Omar Pacha, the commander-in-chief, established his head-quarters at Shumla with 50,000 troops. Alim Pacha, at Baba-Dagh, in the Dobruscha, headed 25,000. Mustapha Pacha, with 30,000, guarded the line of country between Sistow and Rustuck; and Ismail Pacha, with a like number, the district between Sistow and Widdin. Thirty-five thousand men, besides, were distributed among the garrisons of Varna, Tirnova, Pravardin, and different small fortresses along the grim range of the Balkan.
A reserve of 50,000 was assigned to Rifaat Pacha, who was stationed at Sophia, an important town in Bulgaria, on the road from Belgrade to Constantinople.
The whole of Europe—and no country more than Russia—had strangely erred in its estimate of the Turkish army. Any man who could have been found rash enough to have hinted at the possibility of the Sultan’s troops standing before the “stalwart warriors” from the Don, would have been laughed to scorn: yet almost every engagement has shown them uniformly triumphant.
The Turkish army is divided into sections, commanded by generals of division, each of whom has under his orders three generals of brigade. The division consists of eleven regiments, six of infantry, four of cavalry, and one of artillery. The available force of a division comprises 20,980 men; i. e., 16,800 infantry, 2,880 cavalry, and 1,300 artillery-men. The infantry regiments are divided into battalions, and the battalions into companies. The cavalry regiments are divided into squadrons. The artillery regiments each comprise three horse and nine foot batteries, numbering altogether seventy-two heavy and four “grasshopper guns,” about of the same calibre as those used at the battle of Buena Vista by General Taylor.
The Russian army has, for a long time past, been adopting from other powers every improvement that could advantageously be introduced into those docile but stolid ranks, and it was universally supposed to be in the highest state of efficiency. Numerically, it was about equal to the Turkish army immediately opposed to it. At the time to which we allude, Nicholas had, in Georgia and Circassia, at least 148,000 men, commanded by the venerable Prince Woronzow, who does not enjoy a brilliant military reputation, but still is considered an experienced soldier, and one of the few trustworthy men in the Czar’s service. Had this large army not been engaged in holding in check the hardy and active hordes of Schamyl, it might possibly have been available to threaten Constantinople; but danger from the quarter we allude to was never very imminent, for the Turks had stationed 148,000 men, in two separate armies, on the Asiatic shore of the Black Sea, to coöperate with Schamyl, and to observe, at the same time, the movements of the enemy. The Turks and the Russians had, consequently, about an equal number of troops, both upon the Danube and in Asia.
The first cartridge burnt in anger, was at the affair of Issatcha, scarcely more than a skirmish between a handful of Egyptians and Russians, and leading to no important results. The Russian general would fain have confined operations—for a time at least—to such skirmishes, from his unwillingness to risk the prestige with which the Russians had continued hitherto to surround their arms; but this policy accorded not with the views of Omar Pacha, who was anxious to elevate the morale of his men, and to prove to them, by the most conclusive of all arguments, their capability to contend with those whom they had been led to regard with so much respect.