(351) It will be seen, however, from the following letter from Gen. Sigel which tells why the battle was fought just when and where it was, and other details which the survivors of the Twelfth will read no doubt with eager interest, that he disclaims responsibility for the regiment's final bad position on the field of battle. And it is inferred from Col. Curtis M.S. before mentioned wherein he speaks of our being "withdrawn" from our first position and placed in our final one, that he supposed this was done by competent authority. It appears that no one knows who was responsible for the blunder. Sigel's letter is given nearly in full:
(352)
New York, August 19th, 1891.
Lieut. Wm. Hewitt, Linton, Ohio.
Dear Sir:
The advance of my forces up the Shenandoah Valley was made for the purpose of assisting Gen. Crook's movement from the Kanawha Valley, by inducing Breckinridge, who commanded in southwest Virginia, to detach a part of his forces against me. To attain this object we advanced as far as Woodstock. From this place Col. Moor was sent forward on a reconnoitering expedition in the direction of Mount Jackson to ascertain the movements of the enemy, as from the telegraphic dispatches captured at Woodstock, we found that Breckinridge was moving down the Shenandoah Valley against us.
(353) In the evening and during the night of the 14th of May, it was ascertained that Col. Moor had passed Mount Jackson and had met a part of Breckinridge's forces; I, therefore, moved forward to Mount Jackson, to be nearer him (Moor) and for the reason that I intended to await Breckinridge's attack at that place. We arrived at Mount Jackson on the morning of the 15th, and found that Moor had gone as far as New Market, seven miles from Mount Jackson; that Breckenridge was near him, and had made an attack on him during the night of the 14th, which was repulsed.
(354) Made aware of the exposed position of the little force of Moor, I immediately sent orders for him to return to Mount Jackson, and to Gen. Stahl to move forward with the main force of our cavalry to cover the retreat of Moor, and retard the movement of the enemy. But this movement was executed so slowly and the distance from Mount Jackson to New Market was comparatively so great, that I resolved to move forward with my whole force, after having waited over an hour for an answer to my orders sent to Moor and Sullivan.
(355) While the troops were in motion I rode forward myself, accompanied by an aid, as far as Rude's Hill; and on my way was met by Capt. Alexander, who had been sent by Col. Moor and he reported that his (Moor's) troops were in an excellent position and that I should come to their assistance. Under these circumstances, I sent back to our troops to hasten their march towards New Market; while I went forward to meet those of Moor and Stahl. I arrived near New Market about noon, and before the enemy began his attack.
(356) It now became clear to me that all the troops could not reach the position close to New Market; I therefore ordered Col. Moor to evacuate his position slowly, covered by cavalry, and to fall back into a new position, which was selected about three-quarters of a mile north of New Market right and left of the turn pike leading to Mount Jackson. During this time I sent two officers, Captains McEstee and T. G. Putnam back to Gen. Sullivan who was in command of the infantry division, with orders to bring forward all his troops without delay, and at the moment when Col. Moor was approaching the new line from his position in advance, it was reported to me by Capt. R. G. Pendergast, commander of my escort, whom I also had sent back to hurry the troops up that all the infantry and artillery of Gen. Sullivan had arrived (the head of the column being in sight) and that they were waiting for orders.
(357) Supposing this report to be correct, I formed the line of battle, Col. Thoburn's brigade and two batteries on the right, while Col. Moor was ordered to form on the left of Thoburn. The Twelfth West Virginia, and Dupont's battery took position behind the right of Thoburn's brigade as a reserve, and two companies of the Twelfth West Virginia were posted behind the batteries on the right for their support, Von Kleiser's battery was in the center of the line, Ewing's on the left, and the cavalry behind the extreme left and some behind the center. My own position during the battle was in the line between the batteries on the right, and the Thirty-fourth Massachusetts (Col. Wells) as on the right the principal attack of the enemy was directed. With me was an orderly, a young man of 17 years who held bravely out during the whole fight. My staff officers were some distance behind the line, near Dr. Rice's house.