, became more important than they had been before. For the securing of the aim in view any means were considered justifiable. Never was there such bribery and corruption among the officials as in the years after 1912. This period, until 1927, may therefore be described as a period of dissolution and destruction of the social system of the gentry.

Over against this dying class of the gentry stood, broadly speaking, a tripartite opposition. To begin with, there was the new middle class, divided and without clear political ideas; anti-dynastic of course, but undecided especially as to the attitude it should adopt towards the peasants who, to this day, form over 80 per cent of the Chinese population. The middle class consisted mainly of traders and bankers, whose aim was the introduction of Western capitalism in association with foreign powers. There were also young students who were often the sons of old gentry families and had been sent abroad for study with grants given them by their friends and relatives in the government; or sons of businessmen sent away by their fathers. These students not always accepted the ideas of their fathers; they were influenced by the ideologies of the West, Marxist or non-Marxist, and often created clubs or groups in the University cities of Europe or the United States. Such groups of people who had studied together or passed the exams together, had already begun to play a role in politics in the nineteenth century. Now, the influence of such organizations of usually informal character increased. Against the returned students who often had difficulties in adjustment, stood the students at

Chinese Universities, especially the National University in Peking (Peita). They represented people of the same origin, but of the lower strata of the gentry or of business; they were more nationalistic and politically active and often less influenced by Western ideologies.

In the second place, there was a relatively very small genuine proletariat, the product of the first activities of big capitalists in China, found mainly in Shanghai. Thirdly and finally, there was a gigantic peasantry, uninterested in politics and uneducated, but ready to give unthinking allegiance to anyone who promised to make an end of the intolerable conditions in the matter of rents and taxes, conditions that were growing steadily worse with the decay of the gentry. These peasants were thinking of popular risings on the pattern of all the risings in the history of China—attacks on the towns and the killing of the hated landowners, officials, and money-lenders, that is to say of the gentry.

Such was the picture of the middle class and those who were ready to support it, a group with widely divergent interests, held together only by its opposition to the gentry system and the monarchy. It could not but be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve political success with such a group. Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), the "Father of the Republic", accordingly laid down three stages of progress in his many works, of which the best-known are San-min chu-i, ("The Three Principles of the People"), and Chien-kuo fang-lüeh ("Plans for the Building up of the Realm"). The three phases of development through which republican China was to pass were: the phase of struggle against the old system, the phase of educative rule, and the phase of truly democratic government. The phase of educative rule was to be a sort of authoritarian system with a democratic content, under which the people should be familiarized with democracy and enabled to grow politically ripe for true democracy.

Difficult as was the internal situation from the social point of view, it was no less difficult in economic respects. China had recognized that she must at least adopt Western technical and industrial progress in order to continue to exist as an independent state. But the building up of industry demanded large sums of money. The existing Chinese banks were quite incapable of providing the capital needed; but the acceptance of capital from abroad led at once, every time, to further political capitulations. The gentry, who had no cash worth mention, were violently opposed to the capitalization of their properties, and were in favour of continuing as far as possible to work the soil in the old style. Quite apart from all this, all over the country there were generals

who had come from the ranks of the gentry, and who collected the whole of the financial resources of their region for the support of their private armies. Investors had little confidence in the republican government so long as they could not tell whether the government would decide in favour of its right or of its left wing.

No less complicated was the intellectual situation at this time. Confucianism, and the whole of the old culture and morality bound up with it, was unacceptable to the middle-class element. In the first place, Confucianism rejected the principle, required at least in theory by the middle class, of the equality of all people; secondly, the Confucian great-family system was irreconcilable with middle-class individualism, quite apart from the fact that the Confucian form of state could only be a monarchy. Every attempt to bolster up Confucianism in practice or theory was bound to fail and did fail. Even the gentry could scarcely offer any real defence of the Confucian system any longer. With Confucianism went the moral standards especially of the upper classes of society. Taoism was out of the question as a substitute, because of its anarchistic and egocentric character. Consequently, in these years, part of the gentry turned to Buddhism and part to Christianity. Some of the middle class who had come under European influence also turned to Christianity, regarding it as a part of the European civilization they had to adopt. Others adhered to modern philosophic systems such as pragmatism and positivism. Marxist doctrines spread rapidly.

Education was secularized. Great efforts were made to develop modern schools, though the work of development was continually hindered by the incessant political unrest. Only at the universities, which became foci of republican and progressive opinion, was any positive achievement possible. Many students and professors were active in politics, organizing demonstrations and strikes. They pursued a strong national policy, often also socialistic. At the same time real scientific work was done; many young scholars of outstanding ability were trained at the Chinese universities, often better than the students who went abroad. There is a permanent disagreement between these two groups of young men with a modern education: the students who return from abroad claim to be better educated, but in reality they often have only a very superficial knowledge of things modern and none at all of China, her history, and her special circumstances. The students of the Chinese universities have been much better instructed in all the things that concern China, and most of them are in no way behind the returned students in the modern sciences. They are therefore a much more serviceable element.

The intellectual modernization of China goes under the name of the "Movement of May Fourth", because on May 4th, 1919, students of the National University in Peking demonstrated against the government and their pro-Japanese adherents. When the police attacked the students and jailed some, more demonstrations and student strikes and finally a general boycott of Japanese imports were the consequence. In these protest actions, professors such as Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei, later president of the Academia Sinica (died 1940), took an active part. The forces which had now been mobilized, rallied around the journal "New Youth" (Hsin Ch'ing-nien), created in 1915 by Ch'en Tu-hsiu. The journal was progressive, against the monarchy, Confucius, and the old traditions. Ch'en Tu-hsiu who put himself strongly behind the students, was more radical than other contributors but at first favoured Western democracy and Western science; he was influenced mainly by John Dewey who was guest professor in Peking in 1919-20. Similarly tending towards liberalism in politics and Dewey's ideas in the field of philosophy were others, mainly Hu Shih. Finally, some reformers criticized conservativism purely on the basis of Chinese thought. Hu Shih (born 1892) gained greatest acclaim by his proposal for a "literary revolution", published in the "New Youth" in 1917. This revolution was the logically necessary application of the political revolution to the field of education. The new "vernacular" took place of the old "classical" literary language. The language of the classical works is so remote from the language of daily life that no uneducated person can understand it. A command of it requires a full knowledge of all the ancient literature, entailing decades of study. The gentry had elaborated this style of speech for themselves and their dependants; it was their monopoly; nobody who did not belong to the gentry and had not attended its schools could take part in literary or in administrative life. The literary revolution introduced the language of daily life, the language of the people, into literature: newspapers, novels, scientific treatises, translations, appeared in the vernacular, and could thus be understood by anyone who could read and write, even if he had no Confucianist education.

It may be said that the literary revolution has achieved its main objects. As a consequence of it, a great quantity of new literature has been published. Not only is every important new book that appears in the West published in translation within a few months, but modern novels and short stories and poems have been written, some of them of high literary value.

At the same time as this revolution there took place another fundamental change in the language. It was necessary to take over

a vast number of new scientific and technical terms. As Chinese, owing to the character of its script, is unable to write foreign words accurately and can do no more than provide a rather rough paraphrase, the practice was started of expressing new ideas by newly formed native words. Thus modern Chinese has very few foreign words, and yet it has all the new ideas. For example, a telegram is a "lightning-letter"; a wireless telegram is a "not-have-wire-lightning-communication"; a fountain-pen is a "self-flow-ink-water-brush"; a typewriter is a "strike-letter-machine". Most of these neologisms are similar in the modern languages of China and Japan.

There had been several proposals in recent decades to do away with the Chinese characters and to introduce an alphabet in their place. They have all proved to be unsatisfactory so far, because the character of the Chinese language, as it is at this moment, is unsuited to an alphabetical script. They would also destroy China's cultural unity: there are many dialects in China that differ so greatly from each other that, for instance, a man from Canton cannot understand a man from Shanghai. If Chinese were written with letters, the result would be a Canton literature and another literature confined to Shanghai, and China would break up into a number of areas with different languages. The old Chinese writing is independent of pronunciation. A Cantonese and a Pekinger can read each other's newspapers without difficulty. They pronounce the words quite differently, but the meaning is unaltered. Even a Japanese can understand a Chinese newspaper without special study of Chinese, and a Chinese with a little preparation can read a Japanese newspaper without understanding a single word of Japanese.

The aim of modern education in China is to work towards the establishment of "High Chinese", the former official (Mandarin) language, throughout the country, and to set limits to the use of the various dialects. Once this has been done, it will be possible to proceed to a radical reform of the script without running the risk of political separatist movements, which are always liable to spring up, and also without leading, through the adoption of various dialects as the basis of separate literatures, to the break-up of China's cultural unity. In the last years, the unification of the spoken language has made great progress. Yet, alphabetic script is used only in cases in which illiterate adults have to be enabled in a short time to read very simple informations. More attention is given to a simplification of the script as it is; Japanese had started this some forty years earlier. Unfortunately, the new Chinese abbreviated forms of characters are not always identical with long-established

Japanese forms, and are not developed in such a systematic form as would make learning of Chinese characters easier.

2 First period of the Republic: The warlords

The situation of the Republic after its foundation was far from hopeful. Republican feeling existed only among the very small groups of students who had modern education, and a few traders, in other words, among the "middle class". And even in the revolutionary party to which these groups belonged there were the most various conceptions of the form of republican state to be aimed at. The left wing of the party, mainly intellectuals and manual workers, had in view more or less vague socialistic institutions; the liberals, for instance the traders, thought of a liberal democracy, more or less on the American pattern; and the nationalists merely wanted the removal of the alien Manchu rule. The three groups had come together for the practical reason that only so could they get rid of the dynasty. They gave unreserved allegiance to Sun Yat-sen as their leader. He succeeded in mobilizing the enthusiasm of continually widening circles for action, not only by the integrity of his aims but also because he was able to present the new socialistic ideology in an alluring form. The anti-republican gentry, however, whose power was not yet entirely broken, took a stand against the party. The generals who had gone over to the republicans had not the slightest intention of founding a republic, but only wanted to get rid of the rule of the Manchus and to step into their place. This was true also of Yüan Shih-k'ai, who in his heart was entirely on the side of the gentry, although the European press especially had always energetically defended him. In character and capacity he stood far above the other generals, but he was no republican.

Thus the first period of the Republic, until 1927, was marked by incessant attempts by individual generals to make themselves independent. The Government could not depend on its soldiers, and so was impotent. The first risings of military units began at the outset of 1912. The governors and generals who wanted to make themselves independent sabotaged every decree of the central government; especially they sent it no money from the provinces and also refused to give their assent to foreign loans. The province of Canton, the actual birthplace of the republican movement and the focus of radicalism, declared itself in 1912 an independent republic.

Within the Peking government matters soon came to a climax.

Yüan Shih-k'ai and his supporters represented the conservative view, with the unexpressed but obvious aim of setting up a new imperial house and continuing the old gentry system. Most of the members of the parliament came, however, from the middle class and were opposed to any reaction of this sort. One of their leaders was murdered, and the blame was thrown upon Yüan Shih-k'ai; there then came, in the middle of 1912, a new revolution, in which the radicals made themselves independent and tried to gain control of South China. But Yüan Shih-k'ai commanded better troops and won the day. At the end of October 1912 he was elected, against the opposition, as president of China, and the new state was recognized by foreign countries.

China's internal difficulties reacted on the border states, in which the European powers were keenly interested. The powers considered that the time had come to begin the definitive partition of China. Thus there were long negotiations and also hostilities between China and Tibet, which was supported by Great Britain. The British demanded the complete separation of Tibet from China, but the Chinese rejected this (1912); the rejection was supported by a boycott of British goods. In the end the Tibet question was left undecided. Tibet remained until recent years a Chinese dependency with a good deal of internal freedom. The Second World War and the Chinese retreat into the interior brought many Chinese settlers into Eastern Tibet which was then separated from Tibet proper and made a Chinese province (Hsi-k'ang) in which the native Khamba will soon be a minority. The communist régime soon after its establishment conquered Tibet (1950) and has tried to change the character of its society and its system of government which lead to the unsuccessful attempt of the Tibetans to throw off Chinese rule (1959) and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India. The construction of highways, air and missile bases and military occupation have thus tied Tibet closer to China than ever since early Manchu times.

In Outer Mongolia Russian interests predominated. In 1911 there were diplomatic incidents in connection with the Mongolian question. At the end of 1911 the Hutuktu of Urga declared himself independent, and the Chinese were expelled from the country. A secret treaty was concluded in 1912 with Russia, under which Russia recognized the independence of Outer Mongolia, but was accorded an important part as adviser and helper in the development of the country. In 1913 a Russo-Chinese treaty was concluded, under which the autonomy of Outer Mongolia was recognized, but Mongolia became a part of the Chinese realm. After the Russian revolution had begun, revolution was carried

also into Mongolia. The country suffered all the horrors of the struggles between White Russians (General Ungern-Sternberg) and the Reds; there were also Chinese attempts at intervention, though without success, until in the end Mongolia became a Soviet Republic. As such she is closely associated with Soviet Russia. China, however, did not quickly recognize Mongolia's independence, and in his work China's Destiny (1944) Chiang Kai-shek insisted that China's aim remained the recovery of the frontiers of 1840, which means among other things the recovery of Outer Mongolia. In spite of this, after the Second World War Chiang Kai-shek had to renounce de jure all rights in Outer Mongolia. Inner Mongolia was always united to China much more closely; only for a time during the war with Japan did the Japanese maintain there a puppet government. The disappearance of this government went almost unnoticed.

At the time when Russian penetration into Mongolia began, Japan had entered upon a similar course in Manchuria, which she regarded as her "sphere of influence". On the outbreak of the first world war Japan occupied the former German-leased territory of Tsingtao, at the extremity of the province of Shantung, and from that point she occupied the railways of the province. Her plan was to make the whole province a protectorate; Shantung is rich in coal and especially in metals. Japan's plans were revealed in the notorious "Twenty-one Demands" (1915). Against the furious opposition especially of the students of Peking, Yüan Shih-k'ai's government accepted the greater part of these demands. In negotiations with Great Britain, in which Japan took advantage of the British commitments in Europe, Japan had to be conceded the predominant position in the Far East.

Meanwhile Yüan Shih-k'ai had made all preparations for turning the Republic once more into an empire, in which he would be emperor; the empire was to be based once more on the gentry group. In 1914 he secured an amendment of the Constitution under which the governing power was to be entirely in the hands of the president; at the end of 1914 he secured his appointment as president for life, and at the end of 1915 he induced the parliament to resolve that he should become emperor.

This naturally aroused the resentment of the republicans, but it also annoyed the generals belonging to the gentry, who had had the same ambition. Thus there were disturbances, especially in the south, where Sun Yat-sen with his followers agitated for a democratic republic. The foreign powers recognized that a divided China would be much easier to penetrate and annex than a united China, and accordingly opposed Yüan Shih-k'ai. Before he could

ascend the throne, he died suddenly—and this terminated the first attempt to re-establish monarchy.

Yüan was succeeded as president by Li Yüan-hung. Meanwhile five provinces had declared themselves independent. Foreign pressure on China steadily grew. She was forced to declare war on Germany, and though this made no practical difference to the war, it enabled the European powers to penetrate further into China. Difficulties grew to such an extent in 1917 that a dictatorship was set up and soon after came an interlude, the recall of the Manchus and the reinstatement of the deposed emperor (July 1st-8th, 1917).

This led to various risings of generals, each aiming simply at the satisfaction of his thirst for personal power. Ultimately the victorious group of generals, headed by Tuan Ch'i-jui, secured the election of Fêng Kuo-chang in place of the retiring president. Fêng was succeeded at the end of 1918 by Hsü Shih-ch'ang, who held office until 1922. Hsü, as a former ward of the emperor, was a typical representative of the gentry, and was opposed to all republican reforms.

The south held aloof from these northern governments. In Canton an opposition government was set up, formed mainly of followers of Sun Yat-sen; the Peking government was unable to remove the Canton government. But the Peking government and its president scarcely counted any longer even in the north. All that counted were the generals, the most prominent of whom were: (1) Chang Tso-lin, who had control of Manchuria and had made certain terms with Japan, but who was ultimately murdered by the Japanese (1928); (2) Wu P'ei-fu, who held North China; (3) the so-called "Christian general", Fêng Yü-hsiang, and (4) Ts'ao K'un, who became president in 1923.

At the end of the first world war Japan had a hold over China amounting almost to military control of the country. China did not sign the Treaty of Versailles, because she considered that she had been duped by Japan, since Japan had driven the Germans out of China but had not returned the liberated territory to the Chinese. In 1921 peace was concluded with Germany, the German privileges being abolished. The same applied to Austria. Russia, immediately after the setting up of the Soviet government, had renounced all her rights under the Capitulations. This was the first step in the gradual rescinding of the Capitulations; the last of them went only in 1943, as a consequence of the difficult situation of the Europeans and Americans in the Pacific produced by the Second World War.

At the end of the first world war the foreign powers revised their attitude towards China. The idea of territorial partitioning of the country was replaced by an attempt at financial exploitation;

military friction between the Western powers and Japan was in this way to be minimized. Financial control was to be exercised by an international banking consortium (1920). It was necessary for political reasons that this committee should be joined by Japan. After her Twenty-one Demands, however, Japan was hated throughout China. During the world war she had given loans to the various governments and rebels, and in this way had secured one privilege after another. Consequently China declined the banking consortium. She tried to secure capital from her own resources; but in the existing political situation and the acute economic depression internal loans had no success.

In an agreement between the United States and Japan in 1917, the United States, in consequence of the war, had had to give their assent to special rights for Japan in China. After the war the international conference at Washington (November 1921-February 1922) tried to set narrower limits to Japan's influence over China, and also to re-determine the relative strength in the Pacific of the four great powers (America, Britain, France, Japan). After the failure of the banking plan this was the last means of preventing military conflicts between the powers in the Far East. This brought some relief to China, as Japan had to yield for the time to the pressure of the western powers.

The years that followed until 1927 were those of the complete collapse of the political power of the Peking government—years of entire dissolution. In the south Sun Yat-sen had been elected generalissimo in 1921. In 1924 he was re-elected with a mandate for a campaign against the north. In 1924 there also met in Canton the first general congress of the Kuomintang ("People's Party"). The Kuomintang (in 1929 it had 653,000 members, or roughly 0.15 per cent of the population) is the continuation of the Komingtang ("Revolutionary Party") founded by Sun Yat-sen, which as a middle-class party had worked for the removal of the dynasty. The new Kuomintang was more socialistic, as is shown by its admission of Communists and the stress laid upon land reform.

At the end of 1924 Sun Yat-sen with some of his followers went to Peking, to discuss the possibility of a reunion between north and south on the basis of the programme of the People's Party. There, however, he died at the beginning of 1925, before any definite results had been attained; there was no prospect of achieving anything by the negotiations, and the south broke them off. But the death of Sun Yat-sen had been followed after a time by tension within the party between its right and left wings. The southern government had invited a number of Russian advisers in 1923 to assist in building up the administration, civil and military, and on

their advice the system of government had been reorganized on lines similar to those of the soviet and commissar system. This change had been advocated by an old friend of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, who later married Sun's sister-in-law. Chiang Kai-shek, who was born in 1886, was the head of the military academy at Whampoa, near Canton, where Russian instructors were at work. The new system was approved by Sun Yat-sen's successor, Hu Han-min (who died in 1936), in his capacity of party leader. It was opposed by the elements of the right, who at first had little influence. Chiang Kai-shek soon became one of the principal leaders of the south, as he had command of the efficient troops of Canton, who had been organized by the Russians.

The People's Party of the south and its governments, at that time fairly radical in politics, were disliked by the foreign powers; only Japan supported them for a time, owing to the anti-British feeling of the South Chinese and in order to further her purpose of maintaining disunion in China. The first serious collision with the outer world came on May 30th, 1925, when British soldiers shot at a crowd demonstrating in Shanghai. This produced a widespread boycott of British goods in Canton and in British Hong Kong, inflicting a great loss on British trade with China and bringing considerable advantages in consequence to Japanese trade and shipping: from the time of this boycott began the Japanese grip on Chinese coastwise shipping.

The second party congress was held in Canton in 1926. Chiang Kai-shek already played a prominent part. The People's Party, under Chiang Kai-shek and with the support of the communists, began the great campaign against the north. At first it had good success: the various provincial governors and generals and the Peking government were played off against each other, and in a short time one leader after another was defeated. The Yangtze was reached, and in 1926 the southern government moved to Hankow. All over the southern provinces there now came a genuine rising of the masses of the people, mainly the result of communist propaganda and of the government's promise to give land to the peasants, to set limits to the big estates, and to bring order into the taxation. In spite of its communist element, at the beginning of 1927 the southern government was essentially one of the middle class and the peasantry, with a socialistic tendency.

3 Second period of the Republic: Nationalist China

With the continued success of the northern campaign, and with Chiang Kai-shek's southern army at the gates of Shanghai (March

21st, 1927), a decision had to be taken. Should the left wing be allowed to gain the upper hand, and the great capitalists of Shanghai be expropriated as it was proposed to expropriate the gentry? Or should the right wing prevail, an alliance be concluded with the capitalists, and limits be set to the expropriation of landed estates? Chiang Kai-shek, through his marriage with Sun Yat-sen's wife's sister, had become allied with one of the greatest banking families. In the days of the siege of Shanghai Chiang, together with his closest colleagues (with the exception of Hu Han-min and Wang Chying-wei, a leader who will be mentioned later), decided on the second alternative. Shanghai came into his hands without a struggle, and the capital of the Shanghai financiers, and soon foreign capital as well, was placed at his disposal, so that he was able to pay his troops and finance his administration. At the same time the Russian advisers were dismissed or executed.

The decision arrived at by Chiang Kai-shek and his friends did not remain unopposed, and he parted from the "left group" (1927) which formed a rival government in Hankow, while Chiang Kai-shek made Nanking the seat of his government (April 1927). In that year Chiang not only concluded peace with the financiers and industrialists, but also a sort of "armistice" with the landowning gentry. "Land reform" still stood on the party programme, but nothing was done, and in this way the confidence and cooperation of large sections of the gentry was secured. The choice of Nanking as the new capital pleased both the industrialists and the agrarians: the great bulk of China's young industries lay in the Yangtze region, and that region was still the principal one for agricultural produce; the landowners of the region were also in a better position with the great market of the capital in their neighbourhood.

Meanwhile the Nanking government had succeeded in carrying its dealings with the northern generals to a point at which they were largely out-manœuvred and became ready for some sort of collaboration (1928). There were now four supreme commanders—Chiang Kai-shek, Fêng Yü-hsiang (the "Christian general"), Yen Hsi-shan, the governor of Shansi, and the Muslim Li Chung-yen. Naturally this was not a permanent solution; not only did Chiang Kai-shek's three rivals try to free themselves from his ever-growing influence and to gain full power themselves, but various groups under military leadership rose again and again, even in the home of the Republic, Canton itself. These struggles, which were carried on more by means of diplomacy and bribery than at arms, lasted until 1936. Chiang Kai-shek, as by far the most skilful player in this game, and at the same time the man who had the

support of the foreign governments and of the financiers of Shanghai, gained the victory. China became unified under his dictatorship.

