London, January 3rd, 1831.
My dear General,—I have read over several times, with the utmost attention, your letter of the 30th ult., and I wish to explain to you confidentially my views relative to its contents. It is evident that, at the present time, France is divided between two parties, whose opinions have their echoes in the council of the king. One of these parties urges us to war, and employs every means, direct and indirect, to bring about that end. The views of this party are directed solely to the attainment of power, and therefore it is necessary to be on one’s guard against the suggestions and speeches which they put forth. The other party, which is so ably headed by yourself, maintains that peace alone can consolidate the new state of things in France, and, consequently, it may be presumed that all its efforts tend to the preservation of peace. It has been truly observed, that a kingdom may rise up amidst the turmoil of war, but that it can only be firmly established in time of peace.
The new line of policy which you suggest in reference to the affairs of Belgium is at variance with all my ideas on the subject, and it would, I am sure, be equally opposed to the views of the English ministers and the members of the conference. Of this fact I have had opportunities of convincing myself in the course of several conversations I have casually entered into for the purpose of sounding opinions on the subject.
We might succeed, but not without difficulty, in obtaining the sovereignty of Belgium for Prince Leopold, on his marriage with a French princess; and I cannot comprehend how the speeches of certain members of the party decidedly favourable to war, should have determined you to renounce the only arrangement by which peace can now be secured.
It must be evident to you, as it is to me, that Prince Leopold is very far from being what is called English. He is attached to England only by the 50,000l. per annum, of which he cannot be deprived, and which gives him the advantage of presenting a civil list, ready settled, to the country he may be called to rule.
Like all great political events, the Belgian revolution appears to me to pass through different phases. The establishment of a monarchical government in Belgium seems a step calculated to relieve that country from the embarrassments in which she is enthralled—viz., the division of the debt between Belgium and Holland; the debt contracted by Belgium to Russia; together with many other matters connected with Belgian independence.
When all these questions shall be adjusted, and Europe shall have approved the adjustment, we may, after the lapse of a few years, entertain with some hope of success, the project of uniting Belgium to France. The very adjustment of the points above referred to, would favour the chance of success, because it would remove difficulties which every one is capable of appreciating. But I am convinced that war would be the inevitable consequence of the proposition now made for annexing Belgium to France.
The present spirit of the members of the conference, and of the English Cabinet, is extremely favourable to us; but, my dear General, I affirm, in the full confidence of being correct, that if we were suspected of entertaining other intentions than those which I have deemed it expedient to express, our position with reference to all the Courts of Europe, including that of England, would be changed much to our disadvantage.
I entreat you, therefore, to reflect maturely before you enter upon so perilous a course. War may compromise so many questions, that it appears to me of all things most to be feared and avoided. The wisdom of the king, who well knows how to resist party clamour, and your prudence, my dear General, must avert this misfortune, and control the turbulent spirits who would drive us to extremities, unmindful that the glory of France now depends on peace. It is easy to commence war,—the difficulty is how to maintain and to terminate it. In short, I am averse to the project of the acquisition of Belgium. The aggrandizement of France by that acquisition would doubtless be flattering to French vanity, but it would in many respects be injurious to French industry. The case is different with respect to the Rhine and Saxony. But, General, your position enables you to judge more accurately than I can, the various questions adverted to in this letter.