1. The 2nd Army was to gain possession of the line of Japanese works San-de-pu–Lita-jen-tun–Ta-tai–San-chia-tzu, and then the line Tsun-lun-ian-tun–Ta-ta-san-pu along the Sha Ho. And, conformably to the enemy’s action and the success attained by the 3rd Army, it was, while throwing a strong containing force to the south, to develop its operations towards the line San-tia-tzu–Shih-li-ho, and on the heights south of the last village.
2. The 3rd Army was to capture the line of works Chang-ling-pu–Ling-shen-pu, and then the line along the Sha Ho from the latter point to Hun-ling-pu inclusive. And, conformably to the enemy’s action and the successes attained by the 2nd Army, it was to develop its operations towards the line Hei-te-kai Peak–Hung-pao Shan Peak.
3. The 1st Army was to co-operate in the capture of Hou-te-kai Peak, and seize the heights near the villages of Cheng-san-lin-tzu and Shih-shan-tzu. And according to the action of the enemy and the successes attained by the 2nd and 3rd Armies, it was, with the assistance of the 3rd Army, to develop its operations towards the positions near the villages Ta-pu, San-chia-tzu, Shan-lu-ho-tzu, which we had occupied on the 10th to 12th October.
In my orders of January 21 it was clearly defined that the above scheme would require modification dependent on the line of action adopted by the Japanese.
If, contrary to our calculations, the enemy preferred to contain our 2nd and 3rd Armies, and to fall with the rest of their forces on the 1st, or on the interval between the 1st and 3rd Armies, the position would call for a very energetic advance against their flank by the 2nd and 3rd Armies.
If they should at once fall back on their second line of positions without holding on to their first line, we should endeavour to turn their retirement into a disordered retreat.
January 25 was the day fixed for the commencement of our advance, but, owing to the action of Grippenberg, who should have started the movement, the arrangements had to be altered. Almost a fortnight before our operations began our chances of success had been unfortunately reduced by certain dispositions made by him. The corps to be attached to his army were disposed as follows:
| 8th Corps | … | South of the River Hun on |
| both sides of the railway. | ||
| 10th Corps | … | At Bai-ta-pu village on the |
| Mandarin road. | ||
| 1st Siberians | … | Behind the right flank of the |
| 1st Army. |
The right of the 2nd Army between the 5th Siberians and the River Hun was only protected by cavalry, while a separate column of five battalions and two cavalry regiments under Kossagovski was on the right bank of the river. Notwithstanding the instructions issued that these dispositions were to hold good as long as possible, in order that we might conceal our intentions from the enemy, and also that the 10th Corps—intended to act as a reserve in the event of their striking at our centre—was not to be moved from its place without my knowledge, on January 14 Grippenberg transferred the 14th Division over on to the left bank of the Hun, and on the 16th, without letting me know, moved the 10th Corps closer to the right of the 3rd Army. These movements, of course, at once disclosed our intentions, and information soon came in that the enemy had, in their turn, commenced moving their troops westwards and fortifying opposite our new dispositions.
The strength of the army was: