Armenia and the War

by A. P. Hacobian

I have said "Great Britain," but it would be more accurate to say "the British Government of the day," for I firmly believe—in fact, who will doubt?—that if the British people had had the slightest suspicion that the Treaty of Berlin and the Cyprus Convention had in them the germs of the disaster that has since overtaken the Christian subjects of the Porte, they would never have ratified those treaties. Nor do I suggest, I need hardly say, that the statesmen who are responsible for these diplomatic instruments consciously and deliberately jeopardized the existence of an ancient Christian people. Lord Salisbury's sympathetic utterances in 1895-96 show unmistakably how deeply distressed he was at the grievous turn events had taken, and still more at the powerlessness of the Concert of Europe to save the Armenians from the position of extreme peril in which the Concert had placed them in 1878.

Successive British Governments have made frequent attempts to improve the lot of the Armenians; but the more they tried the more the Turks massacred. There is no fairer-minded public than the British, whose hospitality and the blessings of whose rule I have gratefully enjoyed for many years, as have some thousands of my compatriots in almost every part of the empire. There is also no one more ready and anxious to pay his debt than the Briton when he knows what he owes. I have therefore no fear whatever of arousing any resentment by calling the attention of the British public to the existence of this old liability. On the contrary, I am convinced that the fact will be taken note of in good part, and by most even thankfully. I read a Press article not long ago—it was, if I remember rightly, a review of Mr. Llew Williams's book, Armenia Past and Present in The Court Journal—which ended with the following question: "If these terrible things are true and we have any responsibility, why are we not told so?"

As regards the nature of the responsibilities and obligations, I refer my readers to the [Appendix], where will be found the texts of Art. 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, Art. 18 of the Treaty of San Stefano—which was torn up and superseded by the Treaty of Berlin—the full text of the Cyprus Convention, and Lord Salisbury's Dispatch to Sir Henry Layard containing instructions for the negotiation of that Convention.

I may here point out that though at first sight there appears to be little difference between the wording of Art. 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano and Art. 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, there is this fundamental difference between the application of the two clauses that, while the former left the Russian Army in occupation of the Armenian provinces until the reforms should be an accomplished fact, the latter was a mere Turkish promise to be performed after their evacuation by the Russian forces. How the Turk performed his promise is well enough known, and forms the darkest page of modern history—probably of all history.

Those who have the interest and the time for fuller information on the subject I recommend to refer to Mr. Gladstone's famous speeches on the Eastern Question and the Treaty of Berlin, the debates in both Houses of Parliament on the massacres of 1895-96, Canon Maccoll's "The Sultan and the Powers," Mr. W. Llew Williams's "Armenia Past and Present," and last but not least, "Our Responsibilities for Turkey," by the late Duke of Argyll. This frank and admirable commentary on the bearing of British policy upon the Armenian question is now unfortunately out of print. I therefore quote, with apologies, the following lengthy extract for the convenience of those who may have difficulty in procuring a copy. It is an authority that will command general and respectful attention.[26] (The italics are mine.)

"Nothing can be more childish than to suppose that the significance and effect of such a change as this[27] can be measured or appreciated by looking at the mere grammatical meaning of the words. The words seemed harmless enough. They may even seem to be most benevolent and most wise in the interests of the Christian subjects of the Porte in Armenia. But when we look at the facts which lay behind the words, and at the motives which were at work among the contracting parties, we must see that nothing could have been devised more fatal to their interests. The change which the new words affected in the Treaty of San Stefano wounded the pride and the most justifiable ambition of Russia to be the protector of her co-religionists in provinces with which no other Christian Power had any natural connection. On the other hand, it delighted the low cunning of the Turk, in constituting another 'rift within the lute' which by and by would be quite sure to make the 'music mute' of any effective concert between the Powers of Europe. The Turk could see at a glance that, whilst it relieved him of the dangerous pressure of Russia, it substituted no other pressure which his own infinite dexterity in delays could not easily make abortive. As for the unfortunate Armenians, the change was simply one which must tend to expose them to the increased enmity of their tyrants, whilst it damaged and discouraged the only protection which was possible under the inexorable conditions of the physical geography of the country.[28]

"But this is not the whole of the responsibility which falls on us out of the international transactions connected with the Treaty of Berlin. After that treaty had been concluded, we entered by ourselves into a separate, and for a while a secret, convention with Turkey, by which we undertook to defend her Asiatic provinces by force of arms from any further conquests on the part of Russia, and in return we asked for nothing more than a lease of Cyprus, and a new crop of Turkish promises that she would introduce reforms in her administration of Armenia. No security whatever was asked or offered for the execution of those promises. We simply repeated the old mistake of 1856, of trusting entirely to the good faith of Turkey, or to her gratitude. But this time the mistake was repeated after twenty-two years' continued experience of the futility of such a trust. As to gratitude, it must have been quite clear to the Turks that we were acting in our own supposed interests in resisting the advance of Russia at any cost.