As early as 1928, when there seemed a possibility of uniting China, with the exception of Manchuria, which was dominated by Japan, and when the European powers began more and more to support Chiang Kai-shek, Japan felt that her interests in North China were threatened, and landed troops in Shantung. There was hard fighting on May 3rd, 1928. General Chang Tso-lin, in Manchuria, who was allied to Japan, endeavoured to secure a cessation of hostilities, but he fell victim to a Japanese assassin; his place was taken by his son, Chang Hsüeh-liang, who pursued an anti-Japanese policy. The Japanese recognized, however, that in view of the international situation the time had not yet come for intervention in North China. In 1929 they withdrew their troops and concentrated instead on their plans for Manchuria.

Until the time of the "Manchurian incident" (1931), the Nanking government steadily grew in strength. It gained the confidence of the western powers, who proposed to make use of it in opposition to Japan's policy of expansion in the Pacific sphere. On the strength of this favourable situation in its foreign relations, the Nanking government succeeded in getting rid of one after another of the Capitulations. Above all, the administration of the "Maritime Customs", that is to say of the collection of duties on imports and exports, was brought under the control of the Chinese government: until then it had been under foreign control. Now that China could act with more freedom in the matter of tariffs, the government had greater financial resources, and through this and other measures it became financially more independent of the provinces. It succeeded in building up a small but modern army, loyal to the government and superior to the still existing provincial armies. This army gained its military experience in skirmishes with the Communists and the remaining generals.

It is true that when in 1931 the Japanese occupied Manchuria, Nanking was helpless, since Manchuria was only loosely associated with Nanking, and its governor, Chang Hsüeh-liang, had tried to remain independent of it. Thus Manchuria was lost almost without a blow. On the other hand, the fighting with Japan that broke out soon afterwards in Shanghai brought credit to the young Nanking army, though owing to its numerical inferiority it was unsuccessful. China protested to the League of Nations against its loss of Manchuria. The League sent a commission (the Lytton Commission), which condemned Japan's action, but nothing further happened, and China indignantly broke away from her association with the

Western powers (1932-1933). In view of the tense European situation (the beginning of the Hitler era in Germany, and the Italian plans of expansion), the Western powers did not want to fight Japan on China's behalf, and without that nothing more could be done. They pursued, indeed, a policy of playing off Japan against China, in order to keep those two powers occupied with each other, and so to divert Japan from Indo-China and the Pacific.

China had thus to be prepared for being involved one day in a great war with Japan. Chiang Kai-shek wanted to postpone war as long as possible. He wanted time to establish his power more thoroughly within the country, and to strengthen his army. In regard to external relations, the great powers would have to decide their attitude sooner or later. America could not be expected to take up a clear attitude: she was for peace and commerce, and she made greater profits out of her relations with Japan than with China; she sent supplies to both (until 1941). On the other hand, Britain and France were more and more turning away from Japan, and Russo-Japanese relations were at all times tense. Japan tried to emerge from her isolation by joining the "axis powers", Germany and Italy (1936); but it was still doubtful whether the Western powers would proceed with Russia, and therefore against Japan, or with the Axis, and therefore in alliance with Japan.

Japan for her part considered that if she was to raise the standard of living of her large population and to remain a world power, she must bring into being her "Greater East Asia", so as to have the needed raw material sources and export markets in the event of a collision with the Western powers; in addition to this, she needed a security girdle as extensive as possible in case of a conflict with Russia. In any case, "Greater East Asia" must be secured before the European conflict should break out.

4 The Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945)

Accordingly, from 1933 onward Japan followed up her conquest of Manchuria by bringing her influence to bear in Inner Mongolia and in North China. She succeeded first, by means of an immense system of smuggling, currency manipulation, and propaganda, in bringing a number of Mongol princes over to her side, and then (at the end of 1935) in establishing a semi-dependent government in North China. Chiang Kai-shek took no action.

The signal for the outbreak of war was an "incident" by the Marco Polo Bridge, south of Peking (July 7th, 1937). The Japanese government profited by a quite unimportant incident, undoubtedly provoked by the Japanese, in order to extend its dominion a little

further. China still hesitated; there were negotiations. Japan brought up reinforcements and put forward demands which China could not be expected to be ready to fulfil. Japan then occupied Peking and Tientsin and wide regions between them and south of them. The Chinese soldiers stationed there withdrew almost without striking a blow, but formed up again and began to offer resistance. In order to facilitate the planned occupation of North China, including the province of Shantung, Japan decided on a diversionary campaign against Shanghai. The Nanking government sent its best troops to the new front, and held it for nearly three months against superior forces; but meanwhile the Japanese steadily advanced in North China. On November 9th Nanking fell into their hands. By the beginning of January 1938, the province of Shantung had also been conquered.

Chiang Kai-shek and his government fled to Ch'ung-k'ing (Chungking), the most important commercial and financial centre of the interior after Hankow, which was soon threatened by the Japanese fleet. By means of a number of landings the Japanese soon conquered the whole coast of China, so cutting off all supplies to the country; against hard fighting in some places they pushed inland along the railways and conquered the whole eastern half of China, the richest and most highly developed part of the country. Chiang Kai-shek had the support only of the agriculturally rich province of Szechwan, and of the scarcely developed provinces surrounding it. Here there was as yet no industry. Everything in the way of machinery and supplies that could be transported from the hastily dismantled factories was carried westwards. Students and professors went west with all the contents of their universities, and worked on in small villages under very difficult conditions—one of the most memorable achievements of this war for China. But all this was by no means enough for waging a defensive war against Japan. Even the famous Burma Road could not save China.

By 1940-1941 Japan had attained her war aim: China was no longer a dangerous adversary. She was still able to engage in small-scale fighting, but could no longer secure any decisive result. Puppet governments were set up in Peking, Canton, and Nanking, and the Japanese waited for these governments gradually to induce supporters of Chiang Kai-shek to come over to their side. Most was expected of Wang Ching-wei, who headed the new Nanking government. He was one of the oldest followers of Sun Yat-sen, and was regarded as a democrat. In 1925, after Sun Yat-sen's death, he had been for a time the head of the Nanking government, and for a short time in 1930 he had led a government in Peking that was opposed to Chiang Kai-shek's dictatorship. Beyond any question

Wang still had many followers, including some in the highest circles at Chungking, men of eastern China who considered that collaboration with Japan, especially in the economic field, offered good prospects. Japan paid lip service to this policy: there was talk of sister peoples, which could help each other and supply each other's needs. There was propaganda for a new "Greater East Asian" philosophy, Wang-tao, in accordance with which all the peoples of the East could live together in peace under a thinly disguised dictatorship. What actually happened was that everywhere Japanese capitalists established themselves in the former Chinese industrial plants, bought up land and securities, and exploited the country for the conduct of their war.

After the great initial successes of Hitlerite Germany in 1939-1941, Japan became convinced that the time had come for a decisive blow against the positions of the Western European powers and the United States in the Far East. Lightning blows were struck at Hong Kong and Singapore, at French Indo-China, and at the Netherlands East Indies. The American navy seemed to have been eliminated by the attack on Pearl Harbour, and one group of islands after another fell into the hands of the Japanese. Japan was at the gates of India and Australia. Russia was carrying on a desperate defensive struggle against the Axis, and there was no reason to expect any intervention from her in the Far East. Greater East Asia seemed assured against every danger.

The situation of Chiang Kai-shek's Chungking government seemed hopeless. Even the Burma Road was cut, and supplies could only be sent by air; there was shortage of everything. With immense energy small industries were begun all over western China, often organized as co-operatives; roads and railways were built—but with such resources would it ever be possible to throw the Japanese into the sea? Everything depended on holding out until a new page was turned in Europe. Infinitely slow seemed the progress of the first gleams of hope—the steady front in Burma, the reconquest of the first groups of inlands; the first bomb attacks on Japan itself. Even in May, 1945, with the war ended in Europe, there seemed no sign of its ending in the Far East. Then came the atom bomb, bringing the collapse of Japan; the Japanese armies receded from China, and suddenly China was free, mistress once more in her own country as she had not been for decades.

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Chapter Twelve

PRESENT-DAY CHINA

1 The growth of communism

In order to understand today's China, we have to go back in time to report events which were cut short or left out of our earlier discussion in order to present them in the context of this chapter.

Although socialism and communism had been known in China long ago, this line of development of Western philosophy had interested Chinese intellectuals much less than liberalistic, democratic Western ideas. It was widely believed that communism had no real prospects for China, as a dictatorship of the proletariat seemed to be relevant only in a highly industrialized and not in an agrarian society. Thus, in its beginning the "Movement of May Fourth" of 1919 had Western ideological traits but was not communistic. This changed with the success of communism in Russia and with the theoretical writings of Lenin. Here it was shown that communist theories could be applied to a country similar to China in its level of development. Already from 1919 on, some of the leaders of the Movement turned towards communism: the National University of Peking became the first centre of this movement, and Ch'en Tu-hsiu, then dean of the College of Letters, from 1920 on became one of its leaders. Hu Shih did not move to the left with this group; he remained a liberal. But another well-known writer, Lu Hsün (1881-1936), while following Hu Shih in the "Literary Revolution," identified politically with Ch'en. There was still another man, the Director of the University Library, Li Ta-chao, who turned towards communism. With him we find one of his employees in the Library, Mao Tse-tung. In fact, the nucleus of the Communist Party, which was officially created as late as 1921, was a student organization including some professors in Peking. On the other hand, a student group in Paris had also learned about communism and had organized; the leaders of this group were Chou En-lai and Li Li-san. A little later, a third group organized in

Germany; Chu Tê belonged to this group. The leadership of Communist China since 1949 has been in the hands of men of these three former student groups.

After 1920, Sun Yat-sen, too, became interested in the developments in Soviet Russia. Yet, he never actually became a communist; his belief that the soil should belong to the tiller cannot really be combined with communism, which advocates the abolition of individual landholdings. Yet, Soviet Russia found it useful to help Sun Yat-sen and advised the Chinese Communist Party to collaborate with the KMT (Kuo-min-tang). This collaboration, not always easy, continued until the fall of Shanghai in 1927.

In the meantime, Mao Tse-tung had given up his studies in Peking and had returned to his home in Hunan. Here, he organized his countrymen, the farmers of Hunan. It is said that at the verge of the northern expedition of Chiang Kai-shek, Mao's adherents in Hunan already numbered in the millions; this made the quick and smooth advance of the communist-advised armies of Chiang Kai-shek possible. Mao developed his ideas in written form in 1927; he showed that communism in China could be successful only if it was based upon farmers. Because of this unorthodox attitude, he was for years severely attacked as a deviationist.

When Chiang Kai-shek separated from the KMT in 1927, the main body of the KMT remained in Hankow as the legal government. But now, while Chiang Kai-shek executed all leftists, union leaders, and communists who fell into his hands, tensions in Hankow increased between the Chinese Communist Party and the rest of the KMT. Finally, the KMT turned against the communists and reunited with Chiang Kai-shek. The remaining communists retreated to the Hunan-Kiangsi border area, the centre of Mao's activities; even the orthodox communist wing, which had condemned Mao, now had to come to him for protection from the KMT. A small communist state began to develop in Kiangsi, in spite of pressure and, later, attacks of the KMT against them. By 1934, this pressure became so strong that Kiangsi had to be abandoned, and in the epic "Long March" the rest of the communists and their army fought their way through all of western and northwestern China into the sparsely inhabited, underdeveloped northern part of Shensi, where a new socialistic state was created with Yen-an as its capital.

After the fall of the communist enclave in Kiangsi, the prospects for the Nationalist regime were bright; indeed, the unification of China was almost achieved. At this moment a new Japanese invasion threatened and demanded the full attention of the regime. Thus, in spite of talk about land reform and other reforms which might have

led to a liberalization of the government, no attention was given to internal and social problems except to the suppression of communist thought. Although all leftist publications were prohibited, most historians and sociologists succeeded in writing Marxist books without using Marxist terminology, so that they escaped Chiang's censors. These publications contributed greatly to preparing China's intellectuals and youth for communism.

When the Japanese War began, the communists in Yen-an and the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-shek agreed to cooperate against the invaders. Yet, each side remembered its experiences in 1927 and distrusted the other. Chiang's resistance against the invaders became less effective after the Japanese occupied all of China's ports; supplies could reach China only in small quantities by airlift or via the Burma Road. There was also the belief that Japan could be defeated only by an attack on Japan itself and that this would have to be undertaken by the Western powers, not by China. The communists, on their side, set up a guerilla organization behind the Japanese lines, so that, although the Japanese controlled the cities and the lines of communication, they had little control over the countryside. The communists also attempted to infiltrate the area held by the Nationalists, who in turn were interested in preventing the communists from becoming too strong; so, Nationalist troops guarded also the borders of communist territory.

American politicians and military advisers were divided in their opinions. Although they recognized the internal weakness of the Nationalist government, the fighting between cliques within the government, and the ever-increasing corruption, some advocated more help to the Nationalists and a firm attitude against the communists. Others, influenced by impressions gained during visits to Yen-an, and believing in the possibility of honest cooperation between a communist regime and any other, as Roosevelt did, attempted to effect a coalition of the Nationalists with the communists.

At the end of the war, when the Nationalist government took over the administration, it lacked popular support in the areas liberated from the Japanese. Farmers who had been given land by the communists, or who had been promised it, were afraid that their former landlords, whether they had remained to collaborate with the Japanese or had fled to West China, would regain control of the land. Workers hoped for new social legislation and rights. Businessmen and industrialists were faced with destroyed factories, worn-out or antiquated equipment, and an unchecked inflation which induced them to shift their accounts into foreign banks or to favor short-term gains rather than long-term investments. As in all countries which

have suffered from a long war and an occupation, the youth believed that the old regime had been to blame, and saw promise and hope on the political left. And, finally, the Nationalist soldiers, most of whom had been separated for years from their homes and families, were not willing to fight other Chinese in the civil war now well under way; they wanted to go home and start a new life. The communists, however, were now well organized militarily and well equiped with arms surrendered by the Japanese to the Soviet armies as well as with arms and ammunition sold to them by KMT soldiers; moreover, they were constantly strengthened by deserters from the KMT. The civil war witnessed a steady retreat by the KMT armies, which resisted only sporadically. By the end of 1948, most of mainland China was in the hands of the communists, who established their new capital in Peking.

2 Nationalist China in Taiwan

The Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan with those soldiers who remained loyal. This island was returned to China after the defeat of Japan, though final disposition of its status had not yet been determined.

Taiwan's original population had been made up of more than a dozen tribes who are probably distant relatives of tribes in the Philippines. These are Taiwan's "aborigines," altogether about 200,000 people in 1948.

At about the time of the Sung dynasty, Chinese began to establish outposts on the island; these developed into regular agricultural settlements toward the end of the Ming dynasty. Immigration increased in the eighteenth and especially the nineteenth centuries. These Chinese immigrants and their descendants are the "Taiwanese," Taiwan's main population of about eight million people as of 1948.

Taiwan was at first a part of the province of Fukien, whence most of its Chinese settlers came; there was also a minority of Hakka, Chinese from Kuangtung province. When Taiwan was ceded to Japan, it was still a colonial area with much lawlessness and disorder, but with a number of flourishing towns and a growing population. The Japanese, who sent administrators but no settlers, established law and order, protected the aborigines from land-hungry Chinese settlers, and attempted to abolish headhunting by the aborigines and to raise the cultural level in general. They built a road and railway system and strongly stressed the production of sugar cane and rice. During the Second World War, the island suffered from air attacks and from the inability of the Japanese to protect its industries.

After Chiang Kai-shek and the remainder of his army and of his government officials arrived in Taiwan, they were followed by others fleeing from the communist regime, mainly from Chekiang, Kiangsu, and the northern provinces of the mainland. Eventually, there were on Taiwan about two million of these "mainlanders," as they have sometimes been called.

When the Chinese Nationalists took over from the Japanese, they assumed all the leading positions in the government. The Taiwanese nationals who had opposed the Japanese were disappointed; for their part, the Nationalists felt threatened because of their minority position. The next years, especially up to 1952, were characterized by terror and bloodshed. Tensions persisted for many years, but have lessened since about 1960.

The new government of Taiwan resembled China's pre-war government under Chiang Kai-shek. First, to maintain his claim to the legitimate rule of all of China, Chiang retained—and controlled through his party, the KMT—his former government organization, complete with cabinet ministers, administrators, and elected parliament, under the name "Central Government of China." Secondly, the actual government of Taiwan, which he considered one of China's provinces, was organized as the "Provincial Government of Taiwan," whose leading positions were at first in the hands of KMT mainlanders. There have since been elections for the provincial assembly, for local government councils and boards, and for various provincial and local positions. Thirdly, the military forces were organized under the leadership and command of mainlanders. And finally, the education system was set up in accordance with former mainland practices by mainland specialists. However, evolutionary changes soon occurred.

The government's aim was to make Mandarin Chinese the language of all Chinese in Taiwan, as it had been in mainland China long before the War, and to weaken the Taiwanese dialects. Soon almost every child had a minimum of six years of education (increased in 1968 to nine years), with Mandarin Chinese as the medium of instruction. In the beginning few Taiwanese qualified as teachers because, under Japanese rule, Japanese had been the medium of instruction. As the children of Taiwanese and mainland families went to school together, the Taiwanese children quickly learned Mandarin, while most mainland children became familiar with the Taiwan dialect. For the generation in school today, the difference between mainlander and Taiwanese has lost its importance. At the same time, more teachers of Taiwanese origin, but with modern training, have begun to fill first the ranks of elementary, later of

high-school, and now even of university instructors, so that the end of mainland predominance in the educational system is foreseeable.

The country is still ruled by the KMT, but although at first hardly any Taiwanese belonged to the Party, many of the elective jobs and almost all positions in the provincial government are at present (1969) in the hands of Taiwanese independents, or KMT members, more of whom are entering the central government as well. Because military service is compulsory, the majority of common soldiers are Taiwanese: as career officers grow older and their sons show little interest in an army career, more Taiwan-Chinese are occupying higher army positions. Foreign policy and major political decisions still lie in the hands of mainland Chinese, but economic power, once monopolized by them, is now held by Taiwan-Chinese.

This shift gained impetus with the end of American economic aid, which had tied local businessmen to American industry and thus worked to the advantage of mainland Chinese, for these had contacts in the United States, whereas the Taiwan-Chinese had contacts only in Japan. After the termination of American economic aid, Taiwanese trade with Japan, the Philippines, and Korea grew in importance and with it the economic strength of Taiwan-Chinese businessmen. After 1964, Taiwan became a strong competitor of Hong Kong and Japan in some export industries, such as electronics and textiles. We can regard Taiwan from 1964 on as occupying the "take-off" stage, to use Rostow's terminology—a stage of rapid development of new, principally light and consumer, industries. There has been a rapid rise of industrial towns around the major cities, and there are already many factories in the countryside, even in some villages. Electrification is essentially completed, and heavy industries, such as fertilizer and assembly plants and oil refineries, now exist.

This rapid industrialization was accompanied by an unusually fast development of agriculture. A land-reform program limited land ownership, reduced rents, and redistributed formerly Japanese-owned land. This was the program that the Nationalist government had attempted unsuccessfully to enforce in liberated China after the Pacific War. It is well known that the abolition of landlordism and the distribution of land to small farmers do not in themselves improve or enlarge production. The Joint Council on Rural Reconstruction, on which American advisers worked with Chinese specialists to devise a system comparable to American agricultural extension services but possessing added elements of community development, introduced better seeds, more and better fertilizers, and numerous other innovations which the farmers quickly adopted,

with the result that the island became self-supporting, in spite of a steadily growing population (thirteen million in 1968).

At the same time, the government succeeded in stabilizing the currency and in eliminating corruption, thus re-establishing public confidence and security. Good incomes from farming as well as from industries were invested on the island instead of flowing into foreign banks. In addition, the population had enough surplus money to buy the products of the new domestic industries as these appeared. Thus, the industrialization of Taiwan may be called "industrialization without tears," without the suffering, that is, of proletarian masses who produce objects which they cannot afford for themselves. Today, even lower middle-class families have television consoles which cost the equivalent of US $200; they own electric fans and radios; they are buying Taiwan-produced refrigerators and air conditioners; and more and more think of buying Taiwan-assembled cars. They encourage their children to finish high school and to attend college if at all possible; competition for admission is very strong in spite of the continuous building of new schools and universities. Education to the level of the B. A. is of good quality, but for most graduate study students are still sent abroad. Taiwan complains about the "brain drain," as about 93 per cent of its students who go overseas do not return, but in many fields it has sufficient trained manpower to continue its development, and in any case there would not be enough jobs available if all the students returned. Most of these expatriates would be available to develop mainland China, if conditions there were to change in a way that would make them compatible with the values with which these expatriates grew up on Taiwan, or with the Western democratic values which they absorbed abroad.

Chiang Kai-shek's government still hopes that one day its people will return to the mainland. This hope has changed from hope of victory in a civil war to hope of revolutionary developments within Communist China which might lead to the creation of a more liberal government in which men with KMT loyalties could find a place. Because they are Chinese, the present government and, it is believed, the majority of the people, consider themselves a part of China from which they are temporarily separated. Therefore they reject the idea, proposed by some American politicians, that Taiwan should become an independent state. There are, mainly in the United States and Japan, groups of Taiwan-Chinese who favor an independent Taiwan, which naturally would be close to Japan politically and economically. One may agree with their belief that Taiwan, now larger

than many European countries, could exist and flourish as an independent country; yet few Chinese will wish to divorce themselves from the world's largest society.

3 Communist China

Both Taiwan and mainland China have developed extremely quickly. The reasons do not seem to lie solely in the form of government, for the pre-conditions for a "take-off" existed in China as early as the 1920's, if not earlier. That is, the quick development of China could have started forty years ago but was prevented, primarily for political reasons. One of the main pre-conditions for quick development is that a large part of the population is inured to hard and repetitive work. The Chinese farmer was accustomed to such work; he put more time and energy into his land than any other farmer. He and his fellows were the industrial workers of the future: reliable, hard-working, tractable, intelligent. To train them was easy, and absenteeism was never a serious problem, as it is in other developing nations. Another pre-condition is the existence of sufficient trained people to manage industry. Forty years ago China had enough such men to start modernization; foreign assistance would have been necessary in some fields, but only briefly.

