Trial of the Officers and Crew of the Privateer Savannah, on the Charge of Piracy, in the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York

by A. F. Warburton

As I said, therefore, the citizen of New York or the citizen of South Carolina (because, whether in one or the other locality, it is the same thing) is under two sovereigns, owing allegiance to each of them—the sovereign State in which he is, owning the whole mass of residuary power (as it has been happily expressed in the decisions of the Court) beyond the express, limited power granted to the Federal Government by the Constitution of the United States.

I want to call your attention to another thing, as I go along with this line of the argument. I contend that, among the powers which have been delegated to the State governments by the Constitutions of the States, is the power in the executive government of the State, co-ordinately with the General Government, to decide whether itself or the General Government has transcended the line which bounds their respective jurisdictions, upon any case in which a collision may arise between them, which affects the public domain of the State, or the whole State, or its citizens, considered as a body politic. And you will see, in a moment, the reason why I state my proposition in that way.

You have all heard of what, in the history of the country, has been called nullification, and you probably all understand very nearly what that is. By nullification, as it has been spoken of in the history of our country, was meant the claim on the part of a State, by a convention of its people, or otherwise, to decide that the laws of the United States should not operate within its limits upon its citizens, in cases where the law could legitimately operate upon individual citizens. Because you will all recollect that the laws of the United States, in their operation throughout the Union—their criminal laws, laws for the collection of duties, and similar laws—operate upon individual citizens, without reference to whether they are citizens of one State or another. The law operates upon them as people of the United States. And therefore, if you are carrying on business in the port of New York, and a consignment comes to you, it is a question between you as a citizen of the United States and the Government whether the tariff, under which duties are attempted to be collected is valid, as between you and the Government, or not—whether it was legitimate for Congress to pass that tariff; and, in all cases arising on these subjects, the Constitution has provided a tribunal, an arbiter, which is supreme and final, without any appeal. For instance, if you deny the validity of the law under which duties are attempted to be collected upon the goods imported by you, and the Collector attempts to collect them, you refuse to pay, or pay under protest,—and the case must come into the District Court of the United States; and if the Court decides that the law was unconstitutional, you get immediate redress; if it decides that it was constitutional, the question can be carried to the Supreme Court of the United States, and there finally settled. And, therefore, I say that in all cases that come within the purview of the judicial department of the Government, the laws of the United States, as administered by the Courts, and their decisions, bind the citizens of the States in every part of the land.

But, gentlemen, there are an immense class of cases constantly arising where no opportunity can ever be presented to a Court to pass upon them, which were never intended to be passed upon by a Court, which are cases of collision between the executive department of the General Government and the State government in matters, as I expressed it to you before, affecting the public domain, or the State or its citizens as a body politic. As laid down by the expounders of the Constitution of the United States, that instrument is one to which the States are parties, as well as the people of the United States and people of each State.

Suppose a case of this kind. It is not a case likely to arise; but every case may arise, as we have been sadly admonished by the events of the last few months. Suppose we had a President in the executive chair at Washington who was a citizen of the State of Massachusetts, and greatly interested in the prosperity of the commerce of the City of Boston; and suppose that, being a wicked man (for wicked men have been sometimes elected to offices in this and every country), he had conceived the iniquitous design of ruining the commerce of New York, for the purpose of benefiting the commerce of the City of Boston; and suppose, in the prosecution of that wicked design, without the pretense of authority to do so under the Constitution of the United States, without a pretense that Congress had passed any law authorizing him to do anything of the kind, he should station a fleet of vessels, by orders to the commander of his squadron, off the harbor of New York, and should say, from this day forward the commerce of the port of New York is hermetically closed, and the commerce which has formerly gone to New York must go to Boston. Is the State of New York, under a condition of things of that kind, to submit to the closing of her commerce, to her ruin and destruction? Can she get before the Courts for redress against such an infringement of the Constitution by the President? How is she to get there? She cannot go to the Supreme Court of the United States, for in the Courts of the United States there is no form of jurisdiction by which the question can be brought before the Courts by any possibility whatever; and New York is a sovereign and independent State, and, so far as she has not conceded jurisdiction to the United States by the Constitution, has a right to exercise every sovereign and independent power that she has. There is a case, therefore, in which the Courts of law can afford no redress,—in which the Constitution has erected no common arbiter between the General Government and the government of the State.

Who, then, is the arbiter in such a case? Why, gentlemen, the books have expressed it. It is the last argument of Kings—it is the law of might; and in case of a collision of that kind, I maintain before you, upon this trial, that the State has a right to redress herself by force against the General Government; that she has a right, if necessary, to commission cruisers, to drive the squadron away from the port of New York; and she has a right, if more effectual, to commission private armed vessels to aid in driving them away, or to capture or subdue them. There being no common arbiter between her and the General Government in a case of that kind, she has a right to use force in redressing herself, and to take the power into her own hands.

