Made on Tuesday, the 14th day of Muharram-ul-haram of the year 1323 Hijri, corresponding to the 21st day of March of the year 1905 A.D. (Persian Seal of Amir Habib Ullah Khan.)
This is correct. I have sealed and signed.
Amir Habib Ullah,
Louis W. Dane, Foreign Secretary,
Representing the Government of India.
Thus the situation upon the arrival of Mr. Dane from Kabul differed in no way from that which had preceded his departure for the Afghan capital, save that substantial concessions had been awarded to the Amir of Afghanistan who, in return, had conceded nothing. In addition to an astonishing and entirely unnecessary elevation in the style and title of the ruler of Afghanistan—conveyed in the charge “Independent King of the State of Afghanistan and its Dependencies,” and the reference to “His Majesty,” which the precious instrument reveals—inevitable corollaries of the transaction were the continuation of the annual subsidy of eighteen lakhs to Abdur Rahman’s successor, the release of the arrears—approximately amounting to £400,000—which had been accumulating since a little previous to the demise of the late Amir, and the right to an unrestricted importation of arms.
ESCORT OUTSIDE THE GATE OF THE QUARTERS OCCUPIED BY THE DANE MISSION
It must not be supposed that the mere ratification of the engagements was sufficient for the purposes of British policy in Central Asia. Much more was needed; and, since facilities were deliberately withheld and the Amir rejected consideration of our pledged responsibility, it is evident that the subjugation of Afghanistan to the interests of India is incomplete. It is of value perhaps to have ascertained that the Amir is disaffected and untrustworthy. There was always a doubt but it was hoped that the affront, which he offered so sedulously to the British Government, was due to his own conspicuous vanity rather than the manifestation of actual ill-will. The Kabul conference made that point clear; but, as the Imperial Government have elected to observe an impressive reticence upon the circumstances of this unfortunate episode, it is no less incumbent upon others to do likewise. Nothing can be gained by revealing to the world the details of a rebuff without parallel in the history of Indian politics, unless such acknowledgment were made to assist public opinion in appreciating the issues involved in the absence of any satisfactory understanding between Kabul and Calcutta. That this course formed no part of the late Government’s policy was disclosed on June 21, 1905, by the debate in Parliament upon the Indian budget and, at a later date, upon Mr. Balfour’s speech on Imperial Defence. The Ministers, who spoke on these occasions, concealed the truth rather than stated it, and their utterances cannot be accepted as either correct or adequate. Mr. Balfour’s statement that the construction “of strategic railways by Russia in Afghanistan” would provoke Great Britain to war does not render the character of Anglo-Afghan policy more intelligible, nor remove the disadvantages from our position. On the contrary, the utterance was most misleading since no such contingency, as the construction of Russian railways in Afghanistan itself, is likely to occur until Russia is prepared to strike with all her strength in Persia and Afghanistan. The question of Anglo-Afghan relations, therefore, remains for solution, having given rise to a situation which was regarded by the late Viceroy and every member of his Council with the gravest apprehension.