Another requirement (at least in the period before radio and television) is general literacy. Meaningful statistical data on literacy in China before 1937 are lacking. Some authors remark that before 1800 probably all upper-class sons and most daughters were educated, and that men in the middle and even in the lower classes often had some degree of literacy. In this context "educated" means that these persons could read classical poetry and essays written in literary Chinese, which was not the language of daily conversation. "Literacy," however, might mean only that a person could read and write some 600 characters, enough to conduct a business and to read simple stories. Although newspapers today have a stock of about 6,000 characters, only some 600 characters are commonly used, and a farmer or worker can manage well with a knowledge of about 100 characters. Statements to the effect that in 1935 some 70 per cent of all men and 95 per cent of all women were illiterate must include the last category in these figures. In any case, the literacy program of the Nationalist government had penetrated the countryside and had reached even outlying villages before the Pacific War.

The transportation system in China before the war was not highly developed, but numerous railroads connecting the main industrial centers did exist, and bus and truck services connected small towns

with the larger centers. What were missing in the pre-war years were laws to protect the investor, efficient credit facilities, an insurance system supported by law, and a modern tax structure. In addition, the monetary system was inflation-prone. Although sufficient capital probably could have been mobilized within the country, the available resources either went into foreign banks or were invested in enterprises providing a quick return.

The failure to capitalize on existing means of development before the War resulted from the chronic unrest caused by warlordism, revolutionaries and foreign invaders, which occupied the energies of the Nationalist government from its establishment to its fall. Once a stable government free from internal troubles arose, national development, whether private or socialist, could proceed at a rapid pace.

Thus, the development of Communist China is not a miracle, possible only because of its form of government. What is unusual about Communist China is the fact that it is the only nation possessing a highly developed culture of its own to have jettisoned it in favor of a foreign one. What missionaries had dreamed of for centuries and knew they would never accomplish, Mao Tse-tung achieved; he imposed an ideology created by Europeans and understandable only in the context of Central Europe in the nineteenth century. How long his success will last is uncertain. One school of analysts believes that the friction between Soviet Russia and Communist China indicates that China's communism has become Chinese. These men point out that Communist Chinese practices are often direct continuations of earlier Chinese practices, customs, and attitudes. And they predict that this trend will continue, resulting in a form of socialism or communism distinctly different from that found in any other country. Another school, however, believes that communism precedes "Sinism," and that the regime will slowly eliminate traits which once were typical of China and replace them with institutions developed out of Marxist thinking. In any case, for the present, although the Communist government's aim is to impose communist thought and institutions in the country, typically Chinese traits are still omnipresent.

Soon after the establishment of the Peking regime, a pact of friendship and alliance with the Soviet Union was concluded (February 1950), and Soviet specialists and civil and military products poured into China to speed its development. China had to pay for this assistance as well as for the loans it received from Russia, but the application of Russian experience, often involving the duplication of whole factories, was successful. In a few years, China developed

its heavy industry, just as Russia had done. It should not be forgotten that Manchuria, as well as other parts of China, had had modern heavy industries long before 1949. The Manchurian factories ceased production because, when the Russians invaded Manchuria at the end of the war, they removed the machinery to Russia.

Russian aid to Communist China continued to 1960. Its termination slowed development briefly but was not disastrous. Russian assistance was a "shot in the arm," as stimulating and about as lasting as American aid to Taiwan or to European countries. The stress laid upon heavy industry, in imitation of Russia, increased China's military strength quickly, but the consumer had to wait for goods which would make his life more enjoyable. One cause of friction in China today concerns the relative desirability of heavy industry versus consumer industry, a problem which arose in Russia after the death of Stalin.

China's military strength was first demonstrated in the Korean War when Chinese armies entered Korea (October 1950). Their successes contributed to the prestige of the Peking regime at home and abroad, but they also foreshadowed a conflict with Soviet Russia, which regarded North Korea as lying within its own sphere of influence.

In the same year, China invaded and conquered Tibet. Tibet, under Manchu rule until 1911, had achieved a certain degree of independence thereafter: no republican Chinese regime ever ruled Lhasa. The military conquest of Tibet is regarded by many as an act of Chinese imperialism, or colonialism, as the Tibetans certainly did not want to belong to China or be forced to change their traditional form of government. Having regarded themselves as subjects of the Manchu but not of the Chinese, they rose against the communist rulers in March 1959, but without success.

Chinese control of Tibet, involving the construction of numerous roads, airstrips, and military installations, as well as differences concerning the international border, led in 1959 to conflicts with India, a country which had previously sided with the new China in international affairs. Indeed, the borders were uncertain and looked different depending on whether one used Manchu or Indian maps. China's other border problem was with Burma. Early in 1960 the two countries concluded a border agreement which ended disputes dating from British colonial times.

Very early in its existence Communist China assumed control of Sinkiang, Chinese Central Asia, a large area originally inhabited by Turkish and Mongolian tribes and states, later conquered by the Manchu, and then integrated into China in the early nineteenth century.

The communist action was to be expected, although after the Revolution of 1911 Chinese rule over this area had been spotty, and during the Pacific War some Soviet-inspired hope had existed that Sinkiang might gain independence, following the example of Outer Mongolia, another country which had been attached to the Manchu until 1911 and which, with Russian assistance, had gained its independence from China. Sinkiang is of great importance to Communist China as the site of large sources of oil and of atomic industries and testing grounds. The government has stimulated and often forced Chinese immigration into Sinkiang, so that the erstwhile Turkish and Mongolian majorities have become minorities, envious of their ethnic brothers in Soviet Central Asia who enjoy a much higher standard of living and more freedom.

Inner Mongolia had a brief dream of independence under Japanese protection during the war. But the majority of the population were Chinese, and already before the Pacific War, the country had been divided into three Chinese provinces, of which the Chinese Communists gained control without delay.

In general, when the Chinese Communists discuss territorial claims, they appear to seek the restoration of borders that China claimed in the eighteenth century. Thus, they make occasional remarks about the Ili area and parts of Eastern Siberia, which the Manchu either lost to the Russians or claimed as their territory. North Vietnam is probably aware that Imperial China exercised political rights over Tongking and Annam (the present-day North and part of South Vietnam). And, treaty or no, the Sino-Burmese question may be reopened one day, for Burma was semi-dependent on China under the Manchu.

The build-up of heavy industry enabled China to conduct an aggressive policy towards the countries surrounding her, but industrialization had to be paid for, and, as in other countries, it was basically agriculture that had to create the necessary capital. Therefore, in June 1950 a land-reform law was promulgated. By October 1952 it had been implemented at an estimated cost of two million human lives: the landlords. The next step, socialization of the land, began in 1953.

The cooperative farms were supposed to achieve higher production than small individual farms. It may be that any farmer, but particularly the Chinese, is emotionally involved in his crop, in contrast to the industrial worker, who often is alienated from the product he makes. Thus the farmer is unwilling to put unlimited energy and time into working on a farm that does not belong to him. But it may also be that the application of principles of industrial operation to

agriculture fails because emergencies often occur in farming and are followed by periods of leisure, whereas in industry steady work is possible.

In any case, in 1956 strains began to appear in China's economy. In early 1958 the "Great Leap Forward" was promoted in an attempt to speed production in all sectors. Soon after, the first communes were created, against the advise of Russian specialists. The objective of the communes seems to have been not only the creation of a new organizational form which would allow the government to exercise more pressure upon farmers to increase production, but also the correlation of labor and other needs of industry with agriculture. The communes may have represented an attempt to set up an organization which could function independently, even in the event of a governmental breakdown in wartime. At the same time, the decentralization of industries began and a people's militia was created. The "back-yard furnaces," which produced high-cost iron of low quality, seem to have had a similar purpose: to teach citizens how to produce iron for armaments in case of war and enemy occupation, when only guerrilla resistance would be possible. In the same year, aggressive actions against offshore, Nationalist-held islands increased. China may have believed that war with the United States was imminent. Perhaps as a result of Russian talks with China, a détente followed in 1959, but so too did increased tension between Russia and China, while the results of the Great Leap and its policies proved catastrophic. The years 1961-64 provided a needed respite from the failures of the Great Leap. Farmers regained limited rights to income from private efforts, and improved farm techniques such as better seed and the use of fertilizer began to produce results. China can now feed her population in normal years.

Chinese leaders realize that an improved level of living is difficult to attain while the birth rate remains high. They have hesitated to adopt a family-planning policy, which would fly in the face of Marxist doctrine, although for a short period family planning was openly recommended. Their most efficient method of limiting the birth rate has been to recommend postponement of marriage.

First the limitation of private enterprise and business and then the nationalization of all important businesses following the completion of land reform deprived many employers as well as small shopkeepers of an occupation. But the new industries could not absorb all of the labor that suddenly became available. When rural youth inundated the cities in search of employment, the government returned the excess urban population to the countryside and

recruited students and other urban youth to work on farms. Re-education camps in outlying areas also provided cheap farm labor.

The problem facing China or any nation that modernizes and industrializes in the twentieth century can be simply stated. Nineteenth-century industry needed large masses of workers which only the rural areas could supply; and, with the development of farming methods, the countryside could afford to send its youth to the cities. Twentieth-century industry, on the other hand, needs technicians and highly qualified personnel, often with college degrees, but few unskilled workers. China has traditionally employed human labor where machines would have been cheaper and more efficient, simply because labor was available and capital was not. But since, with the growth of modern industry and modern farming, the problem will arise again, the policy of employing urban youth on farms is shortsighted.

The labor force also increased as a result of the "liberation" of women, in which the marriage law of April 1950 was the first step. Nationalist China had earlier created a modern and liberal marriage law; moreover, women were never the slaves that they have sometimes been painted. In many parts of China, long before the Pacific War, women worked in the fields with their husbands. Elsewhere they worked in secondary agricultural industries (weaving, preparation of food conserves, home industries, and even textile factories) and provided supplementary income for their families. All that "liberation" in 1950 really meant was that women had to work a full day as their husbands did, and had, in addition, to do house work and care for their children much as before. The new marriage law did, indeed, make both partners equal; it also made it easier for men to divorce their wives, political incompatibility becoming a ground for divorce.

The ideological justification for a new marriage law was the desirability of destroying the traditional Chinese family and its economic basis because a close family, and all the more an extended family or a clan, could obviously serve as a center of resistance. Land collectivization and the nationalization of business destroyed the economic basis of families. The "liberation" of women brought them out of the house and made it possible for the government to exploit dissention between husband and wife, thereby increasing its control over the family. Finally, the new education system, which indoctrinated all children from nursery to the end of college, separated children from parents, thus undermining parental control and enabling the state to intimidate parents by encouraging their children to denounce their "deviations." Sporadic efforts to dissolve

the family completely by separating women from men in communes—recalling an attempt made almost a century earlier by the T'ai-p'ing—were unsuccessful.

The best formula for a revolution seems to involve turning youth against its elders, rather than turning one class against another. Not all societies have a class system so clear-cut that class antagonism is effective. On the other hand, Chinese youth, in its opposition to the "establishment," to conservatism, to traditional religion, to blind emulation of Western customs and institutions, to the traditional family structure and the position of women, had hopes that communism would eradicate the specific "evil" which each individual wanted abolished. Mao and his followers had once been such rebellious youths, but by the 1960's they were mostly old men and a new youth had appeared, a generation of revolutionaries for whom the "old regime" was dim history, not reality. In the struggle between Mao and Liu Shao-ch'i, which became increasingly apparent in 1966, Mao tried to retain his power by mobilizing young people as "Red Guards" and by inciting them to make the "Great Proletarian Revolution." The motives behind the struggle are diverse. It is on the one hand a conflict of persons contending for power, but there are also disagreements over theory: for example, should China's present generation toil to make possible a better life only for the next generation, or should it enjoy the fruits of its labor, after its many years of suffering? Mao opposes such "weakening" and favors a new generation willing to endure hardships, as he did in his youth. There is also a question whether the Chinese Communist Party under the banner of Maoism should replace the Russian party, establish Mao as the fourth founder after Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, and become the leader of world communism, or whether it should collaborate with the Russian party, at least temporarily, and thus ensure China Russian support. When, however, Chinese youth was summoned to take up the fight for Mao and his group, forces were loosed which could not be controlled. Following independent action by youth groups similar in nature to youth revolts in Western countries, the power and prestige of older leaders suffered. Even now (1969) it is impossible to re-establish unity and order; the Mao and Liu groups still oppose each other, and local factions have arisen. Violent confrontations, often resulting in hundreds of deaths, occur in many provinces. The regime is no longer so strong and unified as it was before 1966, although its end is not in sight. Quite possibly far-reaching changes may occur in the future.

Three factors will probably influence the future of China. First,

the emergence of neo-communism, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in an attempt to soften traditional communist practice. Second, the outcome of the war in Vietnam. Will China be able to continue its eighteenth-century dream of direct or indirect domination of Southeast Asia? Will North Vietnam detach itself from China and attach itself more closely to Russia? Will Russia and China continue to create separate spheres of influence in Asia, Africa, and South America? The first factor depends on developments inside China, the second on events outside, and at least in part on decisions in the United States, Japan, and Europe.

The third factor has to do with human nature. One may justifiably ask whether the change in human personality which Chinese communism has attempted to achieve is possible, let alone desirable. Studies of animals and of human beings have demonstrated a tendency to identify with a territory, with property, and with kin. Can the Chinese eradicate this tendency? The Chinese have been family-centered and accustomed to subordinating their individual inclinations to the requirements of family and neighborhood. But beyond these established frameworks they have been individualistic and highly idiosyncratic at all times. Under the communist regime, however, the government is omnipresent, and people must toe the official line. One senses the tragedy that affects well-known scholars, writers and poets, who must degrade themselves, their work, their past and their families in order to survive. They may hope for comprehension of their actions, but nonetheless they must suffer shame. Will the present government change the minds of these men and eradicate their feelings?

Communist China has made great progress, no doubt. Soon it may equal other developed nations. But its progress has been achieved at an unnecessary cost in human lives and happiness.

That the regime is no longer so strong and unified as it was before 1966 does not mean that its end is in sight. Far-reaching changes may occur in the near future. Public opinion is impressed with mainland China's progress, as the world usually is with strong nations. And public opinion is still unimpressed by the achievements of Taiwan and has hardly begun to change its attitude toward the government of the "Republic of China." To the historian and the sociologist, the experience of Taiwan indicates that China, if left alone and freed from ideological pressures, could industrialize more quickly than any other presently underdeveloped nation. Taiwan offers a model with which to compare mainland China.

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NOTES AND REFERENCES

The following notes and references are intended to help the interested reader. They draw his attention to some more specialized literature in English, and occasionally in French and German. They also indicate for the more advanced reader the sources for some of the interpretations of historical events. As such sources are most often written in Chinese or Japanese and, therefore, inaccessible to most readers, only brief hints and not full bibliographical data are given. The specialists know the names and can easily find details in the standard bibliographies. The general reader will profit most from the bibliography on Chinese history published each year in the Journal of Asian Studies. These Notes do not mention the original Chinese sources which are the factual basis of this book.

Chapter One

p. [7]: Reference is made here to the T'ung-chien kang-mu and its translation by de Mailla (1777-85). Criticism by O. Franke, Ku Chieh-kang and his school, also by G. Haloun.

p. [8]: For the chronology, I rely here upon Ijima Tadao and my own research. Excavations at Chou-k'ou-tien still continue and my account should be taken as very preliminary. An earlier analysis is given by E. von Eickstedt (Rassendynamik von Ostasien, Berlin 1944). For the following periods, the best general study is still J. G. Andersson, Researches into the Prehistory of the Chinese, Stockholm 1943. A great number of new findings has been made recently, but no comprehensive analysis in a Western language is available.

p. [9]: Comparison with Ainu has been made by Weidenreich. The theory of desiccation of Asia is not the Huntington theory, but I rely here upon arguments by J. G. Andersoon and Sven Hedin.

p. [10]: The earlier theories of R. Heine-Geldern have been used here.

p. [11]: This is a summary of my own theories. Concerning the Tungus tribes, K. Jettmar (Wiener Beiträge zur Kulturgeschichte, vol. 9, 1952, p. 484f and later studies) has proposed a more refined theory; other parts of the theory, as far as it is concerned with conditions in Central Asia, have been modified by F. Kussmaul (in: Tribus, vol. 1952-3, pp. 305-60). Archaeological data from Central Asia have been analysed again by K. Jettmar (in: The Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, Bulletin No. 23, 1951). The discussion on domestication of large animals relies on the studies by C. O. Sauer, H. von Wissmann, Menghin, Amschler, Flohr and, most recently, F. Hančar (in: Saeculum, vol. 10, 1959, pp. 21-37 with further literature), and also on my own research.

p. [12]: An analysis of the situation in the South according to Western and Chinese studies is found in H. J. Wiens, China's March toward the Tropics, Hamden 1954. Much further work is now published by Ling

Shun-sheng, Rui Yi-fu and other anthropologists in Taipei. The best analysis of denshiring in the Far East is still the book by K. J. Pelzer, Population and Land Utilization, New York 1941. The anthropological theories on this page are my own, influenced by ideas of R. Heine-Geldern and Gordon Luce.

p. [14]: Sociological theory, as developed by R. Thurnwald and others, has been used as a theoretical tool here, together with observations by A. Credner and H. Bernatzik. Concerning rice in Yang-shao see R. Heine-Geldern in Anthropos, vol. 27, p. 595.

p. [15]: Wu Chin-ting defended the local origin of Yang-shao; T. J. Arne, J. G. Andersson and many others suggested Western influences. Most recently R. Heine-Geldern elaborated this theory. The allusion to Indo-Europeans refers to the studies by G. Haloun and others concerning the Ta-Hsia, the later Yüeh-chih, and the Tocharian problem.

p. [16]: R. Heine-Geldern proposed a "Pontic migration". Yin Huan-chang discussed most recently Lung-shan culture and the mound-dwellers.

p. [17]: The original Chu-shu chi-nien version of the stories about Yao has been accepted here, together with my own research and the studies by B. Karlgren, M. Loehr, G. Haloun, E. H. Minns and others concerning the origin and early distribution of bronze and the animal style. Smith families or tribes are well known from Central Asia, but also from India and Africa (see W. Ruben, Eisenschmiede und Dämonen in Indien, Leiden 1939, for general discussion).—For a discussion of the Hsia see E. Erkes.

Chapter Two

p. [19]: The discussion in this chapter relies mainly upon the An-yang excavation reports and the studies by Tung Tso-pin and, most strongly, Ch'en Meng-chia. In English, the best work is still H. G. Creel, The Birth of China, London 1936 and his more specialized Studies in Early Chinese Culture, Baltimore 1937.

p. [20]: The possibility of a "megalithic" culture in the Far East has often been discussed, by O. Menghin, R. Heine-Geldern, Cheng Tê-k'un, Ling Shun-sheng and others. Megaliths occur mainly in South-East Asia, southern China, Korea and Japan.—Teng Ch'u-min and others believe that silk existed already in the time of Yang-shao.

p. [21]: Kuo Mo-jo believes, that the Shang already used a real plough drawn by animals. The main discussion on ploughs in China is by Hsü Chung-shu; for general anthropological discussion see E. Werth and H. Kothe.

p. [22]: For the discussion of the T'ao-t'ieh see the research by B. Karlgren and C. Hentze.

p. [23]: I follow here mainly Ch'en Meng-chia, but work by B. Schindler, C. Hentze, H. Maspero and also my own research has been considered.

p. [24]: I am accepting here a narrow definition of feudalism (see my Conquerors and Rulers, Leiden 1952).—The division of armies into "right" and "left" is interesting in the light of the theories concerning the importance of systems of orientation (Fr. Röck and others).

p. [25]: Here, the work by W. Koppers, O. Spengler, F. Hančar, V. G. Childe and many others, concerning the domestication of the horse and the introduction of the war-chariot in general, and work by Shih Chang-ju, Ch'en Meng-chia, O. Maenchen, Uchida Gimpu and others concerning

horses, riding and chariots in China has been used, in addition to my own research.

p. [26]: Concerning the wild animals, I have relied upon Ch'en Meng-chia, Hsü Chung-shu and Tung Tso-pin.—The discussion as to whether there was a period of "slave society" (as postulated by Marxist theory) in China, and when it florished, is still going on under the leadership of Kuo Mo-jo and his group. I prefer to differentiate between slaves and serfs, and relied for factual data upon texts from oracle bones, not upon historical texts.—The problem of Shang chronology is still not solved, in spite of extensive work by Liu Ch'ao-yang, Tung Tso-pin and many Japanese and Western scholars. The old chronology, however, seems to be rejected by most scholars now.

Chapter Three

p. [29]: Discussing the early script and language, I refer to the great number of unidentified Shang characters and, especially, to the composite characters which have been mentioned often by C. Hentze in his research; on the other hand, the original language of the Chou may have been different from classical Chinese, if we can judge from the form of the names of the earliest Chou ancestors. Problems of substrata languages enter at this stage. Our first understanding of Chou language and dialects seems to come through the method applied by P. Serruys, rather than through the more generally accepted theories and methods of B. Karlgren and his school.

p. [30]: I reject here the statement of classical texts that the last Shang ruler was unworthy, and accept the new interpretation of Ch'en Meng-chia which is based upon oracle bone texts.—The most recent general study on feudalism, and on feudalism in China, is in R. Coulborn, Feudalism in History, Princeton 1956. Stimulating, but in parts antiquated, is M. Granet, La Féodalité Chinoise, Oslo 1952. I rely here on my own research. The instalment procedure has been described by H. Maspero and Ch'i Szŭ-ho.

p. [31]: The interpretation of land-holding and clans follows my own research which is influenced by Niida Noboru, Katō Shigeru and other Japanese scholars, as well as by G. Haloun.—Concerning the origin of family names see preliminarily Yang Hsi-mei; much further research is still necessary. The general development of Chinese names is now studied by Wolfgang Bauer.—The spread of cities in this period has been studied by Li Chi, The Formation of the Chinese People, Cambridge 1928. My interpretation relies mainly upon a study of the distribution of non-Chinese tribes and data on early cities coming from excavation reports (see my "Data on the Structure of the Chinese City" in Economic Development and Cultural Change, 1956, pp. 253-68, and "The Formation of Chinese Civilization" in Sociologus 7, 1959, pp. 97-112).

p. [32]: The work on slaves by T. Pippon, E. Erkes, M. Wilbur, Wan Kuo-ting, Kuo Mo-jo, Niida Noboru, Kao Nien-chih and others has been consulted; the interpretation by E. G. Pulleyblank, however, was not accepted.

p. [33]: This interpretation of the "well-field" system relies in part upon the work done by Hsü Ti-shan, in part upon M. Granet and H. Maspero, and attempts to utilize insight from general anthropological theory and field-work mainly in South-East Asia. Other interpretations have been proposed by Yang Lien-sheng, Wan Kuo-ting, Ch'i Szŭ-ho P. Demiéville, Hu Shih, Chi Ch'ao-ting, K. A. Wittfogel, and others.

Some authors, such as Kuo Mo-jo, regard the whole system as an utopia, but believe in an original "village community".—The characterization of the Chou-li relies in part upon the work done by Hsü Chung-shu and Ku Chieh-kang on the titles of nobility, research by Yang K'uan and textual criticism by B. Karlgren, O. Franke, and again Ku Chieh-kang and his school.—The discussion on twin cities is intended to draw attention to its West Asian parallels, the "acropolis" or "ark" city, as well as to the theories on the difference between Western and Asian cities (M. Weber) and the specific type of cities in "dual societies" (H. Boeke).

p. [34]: This is a modified form of the Hu Shih theory.—The problem of nomadic agrarian inter-action and conflict has been studied for a later period mainly by O. Lattimore. Here, general anthropological research as well as my own have been applied.

p. [36]: The supra-stratification theory as developed by R. Thurnwald has been used as analytic tool here.

p. [38]: For this period, a novel interpretation is presented by R. L. Walker, The Multi-State System of China, Hamden 1953. For the concepts of sovereignty, I have used here the Chou-li text and interpretations based upon this text.

p. [40]: For the introduction of iron and the importance of Ch'i, see Chu Hsi-tsu, Kuo Mo-jo, Yang K'uan, Sekino, Takeshi.—Some scholars (G. Haloun) tend to interpret attacks such as the one of 660 B.C. as attacks from outside the borders of China.

p. [41]: For Confucius see H. G. Creel, Confucius, New York 1949. I do not, however, follow his interpretation, but rather the ideas of Hu Shih, O. Franke and others.

p. [42]: For "chün-tzu" and its counterpart "hsiao-jen" see D. Bodde and Ch'en Meng-chia.

p. [43]: I rely strongly here upon O. Franke and Ku Chieh-kang and upon my own work on eclipses.

p. [44]: I regard the Confucian traditions concerning the model emperors of early time as such a falsification. The whole concept of "abdication" has been analysed by M. Granet. The later ceremony of abdication was developed upon the basis of the interpretations of Confucius and has been studied by Ku Chieh-kang and Miyakawa Hisayuki. Already Confucius' disciple Meng Tzŭ, and later Chuang Tzŭ and Han Fei Tzŭ were against this theory.—As a general introduction to the philosophy of this period, Y. L. Feng's History of Chinese Philosophy, London 1937 has still to be recommended, although further research has made many advances.—My analysis of the role of Confucianism in society is influenced by theories in the field of Sociology of religion.

p. [45]: The temple in Turkestan was in Khotan and is already mentioned in the Wei-shu chapter 102. The analysis of the famous "Book on the transfiguration of Lao Tzŭ into a Western Barbarian" by Wang Wei-cheng is penetrating and has been used here. The evaluation of Lao Tzŭ and his pupils as against Confucius by J. Needham, in his Science and Civilization in China, Cambridge 1954 et sqq. (in volume 2) is very stimulating, though necessarily limited to some aspects only.

p. [47]: The concept of wu-wei has often been discussed; some, such as Masaaki Matsumoto, interpreted the concept purely in social terms as "refusal of actions carrying wordly estimation".

p. [49]: Further literature concerning alchemy and breathing exercises is found in J. Needham's book.

Chapter Four

p. [51]: I have used here the general frame-work of R. L. Walker, but more upon Yang K'uan's studies.

p. [52]: The interpretation of the change of myths in this period is based in part upon the work done by H. Maspero, G. Haloun, and Ku Chieh-kang. The analysis of legends made by B. Karlgren from a philological point of view ("Legends and Cults in Ancient China", The Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities, Bulletin No. 18, 1946, pp. 199-365) follows another direction.

p. [53]: The discussion on riding involves the theories concerning horse-nomadic tribes and the period of this way of life. It also involves the problem of the invention of stirrup and saddle. The saddle seems to have been used in China already at the beginning of our period; the stirrup seems to be as late as the fifth century A.D. The article by A. Kroeber, The Ancient Oikumene as an Historic Culture Aggregate, Huxley Memorial Lecture for 1945, is very instructive for our problems and also for its theoretical approach.—The custom of attracting settlers from other areas in order to have more production as well as more man-power seems to have been known in India at the same time.

p. [54]: The work done by Katō Shigeru and Niida Noboru on property and family has been used here. For the later period, work done by Makino Tatsumi has also been incorporated.—Literature on the plough and on iron for implements has been mentioned above. Concerning the fallow system, I have incorporated the ideas of Katō Shigeru, Ōshima Toshikaza, Hsü Ti-shan and Wan Kuo-ting. Hsü Ti-shan believes that a kind of 3-field system had developed by this time. Traces of such a system have been observed in modern China (H. D. Scholz). For these questions, the translation by N. Lee Swann, Food and Money in Ancient China, 1959 is very important.

p. [55]: For all questions of money and credit from this period down to modern times, the best brief introduction is by Lien-sheng Yang, Money and Credit in China, Cambridge 1952. The Introduction to the Economic History of China, London 1954, by E. Stuart Kirby is certainly still the best brief introduction into all problems of Chinese Economic history and contains a bibliography in Western and Chinese-Japanese languages. Articles by Chinese authors on economic problems have been translated in E-tu Zen Sun and J. de Francis, Chinese Social History; Washington 1956.—Data on the size of early cities have been collected by T. Sekino and Katō Shigeru.

p. [56]: T. Sekino studied the forms of cities. G. Hentze believes that the city even in the Shang period normally had a square plan.—T. Sekino has also made the first research on city coins. Such a privilege and such independence of cities disappear later, but occasionally the privilege of minting was given to persons of high rank.—K. A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism, New Haven 1957 regards irrigation as a key economic and social factor and has built up his theory around this concept. I do not accept his theory here or later. Evidence seems to point towards the importance of transportation systems rather than of government-sponsored or operated irrigation systems.—Concerning steel, we follow Yang K'uan; a special study by J. Needham is under preparation. Centre of steel production at this time was Wan (later Nan-yang in Honan).—For early Chinese law, the study by A. F. P. Hulsewé, Remnants of Han Law, Leiden 1955 is the best work in English. He does not, however, regard Li K'ui as the main creator of Chinese law, though Kuo Mo-jo and others

do. It is obvious, however, that Han law was not a creation of the Han Chinese alone and that some type of code must have existed before Han, even if such a code was not written by the man Li K'ui. A special study on Li was made by O. Franke.

p. [57]: In the description of border conditions, research by O. Lattimore has been taken into consideration.

p. [59]: For Shang Yang and this whole period, the classical work in English is still J. J. L. Duyvendak, The Book of Lord Shang, London 1928; the translation by Ma Perleberg of The Works of Kung-sun Lung-tzu, Hongkong 1952 as well as the translation of the Economic Dialogues in Ancient China: The Kuan-tzu, edited by L. Maverick, New Haven 1954 have not found general approval, but may serve as introductions to the way philosophers of our period worked. Han Fei Tzŭ has been translated by W. K. Liao, The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzŭ, London 1939 (only part 1).

p. [60]: Needham does not have such a positive attitude towards Tsou Yen, and regards Western influences upon Tsou Yen as not too likely. The discussion on pp. 60-1 follows mainly my own researches.

p. [61]: The interpretation of secret societies is influenced by general sociological theory and detailed reports on later secret societies. S. Murayama and most modern Chinese scholars stress almost solely the social element in the so-called "peasant rebellions".

Chapter Five

p. [63]: The analysis of the emergence of Ch'in bureaucracy has profitted from general sociological theory, especially M. Weber (see the new analysis by R. Bendix, Max Weber, an Intellectual Portrait, Garden City 1960, p. 117-157). Early administration systems of this type in China have been studied in several articles in the journal Yü-kung (vol. 6 and 7).

p. [65]: In the discussion of language, I use arguments which have been brought forth by P. Serruys against the previously generally accepted theories of B. Karlgren.—For weights and measures I have referred to T. Sekino, Liu Fu and Wu Ch'eng-lo.

p. [66]: For this period, D. Bodde's China's First Unifier, Leiden 1938 and his Statesman, Patriot, and General in Ancient China, New Haven 1940 remain valuable studies.

Chapter Six

p. [71]: The basic historical text for this whole period, the Dynastic History of the Han Dynasty, is now in part available in English translation (H. H. Dubs, The History of the Former Han Dynasty, Baltimore 1938, 3 volumes).

p. [72]: The description of the gentry is based upon my own research. Other scholars define the word "gentry", if applied to China, differently (some of the relevant studies are discussed in my note in the Bull. School of Orient. & African Studies, 1955, p. 373 f.).

p. [73]: The theory of the cycle of mobility has been brought forth by Fr. L. K. Hsu and others. I have based my criticism upon a forthcoming study of Social Mobility in Traditional Chinese Society. The basic point is not the momentary economic or political power of such a family, but the social status of the family (Li-shih yen-chiu, Peking 1955, No. 4, p. 122). The social status was, increasingly, defined and fixed by law (Ch'ü T'ung-tsu).—The difference in the size of gentry and other families has been pointed out by a number of scholars such as Fr. L. K. Hsu, H. T. Fei,

O. Lang. My own research seems to indicate that gentry families, on the average, married earlier than other families.

p. [74]: The Han system of examinations or rather of selection has been studied by Yang Lien-sheng; and analysis of the social origin of candidates has been made in the Bull. Chinese Studies, vol. 2, 1941, and 3, 1942.—The meaning of the term "Hundred Families" has been discussed by W. Eichhorn, Kuo Mo-jo, Ch'en Meng-chia and especially by Hsü T'ung-hsin. It was later also a fiscal term.

p. [75]: The analysis of Hsiung-nu society is based mainly upon my own research. There is no satisfactory history of these northern federations available in English. The compilation of W. M. MacGovern, The Early Empires of Central Asia, Chapel Hill 1939, is now quite antiquated.—An attempt to construct a model of Central Asian nomadic social structure has been made by E. E. Bacon, Obok, a Study of Social Structure in Eurasia, New York 1958, but the model constructed by B. Vladimirtsov and modified by O. Lattimore remains valuable.—For origin and early-development of Hsiung-nu society see O. Maenchen, K. Jettmar, B. Bernstam, Uchida Gimpu and many others.

p. [79]: Material on the "classes" (szŭ min) will be found in a forthcoming book. Studies by Ch'ü T'ung-tsu and Tamai Korehiro are important here. An up-to-date history of Chinese education is still a desideratum.

p. [80]: For Tung Chung-shu, I rely mainly upon O. Franke.—Some scholars do not accept this "double standard", although we have clear texts which show that cases were evaluated on the basis of Confucian texts and not on the basis of laws. In fact, local judges probably only in exceptional cases knew the text of the law or had the code. They judged on the basis of "customary law".

p. [81]: Based mainly upon my own research. K. A. Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism, New Haven 1957, has a different interpretation.

p. [82]: Cases in which the Han emperors disregarded the law code were studied by Y. Hisamura.—I have used here studies published in the Bull. of Chinese Studies, vol. 2 and 3 and in Tôyô gakuho, vol. 8 and 9, in addition to my own research.

p. [85]: On local administration see Katō Shigeru and Yen Keng-wang's studies.

p. [86]: The problem of the Chinese gold, which will be touched upon later again, has gained theoretical interest, because it could be used as a test of M. Lombard's theories concerning the importance of gold in the West (Annales, Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations, vol. 12, Paris 1957, No. 1, p. 7-28). It was used in China from c. 600 B.C. on in form of coins or bars, but disappeared almost completely from A.D. 200 on, i.e. the period of economic decline (see L. S. Yang, Katō Shigeru).—The payment to border tribes occurs many times again in Chinese history down to recent times; it has its parallel in British payments to tribes in the North-West Frontier Province in India which continued even after the Independence.

p. [88]: According to later sources, one third of the tributary gifts was used in the Imperial ancestor temples, one third in the Imperial mausolea, but one third was used as gifts to guests of the Emperor.—The trade aspect of the tributes was first pointed but by E. Parker, later by O. Lattimore, recently by J. K. Fairbank.—The importance of Chang Ch'ien for East-West contacts was systematically studied by B. Laufer; his Sino-Iranica, Chicago 1919 is still a classic.

p. [89]: The most important trait which points to foreign trade, is the occurrence of glass in Chinese tombs in Indo-China and of glass in China proper from the fifth century B.C. on; it is assumed that this glass was imported from the Near East, possibly from Egypt (O. Janse, N. Egami, Seligman).

p. [91]: Large parts of the "Discussions" have been translated by Esson M. Gale, Discourses on Salt and Iron, Leiden 1931; the continuation of this translation is in Jour. Royal As. Society, North-China Branch 1934.—The history of eunuchs in China remains to be written. They were known since at least the seventh century B.C. The hypothesis has been made that this custom had its origin in Asia Minor and spread from there (R. F. Spencer in Ciba Symposia, vol. 8, No. 7, 1946 with references).

p. [92]: The main source on Wang Mang is translated by C. B. Sargent, Wang Mang, a translation, Shanghai 1950 and H. H. Dubs, History of the Former Han Dynasty, vol, 3, Baltimore 1955.

p. [93]: This evaluation of the "Old character school" is not generally accepted. A quite different view is represented by Tjan Tjoe Som and R. P. Kramers and others who regard the differences between the schools as of a philological and not a political kind. I follow here most strongly the Chinese school as represented by Ku Chieh-kang and his friends, and my own studies.

p. [93]: Falsification of texts refers to changes in the Tso-chuan. My interpretation relies again upon Ku Chieh-kang, and Japanese astronomical studies (Ijima Tadao), but others, too, admit falsifications (H. H. Dubs); B. Karlgren and others regard the book as in its main body genuine. The other text mentioned here is the Chou-li which is certainly not written by Wang Mang (Jung-chai Hsü-pi 16), but heavily mis-used by him (in general see S. Uno).

p. [94]: I am influenced here by some of H. H. Dubs's studies. For this and the following period, the work by H. Bielenstein, The Restoration of the Han Dynasty, Stockholm 1953 and 1959 is the best monograph.—The "equalization offices" and their influence upon modern United States has been studied by B. Bodde in the Far Eastern Quarterly, vol. 5, 1946.

p. [95]: H. Bielenstein regards a great flood as one of the main reasons for the breakdown of Wang Mang's rule.

p. [98]: For the understanding of Chinese military colonies in Central Asia as well as for the understanding of military organization, civil administration and business, the studies of Lao Kan on texts excavated in Central Asia and Kansu are of greatest importance.

p. [101]: Mazdaistic elements in this rebellion have been mentioned mainly by H. H. Dubs. Zoroastrism (Zoroaster born 569 B.C.) and Mazdaism were eminently "political" religions from their very beginning on. Most scholars admit the presence of Mazdaism in China only from 519 on (Ishida Mikinosuke, O. Franke). Dubs's theory can be strengthened by astronomical material.—The basic religious text of this group, the "Book of the Great Peace" has been studied by W. Eichhron, H. Maspero and Ho Ch'ang-ch'ün.

p. [102]: For the "church" I rely mainly upon H. Maspero and W. Eichhorn.

p. [103]: I use here concepts developed by Cheng Chen-to and especially by Jung Chao-tsu.

p. [104]: Wang Ch'ung's importance has recently been mentioned again by J. Needham.

p. [105]: These "court poets" have their direct parallel in Western Asia. This trend, however, did not become typical in China.—On the general history of paper read A. Kroeber, Anthropology, New York 1948, p. 490f., and Dard Hunter, Paper Making, New York 1947 (2nd ed.).

Chapter Seven

p. [109]: The main historical sources for this period have been translated by Achilles Fang, The Chronicle of the Three Kingdoms, Cambridge, Mass. 1952; the epic which describes this time is C. H. Brewitt-Taylor, San Kuo, or Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Shanghai 1925.

p. [112]: For problems of migration and settlement in the South, we relied in part upon research by Ch'en Yüan and Wang Yi-t'ung.

p. [114]: For the history of the Hsiung-nu I am relying mainly upon my own studies.

p. [117]: This analysis of tribal structure is based mainly upon my own research; it differs in detail from the studies by E. Bacon, Obok, a Study of Social Structure in Eurasia, New York 1958, B. Vladimirtsov, O. Lattimore's Inner Asian Frontiers of China, New York 1951 (2nd edit.) and the studies by L. M. J. Schram, The Monguors of the Kansu-Tibetan Frontier, Philadelphia 1954 and 1957.

p. [118]: The use of the word "Huns" does not imply that we identify the early or the late Hsiung-nu with the European Huns. This question is still very much under discussion (O. Maenchen, W. Haussig, W. Henning, and others).

p. [119]: For the history of the early Hsien-pi states see the monograph by G. Schreiber, "The History of the Former Yen Dynasty", in Monomenta Serica, vol. 14 and 15 (1949-56). For all translations from Chinese Dynastic Histories of the period between 220 and 960 the Catalogue of Translations from the Chinese Dynastic Histories for the Period 220-960, by Hans H. Frankel, Berkeley 1957, is a reliable guide.

p. [125]: For the description of conditions in Turkestan, especially in Tunhuang, I rely upon my own studies, but studies by A. von Gabein, L. Ligeti, J. R. Ware, O. Franke and Tsukamoto Zenryû have been used, too.

p. [133]: These songs have first been studied by Hu Shih, later by Chinese folklorists.

p. [134]: For problems of Chinese Buddhism see Arthur F. Wright, Buddhism in Chinese History, Stanford 1959, with further bibliography. I have used for this and later periods, in addition to my own sociological studies, R. Michihata, J. Gernet, and Tamai Korehiro.—It is interesting that the rise of land-owning temples in India occurred at exactly the same time (R. S. Sharma in Journ. Econ. and Soc. Hist. Orient, vol. 1, 1958, p. 316). Perhaps even more interesting, but still unstudied, is the existence of Buddhist temples in India which owned land and villages which were donated by contributions from China.—For the use of foreign monks in Chinese bureaucracies, I have used M. Weber's theory as an interpretative tool.

p. 135: The important deities of Khotan Buddhism are Vaišramana and Kubera, (research by P. Demiéville, R. Stein and others).—Where, how, and why Hinayana and Mahayana developed as separate sects, is not yet studied. Also, a sociological analysis of the different Buddhist sects in China has not even been attempted yet.

p. [136]: Such public religious disputations were known also in India.

p. [137]: Analysis of the tribal names has been made by L. Bazin.

p. [138]-9: The personality type which was the ideal of the Toba corresponded closely to the type described by G. Geesemann, Heroische Lebensform, Berlin 1943.

p. [142]: The Toba occur in contemporary Western sources as Tabar, Tabgaç, Tafkaç and similar names. The ethnic name also occurs as a title (O. Pritsak, P. Pelliot, W. Haussig and others).—On the chün-t'ien system cf. the article by Wan Kuo-ting in E-tu Zen Sun, Chinese Social History, Washington 1956, p. 157-184. I also used Yoshimi Matsumoto and T'ang Ch'ang-ju.—Census fragments from Tunhuang have been published by L. Giles, Niida Noboru and other Japanese scholars.

p. [143]: On slaves for the earlier time see M. Wilbur, Slavery in China during the Former Han Dynasty, Chicago 1943. For our period Wang Yi-t'ung and especially Niida Noboru and Ch'ü T'ung-tsu. I used for this discussion Niida, Ch'ü and Tamai Korehiro.—For the pu-ch'ü I used in addition Yang Chung-i, H. Maspero, E. Balazs, W. Eichhorn. Yang's article is translated in E-tu Zen Sun's book, Chinese Social History, pp. 142-56.—The question of slaves and their importance in Chinese society has always been given much attention by Chinese Communist authors. I believe that a clear distinction between slaves and serfs is very important.

p. [145]: The political use of Buddhism has been asserted for Japan as well as for Korea and Tibet (H. Hoffmann, Quellen zur Geschichte der tibetischen Bon-Religion, Mainz 1950, p. 220 f.). A case could be made for Burma. In China, Buddhism was later again used as a tool by rulers (see below).

p. [146]: The first text in which such problems of state versus church are mentioned is Mou Tzŭ (P. Pelliot transl.). More recently, some of the problems have been studied by R. Michihata and E. Zürcher. Michihata also studied the temple slaves. Temple families were slightly different. They have been studied mainly by R. Michihata, J. Gernet and Wang Yi-t'ung. The information on T'an-yao is mainly in Wei-shu 114 (transl. J. Ware).—The best work on Yün-kang is now Seiichi Mizuno and Toshio Nagahiro, Yün-kang. The Buddhist Cave-Temples of the Fifth Century A.D. in North China, Kyoto 1951-6, thus far 16 volumes. For Chinese Buddhist art, the work by Tokiwa Daijô and Sekino Tadashi, Chinese Buddhist Monuments, Tokyo 1926-38, 5 volumes, is most profusely illustrated.—As a general reader for the whole of Chinese art, Alexander Soper and L. Sickman's The Art and Architecture of China, Baltimore 1956 may be consulted.

p. [147]: Zenryû Tsukamoto has analysed one such popular, revolutionary Buddhist text from the fifth century A.D. I rely here for the whole chapter mainly upon my own research.

p. [150]: On the Ephtalites (or Hephtalites) see R. Ghirshman and Enoki.—The carpet ceremony has been studied by P. Boodberg, and in a comparative way by L. Olschki, The Myth of Felt, Berkeley 1949.

p. [151]: For Yang Chien and his time see now A. F. Wright, "The Formation of Sui Ideology" in John K. Fairbank, Chinese Thought and Institutions, Chicago 1957, pp. 71-104.

p. [153]: The processes described here, have not yet been thoroughly analysed. A preliminary review of literature is given by H. Wiens, China's March towards the Tropics, Hamden 1954. I used Ch'en Yüan, Wang Yi-t'ung and my own research.

p. [154]: It is interesting to compare such hunting parks with the "paradeisos" (Paradise) of the Near East and with the "Garden of Eden".—Most of the data on gardens and manors have been brought together and

studied by Japanese scholars, especially by Katō Shigeru, some also by Ho Tzû-ch'üan.—The disappearance of "village commons" in China should be compared with the same process in Europe; both processes, however, developed quite differently. The origin of manors and their importance for the social structure of the Far East (China as well as Japan) is the subject of many studies in Japan and in modern China. This problem is connected with the general problem of feudalism East and West. The manor (chuang: Japanese shô) in later periods has been studied by Y. Sudô. H. Maspero also devotes attention to this problem. Much more research remains to be done.

p. [158]: This popular rebellion by Sun En has been studied by W. Eichhorn.

p. [163]: On foreign music in China see L. C. Goodrich and Ch'ü T'ung-tsu, H. G. Farmer, S. Kishibe and others.—Niida Noboru pointed out that musicians belonged to one of the lower social classes, but had special privileges because of their close relations to the rulers.

p. [164]: Meditative or Ch'an (Japanese: Zen) Buddhism in this period has been studied by Hu Shih, but further analysis is necessary.—The philosophical trends of this period have been analysed by E. Balazs.—Mention should also be made of the aesthetic-philosophical conversation which was fashionable in the third century, but in other form still occurred in our period, the so-called "pure talk" (ch'ing-t'an) (E. Balazs, H. Wilhelm and others).