And the authorities are uniform upon that subject. I have been obliged to detain you so long that I shall not read them to you; but I have them collected before me, and in the future discussions which may take place before the Court I shall be able to show that that right was maintained by Hamilton, one of the most distinguished members of the Convention who helped to frame the Constitution, and the strongest advocate of placing large powers in the hands of the Federal Government; by Madison, Jefferson, and all the Fathers of the Constitution, and by all who have written upon the subject; that it is a doctrine which has been asserted by the Legislature of the State of New Jersey, and, indeed, by the State Legislatures of all the States, pretty much, in which the question has arisen—that the Supreme Court of the United States have themselves over and over again declared that the only safeguard that existed, under the Constitution, against the right of the State to come into collision with the General Government, in all cases whatever, was the existence of the judiciary power, in cases where that was applicable between them, and that in all cases where that judiciary power failed, they were left to the law of nature and the might of Kings to redress themselves.

Now, gentlemen, if I am right in that step in my argument,—if that right would exist at any time or under any circumstances,—there must be some authority, in the State that has the jurisdiction, to decide for the citizens of the State when that occasion has arisen; and there must be some authority in the United States which has a right to decide for the Government of the United States when that occasion has arisen; whose decision (that is, in the General Government) is binding for the people of all the States, except the State in collision with the Federal Government and which makes a contrary decision; and whose decision, in that State, is an authority and protection for all the citizens of that State.

I say to you, moreover, gentlemen, that that right, under the law of nature, to resist the attempted usurpation of a power which has not been granted by the Constitution, resides, in a State, in the executive government, and necessarily in the Governor of the State; because you will recollect one of the premises upon which we started was, that all the residuary power in the government, beyond what had been expressly ceded to the Government of the United States by the Federal Constitution, is, by the Constitution, reserved to the State; and the Governor of the State is the sentinel upon the watch-tower for the protection of the rights of the State. He is placed in that position to watch the danger from afar. He communicates with the General Government. Any steps taken having reference to the State, pass under his inspection; and he alone has the materials within his reach for knowing the circumstances and deciding upon the facts in regard to the question whether the General Government is acting within the constitutional limit of its powers, or whether it is guilty of any usurpation of power, in any claim of authority it makes with reference to the affairs of the State. Because, in the case I have supposed, of a President elected from the State of Massachusetts, seeking to destroy the commerce of New York, and stationing a fleet off the harbor, it is not likely that a President who was guilty of such wickedness would avow that he did it for the purpose of building up the commerce of Boston and destroying that of New York. No; he would say that he had notice of a hostile invasion—a fleet leaving the coast of Great Britain or of some other maritime power to make a descent upon New York,—that he had notice of some threatened injury to New York, which would make it necessary to station a fleet there, and to prevent vessels from entering or leaving. The Governor alone would have the means of ascertaining whether there was any foundation in truth for that, or whether it was a mere pretence to cover his iniquitous purpose; and in determining the case whether the Federal Government is exceeding its power or not, or acting within the constitutional limit of its power, the Governor has to deal with a compound question of law and fact. He must first read the Constitution of the United States, and ascertain its grant of power, and then compare that with the facts as presented to him; and upon that comparison the jurisdiction is placed in him to decide whether the act of the General Government is within its power, or a transgression of it.

He decides the question, and what more have we then? He is, by his office, commander-in-chief of the military and naval forces of the State; for the State can have both military and naval forces. It has its militia at all times. It is authorized expressly by the Constitution to keep ships of war, in time of war. There is, certainly, a prohibition in the Constitution of the United States against a State granting letters of marque; but that is a prohibition against its granting letters of marque in a war against foreign States; it has no reference whatever to any possible collision that may take place between the State and the Federal Government. And that rule is laid down by Grotius and Vattel both; for they both maintain and assert the right of the people, under every limited Constitution, in the case of a palpable infringement of power by the chief of the State, forcibly to resist it; and Grotius puts the case of a State with a limited Constitution, having both a King and a Senate, in which the power of declaring war was in express terms reserved to the King alone, and he says that by no means prevents the Senate, in case of an infringement of the Constitution by the King, from declaring and making war against him; because the phrase is to be understood of a war with foreign nations and not of an internal war. I say, therefore, that in a case of that kind—a palpable infringement by the General Government of the Constitution—the Governor of the State, in the first place, has the only means and the only right of deciding whether that infringement has taken place.