Trial of the Officers and Crew of the Privateer Savannah, on the Charge of Piracy, in the United States Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York

by A. F. Warburton

In each State the Governor is commander-in-chief of the naval and military forces; he has a right to give military orders to citizens; he has a right to order them to muster in the service of the State; and if they disobey him they can be punished the same as they can in any civilized country.

And more than that: suppose a case arises of that kind, in which the General and State Governments come into forcible collision, and suppose a citizen should take arms against the State; there is the law of the State which punishes for treason every citizen of the State who adheres to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort; and, under the theory of the prosecution, if he adheres to the State, and the Federal Government should happen to be the victor in the contest, there is the law of the Federal Government which punishes him for adhering to the State. So that the poor citizen of the State, if this theory be correct, is to be punished and hanged, whichever party may succeed in the unhappy contest.

But, gentlemen, the law perpetrates no such absurdity as that; for the very moment the doctrine for which I contend is admitted, the citizen, in a conflict like that between the Federal Government and the State, is not liable to be considered a traitor or punished as such, let him adhere to which of the two parties he pleases, in good faith. The reason of which is clear. He is the subject of two sovereigns,—the one the Federal Government and the other the State in which he lives. Either of these sovereigns has jurisdiction to decide for him the question whether the other is committing a usurpation of power or not; and it inevitably follows that if these two sovereigns decide that question differently, the citizen is not to be punished as a traitor, let him adhere to which he pleases in good faith. And I submit to you, gentlemen, that is the only doctrine, under the Constitution of the United States, and under our complex system of government, which can be admitted for a moment. I will give you a confirmation of that. I have already stated to you the clause of the Constitution of the United States which defines the punishment of the crime of treason against the United States,—and by looking at the reports of the debates in the Convention which adopted the Constitution, you will find that the clause, as originally reported to the Convention, read: "Treason against the United States shall consist in levying war against the United States or any of them, or in adhering to the enemies of the United States, or any of them, giving them aid and comfort,"—and the clause, as reported, was amended by striking out the words, "or any of them," and making it read: "Treason against the United States shall consist in levying war against them or in adhering to their enemies," &c. Therefore, under our Constitution, treason against the United States must be levying war against all the States of this Confederacy. It does not mean the Government. The amendment which I have spoken of shows it must be an act of hostility which is, in judgment of law, an act of hostility against all the States of the Union. Therefore I say that a citizen who owes allegiance to a State of the Union, when he acts in good faith, under the jurisdiction of one of the sovereigns to whom he owes allegiance—to wit, the State—does not levy war against the United States. He levies war against the Government which claims to represent him, in that case,—his other sovereign, to whom he equally owes allegiance, deciding that that Government is committing an usurpation of power; and he is acting under the authority of those in whom he rightly and justly reposes faith,—to whom has been delegated the right to decide; and however the Governor of the State may be punished by impeachment, if he has acted in bad faith, the citizen cannot be subject to the halter for doing that which he was under a legal obligation to do.

Then, gentlemen, to show the application of the rule for which I have been contending—and with the necessary details of which I fear I must have wearied you—to the case in hand: The moment it is conceded that any possible case can arise in which a State would have the right to resist by force the General Government,—the moment it is conceded that it is the Governor of the State, who, co-ordinately with the President of the Union, has a right to decide that question for himself,—then I say we have nothing whatever to do with the question, whether, under the unhappy circumstances which have arisen, the Governor of the State, or of any of the States, decided right or wrong. We know they did claim that the General Government was usurping power which did not belong to it. In fact, I think we have the confession of the President of the United States that, with an honest heart and with honest purposes, which I believe have actuated him all through, he has, as he says, for the preservation of the Union, the hope of humanity in all ages, and the greatest Government, as I shall ever believe, that man has ever created,—that he has been compelled to, and did, usurp power which did not belong to him. President Buchanan, before and after this controversy arose, asserted plainly and unequivocally that he had searched the Constitution and laws of the United States for the purpose of finding any color of authority for the invasion of a State by military force, or the using of force against it; and that he could find no such warrant in the Constitution. He was right. There was nothing of the kind in the Constitution; but he failed to see (in my humble judgment) that the law of nature gave him the power to enforce the legitimate authority of the Union, as it gave to the State government the power to repel usurpation. President Lincoln, when he assumed the reins of power, admitted that there was a doubt on that subject. He declared at first that it was not expedient to exercise that power, and that he would not exercise it. He changed his mind afterwards, and did exercise it; and on the 13th of April he issued a proclamation calling for 75,000 volunteers, the first duty assigned to whom, as he stated in his proclamation, would be to invade the Southern States, for the purpose of recapturing the forts and retaking the places that had passed out of the jurisdiction of the United States. And in a subsequent proclamation he declared that he had granted to the military commanders of these forces, without the sanction of an Act of Congress, authority to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, within certain limits and in certain cases, in those States. And he makes the frank admission that, in his own belief at least, some of the powers which he had found himself compelled to exercise were not warranted in the Constitution of the United States.

Now these acts of hostility complained of in the indictment took place long subsequent to that. This proclamation was in the month of April. These commissions were not issued, and the Act of the Confederate States to authorize their issue was not passed, until some time afterwards—after they had learned of this proclamation; and this commission was not granted until the month of June subsequent.

I say, therefore, a case was presented for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Government of the United States, to decide whether it was exercising its rightful powers, under the Constitution, and for the Governor of the State to decide, for the State, that same question; and that an unhappy case of collision, ever to be regretted and deplored, had arisen between the Government of the United States and the Government of those States; and I say that the citizens of any one of those States owing the duty of allegiance to two sovereigns—to the government of their State and to the Government of the United States—had a right honestly to make their election to which of the two sovereigns they would adhere, and are not to be punished as traitors or pirates if they have decided not wisely, nor as we would have done in the section of the country where we live.

I am sorry, gentlemen, to detain you on the question; but it is a most important one—one that enters into the very marrow of this case; and we do claim that the issuing of this commission, whether on the footing of its having been issued by a de facto Government, or by authority from the State, considering it as remaining under the Constitution, was a commission that forms a protection to the defendants, and one which is not within the purview of the Act of 1790; because it was not, in the language of that section, a commission taken by a citizen of the United States to cruise against other citizens of the United States, either from a foreign Prince or State, or a person merely.

You will observe that if the claim of the Confederate States, that the ordinances of secession are valid, be correct, then it is true that they are foreign States; but their citizens have ceased to be citizens of the United States, and are therefore not within the purview of the ninth section of the Act of 1700.

If, on the contrary, the claim on the part of the Government of the United States, that these ordinances are absolutely void, be correct, then the States are still States of this Union, and the commission, being issued by their authority, is not a commission issued by a foreign State, and therefore the case is not within the purview of the ninth section of the Act of 1790.

I must allude very briefly, before closing, to another ground on which this defence will be placed: and that is, that conceding (if we were obliged to concede) that this was not an authority, such as contemplated, to give protection to cruisers as privateers, there was a state of war existing in which hostile forces were arrayed against each other in this country, and which made this capture of the Joseph a belligerent act, even obliterating State lines altogether, for the purpose of the argument.