This plan has the advantage of showing how utterly useless would be any concession made to England on the continent. I will even acknowledge that it was with the view of banishing any idea of that nature that I adopted the system I am now pursuing. I should have deeply regretted to see the king’s name and yours attached to a clause which, in my opinion, would render our government liable to the charge of being indifferent to the judgment of posterity.
History bears evidence to the difficulties entailed by the prolonged occupation of Calais by the English, and it records the favours lavished on the Guises, when they relieved France from that disgrace. These lessons ought not to be thrown away upon us. The same mistakes may be followed by the same results, and may obliterate the stamp of independence which is attached to all the acts of the king’s government. I am certain that his majesty is too high-minded to dwell long on the idea of a plan which, without having any direct effect on our own country, would cause us to be reproached for the manner in which we have exercised our continental power.
No one will go so far as to deny that the annexation of Belgium to France would be an advantage, though an aggrandizement of territory on the bank of the Rhine would be more in accordance with my notions of French policy. I admit that the annexation of Belgium would render popular, for a time, the government that might bring it about, notwithstanding its injurious effects on French industry. But you may rely on it, Count, that that popularity would be exceedingly transient, if purchased at the price that is proposed to be paid for it. There is no reputation, however solid, that would not be shaken by a measure of such a nature. Does not every one blame the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, for having brought the Russians into Europe? What a heavy judgment would fall on those who should bring the English back on the continent! It is best not to throw ourselves into contact with those whom we cannot reach on their own ground.
I am convinced, Monsieur le Comte, if you were plenipotentiary here, you would never affix your name to an act which not even the most protracted and most disastrous war would justify.
Note of M. Colmache.—The Minister for Foreign Affairs (Count Sebastiani) made no reply to the above severe, but just comments on the unworthy proposition which Count Flahaut had undertaken to communicate to the French embassy.
OBSERVATIONS ON THE TRIAL OF PEERS BY THE CHAMBER OF PEERS, AND THE REASONS ON WHICH TALLEYRAND GROUNDED HIS VOTE IN THE AFFAIR OF LIEUTENANTS-GENERAL GUILLEMINOT AND BORDESOULLE.
Our political laws have existed only during the space of a few years. We have witnessed their creation and their birth. As yet they are scarcely anything more than theories. Time alone will convert them into practical laws. In other words, we possess laws, but we do not yet possess jurisprudence.
Amidst all the uncertainties necessarily arising out of such a state of things, it has appeared to me that my duty, as a Peer of France, was to seek, in reflection, for that light and knowledge which experience cannot afford. The following chain of ideas has aided me in the accomplishment of this duty.
The first question I put to myself was, What is the Court of Peers? The answer is, An extraordinary tribunal, instituted by the Charter, for judging certain affairs which that Charter has withdrawn from the ordinary tribunals, either on account of the serious nature of the crimes, or by reason of the rank of the individuals accused. Such, it appears to me, are the meaning and the spirit of Articles 33 and 34 of our fundamental law.