Commencement of the first Illyrian war, 230, which ended with the subjugation of Teuta, 226. The war, however, again broke out, 222, against Demetrius of Pharus, who conceived himself inadequately rewarded by Rome for the services he had rendered her in the preceding war. The Romans found him a much more dangerous adversary than had been expected, even after his expulsion and flight to Philip, 220, (see above, p. 282.) Throughout this war, Rome appeared as the deliverer of the Grecian states, which had suffered extremely from the plunder of these freebooters; Corcyra, Apollonia, and other cities placed themselves formally under her protection, while the Achæans, Ætolians, and Athenians vied with each other in showing their gratitude.
Relations with Greece.
5. In the mean time, while Carthage endeavoured to make up for the loss of Sicily and Sardinia by extending her Spanish dominions, which the jealousy of Rome restrained her from carrying beyond the Ebro (p. 84.), Rome herself had a new war to maintain against her northern neighbours the Gauls, which ended after a violent contest with the establishment of her authority over the north of Italy.
From the first Gallic war to the burning of Rome, 390, the Gauls had repeated their attacks in 360 and 348, even to the conclusion of the peace in 336. But in the latter part of the Samnite war, a formidable confederacy having taken place among the Italian tribes, some of the Gauls enlisted as mercenaries in the service of the Etruscans, while others allied themselves to the Samnites. This led them to take part in these wars in 306, 302, and 292, until they were obliged, together with the Etruscans, to sue for peace in 284, before which time the Romans had sent a colony into their country, near Sena. This peace lasted till 238, when it was disturbed by the incursion of the transalpine Gauls; without, however, their coming to any war with Rome. But in 232, the proposition of Flaminius the tribune, (lex Flaminia), to divide the lands conquered from the Senones, became the cause of new disturbances. Upon this occasion, the Gauls entered into an alliance with their transalpine countrymen, the Gæsates on the Rhone, who had been accustomed to engage as mercenaries. These having crossed the Alps, the dreadful war of six years (226—220) began, in which, after defeating the Gauls near Clusium, 225, the Romans pursued them into their own territory, and encamped upon the Po, 223. The Gauls having been again completely overthrown by Marcellus, were obliged to sue for peace; when the Roman colonies of Placentia and Cremona were established. The number of men capable of bearing arms in all Italy subject to the Romans during this war amounted to 800,000.
Hannibal takes the command in Spain,
6. Before this storm was totally appeased, in which it is probable that Carthaginian policy was not altogether inactive, Hannibal had obtained the chief command in Spain. From the reproach of having first begun the war, he and his party cannot be cleared; Rome, in the situation she then was, could hardly desire it; he however who strikes the first blow is not always the real aggressor. The plan of Hannibal was the destruction of Rome; and by making Italy the and makes Italy the seat of war. principal seat of the war, he necessarily turned the scale in his favour; because Rome, obliged to defend herself, left to him all the advantages of attack. The preparations she made for defence, show that it was not believed possible he could execute his enterprise by the route which he took.
The history of this war, 218—201, of which no later transaction has been able to destroy the interest, is divided into three parts: the history of the war in Italy; the contemporary war in Spain; and from 203, the war in Africa. Hannibal's invasion of Italy in the autumn, 218—engagement near the river Ticinus and the battle of Trebia, in the same year. Battle near the lake Thrasymenus in the spring, 217. Seat of the war transferred to Lower Italy, and the defensive system of the dictator Fabius until the end of the year. Battle of Cannæ, 216, followed by the conquest of Capua and the subjection of the greater part of Lower Italy. The defensive mode of warfare afterwards adopted by the Carthaginian, arose partly from his desire to form a junction with his brother Asdrubal and the Spanish army, and partly from his expectation of foreign support by means of alliances, with Syracuse, after the death of Hiero, 215, and with Philip of Macedon, 216. These hopes, however, were frustrated by the Romans.—Syracuse was besieged and taken, 214—212, (see above, p. 174.) and Philip kept employed in Greece, (see above, p. 282.) In addition to this, the Romans retook Capua, notwithstanding the audacious march of Hannibal towards Rome, 211, and he had now no succour left except the reinforcement which Asdrubal was bringing from Spain. The latter, however, was attacked immediately upon his arrival in Italy, near Sena, by the consuls Nero and Livius, and left dead on the field, 207. From this time the war in Italy became only of secondary importance, as Hannibal was obliged to act on the defensive in Bruttium.
The Course of Hannibal over the Alps ascertained, by J. Whittaker. London, 1794, 2 vols. 8vo. The author endeavours to prove that the passage of Hannibal was over the great St. Bernard, and criticises the opinions of other writers.
[We may likewise mention the learned treatise:—