These are the essential differences, in point of fact, between the report of the committee, and the message of Council: the whole complexion, indeed, of one, materially varies from the other; but the most common observer must have noticed, how different an aspect the same facts will bear, differently dressed and arranged. It was to avoid this, we proposed to reduce them to writing: but as this has not been done, spectators must judge, from the situation of the parties, and the course of the transactions, which side has given the justest relation.
I cannot, however, forbear remarking, that I see expressions of civility, on the part of the committee, making a figure in the message, very different from their genuine intention; being introduced in a manner that gives them the air of concessions in favor of the conduct of the Council. Your Excellency will certainly recollect, that the committee were very remote from a concurrence in sentiment with the Council; and though they did not presume to judge of the disposition of the citizens, strongly urged the expedience and necessity of calling out the militia, and facility of employing them with success against an unofficered and disorderly body of mutinous soldiers. It is true, also, that they acknowledged the candor with which the Council exposed to them, what they deemed the temper of their citizens, and their own difficulties and embarrassments; which were, no doubt, delineated with great energy of language, and display of circumstances: but they certainly never admitted the candor of refusing an answer in writing, which was a part of the business transacted with the Council; nor did they withdraw, without giving an intelligible intimation of their sense of this proceeding.
I was also surprised to see any part of the private and confidential conversation I had with your Excellency, ushered into the message from the Council; and moulded into such a shape, as to imply, by an obvious construction, an approbation of their reasons. Your Excellency will admit the following state of this transaction to be a just one.
I waited upon the Council to correct a piece of information I had given them respecting ammunition: but even this is misstated, as will be seen by my minutes. Having done this, my official business ended; when I was taken aside by your Excellency, and a conversation passed in declared confidence. You informed me, that a meeting of the militia officers was then holding, and in consultation with the Council about eventual measures (in consequence, as I conjectured, of a communication to you, the preceding evening, from the delegates of the State, of the intention of Congress to remove from the city, in case they did not receive satisfactory assurances of support). You added, that you hoped nothing would be precipitated; but that proper allowances would be made for the situation of the Council.
I understood your observations with reference to the departure of Congress, and replied to this effect: That I viewed the departure of Congress as a delicate measure, including consequences important to the national character abroad, and critical with respect to the State of Pennsylvania, and, in particular, the city of Philadelphia; that the triumph of a handful of mutinous soldiers, permitted in a place which is considered as the capital of America, to surround, and, in fact, imprison Congress, without the least effort, on the part of the citizens, to uphold their dignity and authority, so as to oblige them to remove from the place which had been their residence during the Revolution, would, it was to be feared, be viewed at a distance, as a general disaffection of the citizens to the Federal Government; might discredit its negotiations, and affect the national interests: that, at home, it might give a deep wound to the reputation of Pennsylvania; might draw upon it the resentments of the other States, and sow discord between Congress and the State; that the removal of Congress would probably bring the affair to a crisis; and, by convincing the mutineers that extremities were intended, would either intimidate them into a submission, or determine them to immediate excesses; that, impressed with these considerations, and still hoping, notwithstanding some appearances to the contrary, that the mutineers might be sincere in their professions of submission, or that the Council, on further examination, would find it in their power to act with vigor, I had declined giving my assent to a report in writing, which would necessarily be followed by the departure of Congress; that though the committee had no discretion, by the powers under which they acted, but were bound by the tenor of their instructions, the moment they did not receive “satisfactory assurances of prompt and adequate exertions, on the part of the State, for supporting the public authority,” to advise the adjournment of Congress to Trenton or Princeton; and I therefore considered the delay of this advice as at their extreme peril; yet, as to myself, I should persist in it, till the result of the present consultation with the militia officers, or till some new circumstance should turn up, to explain the designs of the mutineers; and in pursuing this line of conduct, I should counteract the sense of some gentlemen, whose feelings upon the occasion were keen, and the opinions of others, who thought the situation of Congress, under the existing circumstances, extremely awkward, precarious, and unjustifiable to their constituents.
Your Excellency approved my intention; wished for time; and promised, if any new resolution should be taken, to give me immediate notice of it.
The meeting of the militia officers dissolved. I heard nothing from your Excellency. General St. Clair, about two in the afternoon, informed the committee, that the officers appointed by the soldiers to manage their business, had, in the first instance, refused to give him an account of their transactions; the which was only extracted from them by a peremptory demand. He mentioned to us the instructions they had received from the soldiers, which contained faint and affected concessions, mixed with new and inadmissible claims.
The whole affair wore the complexion of collusion between the officers of the committee and the soldiery; and of a mere amusement on their part, till they could gain fresh strength and execute their project, whatever it might be, with greater advantage.
This behavior of the officers gave the affair a new and more serious aspect, and overcame my opposition to the report. Mr. Peters, on hearing the relation of General St. Clair, declared, at once, that he thought the committee had then no alternative; at least, what he said was understood in this sense by General St. Clair, Mr. Ellsworth, and myself. If I am not much mistaken, General St. Clair also expressed his opinion that Congress were unsafe in the city.
The ideas I suggested to your Excellency, in the conversation I have mentioned, were substantially expressed to several members of Congress as the motives of my delay; and particularly, I recollect, to Mr. Madison, with these observations in addition: That though I was fully convinced Congress, under an immediate view of circumstances, would, in reality, be justified in withdrawing from a place where such an outrage to government had been with impunity perpetrated, by a body of armed mutineers, still, for several days, in complete command of the city, and where either the feebleness of public councils, or the indisposition of the citizens, afforded no assurance of protection and support; yet, as the opinions of men would be governed by events, and as the most probable event was, that the removal of Congress, announcing decisive measures of coercion to the soldiery, would awe them into submission, there was great danger that the reputation of Congress would suffer by the easy termination of the business; and that they would be accused of levity, timidity, or rashness.