A Dissertation on the Passage of Hannibal over the Alps. By H. L. Wickham, M. A. and the Rev. J. A. Cramer, M. A. second edition, Oxon.]
The war in Spain began nearly about the same time between Asdrubal and the two brothers, Cn. and P. Cornelius Scipio, and was continued, with various success, till the year 216, the issue depending much upon the disposition of the Spaniards themselves. The plan of Carthage after the year 216, was to send Asdrubal with the Spanish army into Italy, and to supply its place by an army from Africa; two victories, however, gained by the Scipios near the Ebro, 216, and the Illiberis, 215, prevented this from being effected, till at last both fell under the superior power and cunning of the Carthaginians, 212. But the arrival of the youthful P. Cornelius Scipio, who did not appear merely to his own nation as an extraordinary genius, entirely changed the face of affairs, and the fortunes of Rome soon became attached to his name, which alone seemed to promise victory. During his command in Spain, 210—206, he won over the inhabitants while he defeated the Carthaginians, and for the furtherance of his great design, contracted an alliance with Syphax in Africa, 206. He was unable, however, to prevent the march of Asdrubal into Italy, 208, which nevertheless rendered it an easy task for him to subdue all Carthaginian Spain as far as Gades, 206, and thus procured him the consular dignity at his return, 205.
The carrying of the war into Africa by Scipio, notwithstanding the opposition of the old Roman generals, and the desertion of Syphax, who at the persuasion of Sophonisba again went over to the Carthaginians (whose loss however was well repaid by Masinissa, whom Scipio had won over to his side in Spain), was followed by an important consequence; for after he had gained two victories over Asdrubal and Syphax, 203, and taken the latter prisoner, the Carthaginians found it necessary to recall Hannibal from Italy, 202; and the battle of Zama terminated the war, 201. The following were the conditions of peace: 1. That the Carthaginians should only retain the territory in Africa annexed to their government. 2. That they should give up all their ships of war, except ten triremes, and all their elephants. 3. That they should pay, at times specified, 10,000 talents. 4. That they should commence no war without the consent of Rome. 5. That they should restore to Masinissa all the houses, cities, and lands that had ever been possessed by himself or his ancestors.—The reproach usually cast upon the Carthaginians, of having left Hannibal unsupported in Italy, in a great measure vanishes, if we remember the plan formed in 216, to send the Spanish army into Italy, and to replace it by an African one: a plan formed with much ability, and followed with as much constancy. We may add to this, that the Barcine faction maintained its influence in the government even to the end of the war. But why they, who by the treaty of peace gave up five hundred vessels of war, suffered Scipio to cross over from Sicily, without sending one to oppose him, is difficult to explain.
Power of Rome increased by the war.
7. Notwithstanding her great loss of men, and the devastation of Italy, Rome felt herself much more powerful at the end of this war than at the beginning. Her dominion was not only established over Italy, but extensive foreign countries had been brought under it; her authority over the seas was rendered secure by the destruction of the naval power of the Carthaginians. The Roman form of government, it is true, underwent no change, but its spirit much, as the power of the senate became almost unlimited; and although the dawn of civilization had broken over Rome, since her intercourse with more civilized foreigners, the state still remained altogether a nation of warriors. And now, for the first time, appears in the page of history the fearful phenomenon She becomes a military republic. of a great military republic; and the history of the next ten years, in which Rome overthrew so many thrones and free states, gives a striking proof, that such a power is the natural enemy to the independence of all the states within the reach of her arms. The causes which led Rome from this time to aspire after the dominion of the world are to be found neither in her geographical situation, which for a conquering power by land seemed rather unfavourable; nor in the inclination of the people, who were opposed to the first war against Philip; but singly and entirely in the spirit of her government. The means, however, whereby she obtained her end, must not be sought for merely in the excellence of her armies and generals, but rather in that uniform, sharp-sighted, and dexterous Her policy. policy, by which she was enabled to frustrate the powerful alliances formed against her, notwithstanding the many adversaries who at that time sought to form new ones. But where could be found such another council of state, embodying such a mass of practical political wisdom, as the Roman senate must have been from the very nature of its organization? All this, however, would not have been State of the rest of the world. sufficient to have subjugated the world, if the want of good government, the degeneracy of the military art, and an extremely corrupt state of morals among both rulers and people, in foreign states, had not seconded the efforts of Rome.
