(341) At Mount Jackson we went into camp, but were ordered to move out in less than thirty minutes. The four regiments in advance having engaged the Rebels at New Market six miles farther up, we marched in the direction of the fighting.
(342) The morning had been clear, but soon after crossing the Shenandoah at Mount Jackson it began raining. Cannonading could be distinctly heard in our front, telling of serious work going on there and presaging a share of it for us, the regiments moving to the assistance of our comrades. We crossed the North Branch of the Shenandoah about one mile from Mount Jackson. The marching after leaving this place had been rapid and laborious through rain and mud, but soon we were ordered to double quick which we kept up for a few miles, till at about 2 o'clock P.M. we reached the field of battle, and were hastily formed in line of battle under the fire of the enemy, their balls at this time, however, passing harmlessly over us.
(343) Our entire brigade under Col. Thoburn was formed on the right of the pike, the two regiments which had been with Col. Moore at the front having returned to their own brigade, Thoburn's. Col. Moor with two regiments of his brigade, the Eighteenth Connecticut, the One Hundred and Twenty-third Ohio infantry with a small body of cavalry was left something in advance. The two other regiments of his brigade were a considerable distance in the rear with the wagon train.
(344) The Twelfth as best can be gathered from a M.S. by Col. Curtis, was first formed in line at some considerable distance in rear of the three other regiments of our brigade; but this was scarcely more than done "when we were withdrawn" as Col. Curtis says, and formed close in the rear, say within 60 yards of the Thirty-fourth Massachusetts, and the First Virginia, except two companies, A and B, which were sent to the right to support Carlin's battery.
(345) The eight companies had scarcely thus formed in line when we heard in our front for the first time the much mentioned Rebel yell. Gen. Breckinridge in command of the Rebel force had moved to the attack with about 5,000 men, and overlapping Moor had soon driven him to the rear. With scarcely a halt he moved on to the attack of Thoburn's brigade, the main line, but was repulsed by a gallant charge made here.
(346) Just where the Rebels raised the yell in making their charge, Gen. Sigel rode up to the eight companies of the Twelfth and ordered it into column by division to resist the charge; but when the charge was repulsed, we were put into line again, and ordered to lie down. The Twelfth had a bad position. We were placed where we could do no good and yet where we suffered seriously, a more trying position on a soldier than where he has a chance to return the fire. There are no data at hand showing the loss of the regiment, but the compiler's own company lost in killed and wounded seven men in this engagement.
(347) The battle was short, sharp, the losses heavy on each side and for a while the result doubtful. It was quite generally said by our men after the battle that at one time just before our line gave way, the Rebel line was breaking. The Rebel account goes to sustain this statement. Col. J. Stoddard Johnston of Breckinridge's staff says, according to Pond's The Shenandoah in 1864, that "when his (Breckenridge's) line had reached within two hundred yards of the enemy, the position was very critical, and for a time it seemed doubtful as to which would be the first to give way." It is thus seen how near we were to gaining a victory. Had Moor's two regiments been drawn back and formed in line with the rest of the infantry and not left where they could do little or no good; and if Sigel had formed his infantry in our line as the enemy were, according to the authority mentioned, it is no violent presumption to say that the victory would probably have been with our troops.
(348) The doubtful struggle was finally decided by our line giving way in some confusion and Sigel ordered a retreat. We fell back slowly. Imboden's official report confirms this, saying: "Sigel's entire line retired slowly." The enemy did not press us much; for if we had suffered severely they had also. The Lexington cadet battalion of 250 lost more than one-fourth their number in killed and wounded. That one fight seemed to do them; they were not present at the battle of Piedmont, three weeks later, though it was nearer home. In fact, they were never heard of in battle again. It is remembered that a Harrisburg newspaper obtained as we went up the Valley, two weeks after the battle of New Market, under Hunter, I lamented the heavy loss of the Cadets in that battle; and urged that they should not be put into another engagement, saying that the young men or boys should be saved for the next war.
(349) When we had retreated as far as Rude's Hill, a mile or two, we met the two regiments, the One Hundred and Sixteenth, and the Twenty-eighth Ohio infantry that had been in the rear and were not in the engagement; and they covered the retreat from this point to Mount Jackson, where we crossed the river, halted and formed in line of battle. The Rebels came close enough to throw a few shells but not close enough to be within musket shot. After dark we resumed the retreat and continued it, with stops for rests and meals, until we arrived at Cedar Creek the next day, the 16th, when our retreat came to an end.
(350) There is nothing so successful as success; but it seems that there is no excuse taken for failure in war, neither by those in or out of authority. Col. Curtis records that the boys of the Twelfth in going up the Valley were constantly singing "We Fights Mit Sigel" but on the retreat their song was changed to "We Fights no more mit Sigel." One of the things that the officers and men of the Twelfth were displeased with and which they criticised severely was the fact that we were so placed in that battle that we could not fire on the enemy without firing into our own men, and yet so close to the front line that we suffered severely from the enemies fire.