Afghanistan

by A. Hamilton

... It is right that I should tell your Highness that the information which I have received indicates that tribesmen from your Highness’s territories have joined the Mullah of Hadda, and have in other respects committed aggression against the British Government. Bodies of men from Jelalabad district crossed the Kabul river openly with flags flying and drums beating. After the fight at Shabkaddar they returned in the same manner, carrying their dead and helping their wounded. On the side of Khost numbers of camels stolen from my troops in Dawar have been taken across the border, and it is even reported that these camels have been ordered to be collected by Sirdar Sherindil Khan. Your Highness will no doubt recognise the propriety of directing the restoration of camels belonging to the Government of India, which have been stolen and carried into Afghan territory.

Your Highness has said that “tribesmen can never join such a movement openly for fear of me. If any one has come he must have gone secretly.” What I now ask your Highness, in accordance with those assurances of friendship which you have so readily made, is that you will publicly announce to the tribesmen through your local officers that, if they cross the border and join in disturbances against the British Government, they will incur your displeasure. The belief is entertained by many misguided persons that they will not incur your Highness’s displeasure by acting in a hostile manner against the British Government, and this belief can be dispelled if your Highness’s local officers will keep watch along the Kabul river and at other places in order to prevent your Highness’s subjects from crossing the frontier with hostile intentions, whether secretly or openly. I ask your Highness, therefore, to issue orders to this effect....

Before the Amir could reply to the letter of August 30 from the Viceroy, a deputation of Afridi elders, whose intentions certainly lent colour to the Viceroy’s plaint, arrived at Jelalabad en route to Kabul for the purpose of presenting a petition to Abdur Rahman. This document, dated September 5, 1897, was as follows:

The British Government has been from olden times gradually encroaching upon our country, and even upon Afghan territory, and has erected forts at various points within our borders. We have complained of this to the Afghan Government on many occasions, but your Highness has paid no attention to our complaints. Therefore, being helpless and having regard to Islam and our constancy in religion, we have now, under the guidance of God, opened the door of jehad in the face of the said Government, and we have severed our connection with them in every way. We have plundered and destroyed five forts on the Samana above Hangu, one fort at Shinauri, at the foot of the Samana, in British territory, one fort at the Ublan Pass, near Kohat, etc., etc. There are, however, three big forts on the top of the said mountain (the Samana) which have not been taken yet. By the grace of God we will destroy and burn these also. All the people of Tirah have taken up their position on the top of the mountain (Samana); and at its base, from Kohat to the Rud-i-Kurman in the district of Kurram the frontier of the Orakzai runs, and the tribesmen have been making jehad from time to time within their respective limits. We will never consent to tender our allegiance to the British Government and become their subjects. We will never give up the reins of authority of our country to the hands of the Government. On the contrary we are willing to tender our allegiance to the King of Islam. It is incumbent on the Government of Islam not only to look after our interests, and consider our position, but that of the whole of Afghanistan. We therefore send these eighteen persons from among our Maliks, Mullahs, and Elders, with our petitions to your Highness’s presence. We are at present engaged in a jehad on the Samana range, and we request that your Highness will be pleased to do what is for our good and benefit; and, by the grace of God, we will act up to your Highness’s instructions, because we leave the conduct and management of our affairs in the hands of your Highness in every respect. We have used our endeavours with our tribesmen to do service to your Highness. This is the time to gain the object of your Highness. All the Moslems are now at the disposal of your Highness in the shape of regular troops, artillery and money. If the British prove victorious, they will ruin the Moslems. The services to be done on this side may be left to us by your Highness. We hope that after the perusal of our petition your Highness will favour us with a reply. Dated 7 Rabi-us-Sani, 1315 (September 7, 1897).

This prayer of the Afridis had not reached Kabul, when a further letter, September 6, was sent to the Amir from the Government of India, anticipating Afghan assistance in catching the Hadda Mullah should he escape into the Kunar valley. Meanwhile, the aspect of the precise relations existing between Kabul and the revolting tribesmen, and disclosed by this deputation from the Afridi jirga was not very much improved when, on September 10, Abdur Rahman, in acknowledging the letter of August 30, wrote:

... I have ordered the local officers to keep watch on Afghan subjects to the best of their ability, and prevent them from joining Mullah Hadda.... No tribesmen from my territories can do such an act in an open manner. Some of them, however, have great faith in Mullah Hadda, and it is possible that they may have joined him during the night, travelling like thieves by unfrequented roads. How is it possible to keep watch on thieves during nights along such an extensive frontier?... My kind friend, such an arrangement could only be possible by posting about 10,000 soldiers on all the mountain tops and at all the fords in that district. Then they will be able to execute properly such an arrangement, otherwise how would it be possible to stop the people who are familiar with the country? If the well-known roads be guarded against them, they can owing to their knowledge of the country find paths over mountains and through desert tracts to cross the frontier. As far as possible, however, the local officials have been watching and will watch any open movements of the tribesmen.

As regards the dead and the wounded whom your Excellency writes that the tribesmen carried away with them after the fight at Shabkaddar, I beg to state that, if they have brought back their dead secretly, they have already, according to their custom, buried them, and now no trace can be obtained of them. As to the wounded, if questions be asked they explain that they are always engaged in tribal feuds, with one another, and they often kill and wound one another, and that the wounded men have received their wounds in such tribal feuds; and, as the witnesses belong to the people concerned, it is difficult to prove anything contrary to what they allege....

As regards the camels which the Waziri thieves stole from the troops in Dawar, and brought to Khost where they sold them to the inhabitants, I have to state that Sirdar Sherindil Khan has ordered the owners of the camels to keep them safe. If your Excellency considers it necessary that the camels should be taken back from them, then, as the inhabitants of Khost have bought the camels from the Waziri thieves, the price current in the country should be given to them and the camels taken back, so that the people of Khost may not suffer loss...!

The air of truculent triumph which pervaded this communication elicited no rebuke. Naturally enough a government, which made no effective preparation to protect the native guards of British posts in their hour of need, would hesitate to take exception at the twist of a Persian phrase. Two days later, September 12, the same strain of insolence, coupled with many amiable sentiments, could be detected in the reply to the Viceroy’s letter of September 6. With remarkable effrontery Abdur Rahman expressed the fear that collisions might occur in the Kunar valley between the Afghan and British forces, if the pursuit of Hadda Mullah were pushed too far in that direction.

Events, culminating with the fall of Saraghari fort on September 12, were making it incumbent to administer sharp punishment to the Afridis; and the Tirah field force, 60,000 strong, was concentrated at Kohat under Lieutenant-General Sir William Lockhart for this purpose. Concerned at the dislocation of border affairs, at the loss of revenue attendant upon the closing of the Khyber, and deriving an inspiration from the magnitude of the force which was collecting for service with General Lockhart, the Amir himself from this time became less obstructive, withdrawing his own troops from outlying posts, refusing to harbour armed fugitives and turning a very cold shoulder to those who invoked his aid. In consequence of this change of front he refused to permit the Afridi elders to come to Kabul, detaining them in Jelalabad while he posted in public in the capital on September 23, the following reply: