The natural corollary followed the ratification of the Chefoo convention. The desire of the Chinese Government, cherished for nearly thirty years, to establish a customs station in Hongkong was virtually consummated in the following year. The trade of the colony had been vexed by a perpetual blockade by so-called revenue cruisers which harried every native vessel entering or leaving the harbour. The hope of getting the investment relaxed may have induced the acquiescence of the colony in any alternative. The Chinese sought to grip the opium supply by the neck, which could only be done by their obtaining control over the harbour of Hongkong. This was conceded, and a customs station was established on the Chinese side of the anchorage, while an office was opened in the city of Victoria.
There was a second "neck" to the opium supply—Macao. The arrangement made with Hongkong without a corresponding agreement with Macao would have merely driven the trade from the one to the other. Overtures were therefore made to the Portuguese, who, unlike the English, were offered a valuable consideration for admitting the control of the Chinese customs into their waters. They then obtained for the first time a treaty of independent sovereignty for the colony.
The effect of all these negotiations and arrangements, whether intended or not, was to stimulate the cultivation of Chinese opium to a high degree, and this, according to the impartial testimony of an ex-German Minister, is, apart from the increase to the Chinese revenue, the net result of the anti-opium agitation.
CHAPTER XXV.
A CHAIN OF INCIDENTS.
I. DISPUTE WITH RUSSIA RE KULDJA.
Insurrection in Kashgaria—Russia occupies Kuldja—Engaging to evacuate when country settled—Tso Tsung-tang's march—Death of Yakub-beg—China reoccupies Kashgaria—Calls upon Russia to retire from Kuldja—Relations become strained—Chunghou concludes treaty with Russia—Violently repudiated by empress—War threatened—Gordon summoned—Dispute arranged by Marquis Tsêng.
The dilatoriness of China in making a stand against Japanese pretensions in Korea may be partly explained by her serious preoccupations elsewhere. She had been immersed in a sea of troubles. She seemed to be enveloped in rebellion. In the south-west the province of Yunnan had been severed from the imperial rule, and in its recovery the land was almost depopulated. In the north-west there were also Mohammedan risings, and in far-distant Kashgaria, separated from China by a thousand miles of desert and militarily untenable by her, the adventurer known as Yakub-beg set up an independent government, which he maintained for some years. Anarchy on her frontier afforded to Russia the pretext of occupying Chinese territory to maintain order; but she was scrupulous in assuring the Peking Government that this step was provisional, and that she was ready to restore Kuldja as soon as the Chinese were again in a position to resume the government of the town and territory. The time came sooner than was expected. The famous march of Tso Tsung-tang, who halted to grow grain for the support of his army, and the disaffection in his camp leading to the demise of Yakub, enabled China to reoccupy the revolted districts. Russia, on being asked to redeem her pledge as to Kuldja, made conditions which were not acceptable, and a diplomatic campaign was entered upon. A high Manchu official, Chunghou, the same who had been sent to France in 1871, was despatched to Prussia, where he concluded the treaty of Livadia, which was so repugnant to the empress-regent and her advisers that not only was it repudiated at Peking, but the envoy was delivered to the Board of Punishments. Relations became strained between Russia and China, and on both sides there were hints of a resort to force. In view of this eventuality the Chinese Government were recommended to apply for the services of their old champion, Gordon, who, unknown to them, had taken service with Lord Ripon, the then new Viceroy of India, and, equally unknown to them, had precipitately resigned that service. The Chinese had a large body of troops in Manchuria; the long line of Russian communication was very weak along that frontier; the governor of Eastern Siberia, declaring himself unable to resist a Chinese attack, had urged the Government at St Petersburg to come to terms at once with China, and wait for a suitable opportunity to recover what they might be obliged to cede. The Chinese Government hoped that if Gordon would come to their assistance, and take command of their Manchurian levies, his name would be a host in itself, and his appearance on the scene would at any rate convince the Russian Government that China was in earnest. With this view an invitation was sent to General Gordon in a telegram from Sir Robert Hart, which found him in Bombay. The invitation was unconditional; it indicated no purpose and named no price. Gordon took it entirely on trust, closed at once, and proceeded to China. Having been given no clue as to what service was expected from him, Gordon, nevertheless, not only came to a conclusion of his own on the subject, but supplied his views to the newspapers before leaving India, and at every port of call on the route. He declared he was going to China to induce her to make peace, for she was unable to do otherwise. In this he was of an opposite opinion from the Russian governor-general. But whatever the merit of his opinion, the object of the Chinese in sending for him was of course frustrated by his published declarations. These being communicated to the Government at Peking, they saw that so far from stiffening them in their negotiations with Russia, Gordon's presence would seriously embarrass them, and they accordingly endeavoured to prevent his coming. Through Sir Robert Hart they sent a message to meet Gordon at Chefoo, requesting him to proceed no farther. Disregarding this request, he continued his journey to Tientsin, where he had interviews with his old friend the Viceroy Li; and he also made his way to Peking, where by the aid of an indifferent Cantonese interpreter he made representations to the Tsungli-Yamên, some of which the interpreter dared not reproduce in Chinese. Gordon left without seeing either Sir Robert Hart, on whose authority alone he had come to China, or the British Minister, Sir Thomas Wade. The advice he left with the Chinese Ministers was to renounce the endeavour to organise an army on Western models, and not to waste money on modern weapons, but to trust rather to numbers and the Fabian strategy which was natural to them. This being promptly published in foreign journals, was regarded as highly paradoxical, if not cynical; but it was recalled to mind fifteen years later, when China was being defeated in the pitched battles against which Gordon had warned them.