However, it was finally decided, in accordance with the opinions of Linievitch and Kaulbars, and with the consent of Grippenberg, to take the offensive in January, on the condition that complete and direct touch was maintained between all three armies.
According to our information, the strength of the Japanese armies was approximately as follows:
| Kuroki’s Army | … | 68 battalions, 21 squadrons, |
| and 204 guns | ||
| Nodzu’s Army | … | 50 battalions, 11 squadrons, |
| and 168 guns | ||
| Oku’s Army | … | 60 battalions, 29 squadrons, |
| and 234 guns |
or a total in all three armies under Oyama of 178 battalions, 61 squadrons, and 606 guns. It was calculated that they could put 200,000 rifles in the field against us on January 14, 1905. As a matter of fact, we underestimated the number. From the prisoners we took we knew accurately what was going on in their 1st Army, but we were unable to ascertain with sufficient accuracy and in good time what was happening in the rear, or what reinforcements were being received. Their fortified positions were as follows: The left flank up to the village of Hsiao-tung-kou was held by Oku. In the centre was Nodzu’s army. On the right was Kuroki. Opposite Rennenkampf, on our extreme left, was a force under Kavamura amounting to about 15,000 to 20,000 men. Nogi’s army was estimated at 72 battalions, 5 squadrons, and 156 guns; but which units had reached Oyama, and how they were grouped, we did not know.
In order to induce the enemy to detach as many men as possible for their line of communications, and so weaken their front, to handicap their supply arrangements, and to stop the rail transport of Nogi’s units to the front, a raid by a mounted force[83] was organized against their line of communications. The objects of this raid, which was under Mischenko, were:
1. To seize Newchuang station, and destroy the large stocks of food-supplies collected there; and—
2. To blow up the railway-bridges and destroy the track on the portion of the line from Ta-shih-chiao to Kai-ping.
Neither object was fully attained, chiefly owing to the slowness with which the force moved. Individual episodes that occurred are, however, very instructive, and show that our cavalry is quite fitted to perform the most self-sacrificing duties.
The plan agreed upon for the main advance was explained in my orders of January 19. Just as it had been in September, our primary object was to drive the enemy behind the Tai-tzu Ho, and to inflict on him as much damage as possible. The force selected for our first attentions was Oku’s left-flank army, the left wing of which was to be enveloped. The advance of the 1st and 3rd Armies against the positions held by Nodzu and Kuroki were to be started and developed in accordance with, and depending upon, the measure of success attending the efforts of the 2nd and 3rd Armies to capture the enemy’s left-flank positions on the Sha Ho. The armies were given the following tasks: