FROM PRINCE TALLEYRAND TO MARSHAL SEBASTIANI, ON THE SAME SUBJECT AS THE PRECEDING.
The importance of the crisis at which we have arrived cannot fail frequently to claim your attention. At the present juncture we may, by prompt and honest decision, preserve peace, or by prolonged hesitation we may enable intriguers (too numerous a class both here and in Belgium) to compromise the destinies of Europe, and of the dynasty which the voice of the nation has raised to the throne of France. I await with the utmost anxiety and impatience the reply of the French Cabinet to the various questions proposed by the four Powers; the delay of that reply probably causes indecision in the opinions of the plenipotentiaries assembled here. For Heaven’s sake let not the Belgians, who are so stupid as not to perceive all that has been done for them, and the Dutch, who are stimulated by bitter hatred, draw us into this deplorable contest! Let us not suffer an affair, trivial in itself, to disturb the equilibrium of the world, and to unbridle the fiercest passions. All will be ended, all consummated on the day when France, conjointly with the four other Powers, shall declare that Belgium is to retain her old boundaries, her independence, and her neutrality. On that day the Dutch will be paralysed, the Germanic Confederation will halt, the Belgians will be subdued, the conference will choose Prince Leopold for king, and peace will be secured. If France be so blind as to censure your administration for having saved her in spite of herself—if she be unjust to those who have preserved her—then, sir, you will cease to be minister, and I shall cease to be ambassador. We shall forfeit our posts for having defended and maintained a great principle, for which future ages will honour us. In short, we may be sacrificed, but let it be in the cause of peace, in the cause of civilization and of good order, and in defence of a sovereign whom we love, and whose throne will fall in the general destruction now impending. There is but little time for averting the terrible disaster which my old experience foresees, and of which your quick and accurate discernment must have enabled you to warn the council. But, sir, let your decisions be formed singly with yourself. The powers of the clearest head, and soundest judgment, cannot be freely exercised except when withdrawn from the turbulence of one party, the timidity of another, and unbiassed by the ignorance of outward affairs which is so marked a trait in the French character. The intelligence of the French people, shrewd as it is, scarcely ever extends beyond the frontiers of their own country, and therefore they labour under the singular mistake of supposing that England cannot go to war with us. They do not perceive that the vast concession made by the recent Reform Bill has conferred on the English ministry a temporary popularity, of which they will freely avail themselves to obtain the means of opposing us; and that this means will be much more readily accorded to the present administration than it would have been to that of the Duke of Wellington. Our July revolution is tarnished by circumstances which have greatly obscured its lustre; and it has been justly observed that anarchy and disorder are not very formidable ramparts to be opposed to an enemy. However, there appears to be no disposition to attack us, more especially since the questions of right and law have been entrusted to you. But whenever we give reason to warrant suspicions of our good faith, or of our capability to repress turbulent movements, then, rest assured, that England will, though reluctantly, oppose us with an immensity and a facility of power at which France will be astounded.
On the other hand all that is required of us is to be firm at home and moderate abroad. There is no intention to take anything from us; on the contrary, many concessions on the part of neighbouring powers have been assented to. But it is wished to preserve general peace and security, and not to grant to nations, whose independence has been recognised in spite of old treaties, the right of conquest over countries which have never belonged to them, and which are the guaranteed property of others. For our own sake, sir, as well as for the general good, it were to be wished that every individual composing the French cabinet could comprehend the principle of non-intervention in the way in which it was understood by M. de Rigny at Navarino.
LETTER FROM PRINCE TALLEYRAND TO COUNT SEBASTIANI, ON THE AFFAIRS OF BELGIUM.
London, January 25th, 1831.
Monsieur le Comte,—Count Flahaut arrived here the day before yesterday, and delivered to me the letter which you entrusted to his charge. I thank you for having chosen him as the bearer of it.
The raising of the siege of Antwerp, and the irritation of the King of Holland, prove that the conference was sufficiently rigorous towards both parties to obtain the wished-for result.
My conversation with M. de Flahaut has furnished me with some valuable information respecting the ideas and intentions of the king’s government relative to the affairs which I am directed to manage here, and also respecting the state of public opinion in France. I, however, regret that Count Flahaut had left France before my despatch of the 21st reached you. The intelligence it contained of the resolution adopted by the conference must necessarily influence the views of the king and his council, as well as the line of policy to be pursued towards Belgium. I congratulate myself on the declaration of neutrality, which has been received with great satisfaction by the statesmen of this country. All, to whatsoever party they belong, regard it as a measure of wise policy, honourable to modern civilization, and calculated to ensure the maintenance of peace by the facility it affords for conciliating, if not all claims, at least all essential interests. I must add, however, that whilst acceding to the measure, they regard it as wholly tending to the advantage of France.
I am aware that, in the juncture at which affairs have arrived in Belgium, and amidst the embarrassment which this state of things entails on France and Europe, the public mind has been agitated by schemes of the most opposite character. The avowed neutrality has now rendered most of these plans utterly impracticable, and has enabled me to revive, with advantage, the question of the Prince of Naples, to which, at first, so much opposition was manifested. I even think that we shall completely succeed in rendering the city of Antwerp a free port, or rather in making it one of the Hanse Towns; and I am not quite certain but that we may arrive at this result without Antwerp ceasing to belong, as a free port, to Belgium. From the day on which the protocol was signed, such is the line of policy I have pursued, and I shall continue to follow it up, unless I receive contrary instructions from you.