View of the political state of the world at this period. In the west, Sicily (the whole island after 212), Sardinia, and Corsica, from the year 237, and Spain, divided into citerior and ulterior (the latter rather in name than in fact), had become Roman provinces 206; the independence of Carthage had been destroyed by the last peace, and her subordination secured by the alliance of Rome with Masinissa; Cisalpine Gaul, formed into a province, served as a barrier against the inroads of the more northern barbarians. On the other side, in the east, the kingdom of Macedonia, and the free states of Greece, forming together a very complicated system, had opened a connection with Rome since the Illyrian war, 230, and Philip's alliance with Hannibal, 214. Of the three powers of the first rank, Macedonia, Syria, and Egypt, the two former were allied against the latter, who, on her part, maintained a good understanding with Rome. The states of secondary rank were, those of the Ætolian league, the kings of Pergamus, and the republic of Rhodes, with some smaller, such as Athens: these had allied themselves to Rome since the confederacy against Philip, 211. The Achæan league, on the contrary, was in the interests of Macedonia, which Rome always endeavoured to attach to herself, in order to make head against those of the first rank.
War against Philip, 200.
T. Quintius Flaminius, 198,
lays the foundation of Roman power in the east.
179.
198.
8. A declaration of war against Philip, notwithstanding the opposition of the tribunes of the people, and an attack upon Macedonia itself, according to the constant maxim of carrying the war into the enemy's country, immediately followed. They could not, however, drive Philip so soon from the fastnesses of Epirus and Thessaly, which were his bulwarks. But Rome possessed in T. Quintius Flaminius, who marched against Philip as the deliverer of Greece, a statesman and general exactly fitted for a period of great revolutions. By the permanency of his political influence he became indeed the true founder of the Roman power in the east. Who could better cajole men and nations, while they were erecting altars to him, than T. Quintius? So artfully indeed did he assume the character of a great genius, such as had been given by nature to Scipio, that he has almost deceived history itself. The struggle between him and Philip consisted rather in a display of talents in political stratagem and finesse than in feats of arms: even before the battle of Cynoscephalæ had given the finishing stroke, the Romans had already turned the balance in their favour, by gaining over the Achæan league.
The negotiations between Rome and Macedonia, from the year 214, give the first striking examples of the ability and address of the Romans in foreign policy; and they are the more remarkable, as the treaty with the Ætolians and others, 211 (see above, p. 283), was the remote cause of the transactions which afterwards took place in the east. The peculiar system adopted by the Romans, of taking the lesser states under their protection as allies, must always have given them an opportunity of making war on the more powerful whenever they chose. This in fact happened in the present case, notwithstanding the peace concluded with Philip, 204. The chief object of the Romans in this war, both by sea and land, was to drive Philip completely out of Greece. The allies on both sides, and the conditions of peace, were similar to those concluded with Carthage (see above, p. 284). The destruction of the naval power of her conquered enemies became now a maxim of Roman policy in making peace; and she thus maintained the dominion of the seas without any great fleet, and without losing the essential character of a dominant power by land.
9. The expulsion of Philip from Greece brought that country into a state of dependence upon Rome; an event which could not have been better secured than by the present of liberty which T. Quintius conferred upon its inhabitants at the Isthmian games. The system of surveillance, which the Romans had already established in the west over Carthage and Numidia, was now adopted in the east over Greece and Macedonia. Roman commissioners, under the name of ambassadors, were sent into the country of the nations in alliance, and were the principal means by which this system of espionage was carried on. These however did not fail to give umbrage to the Greeks, particularly to the turbulent Ætolians; more especially as the Romans seemed in no hurry to withdraw their troops from a country which they had declared to be free.