The Powers of Europe and Fall of Sebastopol

by A British officer

The note containing these demands, and some others of minor importance, was couched in rather menacing if not insolent language, while the reply of the Porte was firm, temperate and dignified; expressive of its readiness to do all that could be fairly demanded of it, and concluding with a declaration of its inability to accede to such violation of its independence and national rights as was implied in the Russian note; appealing at the same time to the emperor’s own sense of justice and honor.

It would be quite superfluous to introduce here all the voluminous correspondence that ensued between the two Powers. Suffice it to observe, that whatever might have been the concessions on the side of the Porte, they would evidently have been met by further and still more exorbitant demands on the part of Russia, as the intention of that Power, from the first, was evidently to bring matters to an open rupture. Surely for no other purpose could the ruler of a vast territory have been suddenly called upon, as he had been not long before at five days’ notice, to divest himself of all authority over many millions of his subjects, and to admit, in fact, of a partition of his empire. What the precise designs of Russia were, are clearly shown in the following extract of a letter from Prince Lieven to Count Nesselrode:

“Our policy,” said he, “must be to maintain a reserved and prudent attitude, until the moment arrives for Russia to vindicate her rights, and for the rapid action which she will be obliged to adopt. The war ought to take Europe by surprise (!) Our movements must be prompt, so that the other powers should find it impossible to be prepared for THE BLOW THAT WE ARE ABOUT TO STRIKE.”

The Cabinets of London and Paris having received early intimation of what was going on, and being well satisfied that the Greek inhabitants of Turkey needed no additional protection, speedily concerted measures for the defence of the Ottoman empire and of their own interests. The political correspondence now became still more involved and prolix; but as more than mere verbal assurances were required to satisfy the Porte of the material support of the two great Western Powers, the combined fleets were directed to anchor in Besika Bay.

On the 4th June, the Sultan, still desirous of avoiding the responsibility of plunging his people into war, addressed to all the governments of Europe a notification of the necessity he felt himself under, of assuming a defensive attitude. This is known as the memorable Hatti-sheriff of Gulhany, a document drawn up with much ability, evincing considerable firmness and moderation of tone, and reflecting great credit on Abdul-Medjid and his advisers. For several years past, indeed, the Sultan has been quietly but steadily introducing a series of reforms into every department of his government, for which he has received little credit from Europe. The strong instinct of his predecessor, Mahmoud, had already marked out the career to be followed. It was only necessary for Abdul-Medjid to wait till he felt himself sufficiently strong to advance. As soon as he did, he established a sound system of national education, took measures for guaranteeing the security of property, organized an uniform dispensation of justice to all classes, not only at Constantinople, but in the remotest districts, reserving exclusively in his own hands the power of life and death. The taxes, moreover, were assessed and levied far more equitably than before, and the abuses which had for a long time been accumulating in numerous offices may be now considered to be in process of abolition.

Abdul-Medjid being alive to the importance of his mission as the regenerator of a vast empire, the moment his independence as a sovereign potentate was menaced, he appealed to England and France, assuring them of his readiness for immediate war in the defence of a principle.

The occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia, which took place in the course of the summer, was preceded by a specious proclamation announcing that it was “but a provisional measure, and that the sole object of the Russian government was efficacious protection in consequence of the unforeseen conduct of the Porte, unmindful of the earnest desire for a sincere alliance manifested by the Imperial Court since the treaty of Adrianople, and of its most strenuous efforts to maintain, on the present occasion, the peace of Europe.”

This proclamation promptly called forth energetic explanations, both from M. Drouyn de Lhuys and from Lord Clarendon (15th and 16th July, 1853). They both clearly set out the true history of the Czar’s aggression, and make no concealment of their resolution to resist it. The invasion of the Sultan’s dominions they maintained to be a just cause for the declaration of war; but as the great Powers of the West had already shown the necessity of avoiding bloodshed, unless as a last resource, the Sultan felt bound to transmit to St. Petersburg a simple protest against the insult passed upon him. Russia perhaps mistook this moderation for feebleness.