Chapter Eight

p. [167]: For genealogies and rules of giving names, I use my own research and the study by W. Bauer.

p. [168]: For Emperor Wen Ti, I rely mainly upon A. F. Wright's above-mentioned article, but also upon O. Franke.

p. [169]: The relevant texts concerning the T'u-chüeh are available in French (E. Chavannes) and recently also in German translation (Liu Mau-tsai, Die chinesischen Nachrichten zur Geschichte der Ost-Tŭrken, Wiesbaden 1958, 2 vol.).—The Tölös are called T'e-lo in Chinese sources; the T'u-yü-hun are called Aza in Central Asian sources (P. Pelliot, A. Minorsky, F. W. Thomas, L. Hambis, et al.). The most important text concerning the T'u-yü-hun had been translated by Th. D. Caroll, Account of the T'u-yü-hun in the History of the Chin Dynasty, Berkeley 1953.

p. [171]: The transcription of names on this and on the other maps could not be adjusted to the transcription of the text for technical reasons.

p. [172]: It is possible that I have underestimated the role of Li Yüan. I relied here mainly upon O. Franke and upon W. Bingham's The Founding of the T'ang Dynasty, Baltimore 1941.

p. [173]: The best comprehensive study of T'ang economy in a Western language is still E. Balazs's work. I relied, however, strongly upon Wan Kuo-ting, Yang Chung-i, Katō Shigeru, J. Gernet, T. Naba, Niida Noboru, Yoshimi Matsumoto.

p. [173]-4: For the description of the administration I used my own studies and the work of R. des Rotours; for the military organization I used Kikuehi Hideo. A real study of Chinese army organization and strategy does not yet exist. The best detailed study, but for the Han period, is written by H. Maspero.

p. [174]: For the first occurrence of the title tu-tu we used W. Eichhorn; in the form tutuq the title occurs since 646 in Central Asia (J. Hamilton).

p. [177]: The name T'u-fan seems to be a transcription of Tüpöt which,

in turn, became our Tibet. (J. Hamilton).—The Uigurs are the Hui-ho or Hui-hu of Chinese sources.

p. [179]: On relations with Central Asia and the West see Ho Chien-min and Hsiang Ta, whose classical studies on Ch'ang-an city life have recently been strongly criticized by Chinese scholars.—Some authors (J. K. Rideout) point to the growing influence of eunuchs in this period.—The sources paint the pictures of the Empress Wu in very dark colours. A more detailed study of this period seems to be necessary.

p. [180]: The best study of "family privileges" (yin) in general is by E. A. Kracke, Civil Service in Early Sung China, Cambridge, Mass. 1953.

p. [180]-1: The economic importance of organized Buddhism has been studied by many authors, especially J. Gernet, Yang Lien-sheng, Ch'üan Han-sheng, K. Tamai and R. Michihata.

p. [182]: The best comprehensive study on T'ang prose in English is still E. D. Edwards, Chinese Prose Literature of the T'ang Period, London 1937-8, 2 vol. On Li T'ai-po and Po Chü-i we have well-written books by A. Waley, The Poetry and Career of Li Po, London 1951 and The Life and Times of Po Chü-i, London 1950.—On the "free poem" (tz'ŭ), which technically is not a free poem, see A. Hoffmann and Hu Shih. For the early Chinese theatre, the classical study is still Wang Kuo-wei's analysis, but there is an almost unbelievable number of studies constantly written in China and Japan, especially on the later theatre and drama.

p. [184]: Conditions at the court of Hsüan Tsung and the life of Yang Kui-fei have been studied by Howard Levy and others, An Lu-shan's importance mainly by E. G. Pulleyblank, The Background of the Rebellion of An Lu-shan, London 1955.

p. [187]: The tax reform of Yang Yen has been studied by K. Hino; the most important figures in T'ang economic history are Liu Yen (studied by Chü Ch'ing-yüan) and Lu Chih (754-805; studied by E. Balazs and others).

p. [187]-8: The conditions at the time of this persecution are well described by E. O. Reischauer, Ennin's Travels in T'ang China, New York 1955, on the basis of his Ennin's Diary. The Record of a Pilgrimage to China, New York 1955. The persecution of Buddhism has been analysed in its economic character by Niida Noboru and other Japanese scholars.—Metal statues had to be delivered to the Salt and Iron Office in order to be converted into cash; iron statues were collected by local offices for the production of agricultural implements; figures in gold, silver or other rare materials were to be handed over to the Finance Office. Figures made of stone, clay or wood were not affected (Michihata).

p. [189]: It seems important to note that popular movements are often not led by simple farmers or members of the lower classes. There are other salt merchants and persons of similar status known as leaders.

p. [190]: For the Sha-t'o, I am relying upon my own research. Tatars are the Ta-tan of the Chinese sources. The term is here used in a narrow sense.

p. [195]: Many Chinese and Japanese authors have a new period begin with the early (Ch'ien Mu) or the late tenth century (T'ao Hsi-sheng, Li Chien-nung), while others prefer a cut already in the Middle of the T'ang Dynasty (Teng Ch'u-min, Naito Torajiro). For many Marxists, the period which we called "Modern Times" is at best a sub-period within a larger period which really started with what we called "Medieval China".

p. [196]: For the change in the composition of the gentry, I am using my own research.—For clan rules, clan foundations, etc., I used D. C. Twitchett, J. Fischer, Hu Hsien-chin, Ch'ü T'ung-tsu, Niida Noboru

and T. Makino. The best analysis of the clan rules is by Wang Hui-chen in D. S. Nivison, Confucianism in Action, Stanford 1959, p. 63-96.—I do not regard such marriage systems as "survivals" of ancient systems which have been studied by M. Granet and systematically analysed by C. Lévy-Strauss in his Les structures élémentaires de la parenté, Paris 1949, pp. 381-443. In some cases, the reasons for the establishment of such rules can still be recognized.—A detailed study of despotism in China still has to be written. K. A. Wittfogel's Oriental Despotism, New Haven 1957 does not go into the necessary detailed work.

p. [197]: The problem of social mobility is now under study, after preliminary research by K. A. Wittfogel, E. Kracke, myself and others. E. Kracke, Ho Ping-ti, R. M. Marsh and I are now working on this topic.—For the craftsmen and artisans, much material has recently been collected by Chinese scholars. I have used mainly Li Chien-nung and articles in Li-shih yen-chiu 1955, No. 3 and in Mem. Inst. Orient. Cult. 1956.—On the origin of guilds see Katō Shigeru; a general study of guilds and their function has not yet been made (preliminary work by P. Maybon, H. B. Morse, J. St. Burgess, K. A. Wittfogel and others). Comparisons with Near-Eastern guilds on the one hand and with Japanese guilds on the other, are quite interesting but parallels should not be over-estimated. The tong of U. S. Chinatowns (tang in Mandarin) are late and organizations of businessmen only (S. Yokoyama and Laai Yi-faai). They are not the same as the hui-kuan.

p. [198]: For the merchants I used Ch'ü T'ung-tsu, Sung Hsi and Wada Kiyoshi.—For trade, I used extensively Ch'üan Han-sheng and J. Kuwabara.—On labour legislation in early modern times I used Ko Ch'ang-chi and especially Li Chien-nung, also my own studies.—On strikes I used Katō Shigeru and modern Chinese authors.—The problem of "vagrants" has been taken up by Li Chien-nung who always refers to the original sources and to modern Chinese research.—The growth of cities, perhaps the most striking event in this period, has been studied for the earlier part of our period by Katō Shigeru. Li Chien-nung also deals extensively with investments in industry and agriculture. The problem as to whether China would have developed into an industrial society without outside stimulus is much discussed by Marxist authors in China.

p. [199]: On money policy see Yang Lien-sheng, Katō Shigeru and others.

p. [200]: The history of one of the Southern Dynasties has been translated by Ed. H. Schafer, The Empire of Min, Tokyo 1954; Schafer's annotations provide much detail for the cultural and economic conditions of the coastal area.—For tea and its history, I use my own research; for tea trade a study by K. Kawakami and an article in the Frontier Studies, vol. 3, 1943.—Salt consumption according to H. T. Fei, Earthbound China, 1945, p. 163.

p. [201]: For salt I used largely my own research. For porcelain production Li Chien-nung and other modern articles.—On paper, the classical study is Th. F. Carter, The Invention of Printing in China, New York 1925 (a revised edition now published by L. C. Goodrich).

p. [202]: For paper money in the early period, see Yang Lien-sheng, Money and Credit in China, Cambridge, Mass., 1952. Although the origin of paper money seems to be well established, it is interesting to note that already in the third century A.D. money made of paper was produced and was burned during funeral ceremonies to serve as financial help for the dead. This money was, however, in the form of coins.—On

iron money see Yang Lien-sheng; I also used an article in Tung-fang tsa-chih, vol. 35, No. 10.

p. [203]: For the Kitan (Chines: Ch'i-tan) and their history see K. A. Wittfogel and Feng Chia-sheng, History of Chinese Society. Liao, Philadelphia 1949.

p. [204]: For these dynasties, I rely upon my own research.—Niida Noboru and Katō Shigeru have studied adoption laws; our specific case has in addition been studied by M. Kurihara. This system of adoptions is non-Chinese and has its parallels among Turkish tribes (A. Kollantz, Abdulkadir Inan, Osman Turan).

p. [207]: For the persecution I used K. Tamai and my own research.

p. [211]: This is based mainly upon my own research.—The remark on tax income is from Ch'üan Han-sheng.

p. [212]: Fan Chung-yen has been studied recently by J. Fischer and D. Twitchett, but these notes on price policies are based upon my own work.—I regard the statement, that it was the gentry which prevented the growth of an industrial society—a statement which has often been made before—as preliminary, and believe that further research, especially in the growth of cities and urban institutions may lead to quite different explanations.—On estate management I relied on Y. Sudô's work.

p. [213]: Research on place names such as mentioned here, has not yet been systematically done.—On i-chuang I relied upon the work by T. Makino and D. Twitchett.—This process of tax-evasion has been used by K. A. Wittfogel (1938) to construct a theory of a crisis cycle in China. I do not think that such far-reaching conclusions are warranted.

p. [214]: This "law" was developed on the basis of Chinese materials from different periods as well as on materials from other parts of Asia.—In the study of tenancy, cases should be studied in which wealthier farmers rent additional land which gets cultivated by farm labourers. Such cases are well known from recent periods, but have not yet been studied in earlier periods. At the same time, the problem of farm labourers should be investigated. Such people were common in the Sung time. Research along these lines could further clarify the importance of the so-called "guest families" (k'o-hu) which were alluded to in these pages. They constituted often one third of the total population in the Sung period. The problem of migration and mobility might also be clarified by studying the k'o-hu.

p. [215]: For Wang An-shih, the most comprehensive work is still H. Williamson's Wang An-shih, London 1935, 3 vol., but this work in no way exhausts the problems. We have so much personal data on Wang that a psychological study could be attempted; and we have since Williamson's time much deeper insight into the reforms and theories of Wang. I used, in addition to Williamson, O. Franke, and my own research.

p. [216]: Based mainly upon Ch'ü T'ung-tsu.—For the social legislation see Hsü I-t'ang; for economic problems I used Ch'üan Han-sheng, Ts'en Chung-mien and Liu Ming-shu.—Most of these relief measures had their precursors in the T'ang period.

p. [217]: It is interesting to note that later Buddhism gave up its "social gospel" in China. Buddhist circles in Asian countries at the present time attempt to revive this attitude.

p. [218]: For slaughtering I used A. Hulsewé; for greeting R. Michihata; on law Ch'ü T'ung-tsu; on philosophy I adapted ideas from Chan Wing-sit.

p. [219]: A comprehensive study of Chu Hsi is a great desideratum. Thus far, we have in English mainly the essays by Feng Yu-lan (transl. and annotated by D. Bodde) in the Harvard Journal of Asiat. Stud., vol. 7, 1942. T. Makino emphasized Chu's influence upon the Far East, J. Needham his interest in science.

p. [220]: For Su Tung-p'o as general introduction see Lin Yutang, The Gay Genius. The Life and Times of Su Tungpo, New York 1947.—For painting, I am using concepts of A. Soper here.

p. [222]: For this period the standard work is K. A. Wittfogel and Feng Chia-sheng, History of Chinese Society, Liao, Philadelphia 1949.—Po-hai had been in tributary relations with the dynasties of North China before its defeat, and resumed these from 932 on; there were even relations with one of the South Chinese states; in the same way, Kao-li continuously played one state against the other (M. Rogers et al.).

p. [223]: On the Kara-Kitai see Appendix to Wittfogel-Feng.

p. [228]: For the Hakka, I relied mainly upon Lo Hsiang-lin; for Chia Ssu-tao upon H. Franke.

p. [229]: The Ju-chên (Jurchen) are also called Nü-chih and Nü-chen, but Ju-chen seems to be correct (Studia Serica, vol. 3, No. 2).

Chapter Ten

p. [233]: I use here mainly Meng Ssu-liang, but also others, such as Chü Ch'ing-yüan and Li Chien-nung.—The early political developments are described by H. D. Martin, The Rise of Chingis Khan and his Conquest of North China, Baltimore 1950.

p. [236]: I am alluding here to such Taoist sects as the Cheng-i-chiao (Sun K'o-k'uan and especially the study in Kita Aziya gakuhō, vol. 2).

pp. [236]-7: For taxation and all other economic questions I have relied upon Wan Kuo-ting and especially upon H. Franke. The first part of the main economic text is translated and annotated by H. F. Schurmann, Economic Structure of the Yüan Dynasty, Cambridge, Mass., 1956.

p. [237]: On migrations see T. Makino and others.—For the system of communications during the Mongol time and the privileges of merchants, I used P. Olbricht.

p. [238]: For the popular rebellions of this time, I used a study in the Bull. Acad. Sinica, vol. 10, 1948, but also Meng Ssu-liang and others.

p. [239]: On the White Lotos Society (Pai-lien-hui) see note to previous page and an article by Hagiwara Jumpei.

p. [240]: H. Serruys, The Mongols in China during the Hung-wu Period, Bruges 1959, has studied in this book and in an article the fate of isolated Mongol groups in China after the breakdown of the dynasty.

pp. [241]-2: The travel report of Ch'ang-ch'un has been translated by A. Waley, The Travels of an Alchemist, London 1931.

pp. [242]: Hsi-hsiang-chi has been translated by S. I. Hsiung. The Romance of the Western Chamber, London 1935. All important analytic literature on drama and theatre is written by Chinese and Japanese authors, especially by Yoshikawa Kôjirô.—For Bon and early Lamaism, I used H. Hoffmann.

p. [243]: Lamaism in Mongolia disappeared later, however, and was re-introduced in the reformed form (Tsong-kha-pa, 1358-1419) in the sixteenth century. See R. J. Miller, Monasteries and Culture Change in Inner Mongolia, Wiesbaden 1959.

p. [245]: Much more research is necessary to clarify Japanese-Chinese relations in this period, especially to determine the size of trade. Good

material is in the article by S. Iwao. Important is also S. Sakuma and an article in Li-shih yen-chiu 1955, No. 3. For the loss of coins, I relied upon D. Brown.

p. [246]: The necessity of transports of grain and salt was one of the reasons for the emergence of the Hsin-an and Hui-chou merchants. The importance of these developments is only partially known (studies mainly by H. Fujii and in Li-shih-yen-chiu 1955, No. 3). Data are also in an unpublished thesis by Ch. Mac Sherry, The Impairment of the Ming Tributary System, and in an article by Wang Ch'ung-wu.

p. [247]: The tax system of the Ming has been studied among others by Liang Fang-chung. Yoshiyuki Suto analysed the methods of tax evasion in the periods before the reform. For the land grants, I used Wan Kuo-ting's data.

p. [248]: Based mainly upon my own research. On the progress of agriculture wrote Li Chien-nung and also Katō Shigeru and others.

p. [250]: I believe that further research would discover that the "agrarian revolution" was a key factor in the economic and social development of China. It probably led to another change in dietary habits; it certainly led to a greater labour input per person, i.e. a higher number of full working days per year than before. It may be—but only further research can try to show this—that the "agrarian revolution" turned China away from technology and industry.—On cotton and its importance see the studies by M. Amano, and some preliminary remarks by P. Pelliot.

p. [250]-1: Detailed study of Central Chinese urban centres in this time is a great desideratum. My remarks here have to be taken as very preliminary. Notice the special character of the industries mentioned!—The porcelain centre of Ching-tê-chen was inhabited by workers and merchants (70-80 per cent of population); there were more than 200 private kilns.—On indented labour see Li Chien-nung, H. Iwami and Y. Yamane.

p. [253]: On pien-wen I used R. Michihata, and for this general discussion R. Irvin, The Evolution of a Chinese Novel, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, and studies by J. Jaworski and J. Prušek. Many texts of pien-wen and related styles have been found in Tunhuang and have been recently republished by Chinese scholars.

p. [254]: Shui-hu-chuan has been translated by Pearl Buck, All Men are Brothers. Parts of Hsi-yu-chi have been translated by A. Waley, Monkey, London 1946. San-kuo yen-i is translated by C. H. Brewitt-Taylor, San Kuo, or Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Shanghai 1925 (a new edition just published). A purged translation of Chin-p'ing-mei is published by Fr. Kuhn Chin P'ing Mei, New York 1940.

p. [255]: Even the "murder story" was already known in Ming time. An example is R. H. van Gulik, Dee Gong An. Three Murder Cases solved by Judge Dee, Tokyo 1949.

p. [256]: For a special group of block-prints see R. H. van Gulik, Erotic Colour Prints of the Ming Dynasty, Tokyo 1951. This book is also an excellent introduction into Chinese psychology.

p. [257]: Here I use work done by David Chan.

p. [258]: I use here the research of J. J. L. Duyvendak; the reasons for the end of such enterprises, as given here, may not exhaust the problem. It may not be without relevance that Cheng came from a Muslim family. His father was a pilgrim (Bull. Chin. Studies, vol. 3, pp. 131-70). Further research is desirable.—Concerning folk-tales, I use my own research. The main Buddhist tales are the Jataka stories. They are still used by Burmese Buddhists in the same context.

p. [260]: The Oirat (Uyrat, Ojrot, Ölöt) were a confederation of four tribal groups: Khosud, Dzungar, Dörbet and Turgut.

p. [261]: I regard this analysis of Ming political history as unsatisfactory, but to my knowledge no large-scale analysis has been made.—For Wang Yang-ming I use mainly my own research.

p. [262]: For the coastal salt-merchants I used Lo Hsiang-lin's work.

p. [263]: On the rifles I used P. Pelliot. There is a large literature on the use of explosives and the invention of cannons, especially L. C. Goodrich and Feng Chia-sheng in Isis, vol. 36, 1946 and 39, 1948; also G. Sarton, Li Ch'iao-p'ing, J. Prušek, J. Needham, and M. Ishida; a comparative, general study is by K. Huuri, Studia Orientalia vol. 9, 1941.—For the earliest contacts of Wang with Portuguese, I used Chang Wei-hua's monograph.—While there is no satisfactory, comprehensive study in English on Wang, for Lu Hsiang-shan the book by Huang Siu-ch'i, Lu Hsiang-shan, a Twelfth-century Chinese Idealist Philosopher, New Haven 1944, can be used.

p. [264]: For Tao-yen, I used work done by David Chan.—Large parts of the Yung-lo ta-tien are now lost (Kuo Po-kung, Yüan T'ung-li studied this problem).

p. [265]: Yen-ta's Mongol name is Altan Qan (died 1582), leader of the Tümet. He is also responsible for the re-introduction of Lamaism into Mongolia (1574).—For the border trade I used Hou Jen-chih; for the Shansi bankers Ch'en Ch'i-t'ien and P. Maybon. For the beginnings of the Manchu see Fr. Michael, The Origins of Manchu Rule in China, Baltimore 1942.

p. [266]: M. Ricci's diary (Matthew Ricci, China in the Sixteenth Century, The Journals of M. Ricci, transl. by L. J. Gallagher, New York 1953) gives much insight into the life of Chinese officials in this period. Recently, J. Needham has tried to show that Ricci and his followers did not bring much which was not already known in China, but that they actually attempted to prevent the Chinese from learning about the Copernican theory.

p. [267]: For Coxinga I used M. Eder's study.—The Szechwan rebellion was led by Chang Hsien-chung (1606-1647); I used work done by James B. Parsons. Cheng T'ien-t'ing, Sun Yueh and others have recently published the important documents concerning all late Ming peasant rebellions.—For the Tung-lin academy see Ch. O. Hucker in J. K. Fairbank, Chinese Thought and Institutions, Chicago 1957. A different interpretation is indicated by Shang Yüeh in Li-shih yen-chiu 1955, No. 3.

p. [268]: Work on the "academies" (shu-yüan) in the earlier time is done by Ho Yu-shen.

p. [273]-4: Based upon my own, as yet unfinished research.

p. [274]: The population of 1953 as given here, includes Chinese outside of mainland China. The population of mainland China was 582.6 millions. If the rate of increase of about 2 per cent per year has remained the same, the population of mainland China in 1960 may be close to 680 million. In general see P. T. Ho. Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953, Cambridge, Mass., 1960.

p. [276]: Based upon my own research.—A different view of the development of Chinese industry is found in Norman Jacobs, Modern Capitalism and Eastern Asia, Hong Kong 1958. Jacobs attempted a comparison of China with Japan and with Europe. Different again is Marion Levy and Shih Kuo-heng, The Rise of the Modern Chinese Business Class,

New York 1949. Both books are influenced by the sociological theories of T. Parsons.

p. [277]: The Dzungars (Dsunghar; Chun-ko-erh) are one of the four Ölöt (Oirat) groups. I am here using studies by E. Haenisch and W. Fuchs.

p. [278]: Tibetan-Chinese relations have been studied by L. Petech, China and Tibet in the Early 18th Century, Leiden 1950. A collection of data is found in M. W. Fisher and L. E. Rose, England, India, Nepal, Tibet, China, 1765-1958, Berkeley 1959. For diplomatic relations and tributary systems of this period, I referred to J. K. Fairbank and Teng Ssu-yü.

p. [279]: For Ku Yen-wu, I used the work by H. Wilhelm.—A man who deserves special mention in this period is the scholar Huang Tsung-hsi (1610-1695) as the first Chinese who discussed the possibility of a non-monarchic form of government in his treatise of 1662. For him see Lin Mou-sheng, Men and Ideas, New York 1942, and especially W. T. de Bary in J. K. Fairbank, Chinese Thought and Institutions, Chicago 1957.

p. [280]-1: On Liang see now J. R. Levenson, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China, London 1959.

p. [282]: It should also be pointed out that the Yung-cheng emperor was personally more inclined towards Lamaism.—The Kalmuks are largely identical with the above-mentioned Ölöt.

p. [286]: The existence of hong is known since 1686, see P'eng Tse-i and Wang Chu-an's recent studies. For details on foreign trade see H. B. Morse, The Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China 1635-1834, Oxford 1926, 4 vols., and J. K. Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast. The Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842-1854, Cambridge, Mass., 1953, 2 vols.—For Lin I used G. W. Overdijkink's study.

p. [287]: On customs read St. F. Wright, Hart and the Chinese Customs, Belfast 1950.

p. [288]: For early industry see A. Feuerwerker, China's Early Industrialization: Sheng Hsuan-huai (1844-1916), Cambridge, Mass., 1958.

p. [289]: The Chinese source materials for the Mohammedan revolts have recently been published, but an analysis of the importance of the revolts still remains to be done.—On T'ai-p'ing much has been published, especially in the last years in China, so that all documents are now available. I used among other studies, details brought out by Lo Hsiang-lin and Jen Yu-wen.

p. [291]: For Tsêng Kuo-fan see W. J. Hail, Tsêng Kuo-fan and the T'ai-p'ing Rebellion, Hew Haven 1927, but new research on him is about to be published.—The Nien-fei had some connection with the White Lotos, and were known since 1814, see Chiang Siang-tseh, The Nien Rebellion, Seattle 1954.

p. [292]: Little is known about Salars, Dungans and Yakub Beg's rebellion, mainly because relevant Turkish sources have not yet been studied. On Salars see L. Schram, The Monguors of Kansu, Philadelphia 1954, p. 23 and P. Pelliot; on Dungans see I. Grebe.

p. [293]: On Tso Tsung-t'ang see G. Ch'en, Tso Tung T'ang, Pioneer Promotor of the Modern Dockyard and Woollen Mill in China, Peking 1938, and Yenching Journal of Soc. Studies, vol. 1.

p. [294]: For the T'ung-chih period, see now Mary C. Wright, The Last Stand of Chinese Conservativism. The T'ung-chih Restoration, 1862-1874, Stanford 1957.

p. [295]: Ryukyu is Chinese: Liu-ch'iu; Okinawa is one of the islands of this group.—Formosa is Chinese: T'ai-wan (Taiwan). Korea is Chinese: Chao-hsien, Japanese: Chôsen.

p. [297]: M. C. Wright has shown the advisers around the ruler before the Empress Dowager realized the severity of the situation.—Much research is under way to study the beginning of industrialization of Japan, and my opinions have changed greatly, due to the research done by Japanese scholars and such Western scholars as H. Rosovsky and Th. Smith. The eminent role of the lower aristocracy has been established. Similar research for China has not even seriously started. My remarks are entirely preliminary.

p. [298]: For K'ang Yo-wei, I use work done by O. Franke and others. See M. E. Cameron, The Reform Movement in China, 1898-1921, Stanford 1921. The best bibliography for this period is J. K. Fairbank and Liu Kwang-ching, Modern China: A Bibliographical Guide to Chinese Works, 1898-1937, Cambridge, Mass., 1950. The political history of the time, as seen by a Chinese scholar, is found in Li Chien-nung, The Political History of China 1840-1928, Princeton 1956.—For the social history of this period see Chang Chung-li, The Chinese Gentry, Seattle 1955.—For the history of Tzŭ Hsi Bland-Backhouse, China under the Empress Dowager, Peking 1939 (Third ed.) is antiquated, but still used For some of K'ang Yo-wei's ideas, see now K'ang Yo-wei: Ta T'ung Shu. The One World Philosophy of K'ang Yu Wei, London 1957.

