or a percentage of killed and wounded amongst the officers of 91, and amongst the rank and file of 67, per cent. of the average war strength. In the independent units the losses in killed and wounded were:
| Officers. | Rank and File. | ||
| 34th East Siberian Rifle Regiment | 89 | … | 3,243 |
| 36th East Siberian Rifle Regiment | 73 | … | 2,531 |
| 3rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment | 102 | … | 2,244 |
| 4th East Siberian Rifle Regiment | 61 | … | 2,170 |
| 23rd East Siberian Rifle Regiment | 50 | … | 2,290 |
| 1st East Siberian Rifle Regiment | 71 | … | 1,920 |
“The particularly gallant conduct in action of the officers is apparent from the fact that the percentage of killed and wounded is considerably higher than that of the men, while many single units proved that it is possible to continue fighting after a loss of two-thirds of the fighting strength. And yet, despite these sacrifices, despite all our efforts, we were unable to beat the enemy. Undoubtedly we had to fight against a very brave, energetic, and most martial foe. So careless were the Japanese of life that they piled the bodies of their comrades on our obstacles, and endeavoured to reach our positions by climbing over these masses of corpses. For a long time also they were able to bring superior forces against us. But we became tempered by misfortune, and gained wisdom by experience, and our numbers grew until we finally became so strong in mind and spirit last summer that victory seemed assured.
“The intervals of comparative peace between the great battles were employed in strengthening the army, and many positions up to and including Mukden were fortified with immense trouble. After that battle the defence of the left flank of the whole force was entrusted to you, and three very strong defensive lines were constructed by your labours up to the River Sungari. These lines, particularly the first and second, were, on account of their fortifications and the nature of the ground, in every way suited either for a desperate defence or for the attack. Although our army was not quite ready to assume the offensive by last May, it would have welcomed orders to advance. The enemy, shaken by their losses at Mukden, kept their positions for six months, and waited for us to move forward. We inaugurated many improvements based upon our previous experiences in the war, and the tactical training of the troops made immense progress. We not only filled up our weakened ranks by means of the drafts which reached us, but expanded all the rifle regiments into four battalions. In the way of reinforcements, the 1st Army received the 53rd Infantry Division, the Cossack Infantry Brigade, and the Don Cossack Division.
“The firing-line of the 1st Army was in August last stronger than it was at the beginning of the war, before the September battles on the Sha Ho, and, thanks to the great exertions of those in command, and the unselfish work of the medical services, the health of the army remained excellent throughout. It was, indeed, fortunate, for if any great sickness had broken out we should, owing to the few drafts then arriving, only have had very weak cadres for the field. It was absolutely essential, therefore, that no expense or efforts should be spared in order to keep every man fit for the ranks, and I am happy to say that our common efforts met with unusual success, for our losses from sickness were less than in killed and wounded. In the 1st Manchurian Army we had lost up to August 14, 1905, 2,218 officers and 66,785 other ranks killed and wounded in action, and 2,390 officers and 58,093 other ranks from sickness. I draw your attention to the fact that while the percentage of losses from action should naturally be higher among the officers than the men, they ought, on account of their better living, to lose less from sickness. The converse was the case with us, which shows that our officers were not sufficiently hardy, and did not know how to preserve their health. To this we must pay particular attention.
“In material matters the army was also excellently situated in August. Clothing and equipment of all sorts were on the spot and plentiful, while all technical supplies had accumulated. Never have we been such a formidable force in every sense as we had become by the summer of 1905, when we were suddenly informed of the unhappy negotiations at Portsmouth, and that peace had been concluded. Doubtless this was necessitated by the state of the interior of Russia; but it was heart-breaking for the army. I remember with what grief the news was received by all ranks. Life seemed to die out of our bivouacs, and all our minds were filled by one sad thought—that the war had ended before the enemy had been beaten. Looking back on the trials we have recently gone through, we can find consolation in the feeling that we have done our duty to Tsar and country as far as has lain in our power; but for many reasons the time given us has turned out to be insufficient. These reasons we must fearlessly search out, and discover what—beyond mere numerical inferiority—prevented our success before peace was concluded. Before all others, I, your senior commander, am guilty because I did not succeed in rectifying our many moral and material defects during the war, and in making the most of the undoubted strong points of our troops. The material defects are known to all of us—the small number of rifles in the firing-line per company [partly owing to lack of care to put as many men as possible into action], the insufficiency [at the beginning] of mountain artillery, the lack of high explosive shells, of machine-guns, and of technical stores of all sorts. By last August the majority of these deficiencies had, through the great exertions of the War Ministry, been made good. Our moral defects I attribute to the different standards of training among the troops, their inferior technical preparation, and the great numerical weakness of units in action. We also suffered much from inadequate reconnaissance of the enemy’s position before a battle, and the resulting vagueness as to how to conduct the action [particularly in the attack]; and, most important, from the lack of initiative and independent thought in individual commanders, the absence of the military spirit in officers and men, of dash, of mutual co-operation between units, and of a general determination to carry out a task to a finish at any sacrifice. The tendency to accept defeat too soon—after only the advanced troops had suffered—and of retiring instead of repeating the attack and setting an example, was highly detrimental. Such retirement, instead of calling forth increased efforts from the neighbours, in most cases only served as a signal for their own retreat.
