My first three volumes supply the answer to the most serious of these accusations: in them are described the tremendous efforts we had to make to prevent our operations ending worse than they did. I have never been one of those who believe that an order once given should not be countermanded or modified. In war circumstances change so quickly, and information received so frequently turns out to be false, that it would be fundamentally unsound to insist, in spite of changed conditions, on keeping exactly to an order once issued. An excellent example of this is given by the operations at Hei-kou-tai. The order received by the officer commanding the 1st Siberians to rest his troops on January 27, and to occupy the line Hei-kou-tai–Su-ma-pu–Pei-tai-tzu, was founded on the incorrect supposition of the commander of the 2nd Manchurian Army that San-de-pu had been captured. The former was more than once told not to attack. Yet, even though news was received that San-de-pu had not been taken, he insisted in carrying out the orders given, in which, by a mistake, a village held in force by the enemy was appointed as our halting-place. The result is known: we fought all day, lost 7,000 men, and at daybreak on January 28 were compelled to retire. With regard to the accusation that the late Commander-in-Chief[26] constantly countermanded his own orders, it is interesting to note that General Grippenberg, in his article, “The Truth about the Battle of Hei-kou-tai,” points out that, although he did not agree with him as to the necessity for retiring the right flank of the 2nd Army to take up a more concentrated position, he did not express this opinion to the Commander-in-Chief, because he and all his staff knew that Kuropatkin would never countermand an order once given.
Upon the point as to whether we might have defeated the Japanese at Liao-yang or Mukden we shall remain unenlightened, in spite of the publication of my book, till we know in detail the actual movements of the Japanese in these actions. As regards Liao-yang, I can only express my personal opinion. An important decision, such as that leading to an order for troops to retire, cannot be given upon the inspiration of a moment. All the attendant circumstances have to be taken into account—the results of the previous engagements; the physical and mental condition of the troops; the strength and dispositions of the enemy; the results which he may attain if the fight is continued; the reports from the front, flanks, and rear; the extent to which the reserves have been depleted, their readiness for action; the amount of ammunition in hand, etc. At the battle of Liao-yang Kuroki’s army, in addition to Nodzu’s, might easily have been pushed across to the right bank of the Tai-tzu Ho, just as the Japanese boldly threw the greater part of Oku’s army, in addition to Nogi’s, across on to the right bank of the Hun Ho at Mukden. This was all the more possible because our attempt to assume the offensive with the troops stationed on the left bank on September 2 ended disastrously. If there is no hope of worsting an enemy by an offensive counter-stroke, it is very important for a defending force, circumstanced as we were,[27] to retire in good time, and not to hold on until an orderly retirement becomes impossible to carry out. We retired under very difficult conditions along roads deep in mud, but not a single trophy was left behind, not a prisoner, not a gun, not a transport cart.
If we had delayed a single day, our retirement might have resembled that of the 2nd and 3rd Armies, which were in so awkward a plight at Mukden. For the reasons explained in my third volume, the 2nd Army was, on March 7, almost surrounded on flanks and rear. Great efforts were necessary in order that we might extricate ourselves from the position in which we were placed without being utterly defeated. But these efforts were not made, and the situation of our whole force on March 7, 8, and 9 became worse, and the danger of a considerable part of the 2nd Army being surrounded by Nogi’s troops still more imminent. Comparing the condition of our men with that of the Japanese on March 7 and 8, as well as the positions occupied by the two forces on the 8th, and taking into account the moral superiority of the Japanese, I should have given up hope of a victorious issue from the battle on the 7th and 8th, and have arranged for a retirement to Tieh-ling before the army became disorganized. The future historian will probably accuse me of having held on too long. I did not give the order to retire till March 10, and according to events and the opinion of my staff, the order should have been given a day earlier. If we had retired on the 9th, the army would probably have fallen back in complete order without losing anything (except wounded); indeed, we might have taken with us a fairly large number of prisoners and captured guns and machine-guns. In my report upon the battle of Mukden to His Majesty the Tsar, I acknowledged that I was primarily responsible for our reverse, and admitted that I should have more accurately gauged the difference between the men of the two forces and the qualifications of the commanders, and that I should have been more careful in making my decisions. Hoping against hope to defeat the enemy, despite the disastrous operations of the 2nd Army, between March 2 and 7, I gave the order to retreat too late. I should have abandoned all hope of eventual victory at Mukden a day sooner than I did, and our withdrawal would have been effected in good order. Thus, the general conclusion regarding the battles of Liao-yang and Mukden could, in my opinion, be expressed as follows: If we had retired from Liao-yang a day later than we did, the result would have been much the same as at Mukden; if we had retired from Mukden a day sooner, the result would have been much the same as at Liao-yang.[28]
I might also have been blamed for not holding on longer to Tieh-ling and fighting there, and for ordering the troops to retire on to the Hsi-ping-kai position. My reply is given in detail in my third volume. It is sufficient to say here that, when it was decided to retire from Tieh-ling on March 12 and 13, according to the officers commanding those units of the 2nd and 3rd Armies which suffered most in the battle of Mukden, we only had an effective strength of 16,390 rifles in 114 battalions.[29] If I had accepted battle there under such conditions, it would have been most dangerous, as we might have completely lost the cadres of many units. How long it would have taken us to re-form for a new battle can be judged from the fact that the officer commanding the 3rd Army stated before a committee assembled as late as May 17 [two months after the retreat] that he thought the acceptance of a general action even then on the Hsi-ping-kai position itself was inadvisable.[30]
I will bring the present chapter to a close by quoting literally my farewell address to the officers of the 1st Manchurian Army. In this address, with fresh impressions of all that we had gone through and had actually felt during the war, I outlined those of our defects which prevented us defeating the enemy in the time at our disposal. But while indicating our weaknesses, I also brought out the strong points of the troops which I had commanded—points which gave every reason for a belief that we should have won in the end.
“To the Officers of the 1st Manchurian Army.
“In a few days the 1st Manchurian Army will be broken up, and I must now bid farewell to the glorious troops which I have had the great honour to command for two years. Upon you fell the arduous duty, in the beginning of the war, of withstanding the attack of a numerically superior enemy, so as to gain time for our reinforcements coming from Russia to concentrate. You had the good fortune to be present at the battles of the Ya-lu, Te-li-ssu, Ta-shih-chiao, Yang-tzu Ling, Lang-tzu-shan, and also at the long-drawn struggles of Liao-yang, the Sha Ho, and Mukden, and by your conduct during those fights you earned the praise of the rest of the army.
“With a comparatively weak establishment of five and a half corps (160 battalions), or an average fighting strength of 100,000 rifles and 2,200 officers, the 1st Manchurian Army lost up to March 14, 1905:
| Officers. | Rank and File. | ||||
| Killed | … | … | 395 | … | 10,435 |
| Wounded | … | … | 1,773 | … | 56,350 |