Chapter Eleven

p. [305]: I rely here partly upon W. Franke's recent studies. For Sun Yat-sen (Sun I-hsien; also called Sun Chung-shan) see P. Linebarger, Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese Republic, Cambridge, Mass., 1925 and his later The Political Doctrines of Sun Yat-sen, Baltimore 1937.—Independently, Atatürk in Turkey developed a similar theory of the growth of democracy.

p. [306]: On student activities see Kiang Wen-han, The Ideological Background of the Chinese Student Movement, New York 1948.

p. [307]: On Hu Shih see his own The Chinese Renaissance, Chicago 1934 and J. de Francis, Nationalism and Language Reform in China, Princeton 1950.

p. [310]: The declaration of Independence of Mongolia had its basis in the early treaty of the Mongols with the Manchus (1636): "In case the Tai Ch'ing Dynasty falls, you will exist according to previous basic laws" (R. J. Miller, Monasteries and Culture Change in Inner Mongolia, Wiesbaden 1959, p. 4).

p. [315]: For the military activities see F. F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949, Princeton 1956. A marxist analysis of the 1927 events is Manabendra Nath Roy, Revolution and Counter-Revolution in China, Calcutta 1946; the relevant documents are translated in C. Brandt, B. Schwartz, J. K. Fairbank, A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, Cambridge, Mass., 1952.

Chapter Twelve

For Mao Tse-tung, see B. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, second ed., Cambridge, Mass., 1958. For Mao's early years; see J. E. Rue, Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 1927-1935, Stanford 1966. For the civil war, see L. M. Chassin, The Communist Conquest of China: A History of

the Civil War, 1945-1949, Cambridge, Mass., 1965. For brief information on communist society, see Franz Schurmann and Orville Schell, The China Reader, vol. 3, Communist China, New York 1967. For problems of organization, see Franz Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China, Berkeley 1966. For cultural and political problems, see Ho Ping-ti, China in Crisis, vol. 1, China's Heritage and the Communist Political System, Chicago 1968. For a sympathetic view of rural life in communist China, see J. Myrdal, Report from a Chinese Village, New York 1965; for Taiwanese village life, see Bernard Gallin, Hsin Hsing, Taiwan: A Chinese Village in Change, Berkeley 1966.

INDEX

• Abahai, ruler, [269]
• Abdication, [92]-3, [182], [227], [302]
• Aborigines, [323]
• Absolutism, [196], [208], [210], [232] ff., [247]
• (see Despotism, Dictator, Emperor, Monarchy)
• Academia Sinica, [307]
• Academies, [221], [255], [267]-8, [272]
• Administration, [64], [82]-4, [138] ff, [142], [144], [154], [170], [173]-4, [210];
• provincial, [85]
• (see Army, Feudalism, Bureaucracy)
• Adobe (Mud bricks), [16], [19], [32]
• Adoptions, [204]
• Afghanistan, [146]-7
• Africa, [201], [259]
• Agriculture, development, [54], [198] ff., [249]-50, [275];
• Origin of, [10], [11];
• of Shang, [21];
• shifting (denshiring), [32]
• (see Wheat, Millet, Rice, Plough, Irrigation, Manure, Canals, Fallow)
• An Ti, ruler of Han, [92]
• Ainu, tribes, [9]
• Ala-shan mountain range, [88]
• Alchemy, [49], [104]
• (see) Elixir
• Alexander the Great, [146]-7
• America, [276], [300]
• (see) United States
• Amithabha, god, [188]
• Amur, river, [278]
• An Chi-yeh, rebel, [293]
• An Lu-shan, rebel, [184] ff., [189], [195]
• Analphabetism, [65]
• Anarchists, [47]
• Ancestor, cult, [24], [32]
• Aniko, sculptor, [243]
• Animal style, [17]
• Annam (Vietnam), [97], [160], [209], [219], [234], [258], [265], [295], [330]
• Anyang (Yin-ch'ü), [19], [22]
• Arabia, [258]; Arabs, [104], [178], [183], [185], [266]
• Architecture, [147], [256]
• Aristocracy, [25], [26], [36], [122], [195]
• (see Nobility, Feudalism)
• Army, cost of, [211];
• organization of, [24], [118], [174], [236];
• size of, [53];
• Tibetan, [127]
• (see War, Militia, tu-tu, pu-ch'ü)
• Art, Buddhist, [146]-7
• (see Animal style, Architecture, Pottery, Painting, Sculpture, Wood-cut)
• Arthashastra, book, attributed to Kautilya, [59]
• Artisans, [19], [26], [31], [33], [56], [79];
• Organizations of, [58]
• (see Guilds, Craftsmen)
• Assimilation, [144], [152], [166], [244]
• (see Colonization)
• Astronomy, [266]
• Austroasiats, [10], [12]
• Austronesians, [12]
• Avars, tribe, [140]
• (see Juan-juan)
• Axes, prehistoric, [10]
• Axis, policy, [51]
• Babylon, [65]
• Baghdad, city, [201]
• Balasagun, city, [224]
• Ballads, [133]
• Banks, [265], [305]
• Banner organization, [268], [291]
• Barbarians (Foreigners), [109], [122], [246], [278]
• Bastards, [41]
• Bath, [217]
• Beg, title, [289]
• Beggar, [239]
• Bengal, [250], [283]
• Boat festival, [23]
• Bokhara (Bukhara), city, [46]
• Bon, religion, [242]
• Bondsmen, [31], [117], [143]
• (see pu-ch'ü, Serfs, Feudalism)
• Book, printing, [201]; B burning, [66]
• Böttger, inventor, [256]
• Boxer rebellion, [299]
• Boycott, [314]
• Brahmans, Indian caste, [34], [106]
• Brain drain, [326]
• Bronze, [17], [20], [22], [29], [33], [40], [106], [180]-1
• (see Metal, Copper)
• Brothel (Tea-house), [163], [217]
• Buddha, [46];
• Buddhism, [20], [106], [108]-9, [125], [127], [133] ff., [145] ff., [150], [161], [164], [168], [178], [179] ff., [188], [217], [218], [236], [257], [259], [266], [306]
• (see Ch'an, Vinaya, Sects, Amithabha, Maitreya, Hinayana,
• Mahayana, Monasteries, Church, Pagoda, Monks, Lamaism)
• Budget, [168], [175], [209], [210], [215], [261]
• (see Treasury, Inflation, Deflation)
• Bullfights, [182]
• Bureaucracy, [24], [33], [63], [72];
• religious B, [25]
• (see Administration; Army)
• Burgher (liang-min), [143], [183], [216]
• Burma, [12], [146], [234], [248], [265], [269], [283], [318], [319], [322], [329], [330]
• Businessmen, [64]
• (see Merchants, Trade)
• Byzantium, [177]
• Calcutta, city, [283]
• Caliph (Khaliph), [185]
• Cambodia, [234], [295]
• Canals, [170], [246]; Imperial C, [168], [235]-6
• (see Irrigation)
• Cannons, [232], [263]
• Canton (Kuang-chou), city, [67], [77], [89], [97], [159], [190], [209], [237], [262], [266], [286], [287], [308], [309], [312], [314]
• Capital of Empire, [144]
• (see Ch'ang-an, Si-an, Lo-yang, etc.)
• Capitalism, [180]-1, [212], [297], [303]
• (see Investments, Banks, Money, Economy, etc.)
• Capitulations (privileges of foreign nations), [273], [287], [290], [312], [316]
• Caravans, [86], [98], [121], [129], [181]
• (see Silk road, Trade)
• Carpet, [243]
• Castes, [106]
• (see Brahmans)
• Castiglione, G., painter, [281]
• Cattle, breeding, [155]
• Cavalry, [53]
• (see Horse)
• Cave temples, [146]-7
• (see Lung-men, Yün-kang, Tun-huang)
• Censorate, [84]
• Censorship, [254]
• Census, [143]
• (see Population)
• Central Asia, [25], [87]-88, [90], [113], [119], [135], [169], [179], [209], [259], [277], [330]
• (see Turkestan, Sinkiang, Tarim, City States)
• Champa, State, [249]
• Ch'an (Zen), meditative Buddhism, [164], [175], [218], [263]
• Chan-kuo Period (Contending States), [51] ff.
• Chancellor, [82]
• Ch'ang-an, capital of China, [123], [127], [129], [167], [172], [176], [184], [185], [190], [207]
• (see Sian)
• Chang Ch'ien, ambassador, [88]
• Chang Chü-chan, teacher, [265]
• Chang Hsien-chung, rebel, [268], [271]
• Chang Hsüeh-liang, war lord, [316]
• Chang Ling, popular leader, [101], [136], [147], [264]
• Chang Ti, ruler, [99]
• Chang Tsai, philosopher, [218]
• Chang Tso-lin, war lord, [312], [316]
• Chao, state, [53], [63];
• Earlier Chao, [124];
• Later Chao, [124]
• Chao K'uang-yin (T'ai Tsu), ruler, [208], [209]
• Chao Meng-fu, painter, [243]
• Charters, [30]
• Chefoo Convention, [295]
• Ch'en, dynasty, [162] ff.
• Ch'en Pa-hsien, ruler, [162]
• Ch'en Tu-hsiu, intellectual, [307], [320]
• Ch'eng Hao, philosopher, [219]
• Cheng Ho, navy commander, [258]
• Ch'eng I, philosopher, [219]
• Cheng-i-chiao, religion, [263]-4
• Ch'eng Ti, ruler of Han, [92];
• ruler of Chin, [156]
• Ch'eng Tsu, ruler of Manchu, [257]
• Ch'eng-tu, city, [110], [120]
• Ch'i, state, [40];
• short dynasty, [190], [225];
• Northern Ch'i, [148] ff., [149], [150] ff., [161], [162], [168]
• Ch'i-fu, clan, [129] ff.
• Chi-nan, city, [55]
• Ch'i-tan (see Kitan)
• Ch'i Wan-nien, leader, [118]
• Chia, clan, [120]
• Chia-ch'ing, period, [285]
• Chia Ssŭ-tao, politician, [228]
• Ch'iang, tribes, [21], [118] (see Tanguts)
• Chiang Kai-shek, president, [264], [311], [314], [315], [316], [317], [318], [321], [322], [324], [326]
• Ch'ien-lung, period, [272], [282], [284], [285]
• ch'ien-min (commoners), [143]
• Chin, dynasty, [229] ff.
• (see Juchên); dynasty, [114], [115] ff.;
• Eastern Chin dynasty, [152] ff., [155] ff.;
• Later Chin dynasty, [139]
• Ch'in, state, [36];
• Ch'in, dynasty, [53], [59], [60], [62] ff., [80];
• Earlier Ch'in dynasty, [126], [157];
• Later Ch'in dynasty, [129], [139], [159];
• Western Ch'in dynasty, [129], [140]
• Ch'in K'ui, politician, [226]
• Chinese, origin of, [2], [8] ff.
• Ching Fang, scholar, [255]
• Ching-tê (-chen), city, [201], [256]
• ching-t'ien system, [33]
• Ching Tsung, Manchu ruler, [260]
• Ch'in Ying, painter, [255]
• Chou, dynasty, [29] f., [76];
• short Chou dynasty, [180];
• Later Chou dynasty, [206];
• Northern Chou dynasty, [148], [149], [150] ff., [169], [172]
• Chou En-lai, politician, [320]
• Chou-k'ou-tien, archaeological site, [8]
• Chou-kung (Duke of Chou), [33], [93]
• Chou-li, book, [33]
• Chou Tun-i, philosopher, [218]
• Christianity, [179], [266], [282], [290]
• (see Nestorians, Jesuits, Missionaries)
• Chronology, [7], [335]
• Ch'u, state, [38], [199] ff., [205]
• Chu Ch'üan-chung, general and ruler, [190], [191], [203], [204]
• Chu Hsi, philosopher, [219], [263], [279]
• Chu-ko Liang, general, [111]
• Chu Tê general, [321]
• Chu Tsai-yü, scholar, [255]
• Chu Yüan-chang (T'ai Tsu), ruler, [239] ff., [243] ff., [246], [247], [256], [257]
• chuang, [181], [212]-13, [345]
• (see Manors, Estates)
• Chuang Tzŭ;, philosopher, [47]-8, [50]
• Chün-ch'en, ruler, [88]
• Ch'un-ch'iu, book, [43], [80]
• chün-t'ien system (land equalization system), [142]-3, [173], [187]
• chün-tzü (gentleman), [42], [44]
• Chung-ch'ang T'ung, philosopher, [50]
• Chungking (Ch'ung-ch'ing), city, [38], [110], [318]
• Church, Buddhistic, [146], [147], [188], [218];
• Taoistic, [136], [147]
• (see Chang Ling)
• Cities, [36], [37];
• spread and growth of cities, [31], [55]-6, [175], [229], [250]-1, [252];
• origin of cities, [19];
• twin cities, [33]
• (see City states, Ch'ang-an, Sian, Lo-yang, Hankow, etc.)
• City States (of Central Asia), [97], [132], [177]
• Clans, [31], [196]
• Classes, social classes, [79], [143]-4, [207], [216]
• (see Castes, ch'ien-min, liang-min, Gentry, etc.)
• Climate, changes, [9]
• Cliques, [91], [160], [197], [257], [261]
• Cloisonné, [256]
• Cobalt, [221], [256]
• Coins, [78], [94], [116], [199], [209]
• (see Money)
• Colonialism, [278], [283], [329]
• (see Imperialism)
• Colonization, [97], [102], [111], [116], [153], [209], [248] ff.
• (see Migration, Assimilation)
• Colour prints, [256]
• Communes, [331]
• Communism, [314], [320] ff.
• (see Marxism, Socialism, Soviets)
• Concubines, [100], [227]
• Confessions, [102]
• Confucian ritual, [78]-9;
• Confucianism, [93], [136], [145], [150], [163]-4, [168], [175], [183]-4, [188], [306];
• Confucian literature, [78];
• false Confucian literature, [93]-4;
• Confucians, [40] ff., [134]
• (see Neo-Confucianism)
• Conquests, [122], [270]
• (see War, Colonialism)
• Conservatism, [219]
• Constitution, [311]
• Contending States, [40] ff.
• Co-operatives, [319]
• Copper, [17], [211]
• (see Bronze, Metal)
• Corruption, [51], [200]
• Corvée (forced labour), [82], [173], [187], [196], [238]
• (see Labour)
• Cotton, [250]
• Courtesans, [182]
• (see Brothel)
• Coxinga, rebel, [267], [271]
• Craftsmen, [26], [105], [183], [197], [216], [247]-8
• (see Artisans)
• Credits, [215]
• Criminals, [146], [218], [248]
• Crop rotation, [249]
• Dalai Lama, religious ruler of Tibet, [278], [310]
• Dance, [105]
• Deflation, [215]
• Deities, [23]
• (see Tien, Shang Ti, Maitreya, Amithabha, etc.)
• Delft, city, [256]
• Demands, the twenty-one, [311], [313]
• Democracy, [305], [301]
• Denshiring, [12]
• Despotism, [81], [196]
• (see Absolutism)
• Dewey, J., educator, [307]
• Dialects, [64]-5
• (see Language)
• Dialecticians, [59]
• Dictators, [38], [47]
• (see Despotism)
• Dictionaries, [65]
• Diploma, for monks, [208]
• Diplomacy, [223], [226]
• Disarmament, [115], [120]
• Discriminatory laws, [189], [233] ff., [270]
• (see Double Standard)
• Dog, [54]
• Dorgon, prince, [269]
• Double standard, legal, [80]
• Drama, [242], [255], [280]
• Dress, changes, [53]
• Dungan, tribes, [292]
• Dynastic histories
• (see History), [2]
• Dzungars, people, [277]
• Eclipses, [43]
• Economy, [53] ff., [94] ff., [100], [109], [112]-13, [142] ff.;
• Money economy, [198];
• Natural economy, [107]-8, [116]
• (see Agriculture, Nomadism, Industry, Denshiring, Money, Trade, etc.)
• Education, [73], [103], [201], [306], [326], [327]
• (see Schools, Universities, Academies, Script, Examination system, etc.)
• Elements, the five, [60]
• Elephants, [26]
• Elite, [73], [74], [196], [218]
• (see Intellectuals, Students, Gentry)
• Elixir, [187] (see Alchemy)
• Emperor, position of, [81], [92], [210], [304];
• Emperor and church, [218]
• (see Despotism, King, Absolutism, Monarchy, etc.)
• Empress (see Lü, Wu, Wei, Tzŭ Hsi)
• Encyclopaedias, [219], [264], [279]
• England, [265], [283], [285] (see Great Britain)
• Ephtalites, tribe, [150]
• Epics, [133]
• Equalization Office, [91], [94] (see chün-t'ien)
• Erotic literature, [254]
• Estates (chuang,), [154], [175], [181], [212], [236]
• Ethics, [45]
• (see Confucianism)
• Eunuchs, [91], [100], [191], [253], [259]-60, [261], [267], [272]
• Europe, [143], [212];
• Europeans, [209], [233], [237], [246], [263], [272], [297], [299]
• Examination system, [74], [78], [85]-6, [91], [175], [197], [216], [252]-3, [259], [280];
• Examinations for Buddhists, [207]
• Fables, [259]
• Factories, [250], [251]
• Fallow system, [54], [249]
• Falsifications, [93]
• (see Confucianism)
• Family structure, [24], [29], [31], [42], [54], [138]-9, [196], [332];
• Family ethics, [58];
• Family planning, [331]
• Fan Chung-yen, politician, [212], [213]
• Fascism, [264]
• Federations, tribal, [117]
• Felt, [33]
• Fêng Kuo-chang, politician, [312]
• Fêng Meng-lung, writer, [254], [255]
• Fêng Tao, politician, [201]
• Fêng Yü-hsiang, war lord, [312], [315]
• Ferghana, city, [88]
• Fertility cults, [23];
• differential fertility, [73]
• Fertilizer, [54]
• Feudalism, [24], [29], [30] ff., [37], [38], [40], [42], [44], [45], [85];
• end of feudalism, [51], [59], [62]-3;
• late feudalism, [71]-2, [77] ff.;
• new feudalism, [81];
• nomadic feudalism, [76], [131]
• (see Serfs, Aristocracy, Fiefs, Bondsmen, etc.)
• Fiefs, [30], [54], [78], [82]
• Finances, [209]
• (see Budget, Inflation, Money, Coins)
• Fire-arms
• (see Rifles, Cannons)
• Fishing, [94]
• Folk-tales, [254], [258]
• Food habits, [54]-5, [155]
• Foreign relations, [84]
• (see Diplomacy, Treaty, Tribute, War)
• Forests, [26]
• Formosa (T'aiwan), [152], [267], [276], [277], [295], [296], [323] ff.
• France, [287], [295], [296], [313], [317]
• Frontier, concept of, [38]
• Frugality, [58]
• Fu Chien, ruler, [126] ff., [130], [131], [136], [139], [157]-8
• Fu-lan-chi (Franks), [263]
• Fu-lin, Manchu ruler, [269]
• Fu-yü, country, [141]
• Fukien, province, [167], [228], [237], [248], [249], [250], [251], [276]
• Galdan, leader, [277]
• Gandhara, country, [146]
• Gardens, [154]
• Geisha (see Courtesans), [217]
• Genealogy, [52], [167], [196]
• Genghiz Khan, ruler, [225], [230], [241]
• Gentry (Upper class), [44], [78], [80], [101], [108], [133], [138], [143], [144], [166], [173], [174], [196], [197], [203], [209], [210], [214], [236], [239], [252] ff., [257], [268], [272], [297], [303]-4, [307];
• colonial gentry, [163];
• definition of gentry, [72];
• gentry state, [71] ff.,
• southern gentry, [153]
• Germany, [296], [311], [312], [317]
• Gök Turks, [149] ff.
• Governors, role of, [184] ff.
• Grain
• (see Millet, Rice, Wheat)
• Granaries, [216], [290]
• Great Britain, [285], [293], [294], [295], [310]
• (see England)
• Great Leap Forward, [331]
• Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, [333]
• Great Wall, [57]
• Greeks, [59], [60]
• Guilds, [58], [197]
• Hakka, ethnic group, [228], [289], [323]
• Hami, city state, [245]
• Han, dynasty, [71] ff., [122];
• Later Han dynasty, [206]
• Han Fei Tzu, philosopher, [59]
• Han T'o-wei, politician, [226]-7
• Han Yü, philosopher, [182], [217], [218]
• Hankow (Han-k'ou), city, [38], [156], [162], [251], [290], [314]
• Hangchow (Hang-chou), city, [38], [225], [228]
• Heaven, [42], [81]
• (see Shang Ti, T'ien)
• Hermits, [46] ff.
• (see Monks, Sages)
• Hinayana, religion, [135]
• Historians, [2]
• Histories, dynastic, [2], [242];
• falsification of histories, [43], [52], [93];
• Historiography, [43], [103]-4
• Hitler, Adolf, dictator, [317], [319]
• Hittites, ethnic group, [25]
• Ho Ch'eng-t'ien, scholar, [255]
• Ho-lien P'o-p'o, ruler, [139], [140], [159], [225]
• Ho Ti, Han ruler, [99]
• hong, association, [286]
• Hong Kong, colony, [286], [319], [325]
• Hopei, province, [296]
• Horse, [11], [90], [186], [223], [237];
• horse chariot, [25];
• horse riding, [53];
• horse trade, [63]
• Hospitals, [216]
• Hou Ching, ruler, [161]-2
• Houses, [19], [33]
• (see Adobe)
• Hsi-hsia, kingdom, [214], [221], [223], [224] ff., [231]
• Hsi-k'ang, Tibet, [310]
• Hsia, dynasty, [17]-18, [21], [25];
• Hunnic Hsia dynasty, [139]
• (see Hsi-hsia)
• Hsia-hou, clan, [113]
• Hsia Kui, painter, [221]
• Hsiao Tao-ch'eng, general, [160]
• Hsiao Wu Ti, Chin ruler, [158]
• Hsieh, clan, [157]
• Hsieh Hsüan, general, [128]
• Hsien-feng, period, [294]
• Hsien-pi, tribal federation, [98], [102], [114], [116], [117], [119], [120], [121], [123], [126], [127], [128] ff., [130], [131], [132], [136], [137], [138], [140], [148], [169]
• Hsien Ti, Han ruler, [100]
• Hsien-yün, tribes, [21]
• Hsin, dynasty, [92]
• Hsin-an merchants, [251], [263]
• Hsin Ch'ing-nien, journal, [307]
• Hsiung-nu, tribal federation, [67] ff., [75] ff., [81], [86] ff., [90], [95], [96], [97] ff., [102], [108], [113], [114], [116], [117], [118], [224], [226]
• (see Huns)
• Hsü Shih-ch'ang, president, [312]
• Hsüan-tê, period, [259]
• Hsüan-tsang, Buddhist, [181]
• Hsüan Tsung, T'ang ruler, [181];
• Manchu ruler, [259], [288]
• Hsüan-t'ung, period, [300]
• Hsün Tzŭ, philosopher, [57]-8
• Hu, name of tribes, [118]
• (see Huns)
• Hu Han-min, politician, [314]-15
• Hu Shih, scholar and politician, [307], [320]
• Hu Wei-yung, politician, [257]
• Huai-nan Tzŭ, philosopher, [50], [104]
• Huai, Ti, Chin ruler, [123], [124]
• Huan Hsüan, general, [158], [159]
• Huan Wen, general, [157]-8
• Huang Ch'ao, leader of rebellion, [189] ff., [195], [203]
• Huang Ti, ruler, [52]
• Huang Tsung-hsi, philosopher, [247], [352]
• Hui-chou merchants, [251], [254]
• hui-kuan, association, [197]
• Hui Ti, Chin ruler, [120];
• Manchu ruler, [257]
• Hui Tsung, Sung ruler, [221]
• Hui Tzŭ, philosopher, [59]
• Human sacrifice, [19], [23]
• Hung Hsiu-ch'üan, leader of rebellion, [289] ff.
• Huns, [57], [118], [119], [120], [121], [124], [125], [126], [127], [130], [131], [136], [139], [140], [147], [148], [151], [278]
• (see Hu, Hsiung-nu)
• Hunting, [25]-6
• Hutuktu, religious ruler, [310]
• Hydraulic society, [56]
• i-chuang, clan manors, [213]
• Ili, river, [282] ff., [293], [330]
• Imperialism, [76], [265], [285] ff., [294], [295], [329]
• (see Colonialism)
• India, [20], [26], [34], [45], [60], [89], [106], [111], [118], [125], [134]-5, [145], [146], [164], [181], [182], [198], [243], [265], [287], [288], [310], [329]
• (see Brahmans, Bengal, Gandhara, Calcutta, Buddhism)
• Indo-China, [234], [258]
• (see Cambodia, Annam, Laos).
• Indo-Europeans, language group, [15], [25], [29], [150]
• (see Yüeh-chih, Tocharians, Hittites)
• Indonesia, [10], [201], [209], [319]
• (see Java)
• Industries, [198], [214], [250] ff.;
• Industrialization, [275], [325]-26, [327]-28, [331]-32;
• Industrial society, [212]
• (see Factories)
• Inflation, [20], [211], [215], [237]
• Inheritance, laws of, [24], [54]
• Intellectuals, [300], [309]
• (see Élite, Students)
• Investments, [198], [212], [212]-14
• Iran (Persia), [60], [61], [234]
• Iron, [40], [55], [96], [198];
• Cast iron, [56];
• Iron money, [202]
• (see Steel)
• Irrigation, [56], [62]
• Islam, [179], [183], [202]-3
• (see Muslims)
• Istanbul (Constantinople), [256], [259], [293]
• Italy, [317]
• Japan, [9], [10], [26], [44], [88], [106], [112], [114], [126], [144], [145], [170], [178], [179], [181], [196], [201], [234], [245]-6, [254], [256], [258], [263], [264], [265], [275], [294] ff., [297], [298], [300], [308], [309], [311], [312], [313], [314], [316], [317] ff., [322], [323], [324], [325]
• (see Meiji, Tada, Tanaka)
• Java, [234]
• Jedzgerd, ruler, [178]
• Jehol, province, [11], [287]
• Jen Tsung, Manchu ruler, [285]
• Jesuits, [266], [278]
• Jews, [179]
• Ju (scribes), [34], [41]
• Ju-chen (Chin Dynasty, Jurchen), [221]-2, [223], [225], [226], [227], [229] ff, [244], [265]
• Juan-juan, tribal federation, [114], [140], [149]
• Jurchen
• (see Ju-chen)
• K'ai-feng, city
• (see Yeh, Pien-liang), [203], [230]
• Kalmuk, Mongol tribes, [282], [283], [284]
• (see Ölöt)
• Kang-hsi, period, [272], [277], [279]
• K'ang Yo-wei, politician and scholar, [298]-99
• Kansu, province, [12], [14], [86], [87], [121], [124], [125], [129], [131], [132], [139], [140], [142], [159], [163], [225], [292], [293], [324]
• (see Tun-huang)
• Kao-ch'ang, city state, [177]
• Kao, clan, [148]
• Kao-li, state, [126], [141], [222]
• (see Korea)
• Kao Ming, writer, [242]
• Kao Tsu, Han ruler, [71], [77]
• Kao Tsung, T'ang ruler, [179], [180]
• Kao Yang, ruler, [148]
• Kapok, textile fibre, [250]
• Kara Kitai, tribal federation, [223]-4
• Kashgar, city, [99], [282], [292]
• Kazak, tribal federation, [282], [283]
• Khalif (see Caliph), [293]
• Khamba, Tibetans, [310]
• Khan, Central Asian title, [149], [169], [176], [177], [186]
• Khocho, city, [177]
• Khotan, city, [99], [135], [174]
• King, position of, [24], [34], [42], [43]; first kings, [19];
• religious character of kingship, [37]
• (see Yao, Shun, Hsia dynasty, Emperor, Wang, Prince)
• Kitan (Ch'i-tan), tribal federation, [184], [186], [203], [204], [205], [206], [207], [208], [209], [221], [222] ff., [229], [241]
• (see Liao dynasty)
• Ko-shu Han, general, [184]-5
• Korea, [9], [88]-89, [112], [126], [169] ff., [178], [181], [201], [219], [222], [265], [268], [295], [296], [324], [329]
• (see Kao-li, Pai-chi, Sin-lo)
• K'ou Ch'ien-chih, Taoist, [147]
• Kowloon, city, [287]
• Ku Yen-wu, geographer, [279]
• Kuan Han-ch'ing, writer, [242]
• Kuang-hsü, period, [295] ff.
• Kuang-wu Ti, Han ruler, [96] ff.
• Kub(i)lai Khan, Mongol ruler, [234], [241]
• Kung-sun Lung, philosopher, [59]
• K'ung Tzu (Confucius), [40] ff.
• Kuo-min-tang (KMT), party, [313], [321], [323], [324], [325]
• Kuo Wei, ruler, [206]
• Kuo Tzŭ-hsing, rebel leader, [239]
• Kuo Tzŭ-i, loyal general, [184], [186]
• Kyakhta (Kiachta), city, [278]
• Labour, forced, [235], [237]
• (see Corvée);
• Labour laws, [198];
• Labour shortage, [251]
• Lacquer, [256]
• Lamaism, religion, [242]-3
• Land ownership, [31], [32], [54]
• (see Property);
• Land reform, [94], [142]-3, [172]-3, [229], [290], [315], [325], [330]
• (see chün-t'ien, ching-t'ien)
• Landlords, [54], [55], [154], [155], [198], [212], [213], [236]-7, [251];
• temples as landlords, [134]
• Language, [36], [46];
• dialects, [64]-5, [167];
• Language reform, [307]-8, [324]
• Lang Shih-ning, painter, [281]
• La Tzŭ, philosopher, [45] ff., [101], [136]
• Laos, country, [12]
• Law codes, [56], [66], [80], [81]-2, [93]
• (see Li K'ui, Property law, Inheritance, Legalists)
• Leadership, [73]-4
• League of Nations, [316]
• Leibniz, philosopher, [281]
• Legalists (fa-chia), [47], [63], [65], [66], [80], [81]
• Legitimacy of rule, [44], [111]
• (see Abdication)
• Lenin, V., [320], [333]
• Lhasa, city, [278], [329]
• Li An-shih, economist, [142]
• Li Chung-yen, governor, [315]
• Li Hung-chang, politician, [291], [296], [297]
• Li K'o-yung, ruler, [190], [191], [203], [204]
• Li Kuang-li, general, [88]
• Li K'ui, law-maker, [56], [80]
• Li Li-san, politician, [320]
• Li Lin-fu, politician, [184]
• Li Lung-mien, painter, [220]
• Li Shih-min
• (see T'ai Tsung), T'ang ruler, [170], [172], [178]
• Li Ssŭ, politician, [66]
• Li Ta-chao, librarian, [320]
• Li T'ai-po, poet, [182]
• Li Tzŭ-ch'eng, rebel, [268], [269], [271]
• Li Yu, writer, [280]
• Li Yu-chen, writer, [280]
• Li Yüan, ruler, [172]
• Li Yüan-hung, politician, [301], [302], [312]
• Liang dynasty, Earlier, [124], [130];
• Later Liang, [130], [150], [162], [191], [203] ff., [207];
• Northern Liang, [130] ff., [132], [133], [140];
• Southern Liang, [132];
• Western Liang, [131], [140]
• Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, journalist, [280]-1
• liang-min (burghers), [143]
• Liao, tribes, [12];
• Liao dynasty (see Kitan), [203], [208], [222] ff.;
• Western Liao dynasty, [224]
• Liao-chai chih-i, short-story collection, [280]
• Libraries, [66], [201]-2
• Lin-chin, city, [55]
• Lin-ch'uan, city, [263]
• Lin Shu, translator, [280]
• Lin Tse-hsü, politician, [286]
• Literati, [73]
• (see Scholars, Confucianists)
• Literature, [66], [103] ff., [182] ff., [220], [253] ff.
• (see pien-wen, pi-chi, Poetry, Drama, Novels, Epics, Theatre, ballads, Folk-tales, Fables, History, Confucians, Writers, Scholars, Scribes)
• Literary revolution, [307], [320]
• Liu Chi, Han ruler, [68], [71] ff.
• Liu Chih-yüan, ruler, [206]
• Liu Chin, eunuch, [261]
• Liu Hsiu
• (see Kuang-wu Ti), Han ruler, [96]
• Liu Lao-chih, general, [158]
• liu-min (vagrants), [198]
• Liu Pang
• (see Liu Chi)
• Liu Pei, general and ruler, [100], [101], [102]
• Liu Shao-ch'i, political leader, [333]
• Liu Sung, rebel, [284]
• Liu Tsung-yüan, writer, [182]
• Liu Ts'ung, ruler, [123], [124]
• Liu Yao, ruler, [124]
• Liu Yü, general, [158], [159];
• emperor, [225]
• Liu Yüan, sculptor, [243];
• emperor, [119], [122], [123], [124], [126], [127], [131], [137], [139]
• Lo Kuan-chung, writer, [254]
• Loans, to farmers, [94];
• foreign, [288]
• Loess, soil formation, [9]
• Logic, [46]
• Long March, [321]
• Lorcha War, [287], [291]
• Loyang (Lo-yang), capital of China, [32], [33], [36], [37], [55], [97], [113], [122], [127], [142], [144], [145], [148], [149], [150], [160], [168], [176], [180], [184], [185], [215]
• Lu, state, [41], [43]
• Lü, empress, [77] ff.
• Lu Hsiang-shan, philosopher, [263]
• Lu Hsün, writer, [320]
• Lü Kuang, ruler, [130]
• Lü Pu, general, [100]
• Lü Pu-wei, politician, [63], [103]
• Lun, prince, [120]
• Lun-heng, book, [104]
• Lung-men, place, [150]
• Lung-shan, excavation site, [14], [15] ff., [19]
• Lytton Commission, [316]
• Ma Yin, ruler, [199]-200
• Ma Yüan, general, [97];
• painter, [221]
• Macchiavellism, [60], [164], [263]-4
• Macao, Portuguese colony, [227], [266], [286]
• Mahayana, Buddhist sect, [135], [145]
• Maitreya, Buddhist deity, [147], [189]
• (see Messianic movements)
• Malacca, state, [263]
• Malaria, [249]
• Managers, [212]-13
• Manchu, tribal federation and dynasty, [76], [232], [265], [267], [270] ff., [301], [312], [329], [330]
• Manchuria, [9], [11], [14], [111], [114], [137], [222], [246], [275], [277], [296], [311], [316], [317]
• Manichaeism, Iranian religion, [46], [179], [187]
• Manors (chuang, see Estates), [154]
• Mao Tun, Hsiung-nu ruler, [75], [76], [119], [122], [139], [170]
• Mao Tse-tung, party leader, [320], [321], [333]
• Marco Polo, businessman, [238], [317]
• Market, [56];
• Market control, [85]
• Marriage systems, [73]-5, [167], [196], [332]
• Marxism, [304], [306], [322], [331], [333];
• Marxist theory of history, [75]
• (see Materialism, Communism, Lenin, Mao Tse-tung)
• Materialism, [58], [164]
• Mathematics, [61]
• Matrilinear societies, [24]
• Mazdaism, Iranian religion, [101], [179], [187], [342]
• May Fourth Movement, [307], [320]
• Medicine, [219];
• Medical doctors, [144], [216]-17
• Meditation
• (see Ch'an)
• Megalithic culture, [20]
• Meiji, Japanese ruler, [294]
• Melanesia, [10]
• Mencius (Meng Tzŭ), philosopher, [57]
• Merchants, [31], [55], [56], [62], [63], [65], [79], [90]-1, [104]-5, [134], [160], [163], [179], [189], [198], [200], [201], [202], [212], [215]-16, [247]-8, [251], [276]-7, [297];
• foreign merchants, [190], [234], [237], [281]-2
• (see Trade, Salt, Caravans, Businessmen)
• Messianic movements, [61], [147]
• Metal, [15], [20]
• (see Bronze, Copper, Iron)
• Mi Fei, painter, [220]
• Middle Class, [195], [254], [297], [304], [309], [310], [314]
• (see Burgher, Merchant, Craftsmen, Artisans)
• Middle East
• (see Near East)
• Migrations, [54], [116], [120] ff., [130], [142], [152] ff., [228], [237], [248], [275]-6, [294];
• forced migrations, [54], [167]
• (see Colonization, Assimilation, Settlement)
• Militarism, [63]
• Militia, [174], [215], [291]
• Millet, [11], [21], [32]
• Mills, [181], [213]
• Min, state in Fukien, [205]
• Ming dynasty, [243] ff.
• Ming Jui, general, [283]
• Min Ti, Chin ruler, [123]
• Ming Ti, Han ruler, [99];
• Wei ruler, [114];
• Later T'ang ruler, [204]
• Minorate, [24]
• Missionaries, Christian, [266], [281], [287], [289]
• (see Jesuits)
• Mo Ti, philosopher, [58]
• Modernization, [296]-7
• Mohammedan rebellions, [292] ff.
• (see Muslim)
• Mon-Khmer tribes, [10]
• Monarchy, [47], [247], [281]
• (see King, Emperor, Absolutism, Despotism)
• Monasteries, Buddhist, [144], [207], [236];
• economic importance, [125], [134], [180]-1, [187] ff.
• Money, [20], [55], [180]-1;
• Money economy, [56], [58], [107]-8;
• Origin of money, [40];
• paper money, [202], [211], [347]
• (see Coins, Paper, Silver)
• Mongolia, [8], [9], [11], [98], [283], [317]
• Mongols, tribes, tribal federation, dynasty, [17], [40], [53], [57], [76], [102], [114], [117], [119], [120], [137], [140], [175], [220], [225], [227], [228], [230] ff., [232] ff., [240], [243], [244], [257], [259], [264], [266], [268], [270], [277], [281], [284], [291], [329], [330]
• (see Yüan dynasty, Kalmuk, Tümet, Oirat, Ölöt, Naiman, Turgut,
• Timur, Genghiz, Kublai)
• Monks, Buddhist, [134], [146], [164], [188], [207], [218], [239], [246], [253]-4
• Monopolies, [85], [91], [200], [215]
• Mound-dwellers, [16]
• Mu-jung, tribes, [119], [126], [128]-9
• Mu Ti, East Chin ruler, [157]
• Mu Tsung, Manchu ruler, [294]
• Mulberries, [143]
• Munda tribes, [10]
• Music, [163], [182]-3, [255]
• (see Theatre, Dance, Geisha)
• Muslims, [179], [233], [278], [289];
• Muslim rebellions, [289], [292] ff.
• (see Islam, Mohammedans)
• Mysticism, [46]
• Naiman, Mongol tribe, [233]
• Nan-chao, state, [171]
• Nan-yang, city, [96]
• Nanking (Nan-ching), capital of China, [38], [121], [156], [162], [225], [228], [235], [246], [250], [254], [257], [262], [263], [266], [270], [286], [287], [290], [291], [302], [315], [316], [318];
• Nanking regime, [314] ff.
• Nationalism, [76], [131], [233], [284]-5
• (see Kuo-min-tang)
• Nature, [46];
• Nature philosophers, [60]
• Navy, [258]
• Near East, [16], [81], [106], [109], [111], [140], [146], [221], [238]
• (see Arabs, Iran, etc.)
• Neo-Confucianism, [218] ff., [263]
• Neolithicum, [9]
• Nepal, [243], [283]
• Nerchinsk, place, [278]
• Nestorian Christianity, [187]
• Ni Tsan, painter, [243]
• Nien Fei, rebels, [291]-2
• Niu Seng-yu, politician, [188]
• Nobility, [31], [80], [124], [131], [138];
• Nomadic nobility, [76]
• (see Aristocracy)
• Nomadism, [10], [40], [67], [222]-3;
• Economy of nomads, [35]-6, [137];
• Nomadic society structure, [75]
• Novels, [254] ff., [280]
• Oil, [294]
• Oirat, Mongol tribes, [260]
• Okinawa (see Ryukyu)
• Ölöt, Mongol tribes, [277]
• Opera, [242], [255]-6
• Opium, [276], [286];
• Opium War, [286]
• Oracle bones, [22], [24]
• Ordos, area, [9], [17], [20], [67], [86], [125], [129], [133], [148], [170], [225]
• Orenburg, city, [282]
• Organizations, [58]
• (see hui-kuan Guilds, hong, Secret Societies)
• Orphanages, [218]
• Ottoman (Turkish) Empire, [293]
• Ou-yang Hsiu, writer, [254]
• Outer Mongolia, [310]-11, [330]
• Pagoda, [243]
• Pai-chi (Paikche), state in Korea, [141]
• Pai-lien-hui (see White Lotos) 239
• Painting, [56], [105], [183], [220] ff., [243], [255], [281]
• Palaeolithicum, [8] ff.
• Pan Ch'ao, general, [99], [100]
• pao-chia, security system, [173]
• Paper, [105], [183], [251];
• Paper money, [202], [228], [237]
• (see Money)
• Parliament, [300]-1
• Party (see Kuo-min-tang, Communists)
• Pearl Harbour, [319]
• Peasant rebellions, [238] ff.
• (see Rebellions)
• Peking, city, [169], [184], [197], [207], [208], [221], [223], [235], [239], [246], [256], [257], [262], [264], [265], [266], [268], [269], [272], [278], [283], [287], [290], [291], [297], [299], [305], [307], [308], [309], [311], [312], [313], [318];
• Peking Man, [8]
• Pensions, [217], [247]
• People's Democracy, [294]
• Persecution, religious, [147], [188], [207]
• Persia (Iran), [256], [258], [259];
• Persian language, [234]
• Peruz, ruler, [178]
• Philippines, state, [295], [323], [325]
• Philosophy, [44], [217] ff., [263] ff.
• (see Confucius, Lao Tzŭ, Chuang Tzŭ, Huai-nan Tzŭ, Hsün Tzŭ, Mencius, Hui Tzŭ, Mo Ti, Kung-sun Lung, Shang Tzŭ, Han Fei Tzŭ, Tsou Yen, Legalists, Chung-ch'ang, T'ung, Yüan Chi, Liu Ling, Chu Hsi, Ch'eng Hao, Lu Hsiang-shan, Wang Yang-ming, etc.)
• pi-chi, literary form, [220]
• pieh-yeh (see Manor), [154]
• Pien-liang, city (see K'ai-feng), [230]
• pien-wen, literary form, [253]
• Pig, [54], [199]
• Pilgrims, [245]
• P'ing-ch'eng, city, [122]
• Pirates, [245], [263]
• Plantation economy, [154]
• Plough, [54]
• Po Chü-i, poet, [182], [220]
• Po-hai, state, [171], [222], [229]
• Poetry, [48], [163], [175], [182] ff., [227], [241], [255];
• Court Poetry, [105];
• Northern Poetry, [133]
• Poets, [219] ff.
• (see T'ao Ch'ien, Po Chü-i, Li T'ai-po, Tu Fu, etc.)
• Politicians, migratory, [52]
• Pontic migration, [16]
• Population changes, [21], [55], [62], [78], [108], [236], [238], [273]-4;
• Population decrease, [107]
• (see Census, Fertility)
• Porcelain, [20], [183], [201], [221], [251], [256], [281]
• Port Arthur, city, [296]
• Portsmouth, treaty, [296]
• Portuguese 262, [263]
• (see Fu-lan-chi, Macao)
• Potter, [32];
• Pottery, [14], [15] ff., [20];
• black pottery, [16]
• (see Porcelain)
• Price controls, [212]
• Priests, [24], [34]
• (see Shamans, Ju, Monks)
• Primogeniture, [54]
• Princes, [115], [120], [123]
• Printing, [201]-2
• (see Colour, Book)
• Privileges of gentry, [173]
• Proletariate, [305], [320]
• (see Labour)
• Propaganda, [93]
• Property relations, [31], [54], [196]
• (see Laws, Inheritance, Primogeniture)
• Protectorate, [82]
• Provinces, administration, [85]
• pu-ch'ü, bondsmen, [143], [174]
• Pu-ku Huai-en, general, [185], [186]
• P'u Sung-lin, writer, [280]
• P'u Yi, Manchu ruler, [300], [312]
• Puppet plays, [255]
• Railways, [301], [324]; Manchurian Railway, [296]
• Rebellions, [95]-6, [156], [158], [184] ff., [189] ff., [238] ff., [261] ff., [267] ff., [284], [289] ff., [291] ff., [299], [301]
• (see Peasants, Secret Societies, Revolutions)
• Red Eyebrows, peasant movement, [95] ff.
• Red Guards, [333]
• Reforms, [298], [299];
• Reform of language, [307]-9
• (see Land reform)
• Regents, [89]
• Religion, [8], [22]-4, [37], [42], [44], [48], [135]-6;
• popular religion, [101]
• (see Bon, Shintoism, Persecution, Sacrifice, Ancestor cult, Fertility cults, Deities, Temples, Monasteries, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Mazdaism, Manichaeism, Messianic religions, Secret societies, Soul, Shamanism, State religion)
• Republic, [303] ff.
• Revolutions, [244];
• legitimization of revolution, [57]
• (see Rebellions)
• Ricci, Matteo, missionary, [266]
• Rice, [12], [155], [219], [235], [249]
• Rifles, [263]
• Ritualism, [34], [42]
• Roads, [30], [56], [65]
• Roman Empire, [31], [51], [107], [144], [210]
• Roosevelt, F. D., president, [322]
• Russia, [246], [259], [278], [282], [283], [284], [293], [294], [296], [298], [300], [310], [311], [313]-14, [315], [317], [320], [321], [322], [323], [328]-29, [330], [333], [334]
• (see Soviet Republics)
• Ryukyu (Liu-ch'iu), islands, [295]
• Sacrifices, [19], [23], [26]
• Sages, [47]
• Sakhalin (Karafuto), island, [295], [296]
• Salar, ethnic group, [292]
• Salary, [213], [227]
• Salt, [40];
• Salt merchants, [189], [238], [248]-9, [262];
• Salt trade, [200]-1
• Samarkand, city, [45], [183], [241]
• San-min chu-i, book, [305]
• Sang Hung-yang, economist, [91]
• Sassanids, Iranian dynasty, [178]
• Scholars (Ju), [34], [41], [52], [59], [60], [100]
• (see Literati, Scribes, Intellectuals, Confucianists)
• Schools, [79], [196], [324]-25
• (see Education)
• Science, [60]-1, [104]-5, [219], [281]
• (see Mathematics, Astronomy, Nature)
• Scribes, [34]
• Script, Chinese, [22], [29], [65], [225], [308]
• Sculpture, [19]-20, [106], [147], [183], [243];
• Buddhist sculptures, [146]
• sê-mu (auxiliary troops), [233]
• Seal, imperial, [92]-3
• Secret societies, [61], [95] ff., [289]
• (see Red Eyebrows, Yellow Turbans, White Lotos, Boxer, Rebellions)
• Sects, [135];
• Buddhist sects, [188]
• Seng-ko-lin-ch'in, general, [291]
• Serfs, [21], [26], [31], [32], [33], [53]-4, [72], [143], [197], [216]
• (see Slaves, Servants, Bondsmen)
• Servants, [32]
• Settlement, of foreigners, [177];
• military, [248]
• (see Colonization)
• Sha-t'o, tribal federation, [187], [190], [203], [204], [206], [207], [222], [230]
• Shadow theatre, [255]
• Shahruk, ruler, [258]
• Shamans, [160], [184];
• Shamanism, [34], [242], [135] ff., [146]
• Shan tribes of South East Asia, [12]
• Shan-hai-ching, book, [103]
• Shan-yü, title of nomadic ruler, [88], [89], [90], [95], [103], [119], [125], [151]
• Shang dynasty, [19] ff., [41]
• Shang Ti, deity, [23], [24], [25]
• Shang Tzŭ, philosopher (Shang Yang), [59]
• Shanghai, city 246, [250], [287], [288], [301], [305], [308], [314]-15, [316], [318]
• Shao Yung, philosopher, [220]
• Sheep, [54], [118]
• Shen Nung, mythical figure, [52]
• Shen Tsung, Sung ruler, [196];
• Manchu ruler, [265], [267]
• Sheng Tsu, Manchu ruler, [272]
• Shih-chi, book, [103]
• Shih Ching-t'ang, ruler, [204], [222]
• Shih Ch'ung, writer, [49]
• Shih Hêng, soldier, [260]
• Shih Hu, ruler, [125] ff.
• Shih Huang-ti, ruler, [63] ff., [78]
• Shih Lo, ruler, [123], [124], [125], [126]
• Shih-pi, ruler, [170]
• Shih Ssŭ-ming, [185]
• Shih Tsung, Manchu ruler, [264], [282]
• Shih-wei, Mongol tribes, [141]
• Shintoism, Japanese religion, [44]
• Ships, [168] (see Navy)
• Short stories, [255]
• Shoulder axes, [10]
• Shu (Szechwan), area and/or state, [219]
• Shu-Han dynasty, [108], [110], [111], [115]
• Shun, dynasty, [268];
• mythical ruler, [17]
• Shun-chih, reign period, [270]
• Sian (Hsi-an, Ch'ang-an), city, [31], [33], [35], [97]
• Siao Ho (Hsiao Ho), jurist, [80]
• Silk, [20]-1, [56], [90]-1, [105], [116], [143], [185], [186], [209], [214], [276], [289], [303];
• Silk road, [86]
• Silver, [211], [251]-2, [276]
• Sin-lo (Hsin-lo, Silla), state of Korea, [141]
• Sinanthropos, [8]
• Sinkiang (Hsin-Chiang, Turkestan), [14], [248], [294], [329], [330]
• Slash and burn agriculture (denshiring), [12]
• Slaves, [26], [32], [79], [94], [123], [137]-8, [143];
• Slave society, [26];
• Temple slaves, [146]
• Social mobility, [73]-4, [196], [197], [218]-19;
• Social structure of tribes, [117]
• Socialism, [93] ff., [291]
• (see Marxism, Communism)
• Sogdiana, country in Central Asia, [45], [60], [134]-5, [163], [174], [184]
• Soul, concept of soul, [32]
• South-East Asia, [9], [10], [14], [198], [201] 250, [275], [324]
• (see Burma, Champa, Cambodia, Annam, Laos, Vietnam, Tonking, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Mon-Khmer)
• Soviet Republics, [294], [312], [328]
• (see Russia)
• Speculations, financial, [227]
• Ssŭ-ma, clan, [113]-14
• Ssŭ-ma Ch'ien, historian, [103]-4
• Ssŭ-ma Kuang, historian, [220]
• Ssŭ-ma Yen, ruler, [114], [115]
• Standardization, [64] ff.
• States, territorial and national, [37], [51];
• State religion, [145]-6, [180]
• Statistics, [83]
• (see Population)
• Steel, [56], [198]
• Steppe, [9]
• Stone age, [8] ff.
• Stratification, social, [29]
• (see Classes, Social mobility)
• Strikes, [198]
• Students, [304]-5, [306], [320]
• Su Chün, rebel, [156]
• Su Tsung, T'ang ruler, [185]
• Su Tung-p'o, poet, [219]
• su-wang (uncrowned king), [43]
• Sui, dynasty, [151]
• Sun Ts'ê, ruler, [100], [101]
• Sun Yat-sen (Sun I-hsien), revolutionary leader, president, [280], [299], [300], [302], [305], [309], [311], [312], [313], [315], [318], [321]
• Sung, dynasty, [207], [208] ff., [238];
• Liu-Sung dynasty, [159] ff.
• Szechwan (Ssŭ-ch'uan), province, [101], [139], [156], [157], [159], [185], [190], [199], [200], [202], [207], [214], [215], [219], [262], [301]
• (see Shu)
• Ta-tan (Tatars), tribal federation, [233]
• Tada, Japanese militarist, [295]
• Tai, tribes, [17], [19], [21], [111], [152]
• (see Thailand)
• Tai Chen, philosopher, [279]
• Tai Ch'ing dynasty (Manchu), [267]
• T'ai P'ing, state, [274], [289] ff., [333]
• T'ai Tsu, Sung ruler, [209]; Manchu ruler, [257]
• T'ai Tsung, T'ang ruler 174, [178]
• (see Li Shih-min)
• Taiwan (T'ai-wan, see Formosa), [323] ff, [334]
• T'an-yao, priest, [146]
• Tanaka, Japanese militarist, [295]
• T'ang, dynasty, [83]-4, [144], [147], [172] ff.;
• Later T'ang dynasty, [204] ff.
• T'ang Hsien-tsu, writer, [255]
• T'ang Yin, painter, [255]
• Tanguts, Tibetan tribal federation and/or state, [99], [102], [118], [224]-5, [233]
• (see Ch'iang)
• Tao, philosophical term, [42], [46], [47]
• Tao-kuang, reign period, [285] ff., [288]
• Tao-tê-ching, book, [46]
• T'ao-t'ieh, mythical emblem, [22]
• Tao-yen, monk, [264]
• Taoism, religion, [101]-2, [133], [136], [150], [183], [188], [236], [266];
• Taoists, [46], [61], [104], [241], [263]-4
• (see Lao Tzŭ, Chuang Tzŭ, Chang Ling, etc.)
• Tarim basin, [89], [179]
• Tatars (Ta-tan) Mongolian tribal federation, [190], [230], [233]
• Taxation, [33], [55], [65], [78], [143], [154], [173], [175], [178], [210], [211], [212], [213], [247], [252];
• Tax collectors, [55], [74], [116];
• Tax evasion, [214], [226], [246];
• Tax exemptions, [188], [213], [236];
• Taxes for monks, [208];
• Tax reform, [187]
• Tê Tsung, Manchu ruler, [295], [299]
• Tea, [276]; Tea trade, [200]; Tea house
• (see Brothel), [182]
• Teachers, [74]
• (see Schools)
• Technology, [219]
• Tell, archaeological term, [16]
• Temples, [101], [183]
• (see Monasteries)
• Tengri khan, ruler, [186]
• Textile industry, [198]
• (see Silk, Cotton)
• Thailand, state, [12], [248], [265]
• (see Tai tribes)
• Theatre, [182]-3, [242]
• (see Shadow, Puppet, Opera)
• Throne, accession to, [150]
• (see Abdication, Legitimacy)
• Ti, Tibetan tribes, [21], [118]
• Tibet, [12], [15], [19], [29], [30], [35], [102], [110], [116], [118]-19, [120], [121], [126], [127], [130], [131], [132], [135], [139], [145], [169], [174], [177], [179], [181], [186], [187], [200], [224]-5, [242], [273], [278], [283], [284], [293], [310], [329]
• (see Ch'iang, Ti, T'u-fan, T'u-yü-hun, Lhasa Tanguts)
• T'ien, deity, [32]
• Tientsin (T'ien-chin), city, [287], [290], [299]
• Timur, ruler, [258]
• Tin, [17]
• Ting-ling, tribal federation, [89], [102]
• T'o-pa
• (see Toba)
• T'o-t'o, writer, [241]-2
• Toba, Turkish tribal federation, [76], [116], [117], [118], [119], [120], [123], [126], [127], [132], [136] ff., [159], [160], [161], [168], [169], [172], [173], [174], [177], [214], [222], [224]
• Tocharians, Central Asian ethnic group, [150]
• Tokto (see T'o-t'o)
• Tölös, Turkish tribal group, [169], [178], [185]
• Tombs, [19], [34]
• Tonking, state, [10], [54], [295], [330]
• Tortoise, [22], [47]-8
• Totalitarianism, [80]
• (see Dictatorship, Fascism, Communism)
• Tou Ku, general, [99]
• T'ou-man, ruler, [67]
• Towns
• (see City)
• Trade, [88]-9, [90], [99], [127];
• barter trade, [57];
• international trade, [60], [62], [86], [127]-8, [139], [178], [179], [198], [209], [223], [245], [258], [264]-5, [276], [286]
• (see Merchants, Commerce, Caravans, Silk road)
• Translations, [135], [182], [280], [307]
• Transportation, [56], [168], [235], [247], [283]
• (see Roads, Canals, Ships, Post, Caravans, Horses)
• Travels of emperors, [66]
• Treasury, [84], [206]
• Treaty, international, [77], [226], [278], [286], [290]-1, [293], [295], [296]
• Tribal organization, [76], [223], [224]
• (see Banner, Army, Nomads)
• Tribes, disappearance of, [133], [151]-2;
• social organization, [117];
• military organization, [149]
• Tribute (kung), [33], [88], [209], [214], [226], [230], [248]
• tsa-hu, social class, [144]
• Tsai T'ien, prince, [295]
• Ts'ai Yüan-p'ei, scholar, [307]
• Ts'ao Chih, poet, [48]
• Ts'ao Hsüeh-ch'in, writer, [280]
• Ts'ao K'un, politician, [312]
• Ts'ao P'ei, ruler, [102], [109], [113]
• Ts'ao Ts'ao, general, [100], [101], [102]
• Tsewang Rabdan, general, [277]
• Tseng Kuo-fan, general, [291]
• Tso Tsung-t'ang, general, [293]
• Tsou Yen, philosopher, [60]-1
• Ts'ui, clan, [113], [147], [181]
• T'u-chüeh, Gök Turk tribes, [149]
• (see Turks)
• Tu Fu, poet, [182]
• T'u-fan, Tibetan tribal group, [171], [177], [205]
• Tu-ku, Turkish tribe, [124], [151]
• T'u-shu chi-ch'eng, encyclopaedia, [279]
• tu-tu, title, [174]
• T'u-yü-hun, Tibetan tribal federation, [130], [141], [169], [177]
• Tuan Ch'i-jui, president, [312]
• Tümet, Mongol tribal group, [265]
• Tung Ch'i-ch'ang, painter, [255]
• T'ung-chien kang-mu, historical encyclopaedia, [43]
• T'ung-chih, reign period, [294]
• Tung Chung-shu, thinker, [80], [104]
• Tung Fu-hsiang, politician, [298]
• Tung-lin academy, [267]
• Tungus tribes, [11], [19], [117], [222], [229], [265]
• (see Ju-chen, Po-hai, Manchu)
• Tunhuang (Tun-huang), city, [85], [324]
• Turfan, city state, [245]
• Turgut, Mongol tribal federation, [283]
• Turkestan, [45], [60], [62], [85], [86] ff., [88], [95], [97], [99], [113], [114], [125], [127], [130], [132], [134], [135], [139], [141], [142], [146], [147], [159], [163], [176], [177], [178], [187], [220], [224], [241], [245], [259], [273], [277], [278], [282], [289], [293], [294]
• (see Central Asia, Tarim, Turfan, Sinkiang, Khotan, Ferghana, Samarkand, Khotcho, Tocharians, Yüeh-chih, Sogdians, etc.)
• Turkey, [259]
• Turks, [11], [15], [17], [25], [29], [30], [32], [35], [53], [57], [108], [109], [117], [119], [122], [127], [133], [135], [137], [140], [146] ff., [149] ff., [169] ff., [174], [176] ff., [179], [180], [181], [184], [185], [203], [206], [230], [282], [294], [329]
• (see Gök Turks, T'u-chüeh, Toba, Tölös, Ting-ling, Uighur, Sha-t'o, etc.)
• Tzŭ Hsi, empress, [294] ff., [296] ff.
• Uighurs, Turkish federation, [171], [174], [176], [177], [178], [181], [185], [186] ff., [190], [233], [234], [278]
• United States, [287], [304], [309], [313], [322], [342]
• (see America)
• Ungern-Sternberg, general, [311]
• Urbanization, [31], [250]
• (see City)
• Urga, city, [310]
• University, [304]-5, [306], [307], [318], [320]
• Usury, [94]
• Vagrants (liu-min), [198], [213]
• Vietnam, [330], [334]
• (see Annam)
• Village, [23];
• Village commons, [94], [154]
• Vinaya Buddhism, [188]
• Voltaire, writer, [242]
• Walls, [57];
• Great Wall, [57], [67], [256]
• Wan-li, reign period, [265], [266]
• Wang (king), [38]
• Wang An-shih, statesman, [215] ff., [217]-18, [254]
• Wang Chen, eunuch, [260]
• Wang Ching-wei, collaborator, [315], [318]
• Wang Ch'ung, philosopher 104-5
• Wang Hsien-chih, peasant leader, [189]-90
• Wang Kung, general, [158]
• Wang Mang, ruler, [92] ff., [97], [100], [101]
• Wang Shih-chen, writer, [255]
• Wang Shih-fu, writer, [242]
• Wang Tao-k'un, writer, [254]
• Wang Tun, rebel, [156]-7
• Wang Yang-ming, general and philosopher, [261] ff.
• War, [82];
• size of wars, [21], [53];
• War-chariot, [25], [29], [30], [53];
• cost of wars, [90];
• War lords, [309] ff.;
• Warrior-nomads, [36]
• (see Army, World War, Opium War, Lorcha War, Fire-Arms)
• Washington, conference, [313]
• Wei, dynasty, [102], [113] ff.;
• small state, [40];
• empress, [180]
• Wei Chung-hsien, eunuch, [267]-8
• Wei T'o, ruler in South China, [77]
• Welfare state, [215] ff.
• Well-field system (ching-t'ien), [33]
• Wen Ti, Han ruler, [78], [79], [80], [81], [86];
• Wei ruler 113;
• Toba ruler, [144];
• Sui ruler, [167] ff.
• Wen Tsung, Manchu ruler, [294]
• Whampoa, military academy, [314]
• Wheat, [11], [21], [32]
• White Lotos sect (Pai-lien), [239], [267], [284]-5
• Wholesalers, [200]
• Wine, [21]
• Wood-cut, [251], [256]
• (see Colour print)
• Wool, [21], [33], [286]
• (see Felt)
• World Wars, [295], [310], [311], [312], [317]
• Women rights, [280], [332]
• Writing, invention, [18], [22]
• (see Script)
• Wu, empress, [179] ff.;
• state, [38], [111]-12, [115], [121]
• Wu-ch'ang, city, [301]
• (see Hankow)
• Wu Ching-tzŭ, writer, [280]
• Wu-huan, tribal federation, [98], [102], [114]
• Wu P'ei-fu, war lord, [312]
• Wu San-Kui, general, [269], [271], [272], [277]
• Wu Shih-fan, ruler, [271]
• Wu-sun, tribal group, [89]
• Wu Tai (Five Dynasties period), [199] ff.
• Wu Tao-tzŭ, painter, [183]
• Wu(Ti), Han ruler, [86], [89], [91];
• Chin ruler, [115];
• Liang ruler, [161], [164]
• Wu Tsung, Manchu ruler, [261], [264]
• Wu Wang, Chou ruler, [30]
• wu-wei, philosophical term, [47]
• Yakub beg, ruler, [293]
• Yamato, part of Japan, [112]
• Yang, clan, [119], [120]
• Yang Chien, ruler, [151], [163], [166] ff.
• (see Wen Ti)
• Yang (Kui-fei), concubine, [184]
• Yang-shao, archaeological site, [12] ff., [29]
• Yang Ti, Sui ruler, [168], [178]
• Yao, mythical ruler, [17];
• tribes in South China, [12], [16], [19], [21], [111], [152]
• Yarkand, city in Turkestan, [97], [98], [282]
• Yeh (K'ai-feng), city, [125], [148]
• Yeh-ta (see Ephtalites)
• Yehe-Nara, tribe, [294]
• Yellow Turbans, secret society, [101], [158]
• Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, politician, [241]
• Yen, state, [114];
• dynasty, [112];
• Earlier Yen dynasty, [126], [127];
• Later Yen dynasty 127, [128] ff.;
• Western Yen dynasty, [129]
• Yen-an, city, [321]-2
• Yen Fu, translator, [280]
• Yen Hsi-shan, war lord, [315]
• Yen-ta (Altan), ruler, [264]-5
• Yen-t'ieh-lun (Discourses on Salt and Iron), book, [91]
• Yin Chung-k'an, general, [158]
• Yin-ch'ü, city, [21]
• Yin and Yang, philosophical terms, [60]
• Ying Tsung, Manchu ruler, [259], [260]
• Yo Fei, general, [226]
• Yü Liang, general, [156], [157]
• Yü-wen, tribal group, [119], [148], [169], [172]
• Yüan Chen, [182]
• Yüan Chi, philosopher, [50]
• Yüan Mei, writer, [280]
• Yüan Shao, general, [100]
• Yüan Shih-k'ai, general and president, [298], [299], [300], [301], [302], [309], [310], [311], [312]
• Yüan Ti, Han ruler, [92];
• Chin ruler, [152], [156]
• Yüeh, tribal group and area, [12], [16], [38], [77], [152]
• Yüeh-chih, Indo-European-speaking ethnic group, [75], [88], [118], [150]
• Yün-kang, caves, [146]-7, [344]
• Yünnan, (Yün-nan), province, [10], [89], [97], [110], [248], [258], [275], [292]
• Yung-cheng, reign period, [278], [282]
• Yung-lo, reign period, [257], [264]
• Zen Buddhism
• (see Ch'an), [164]
• Zoroaster, founder of religion, [342]