The concession was set forth in cryptic form in the convention, but the Chinese knew very well what interpretation they intended to give to the clause. That intention remained unaltered, though tactics varied. By the light of the vague and pointless correspondence carried on for seven years with the British Government they saw their way to advancing considerably beyond the position gained by the convention. They consequently raised their demands in proportion as they found the British Government yielding, until eventually they reached a vantage-ground where they could safely unmask and make direct for their object, an increase in the import tariff pure and simple. Eighty taels were added to the thirty allowed by the old treaty, and the opium duty was thus really trebled at a stroke.
The negotiations which led up to the convention are chiefly interesting as showing how easily the Foreign Office was chased from cover to cover by the Chinese Minister. Having once got the enemy "on the run," the Marquis Tsêng did not relax his pursuit until, notwithstanding one or two rear-guard actions, he capitulated without conditions.
After seven years of active deliberation the definitive diplomatic conference was opened by Lord Granville in January 1883. As a preliminary, the basis of the negotiations was rigidly defined by Mr (now Lord) Currie, in accordance with the Chefoo convention, thus: the regulation of the likin taxation, and specification of the barriers at which collections were to be made.
But, as we have hinted, the Chinese aspirations had in the mean time far transcended the scope of any provision of any treaty. No longer content with regulating likin, their first step in the conference was to induce Lord Granville to abandon the preliminary stipulation he had so carefully laid down. The Chinese Minister proposed a general commutation rate, uniform at all the ports, supporting the claim by sundry specious arguments. The likin barriers had been a chronic grievance of the merchants. The marquis held out a prospect of their abolition as a consequence of the single-payment commutation of inland dues on which he was intent. It is a feature of Chinese bargains of every description that something definite should be conceded on the one side, and something indefinite promised on the other,—the "bird in the hand" invariably for the Chinese. There was nothing surprising, therefore, in the time-honoured formula being employed in these diplomatic interchanges.
In moving from his base, Lord Granville, of course, ceded everything; but he made a final stand at the amount, declaring that "he could not agree that the likin payment should be fixed at more than 70 taels"; moreover, that he "would require full information as to the guarantees which would be given that opium would not be subject to any further payment while in transit." One such guarantee was already provided for in the convention, which stipulates "that the nationality of the person possessing or carrying the merchandise would be immaterial." This was deemed of great importance to trade, because since it was not always possible for a foreign owner, or even a deputy of his own race, to accompany a parcel of goods into the interior, the permission for Chinese to accompany them was essential to the working of the transit business. The contention of the merchant had always been, that the exemption from dues was a privilege attaching to the goods, and not to the temporary owner or transport agent. On the other hand, as the goods could not speak, the option of sending either a native or a foreigner at the merchant's own choice was considered a useful check on illicit exactions.
The confident manner in which the marquis brushed away both of Lord Granville's ultimata showed how well he had profited by his experience of Foreign Office diplomacy. To Lord Granville's maximum of 70 taels (the sum actually agreed upon with the Chinese Government) the marquis said he was sorry, but his instructions did not permit of his accepting less than 80 taels per pecul. It is not customary to ask for proofs of good faith from ambassadors acting "on instructions," and Lord Granville simply yielded the point, while entering a mild protest against being forced by a Chinese non possumus.
And the right of the foreigner to accompany his goods, on which so much stress had been laid, was disposed of with exquisite assurance by the Chinese Minister, who was confident that such a mere detail "would not be allowed to stand in the way of a settlement," notwithstanding that it involved a reversal of the Chefoo convention.
And as to the guarantees for fulfilment, the Marquis Tsêng was sure that "the strongest guarantee would consist in the moral obligation" on the part of the Chinese Government to carry out arrangements of their own proposing. Thus, by sheer persistence, the Chinese gained every point, securing not only a threefold duty on opium, but the assistance of her Majesty's Government in its collection, for that was the meaning of transferring the levy from the interior to the seaport. The agreement, concluded by Lord Granville in June, was signed by Lord Salisbury in July 1885, under the title of an "Additional Article to the Chefoo Convention."
It is right to add, on the authority of recent observers, that the convention has worked smoothly, no complaints being heard of inland exactions in contravention of its terms. It thus appears that the moral guarantee on which the Marquis Tsêng spoke so confidently was after all of some validity. But as the only source from which complaints could come would be those foreign agents who were by the terms of the convention expressly excluded from conveying or accompanying opium into the country, the negative evidence is not absolutely conclusive.
It would have been most interesting to gain from so enlightened a Minister as Tsêng some insight into the causes of the continual friction and recrimination which attend the operation of the commercial articles in the Chinese treaties, but his despatches have reference only to the question of the moment. "The Imperial Government," he says, "have often been held responsible for the friction caused in working arrangements but ill-adapted to the state of the country, and which a better knowledge of its internal conditions would have shown to those who framed them are incapable of execution." "The present scheme," he intimates, "being in harmony with existing institutions," may be expected to work smoothly. Existing institutions, therefore, are opposed to local taxation and in favour of single commutations. When, however, a different thesis has to be sustained, we are assured by other authorities that "existing institutions" claim arbitrary, variable, and unlimited taxation of goods in transit for the benefit of the provincial exchequers, and that it is the attempt to commute these by a payment at the port which is the true cause of the friction and disputation.