Footnote 555:[ (return) ]
Irenæus very frequently emphasises the idea that the whole economy of God refers to mankind, see, e.g., I. 10. 3: εκδιηγεισθαι την πραγματειαν και οικονομιαν του Θεου την επι τη ανθρωποτητι γενομενην, IV, 20. 7: "Verbum dispensator paternæ gratiæ factus est ad utilitatem hominum, propter quos fecit tantas dispositiones." God became a creator out of goodness and love; see the beautiful expression in IV. 20. 7: "Gloria dei vivens homo, vita autem hominis visio dei," or III. 20. 2: "Gloria hominis deus, operationes vero dei et omnis sapientias eius et virtutis receptaculum homo." V. 29. 1: "Non homo propter conditionem, sed conditio facta est propter hominem."
Footnote 556:[ (return) ]
Irenæus speaks about the Holy Spirit in numerous passages. No doubt he firmly believes in the distinction of the Spirit (Holy Spirit, Spirit of God, Spirit of the Father, Spirit of the Son, prophetic Spirit, Wisdom) from the Father and Son, and in a particular significance belonging to the Spirit, as these doctrines are found in the regula. In general the same attributes as are assigned to the Son are everywhere applicable to him; he was always with the Father before there was any creation (IV. 20. 3; Irenæus applies Prov. III. 19: VIII. 22 to the Spirit and not to the Son); like the Son he was the instrument and hand of the Father (IV. pref. 4, 20. 1: V. 6. 1.). That Logos and Wisdom are to be distinguished is clear from IV. 20. 1-12 and particularly from § 12: IV. 7. 4: III. 17. 3 (the host in the parable of the Good Samaritan is the Spirit). Irenæus also tried by reference to Scripture to distinguish the work of the Spirit from that of the Logos. Thus in the creation, the guidance of the world, the Old Testament history, the incarnation, the baptism of Jesus, the Logos is the energy, the Spirit is wisdom. He also alluded to a specific ministry of the Spirit in the sphere of the new covenant. The Spirit is the principle of the new knowledge in IV. 33. 1, 7, Spirit of fellowship with God in V. I. 1, pledge of immortality in V. 8. 1, Spirit of life in V. 18. 2. But not only does the function of the Spirit remain very obscure for all that, particularly in the incarnation, where Irenæus was forced by the canon of the New Testament to unite what could not be united (Logos doctrine and descent of the Spirit upon Mary—where, moreover, the whole of the Fathers after Irenæus launched forth into the most wonderful speculations), but even the personality of the Spirit vanishes with him, e.g., in III. 18. 3: "unguentem patrem et unctum filium et unctionem, qui est spiritus" (on Isaiah LXI. 1); there is also no mention of the Spirit in IV. pref. 4 fin., and IV. 1. 1, though he ought to have been named there. Father, Son, and Spirit, or God, Logos, and Sophia are frequently conjoined by Irenæus, but he never uses the formula τριας, to say nothing of the abstract formulas of Tertullian. In two passages (IV. 20. 5: V. 36. 2) Irenæus unfolded a sublime speculation, which is inconsistent with his usual utterances. In the first passage he says that God has shown himself prophetically through the Spirit (in the Old Testament), then adoptively through the Son, and will finally show himself paternally in the kingdom of heaven; the Spirit prepares man for the Son of God, the Son leads him to the Father, but the Father confers on him immortality. In the other passage he adopts the saying of an old presbyter (Papias?) that we ascend gradually through the Spirit to the Son, and through the Son to the Father, and that in the end the Son will deliver up everything to the Father, and God will be all in all. It is remarkable that, as in the case of Tertullian (see above), it is 1 Cor. XV. 23-28 that has produced this speculation. This is another clear proof, that in Irenæus the equality of Father, Son, and Spirit is not unconditional and that the eternity of Son and Spirit is not absolute. Here also we plainly perceive that the several disquisitions in Irenæus were by no means part of a complete system. Thus, in IV. 38. 2, he inverts the relationship and says that we ascend from the Son to the Spirit: Και δια τουτο Παυλος Κορινθιοις φησι: γαλα 'υμας εποτισα, ου Βρωμα, ουδε γαρ ηδυνασθε βασταζειν; τουτεστι, την μεν κατα ανθρωπον παρουσιαν του κυριου εμαθητευθητε, ουδηπου δε το του πατρος πνευμα επαναπαυεται εφ' 'υμας δια την 'υμων ασθενειαν. Here one of Origen's thoughts appears.
Footnote 557:[ (return) ]
The opinions advanced here are, of course, adumbrations of the ideas about redemption. Noldechen (Zeitschrift fur wissenschaftliche Theologie, 1885, p. 462 ff): "Die Lehre vom ersten Menschen bei den christlichen Lehrern des 2 Jahrhunderts."
Footnote 558:[ (return) ]
Here the whole 38th chapter of the 4th Book is to be examined. The following sentences are perhaps the most important: Ει δε λεγει τις ουκ ηδυνατο 'ο Θεος απ' αρχης τελειον αναδειξαι τον ανθρωπον, Γνωτω, 'οτι τω μεν Θεω, αει κατα τα αυτα οντι και αγεννητω 'υπαρχοντι, 'ως προς 'εαυτον, παντα δυνατα; τα δε γεγοντα, καθο μετεπειτα γενεσεως αρχην ιδιαν εσχε, κατα τουτο και 'υστερεισθαι δει αυτα του πεποιηκοτος; ου γαρ ηδυναντο αγεννητα ειναι τα νεωστι γεγεννημενα. Καθο δε μη εστιν αγεννητα, κατα τουτο και 'υστερουνται του τελειου. Καθο δε νεωτερα, κατα τουτο και νηπια, κατα τουτο και ασυνηθη και αγυμναστα προς την τελειαν αγωγην. The mother can no doubt give strong food to the child at the very beginning, but the child cannot stand it: ανθρωπος αδυνατος λαβειν αυτο; νηπιος γαρ ην, see also § 2-4: "Non ab initio dii facti sumus, sed primo quidem homines, tunc demum dii, quamvis deus secundum simplicitatem bonitatis suæ hoc fecerit, nequis eum putet invidiosum aut impræstantem." "Ego," inquit, "dixi, dii estis et filii excelsi omnes, nobis autem potestatem divinitatis baiulare non sustinentibus" ... "Oportuerat autem primo naturam apparere, post deinde vinci et absorbi mortale ab immortalitate et corruptibile ab incorruptibilitate, et fieri hominem secundum imaginem et similitudinem dei, agnitione accepta boni et mali." Ibid.: 'υποταγη Θεου απθαρσια, και παραμονη απθαρσιας δοξα αγεννητος ... 'ορασις Θεου περιποιητικη απθαρσιας; απθαρσια δε εγγυς ειναι ποιει Θεου. In this chapter Irenæus contemplates the manner of appearance of the Logos (as man) from the point of view of a συννηπιαζειν. His conception of the capacity and destination of man enabled him to develop his ideas about the progressive training of the human race and about the different covenants (see below). On this point cf. also IV. 20. 5-7. The fact that, according to this way of looking at things, the Good and Divine appeared only as the destination of man—which was finally to be reached through divine guidance—but not as his nature, suggested both to Irenæus and Tertullian the distinction between "natura" and "gratia" or between "substantia" and "fides et iustitia." In other words, they were led to propound a problem which had occurred to the Gnostics long before, and had been solved by them in a dualistic sense. See Irenæus II. 29. 1: "Si propter substantiam omnes succedunt animæ in refrigerium, et superfluum est credere, superflua autem et discessio salvatoris; si autem propter iustitiam, iam non propter id, quod sint animæ sed quoniam sunt iustæ ... Si enim natura et substantia salvat, omnes salvabuntur animæ; si autem iustitia et fides etc." II. 34. 3: "Non enim ex nobis neque ex nostra natura vita est, sed secundum gratiam dei datur," II. 34. 4. Tertullian adv. Marc. III. 15: "Christi nomen non ex natura veniens, sed ex dispositione." In Tertullian these ideas are not unfrequently opposed to each other in this way; but the relationship between them has by no means been made clear.
Footnote 559:[ (return) ]
On the psychology of Irenæus see Bohringer, p. 466 f., Wendt p. 22. The fact that in some passages he reckoned the πνευμα in man as the latter's inalienable nature (e.g. II. 33-5), though as a rule (like Tatian) he conceives it as the divine Spirit, is an evident inconsistency on his part. The εικων is realised in the body, the 'ομοιωσις is not given by nature, but is brought about by the union with the Spirit of God realised through obedience (V. 6. 1). The 'ομοιωσις is therefore subject to growth, and was not perfect at the beginning (see above, IV. 38. 4, where he opposes Tatian's opinion). It is clear, especially from V. 12. 2, that it is only the πνοη, not the πνευμα, that is to be conceived as an original possession. On this point Irenæus appealed to 1 Cor. XV. 45. It is plain from the 37th chapter of the 4th Book, that Irenæus also views everything as ultimately dependent on man's inalienable freedom. Alongside of this God's goodness has scope for displaying itself in addition to its exercise at the creation, because it guides man's knowledge through counsel; see § 1. On Matth. XXIII. 37 Irenæus remarks: "veterem legem libertatis hominis manifestavit, quia liberum eum deus fecit ab initio, habentem suam potestatem sicut et suam animam ad utendum sententia dei voluntarie et non coactum a deo ... posuit in homine potestatem electionis quemadmodum in angelis (et enim angeli rationabiles), ut hi quidem qui obedissent iuste bonum sint possidentes, datum quidem a deo, servatum vero ab ipsis." An appeal to Rome II. 4-7 (!) follows. In § 2 Irenæus inveighs violently against the Gnostic doctrines of natural goodness and wickedness: παντες της αυτης εισι φυσεως. In § 4 he interprets the Pauline: "omnia licent, sed non omnia expediunt," as referring to man's inalienable freedom and to the way in which it is abused in order to work evil(!): "liberæ sententiæ ab initio est homo et liberæ sententiæ est deus, cuius ad similitudinem factus est." § 5: "Et non tantum in operibus, sed etiam in fide, liberum et suæ potestatis arbitrium hominis servavit (that is, respected) dominus, dicens: Secundum fidem tuam fiat tibi." § 4: "deus consilium dat continere bonum, quod perficitur ex obedientia." § 3: "το αυτεξουσιον του ανθρωπου και το συμβουλευτικον του Θεου μη βιαζομενου." IV. 4. 3: "homo rationabilis et secundum hoc similis deo liber in arbitrio factus et suæ potestatis, ipse sibi causa est, ut aliquando quidem frumentum aliquando autem palea fiat."
Footnote 560:[ (return) ]
As a matter of fact this view already belongs to the second train of thought; see particularly III. 21-23. Here in reality this merely applies to the particular individuals who chose disobedience, but Irenæus almost everywhere referred back to the fall of Adam. See, however, V. 27. 2: "Quicunque erga eum custodiunt dilectionem, suam his præstat communionem. Communio autem dei vita et lumen et fruitio eorum quæ sunt apud deum bonorum. Quicumque autem absistunt secundum sententiam suam ab eo, his eam quæ electa est ab ipsis separationem inducit. Separatio autem dei mors, et separatio lucis tenebræ, et separatio dei amissio omnium quæ sunt apud eum bonorum." V. 19. 1, 1. 3, 1. 1. The subjective moralism is very clearly defined in IV. 15. 2: "Id quod erat semper liberum et suæ potestatis in homine semper servavit deus et sua exhortatio, ut iuste iudicentur qui non obediunt ei quoniam non obedierunt, et qui obedierunt et crediderunt ei, honorentur incorruptibilitate."
Footnote 561:[ (return) ]
Man's sin is thoughtlessness; he is merely led astray (IV. 40. 3). The fact that he let himself be seduced under the pretext of immortality is an excuse for him; man was infans, (See above; hence it is said, in opposition to the Gnostics, in IV. 38. 4: "supergredieutes legem humani generis et antequam fiant homines, iam volunt similes esse factori deo et nullam esse differentiam infecti dei et nunc facti hominis." The same idea is once more very clearly expressed in IV. 39. 3; "quemadmodum igitur erit homo deus, qui nondum factus est homo?" i.e., how could newly created man be already perfect as he was not even man, inasmuch as he did not yet know how to distinguish good and evil?). Cf. III. 23. 3, 5: "The fear of Adam was the beginning of wisdom; the sense of transgression led to repentance; but God bestows his grace on the penitent" ... "eum odivit deus, qui seduxit hominem, ei vero qui seductus est, sensim paullatimque misertus est." The "pondus peccati" in the sense of Augustine was by no means acknowledged by Irenæus, and although he makes use of Pauline sayings, and by preference such as have a quite different sense, he is very far from sharing Paul's view.
Footnote 562:[ (return) ]
See IV. 37. 7: "Alias autem esset nostrum insensatum bonum, quod esset inexercitatum. Sed et videre non tantum nobis esset desiderabile, nisi cognovissemus quantum esset malum non videre; et bene valere autem male valentis experientia honorabilius efficit, et lucem tenebrarum comparatio et vitam mortis. Sic et cœleste regnum honorabilius est his qui cognoverunt terrenum." The main passage is III. 20. 1, 2, which cannot be here quoted. The fall was necessary in order that man might not believe that he was "naturaliter similis deo." Hence God permitted the great whale to swallow man for a time. In several passages Irenæus has designated the permitting of evil as kind generosity on the part of God, see, e.g., IV. 39. 1, 37. 7.
Footnote 563:[ (return) ]
See Wendt, l.c., p. 24.
Footnote 564:[ (return) ]
See III. 23. 6.