Pius IX. And His Time

by Æneas MacDonell Dawson

Before considering further the statesman-like efforts of Pius IX. in the cause of reform, it may not be out of place to [pg 053] review briefly the political opinion of the time. Although all men cannot be expected to accept, especially in many important matters, all the ideas of those distinguished writers, Gioberti, Balbo, D'Azeglio, it would be unjust, nevertheless, to deny them the credit of having imparted new vigor, if not its first impulse, to the cause of reform in Italy. They were not, like so many others, rash and inconsiderate. They desired not to hurry on recklessly to the wished-for goal. They thought it was unwise to aspire, all at once, to the greatest degree of liberty that might be attained. The end in view could be best reached, they conceived, by judicious and well-timed measures of reform, and by such institutions as might be developed at a later period, when the Italian people, unaccustomed as yet to a constitutional regime, should be capable of a greater degree of freedom. Nothing more wise can be supposed than this view of educating the people for liberty before bestowing on them the precious boon. Their idea of commencing the work of reform by waging war on Austria does not appear to be so commendable. It was not, surely, the part of prudence, when on the eve of a great and arduous undertaking, to stir up enemies on every side. And this was really what they sought to do by provoking Austrian hostility. The government at Vienna was not inclined to be hostile. It had joined with other powers in recommending reform to the late Pope. And now it would rather have been an ally than an enemy. But the “barbarian” Germans were entirely odious to the Italian people. The power of education ought to have been brought to bear on this same people, if only in order to disabuse their minds of this one noxious prejudice. It had become necessary at length to extend to them the benefits of a political education. And surely the eradication of illiberal ideas would have formed a profitable branch of study.

Pius IX., as has been already shown, was a practical reformer, and he had zealously undertaken the work of reform. Austria was not inclined to throw any impediments in the [pg 054] way of his patriotic labors. Only on one occasion did that powerful empire show a disposition to interfere. It was when Rome and the Sovereign Pontiff were threatened by popular commotions. Then, even on the representation of the Holy Father, Austria laid down her arms. With these constitutional reformers, if we except their insane idea of waging a needless war, very little fault can be found as politicians. So lately as the early part of the year 1848, their opinions were generally accepted throughout Italy. They were, at that time, also the most powerful party. Their numbers, authority and talent, gave them a decided superiority, whilst the Republicans were still a weak minority. In a few months, to all appearance, everything was completely changed. Talent, respectability, authority, and influence, were still on the side of the constitutional reformers. But, in the meantime, the Red Republic had gained the command of numbers. How this came to pass it may be well now to enquire.

In every great community there are many people who have no fixed principles in politics, and others, perhaps, not less numerous, who have no political principles at all. Both these classes of people depend entirety on other men for the sentiments and opinions by which, at any given moment, they shall be guided. Such people were sufficiently numerous at Rome and the other cities and provinces of Italy. Demagogues, therefore, who were not without ability and possessed fluency of speech, found it no very difficult task to fashion as they had a mind, for these classes of citizens, any amount of political principles and programmes. Those even who were fairly imbued with constitutional ideas, but whose minds were not wholly decided, the leaders of the Red Republic endeavored, and not without success, to gain to their side, by persuading them to compromise, as regarded certain points, to modify their opinions on others, change their designations, enter into coalitions, and adopt such ingenious arrangements as were proposed to them. Thus, by degrees, and as was only to be expected in such circumstances, the ultra-radicals succeeded [pg 055] but too well in causing the most extravagant political notions to prevail among the masses. As fate would have it, the revolution in France of February, 1848, which brought to an end the constitutional monarchy, afforded no slight aid and encouragement to the Red Republic of Italy. The men of this party might have understood, on reflection, to what extreme peril France became exposed, when she preferred brute force to constitutional proceeding, and tore down by violence a system which was, in many respects, good; and which, inasmuch as it was a constitution, could in due time have been extended and improved, receiving, as new wants arose, and wisdom and experience warranted, new developments, new adaptations, and daily increasing excellence. The constitutional element once removed, there was no medium between and safeguard against absolutism; on the one hand, and on the other anarchy, or the reign of violence and terror.

The extremists of Italy, however, beheld only in the too successful action of the Parisian populace a new step towards liberty. It became the duty of the Italian people, they declared, to march onward in the wake of enlightened France, and seize the prize that was at length presented for their acceptance. By such counsellors were the people abused and led astray. The moderate reform party were themselves excited by the enthusiasm which events had inspired, and heeded not the snares which the radical chiefs were laying for them. They were thus caught in the toils of those designing men, whilst they imagined that they were only working out their own idea. They supposed even that they were gaining Mazzini, whilst, in reality, Mazzini was making proselytes of them. Gioberti and his more immediate friends, who certainly were not without their faults, were abandoned by the crowd.

Reverting to what has been said already concerning Mazzini and his political doctrines, there need be no hesitation in pronouncing him the evil genius of modern Italy. In his book, “Italy in its Relations with Liberty and Moral Civilization,” which was published in France, where he was an exile, in 1847, [pg 056] he formally declared that “Young Italy” (the extreme Republicans) was the only party that could exercise any decisive influence on the destiny of Italy. At the same time, he treated with supreme contempt the ideas and hopes of the Reform party. In his mystic republic only was to be found, he affirmed, the principle of unity, the ideal formula of actual progress. This theory was the idol at whose shrine he offered sacrifice. His followers were also his fellow-worshippers, and he was their high priest. They were fascinated by his brilliant utopias. He was no longer a legislator, a politician, a philosopher only. He was a man of inspiration, a prophet, the Mahomet of a new hegira. His sayings were oracles. His doctrines were enunciated in sententious and poetical language; and from his place of exile they were disseminated over the Italian peninsula. It has been shown already how generously Pius IX. had recalled from banishment many subjects who had violated the laws of their country. These men were, at one time, no doubt, sincerely grateful, and showed how highly they appreciated the clemency of the Pontiff. It is not, however, surprising, if, as is usual in such circumstances, they began to consider more the severity which punished than the goodness which forgave them. Mazzini, among others, dissembled for a time. It may be—it has even been suggested that he was at first sincere, and had nobly resolved to sacrifice his favorite ideas to the cause of Italy. This opinion, however, was destined to be soon dispelled. It was not long till the newspaper Italia del Popolo, revealed the fact that he still held to extreme and revolutionary views. The minds of the people were poisoned by the ravings of this journal, and filled with mistrust. It became the instrument by which sects and parties were stirred up to work the ruin of the country. “Unita e non unione. Assemblea del Popolo Italiano e non dieta.” “Unity; not union. The assembly of the Italian people; not a federal diet.” Such was the watchword of Mazzini's paper. And now the masses in the streets, under the guidance of the revolutionary leader, [pg 057] vociferated, “Live the Constituent Assembly!” with as much wild enthusiasm as they had formerly shouted for Pius IX. and reform. They had no distinct idea as to the meaning of the cry, but held it to be something extreme—a boundless measure of liberty. The populace wanted nothing better; and so they continued to shout, as they believed, for unity and Republican Government. Such a system was, from the very nature and position of the States of Italy, impracticable, and without pressure from without, foreign war—which the Mazzinians so much deprecated—could never have been established. How bring under the yoke of a general popular convention so many diverse peoples? They were all Italian, no doubt, but of different races, different nationalities, and each of them had for ages enjoyed its own national laws, customs, manners, prejudices, predilections, and antipathies. Nor had they common interests. What would be good and suitable in one State might, by no means, be adapted to the requirements of another; might even in some cases prove disastrous. The Grand Dukes had, by their mild and liberal rule, endeared themselves to the Tuscan people. Piedmont and Naples were alike devoted to their respective monarchies. The people of the Papal States, with the exception of the populace of Rome, were loyal to their government. That populace was greatly increased in 1848 by the influx of strangers—men holding Republican opinions, who were diligently culled from foreign nationalities. All but these abnormal masses were attached to the wise and clement rule of their Pontiff Sovereigns. Of late years many things had occurred to confirm their devoted loyalty. Above all, proof had been given that the sacred monarchy itself could, without any diminution of its real power and dignity, adopt such political reforms as were adapted to the wants of the time. All these monarchies, already so moderate and popular, were becoming every day more constitutional. Were they now to be overthrown? The Mazzinian idea aimed at nothing less. And yet, what would it not have cost? So many time-honored rights would never have been given up without a struggle—without [pg 058] bloodshed, if they were at all to be sacrificed. The torch of civil strife would have blazed from end to end of the Italian peninsula. And the ruin of the ancient monarchies—if, indeed, they had been destined at that time to fall—would probably have been succeeded by more despotic forms of kingly rule.

If, at the time in question, the people of the different States of Italy had acted in concert, uniting their influence, they would have assumed an imposing attitude, and might have obtained not only the forbearance but the aid even of their powerful neighbors in developing such of their institutions as already contained germs of liberty, in extending constitutional rights which had long existed in monarchies that were by no means absolute. In the place of political wisdom, however, a universal mania appeared to prevail. In the confusion of popular demonstrations, and the clamor of party cries, the “still small voice of reason” was unheard. The revolutionary chiefs harangued anew for war, and Italy, listening to their ill-omened counsels, took up arms against its sovereigns; and so gave the death-blow to its political existence.

The moderate Reform party conceived a plan which, if it had been carried into effect, would have been attended, no doubt, with great and happy results. They proposed to unite all the States of Italy by means of a Federal Parliament. They directed their efforts in the first place to promote union between the rulers and the people, recommending to the former moderation, to the latter a wise forbearance. They hoped thus to postpone the idea of absolute unity, and of the popular convention by which it was designed to establish and maintain it. The federal diet, an excellent idea of which was reduced to writing by the reverend and learned Abbate Rosmini, would have held the place of this assembly. According to this plan of confederation, the Pope, the King of Sardinia, the Grand Duke of Tuscany and the other Princes would have been united in an offensive and defensive league. Based on these principles, and provided that nothing were admitted in its [pg 059] details which could interfere with the sacred character and office of the Sovereign Pontiff, the proposed political arrangement would have found favor generally with all who held constitutional views. Eminent authors, at least, have written concerning it approvingly. M. Laboulaye, in his learned work on Count Balbo, says:

“It was necessary that the Princes should be induced to take an interest in the independence which concerned them so much, by forming a confederation like the Zolverein, which has so powerfully contributed to the union and the greatness of Germany. A confederation is undoubtedly that organization which is most suited to the character and the history of Italy, and it is also the best means of reviving Italian nationality and of checking Austria.”

Need it be added, that when there should have been question of restraining Austria, there would have been at hand an influence which Austria respected, and to which that mighty empire and its disciplined armies would have yielded more readily than to all Italy in arms. Without a confederation, or an arrangement equally good, there could be no better lot for Italy than civil war and national ruin.

Events, meanwhile, were hastening on with alarming rapidity. The Red Republic persisted in maintaining its idea. The danger with which the country was threatened from without did not, in the least, moderate its efforts, and they were attended by the only results which they were calculated to produce. Italy remained divided. The sword of Charles Albert could not cope alone with the formidable arms of Austria. A united people might have stayed the tide of battle. The imposing spectacle of their union might even have influenced the German Cabinet, and the legions of Radetsky might never have presumed to cross the Mincio. But it was fated to be otherwise. Excess followed on excess, and the inevitable consequence was speedy chastisement. “Perish Italy rather than our idea,” was the watch-cry of the Socialist leaders. And as if fate had combined with their phrenzy to destroy a people, [pg 060] Italy was crushed by the invader. What cared they? What imported it to them that their country was brought low, and its Princes humbled in the field of Novara? The downfall of the Sardinian monarch, which at the same time was the defeat of Italy, was to them a victory. One more impediment to their designs was removed. “The war of Kings,” said Mazzini, “is at an end; that of the people commences.” And he declared himself a soldier. But Garibaldi did not long command him. His warlike enthusiasm was soon exhausted. The war of the people also ended disastrously; and the revolutionary chief, tired of the sword, resumed his pen and renewed his attacks on the moderate Reformers, who alone had fought, like brave men, in the Austrian war. The strife of words was more congenial to the revolutionist; and he set about editing a new publication. In this journal he raged against the Reformers. They were a set of traitors, ante-chamber Machiavels, who had muzzled the popular lion for the benefit of kings and aristocracies.