"No doubt we had occasion to remember, with some natural bitterness, the sacrifice to Russia of all that the gallant General Williams had done for Turkey in his splendid defence of Kars. But we ought to have remembered, also, how dreadful had been the account given by that able and gallant man of the detestable Government which he was defending. We ought to have remembered how easy were the reforms which he had recommended, if the Turkish Government had been honest; and how they had all been systematically evaded. We ought, above all, to have considered the inevitable effect of this new treaty of guarantee upon the sharp cunning of the Turks. They saw how eagerly it was sought by us, and they must have concluded that, whilst we were clearly not only earnest, but excited, in our opposition to Russia, we were comparatively careless and lukewarm about any changes in their own system of government. They must have seen that the new convention[29] practically superseded even the slightest restraints put upon them by the Treaty of Berlin, and that the Christian population of Armenia were practically left entirely at their mercy.

"Let us look back upon all these transactions as a whole, and try to form some estimate of the position of responsibility in which they have placed us towards the Christian populations subject to the Ottoman dominion. In 1854-56 we had saved that dominion from destruction by defeating, and locally disarming, its great natural enemy. We had set up that dominion with new immunities from attack, and we had choked off from any protectorate over the Christians the only Power which would or could exert any such influence with effect. We had done this without providing any substitute of our own, except a recorded promise from the Turks. We had provided no machinery whereby bad faith on the part of Turkey could be proved and punished. Then, twenty years later, in 1876, we had obstinately refused to join the other Powers of Europe in remedying this great defect, by putting a combined pressure on Turkey to compel her to establish effective guarantee for the future. In 1878 we had denounced the treaty in which Russia, by her own expenditure of blood and treasure, had imposed on Turkey the obligations which we had admitted to be needful, but which we had ourselves declined to do anything to enforce. Then, in the same year, at Berlin, we had again done all we could to choke off the only Power which had the means and the disposition to secure the fulfilment of any promises at all. Particularly in Armenia we had substituted for a promise to Russia which her power, her geographical position, and her pride might have really led her to enforce, another promise to all the Powers which, on the face of it, was absurd—namely, a promise to let all the Powers 'superintend the execution' of domestic reforms in a remote and very inaccessible country. Lastly, in the same year, as we had already choked off Russia, we now proceeded by a separate Convention to choke off also all the other Powers collectively, by inducing Turkey to give a special promise to ourselves, apart from them altogether. For the performance of this special promise we provided no security whatever, but trusted entirely, as we had done in 1856, to the good faith of a Power which we knew had none. With Russia deeply offended and estranged, and the rest of Europe set aside or superseded—such were the conditions under which we abandoned the Christian subjects of the Porte in Asia to a Government incurably barbarous and corrupt.

"And now, we are astonished and disgusted by finding that the terrible consequences of all this selfish folly have fallen on those whom we had professed, and whom we were bound by every consideration of honour, to protect. Surely these years might have brought us a reconsideration of our position. The fever of our popular Russophobia had sensibly abated. We had secured our "scientific frontier" in India, and Russian expansion had taken a new direction in the Far East. New combinations—and some new disseverments—had taken place in Europe. The whole position of affairs was favourable to a policy of escape from bad traditions—from obsolete doctrines—and from duties which it was impossible we could discharge. Surely we might have asked ourselves, What had we been doing all these years to fulfil those duties? Nothing. And yet all along we were not ignorant that the vicious Government which we had so long helped to sustain against all the natural agencies that would have brought it to an end long ago was getting no better, but rather worse. We knew this perfectly well, and we have recorded our knowledge of it in a document of unimpeachable authority. In the second year after the Treaty of Berlin, when the obligations we had undertaken under it were still fresh in our recollection, we had made one more endeavour to recall the Ottoman Power to some sense of shame, if not to some sense of duty. In 1880 we had a special Envoy at the Porte, one of our most distinguished public men—Mr. Goschen; and we had called together at Constantinople a meeting of all the Ambassadors of the six Powers of Europe who were signatories of the Treaty of Berlin. They drew up an Identic Note, which they all signed and presented to the Porte. In that Note they declared that no reforms had been, or were even on the way to being, adopted, and that so desperate was the misgovernment of the country, that 'it would lead in all probability to the destruction of the Christian population of vast districts.' Could a more dreadful confession have been made in respect to the conduct and policy of any Christian Government?