Late in 1853 came the tedious conference of Vienna, with its notes, its projects of notes, its despatches, its ultimatums and its ultimatissimums. The result was, the consumption of a vast amount of time, foolscap, post-horses, and government messengers, the concession to Austria of much more importance and consideration than she was in any way entitled to, and the retention at Besika, till the end of November, of the allied fleets, which ought to have passed through the Bosphorus more than four months before,—on the day, indeed, that the Russians crossed the Pruth. The “occupation” which ensued amounted, in fact, to the tyrannical assumption by Russia of the government of two of the finest provinces in Europe, accompanied by such atrocious acts of tyranny, that the English and French consuls found it incumbent upon them at once to withdraw.
Some time after the conclusion of the treaty of Adrianople, in 1828, Count Nesselrode, writing to the Grand Duke Constantine, thus gave expression to the feelings of the government of Russia on this subject:—
“The Turkish monarchy,” said he, “is reduced to such a state as to exist only under the protection of Russia, and must comply in future with her wishes.” Then, adverting to the Principalities, he says, “The possession of these Principalities is of the less importance to us, as without maintaining troops there, which would be attended with considerable expense, we shall dispose of them at our pleasure, as well during peace as in time of war. We shall hold the keys of a position from which it will be easy to keep the Turkish government in check, and the Sultan will feel that any attempt to brave us again must end in his certain ruin.”
The protest of the Porte against the invasion of these provinces bears date the 14th July: from that day till the end of September, the conference at Vienna, urged chiefly by Austria, had been making strenuous efforts to induce the Turkish government to yield to the arrogant pretensions of Russia. No enviable position, indeed, was that of the Sultan: beset on one side by the friendly persuasions of Francis Joseph, and on the other by the imperious summons of Nicholas, who was actively intriguing in every direction, through numberless astute emissaries, to give rise to a belief that the presence of his troops in the Principalities was in conformity to the wishes of the population themselves. On the 8th October, the Grand Vizier (Mustapha Pacha) issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of Constantinople, highly characteristic of the spirit of tolerance which now animates the people of the Sultan, and indicative of a degree of watchfulness and preparation on the part of the government which could scarcely have been anticipated. This proclamation was hailed with enthusiasm, and the whole nation, animated by one will, were only too eager to be led against their aggressors, or to aid in suppressing all attempts, on the part of the Greek population, to adopt the inflammatory counsels of the paid emissaries of Russia.
Equal praise is due to the priests of the Greek Church, and to the Ulemas, who turned a deaf ear to every attempt made to appeal to the fanaticism of their several congregations. Had they acted differently, the internecine war that would have ensued, must have inundated every threshold with blood.
On the eve of the commencement of hostilities, the effective Turkish forces on the Danube may be computed as follows:
| Infantry | 103,000 |
| Egyptian contingent | 13,000 |
| Regular cavalry | 12 regiments |
| Albanians and other irregulars | 20,000 |
| Artillery (guns of different calibre), | 40 batteries. |