“Generally speaking, there was in all ranks a great dearth of men of strong military character, with nerves tough enough to enable them to stand the strain of an almost continual battle lasting for several days. It is evident that neither our educational system nor our national life during the last forty to fifty years has been of a nature to produce men of strong independent characters, or more would have appeared in our army when wanted. Now the Tsar has given us the blessing of freedom. The nation has been released from the leading-strings of a bureaucracy, and can now develop freely, and direct its energies to the good of the country. Let us hope that this blessing of freedom, coupled to a well-thought-out system of education, will raise the material and moral forces of the Russian nation, and produce in every sphere of national activity stalwarts who are enterprising, independent, possessed of initiative, and strong in body and soul. By an infusion of such the army will be enriched. But it is not possible for the army idly to await results which are the work of a generation. Knowing now our strong and weak points, we can, and ought to, start on self-improvement without delay. The war has brought out many men [especially amongst all ranks of the 1st Army], from modest company officers up to corps commanders, on whose energy, zeal, and ability the Russian nation can rely; and I notice with pleasure that not a few of those amongst the 1st Army have received good appointments in the Far East and in Russia. This should serve as a fresh proof that the Tsar is diligently watching our efforts, and is losing no time in employing the most worthy of you to the advantage of the whole army.
“You have first-hand knowledge of the difficult conditions generally under which war is now conducted, and of the moral and physical effort that is required to carry on an almost continuous battle for several days. You also know by experience the exact value in action of all kinds of technical equipment. All this makes it necessary for you to endeavour to perfect yourselves. With the exception of the cadet corps, our schools take no pains about the physical development of children; consequently, many of our officers, as was evident in the war, are physically feeble. Pay attention to gymnastics, to fencing, to singlesticks, and to musketry. An officer should not be a mere spectator of the physical exercises of the men—a thing I have often noticed—but should himself set the example to those under him.
“The relations between officers and men have always been of the closest. Like fathers to the men, our officers have won their affectionate respect. Remember that to our soldiers the word ‘father-commander’ is not merely an empty phrase; they believe in it. Remember, also, that a commander only wins the heart of his soldiers when he is their father-commander. It is quite possible to be strict and at the same time look after the men’s welfare, for our soldiers are not afraid of severity, but respect it; in the majority of cases a just severity is a deterrent against crime. But the simple-minded soldier is particularly sensitive to injustice, and soon sees through any deceit practised on him. You who shared with the men all the hardships and dangers of field service are very favourably situated. The men having seen you in action—always in your place, giving an example of unselfishness—will forgive much, and will follow you through fire and water. These links which bind the ranks must be carefully maintained, and officers who have been in the field with units must not be removed from them unless absolutely necessary. Guard the military traditions acquired by regiments, and do your best to preserve the memory of the gallant deeds done by companies, squadrons, or batteries collectively, or by individual members of them. Keep in close touch with the private soldier; try to win his full confidence. You will gain it by your constant care of and your affection for him; by your strict, and at the same time fatherly, relations to him; by knowing your work; and by your own example. Only by these will you be able to take advantage of all his good points, to correct his defects, and guard him from the harmful influences which will be more numerous in the future than ever. The recent cases of military mutinies should be constantly in our memories. I turn to you officers in command of regiments in particular. You know the great responsibility which falls upon you in action. How often has the issue of the battle depended on the way a regiment has been led. It has often been enough for an energetic, gallant, capable man to get the command of a regiment to change its character utterly. The selection of men for these appointments must, therefore, be carefully made, and those chosen must work incessantly to educate all those under them.