Afghanistan

by A. Hamilton

Matters had gone too far to be adjusted by such means, and on August 13, 1897, Sir Richard Udny, instrumental with Brigadier-General (now Major-General Sir Edmond) Elles, who was commanding at Peshawar, in abandoning the Khyber Pass to the unsupported custody of Afridi militia, directed an emphatic remonstrance to the Amir of Afghanistan. His Highness was informed of the nature of the reports which had reached the Government of India, and was required to take immediate steps to recall his subjects and to prevent the repetition of so exceedingly grave an offence. After reminding the Amir that the Viceroy, in May 1896, had called his Highness’s attention to the unfriendly conduct of the Sipah Salar, the letter concluded as follows:

It is impossible that Afghan sepoys can have joined in this attack without the knowledge of the Sipah Salar, and the Viceroy is constrained to warn your Highness that, if you do not control the Sipah Salar, or withdraw him from his command on the frontier, your Highness must be held responsible for his actions.

Abdur Rahman replied at once to the charges of the Government of India, returning a denial and reading the correspondence at a Kabul Durbar held on August 18, in commemoration of his assumption of the title Zia-ul-Millat wa ud-Din. Facts were a little too strong for much importance to be attached to this refutation; but the rebuke, which had now been administered, warned him, doubtless, that the limits of Government patience in his direction had been reached. Correspondence on the question became protracted, and the initial response from Kabul had barely been received when a further fillip was given to the fighting on the frontier. For several days, as early as August 16, warnings had been received that the Afridis were preparing to descend upon the Khyber. It was further stated that this area of operations would be increased by a simultaneous attack from the Orakzais against the Samana ridge in support of the Afridi movement. To its subsequent confusion the Indian Government at the time was relying upon reports from Sir Richard Udny, Commissioner of Peshawar, and Brigadier-General Elles, whose conception of the seriousness of the situation did not prompt him to employ in support of the posts in the Khyber any portion of the 10,000 men lying idle under his command. Equally with those of Sir Richard Udny, the exertions of General Elles upon this occasion were very disappointing.

On August 17, when no less a frontier personage than Malik Amin Khan reported that an Afridi lasakar of 10,000 men accompanied by 1500 mullahs was preparing to descend upon the Khyber, Sir Richard Udny telegraphed to Simla:

I am watching events in Orakzai and Afridi country very carefully from this side, and all my reports from reliable sources say that up to date there is no serious or general movement, either among Orakzais or Afridis....

Two days later, August 19, Brigadier-General Elles, telegraphing to Simla, stated that Sir Richard Udny had informed him that Malik Amin Khan’s information was much exaggerated, adding that Captain Barton, Commandant of the Khyber rifles, had reported the Afridi gathering to be smaller than originally imagined. On the next day, August 20, alarmed at the gravity of his position and advised by the officer commanding the Peshawar forces, Sir Richard Udny withdrew Captain Barton from his post at Lundi Kotal. After consultation with Colonel Aslam Khan and Brigadier-General Elles, on the same day in a telegram to the Punjab Government, he advocated, in spite of the objections of Colonel Aslam Khan to such a policy, the leaving of the defence of the Khyber positions to the unsupported activities of the native levies, in accordance with the terms of the Khyber Agreement of 1881 by which the Afridis were made responsible for the safety of the pass. In this singular point of view Brigadier-General Elles concurred, contenting himself, in spite of the condition of affairs with a faint-hearted and useless promenade in the direction of Jamrud. Meanwhile, with assistance withheld, disaster was deliberately invited. So it happened that, on August 23, when Sir Richard Udny, in a telegram to the Government of India, was again referring to the terms of the Khyber Agreement, the advancing wave of the Afridi tide actually broke against Ali Masjid. From early morning of this day Afridi met Afridi in a brief, bloody struggle round British supremacy in this border stronghold. True to their salt, the men who had been in charge of our posts held out against their own tribesmen until unsupported resistance was no longer possible. Fort Maude and Ali Masjid fell that same night, Lundi Kotal resisted valiantly until August 25, capitulating almost at the moment when the Orakzais were advancing to the attack against the Samana ridge. There the position was cleared by General Yeatman Biggs who, having reinforced the garrisons, dissipated his victory in an ignominious withdrawal harried by his enemy. Tactical blundering thus accomplished at this point what political irresolution had effected in respect of the Khyber.

ALI MASJID FORT

In whatever degree the Amir of Afghanistan by his letter of August 18, may have exculpated himself from events preliminary to the Tirah campaign, the exodus of armed bands from Afghan territory continued to meet with only passive resistance from the frontier officials. Under pressure of accumulating evidence, forwarded direct from Kabul by the British agent, the Viceroy of India on August 30, 1897, addressed a further communication to Abdur Rahman, in the course of which he wrote: