A Hind Let Loose / Or, An Historical Representation of the Testimonies of the Church of Scotland for the Interest of Christ. With the True State Thereof in All Its Periods

by Alexander Shields

The Principle of, and Testimony for, Defensive Arms Vindicated.

This truth is of that sort, that can hardly be illustrated by demonstration; not for the darkness thereof, but for its self-evidencing clearness, being scarcely capable of any further elucidation, than what is offered to the rational understanding by its simple proposition. As first principles can hardly be proven because they need no probation, and cannot be made clearer than they are, and such as cannot consent to them, are incapable of conceiving any probation of them; so this truth of self preservation being lawful, because it is congenite with and irradicated in every nature, that hath a self which it can preserve, can scarcely be more illustrated that it may do so, than that it can do so. And therefore to all who have a true respect to their own, as well as a due concern in the interest of mankind, and zeal for the interest of Christ, it might seem superfluous to make a doubt or debate of this: were it not that a generation of men is now prevailing, that are as great monsters in nature, as they are malignant in religion, and as great perverters of the law of nature, as they are subverters of municipal laws, and everters of the laws of God: who for owning this principle, as well as using the practice of defensive resistance for self-preservation against tyrannical violence, have set up such monuments of rage and cruelty, in the murder of many innocent people, as was never read nor heard of before. It hath been indeed the practice of all nations in the world, and the greatest of men have maintained this principle in all ages; but the bare asserting the principle, when extorted by severe inquisitions, was never a cause of taking the lives of any, before this was imposed on the poor sufferers in Scotland, to give their judgment, whether or not such appearances for defence (as the tyranny of rulers had forced people to) were rebellion, and a sin against God, which they could not in conscience assert; and therefore, though many that have suffered upon this head, have been as free of the practice of such resistance as any; yet because they would not condemn the principle, they have been criminally processed, arraigned, and condemned to the death. And against this truth they have been observed to have a special kind of indignation, either because the light of it, which cannot be hid, hath some heat with it to scorch them; or because they fear the impression of this in the hearts of people more than others, knowing that they deserve the practical expression of it by the hands of all. But the reason they give why they are so offended at it, is, that they look upon it as the spring of all the errors of presbyterians, and a notion that destroys them; which indeed will be found to have a necessary connexion with many of the truths that they contend for this day, as it hath been the necessary method of defending them. What practices of this kind hath been, and what were the occasions inducing, or rather enforcing to these defensive resistances, here to be vindicated as to the principle of them, is manifested in the historical representation, shewing, that after the whole body of the land was engaged under the bond of a solemn covenant, several times renewed, to defend religion and liberty; and in special manner the magistrates of all ranks, the supreme whereof was formally admitted to the government upon these terms; he, with his associates, conspiring with the nobles, to involve the whole land in perjury and apostasy, overturned the whole covenanted work of reformation; and thereby not only encroached upon the interest of Christ and the church's privileges, but subverted the fundamental constitution of the kingdom's government, and pressed all to a submission unto, and compliance with that tyranny and apostasy, erected upon the ruins thereof; yet the godly and faithful in the land, sensible of the indispensible obligation of these covenants, resolved to adhere thereunto, and suffered long patiently for adherence unto the same, until being quite wearied by a continued tract of tyrannical oppressions, arbitrarily enacted by wicked laws, and illegally executed against their own laws, and cruelly prosecuted even without all colour of law, in many unheard of barbarities, when there could be no access for, or success in complaining, or getting redress by law, all petitions and remonstrances of grievances being declared seditious and treasonable, and interdicted as such: they were forced to betake themselves to this last remedy of defensive resistance, intending only the preservation of their lives, religion and liberties; which many times hath been blessed with success, and therefore zealously contended for, as an inadmissible privilege, by all well affected to the cause of Christ, and interest of their country, because they found it always countenanced of the Lord; until the cause was betrayed by the treachery, and abandoned by the cowardice of such, as were more loyal for the king's interests, than zealous for Christ's and the country's; for which the Lord in his holy jealousy discountenanced many repeated endeavours of this nature, cutting us off, and putting us to shame, and would not go forth with our armies. But because the duty is not to be measured by, and hath a more fixed rule to be founded upon than providence; therefore the godly did not only maintain the principle in their confessions and testimonies, but prosecute the practice in carrying arms, and making use of them in the defence of the gospel and of themselves, at field meetings; which were always successfully prosperous, by the power and presence of God. This question is sufficiently discussed, by our famous and learned invincible patrons and champions for this excellent privilege of mankind, the unanswerable authors of Lex Rex, the Apologetical Relation, Naphtali, and Jus populi vindicatum. But because it is easy to add to what is found, I shall subjoin my mite; and their arguments being various and voluminously prosecute, and scattered at large through their books, I shall endeavour to collect a compend of them in some order. The two first speak of a defensive war, managed in a parliamentary way: and the two last, of resistance against the abuse of a lawful power, when there is no access to maintain religion and liberty any other way; which does not come up so close to our case, nor is an antithesis to the assertions of our adversaries, who say, that it is no ways lawful, in any case, or upon any pretence whatsoever, to resist the sovereign power of a nation, in whomsoever it be resident, or which way soever it be erected. I shall consider it more complexly and extensively, and plead both for resistance against the abuse of a lawful power, and against the use and usurpation of a tyrannical power, and infer not only the lawfulness of resisting kings, when they abuse their power (as is demonstrate unanswerably by these authors) but the expediency and necessity of the duty of resisting this tyrannical power, whensoever we are in a capacity, if we would not be found treacherous covenant-breakers, and betrayers of the interest of God, and the liberties of the nation, and of our brethren, together with the posterity, into the hands of this popish and implacable enemy, and so bring on us the curse of Meroz, and the curse of our brethren's blood, crying for vengeance on the heads of the shedders thereof, and upon all, who being in case, came not to their rescue; and the curse of posterity, for not transmitting that reformation and liberty, whereof we were by the valour of our forefathers put and left in possession. I shall not therefore restrict myself to the state of the question, as propounded ordinarily, to wit, Whether or not, when a covenanted king doth really injure, oppress and invade his subjects civil and religious rights, or unavoidably threatens to deprive their dearest and nearest liberties, and sends out his emissaries with armed violence against them; and when all redress to be had, or hope by any address or petition, is rendered void or inaccessible, yea addressing interdicted under severe penalties, as treasonable; then, and in that case, may a community of these subjects defend themselves, and their religion and liberties, by arms, in resisting his bloody emissaries? But, to bring it home to our present case, and answer the laxness of the adversaries position of the uncontroulableness of every one that wears a crown, I shall state it thus: Whether or not is it a necessary duty for a community (whether they have the concurrence of the primores or nobles, or not) to endeavour, in the defence of their lives, religion, laws and liberties, to resist and repress the usurpation and tyranny of prevailing dominators, using or abusing their power for subverting religion, invading the liberties, and overturning the fundamental laws of their country? I hold the affirmative, and shall essay to prove it, by the same arguments that conclude this question, as usually stated; which will more than evince the justifiableness of the sufferings upon this head. In prosecuting of this subject, I shall first premit some concessory considerations to clear it. And secondly, bring reasons to prove it.

First, For clearing of this truth, and taking off mistakes, these concessions may be considered.

1. The ordinance of magistracy, which is of God, is not to be resisted, no, not so much as by disobedience or non obedience, nay, not so much as mentally, by cursing in the heart, Eccles. x. 20. but a person clothed therewith, abusing his power, may be in so far resisted. But tyrants, or magistrates turning tyrants, are not God's ordinance; and there is no hazard of damnation, for refusing to obey their unjust commands, but rather the hazard of that is in walking willingly after the commandment, when the statutes of Omri are kept. So that what is objected from Eccl. viii. 2-4. "I counsel thee to keep the king's commandment," &c. is answered on Head II. and is to be understood only of the lawful commands of lawful kings.

2. Rebellion is a damnable sin, except where the word is taken in a lax sense, as Israel is said to have rebelled against Rehoboam, and Hezekiah against Sennacherib, which was a good rebellion, and clear duty, being taken there for resistance and revolt. In that sense indeed some of our risings in arms might be called rebellion; for it is lawful to rebel against tyrants. But because the word is usually taken in an evil sense, therefore it would have been offensive to acknowledge that before the inquisitors, except it had been explained. But rebellion against lawful magistrates, is a damnable sin, exemplarily punished in Korah and his company, who rebelled against Moses; and in Sheba and Absalom, who rebelled against David. For to punish the just is not good, nor to strike princes for equity, Prov. xvii. 26. and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation, Rom. xiii. 2. So that this objection brought from this place, as if the apostle were commanding their subjection without resistance to Nero, and such tyrants; as it is very impertinent, it is fully answered above, Head II. Here it will be sufficient to reply, 1. He is hereby vindicating Christianity from that reproach, of casting off or refusing subjection to magistrates for conscience sake in general. And it is very considerable, what Buchanan says in his book de juri regni, that Paul did not write to the kings themselves, because they were not Christians, and therefore the more might be born with from them, though they should not understand the duty of magistrates; but imagine, that there had been some Christian king who had turned tyrant and apostate, 'to the scandal of religion: what would he have written then? Sure if he had been like himself, he would have denied that he should be owned for a king, and would have interdicted all Christians communion with him, and that they should account him no king, but such as they were to have no fellowship with, according to the law of the gospel.' 2. He speaks of lawful rulers here, not tyrants, but of all such as are defined and qualified here, being powers ordained of God, terrors to evil works, ministers of God for good. Yea, but say prelates, and their malignant adherents, these are only motives of subjection to all powers, not qualifications of the powers. I answer, they are indeed motives, but such as can be extended to none but to these powers that are so qualified. 3. He speaks of lawful powers indefinitely in the plural number, not specifying any kind or degree of them, as if only kings and emperors were here meant. It cannot be proven, that the power of the sword is only in them. Neither was there a plurality of kings or emperors at Rome to be subject to: if he meant the Roman emperor, he would have designed him in the singular number. All the reasons of the text agree to inferior judges also, for they are ordained of God, they are called rulers in scripture, and God's ministers, revengers by office, who judge not for man, but for the Lord: and inferior magistrates also are not to be resisted, when doing their duty, 1 Pet. ii. 13. yet all will grant, when they go beyond their bounds, and turn little tyrants, they may be withstood. 4. He does not speak of Nero, concerning whom it cannot be proven, that at this time he had the soverereign power as the learned Mr. Prin shews: or if he had, that he was a tyrant at this time; and if he meant him at all, it was only as he was obliged to be by right, nor as he was in deed. All men know, and none condemns the fact of the senate, that resisted Nero at length, without transgressing this precept. Yea I should rather think, the senate is the power that the apostle applies this text to, if he applied it to any in particular. 5. The subjection here required, is the same with the honour in the fifth command, whereof this is an exposition, and is opposite to the contraordinateness here condemned. Now, subjection takes in all the duties we owe to magistrates, and resistance all the contraries forbidden; but unlimited obedience is not here required: so neither unlimited subjection.

3. We may allow passive subjection in some cases, even to tyrants, when the Lord lays on that yoke, and in effect says, he will have us to lie under it a while, as he commanded the Jews to be subject to Nebuchadnezzar: of which passage, adduced to prove subjection to tyrants universally, Buchanan, as above, infers, that if all tyrants be to be subjected to, because God by his prophet commanded his people to be subject to one tyrant; then it must be likewise concluded, that all tyrants ought, to be killed, because Ahab's house was commanded to be destroyed by Jehu. But passive subjection, when people are not in capacity to resist, is necessary. I do not say passive obedience, which is a mere chimera, invented in the brains of such sycophants, as would make the world slaves to tyrants. Whosoever suffereth, if he can shun it, is an enemy to his own being: for every natural thing must strive to preserve itself against what annoyeth it; and also he sins against the order of God, who in vain hath ordained so many lawful means for preservation of our being, if we must suffer it to be destroyed, having power to help it.

4. We abhor all war of subjects, professedly declared against a lawful king, as such; all war against lawful authority, founded upon, or designed for maintaining principles inconsistent with government, or against policy and piety; yea, all war without authority. Yet, when all authority of magistrates, supreme and subordinate, is perverted and abused, contrary to the ends thereof, to the oppressing of the people, and overturning of their laws and liberties, people must not suspend their resistance upon the concurrence of men of authority, and forbear the duty in case of necessity, because they have not the peers or nobles to lead them: for if the ground be lawful, the call clear, the necessity cogent, the capacity probable, they that have the law of nature, the law of God, and the fundamental laws of the land on their side, cannot want authority though they may want parliaments to espouse their quarrel. This is cleared above, Head 2. yet here I shall add, 1. The people have this privilege of nature, to defend themselves and their rights and liberties, as well as peers; and had it, before they erected and constituted peers or nobles. There is no distinction of quality in interests of nature, though there be in civil order: but self defence is not an act of civil order. In such interests, people must not depend upon the priority of their superiors, nor suspend the duties they owe to themselves and their neighbours, upon the manuduction of other mens greatness. The law of nature allowing self-defence, or the defence of our brethren, against unjust violence, addeth no such restriction, that it must only be done by the conduit or concurrence of the nobles or parliaments. 2. The people have as great interest to defend their religion as the peers, and more, because they have more souls to care for than they, who are fewer. And to be violented in their consciences, which are as free to them as to the peers, is as insupportable to them: yea, both are equally concerned to maintain truth, and rescue their brethren suffering for it, which are the chief grounds of war; and if the ground of the defensive war be the same with them and without them, what reason can be given, making their resistance in one case lawful, and not in the other? Both are alike obliged to concur, and both are equally, obnoxious to God's threatened judgments, for suffering religion to be ruined, and not relieving and rescuing innocents. It will be but a poor excuse for people to plead, they had no peers to head them. What if both king and nobles turn enemies to religion, (as they are at this day) shall people do nothing for the defence of it then? Many times the Lord hath begun a work of reformation by foolish things, and hath made the least of the flock to draw them out, Jer. xlix. 2. and l. 45. and did not think fit to begin with nobles, but began it, when powers and peers were in opposition to it; and when he blessed it so at length, as to engage the public representatives to own it, what was done by private persons before, they never condemned. 3. The people are injured without the nobles, therefore they may resist without them, if they be able: for there can be no argument adduced, to make it unlawful to do it with them. 4. It is true the nobles are obliged beyond others, and have authority more than others to concur; but separately they cannot act as representatives judicially: they have a magistratical power, but limited to their particular precincts where they have interest, and cannot extend it beyond these bounds; and so if they should concur, they are still in the capacity of subjects; for out of a parliamentary capacity they are not representatives. 5. All the power they can have is cumulative, not privative; for the worse condition of a ruler ought not to be by procuring. Why then shall the representatives, betraying their trust, wrong the cause of the people, whose trustees they are? Nay, if it were not lawful for people to defend their religion, lives, and liberties without the concurrence of parliaments, then their case should be worse with them than without them; for they have done it before they had them, and so they had better be without them still. 6. People may defend themselves against the tyranny of a parliament, or primores, or nobles: therefore, they may do it without them; for if it be lawful to resist them, it is lawful to wave them, when they are in a conspiracy with the king against them.

5. We disallow all war without real undeclinable necessity, and great and grievous wrongs sustained: and do not maintain it is to be declared or undertaken upon supposed grounds, or pretended causes: and so the question is impertinently stated by our adversaries, 'Whether or not it be lawful for subjects, or a party of them, when they think themselves injured, or to be in a capacity, to resist or oppose the supreme power of a nation.' For the question is not, if when they think themselves injured they may resist? But when the injuries are real: neither is it every reality of injuries will justify their resistance, but when their dearest and nearest liberties are invaded, especially when such an invasion is made, as threatens ineluctable subversion of them. Next, we do not say, That a party's esteeming themselves in a capacity, or their being really in a capacity, doth make resistance a duty; except, all alike, they have a call as well as a capacity, which requires real necessity, and a right to the action, and the things contended for to be real and legal rights, really and illegally encroached upon: their capacity gives them only a conveniency to go about the duty, that is, previously lawful upon a moral ground. No man needs to say, Who shall be judge? the magistrate or people? For, 1. All who have eyes in their head may judge whether the sun shine or not; and all who have common sense may judge in this case. For when it comes to a necessity of resistance, it is to be supposed, that the grievances complained of, and sought to be redressed by arms, are not hid, but manifest; it cannot be so with any party only pretending their suffering wrong. 2. There is no need of the formality of a judge, in things evident to nature's eye, as grassant tyranny undermining and overturning religion and liberty must be. Nature, in the acts of necessitated ressistance, in such a case, is judge, party, accuser, witness, and all. Neither is it an act of judgment, for people to defend their own: defence is no act of jurisdiction, but a privilege of nature. Hence, these common sayings, all laws permit force to be repelled by force; and the law of nature allows self defence: the defence of life is necessary, and flows from the law of nature. 3. Be judge who will, the tyrant cannot be judge in the case: for, in these tyrannical acts, that force the people to that resistance, he cannot be acknowledged as king, and therefore no judge: for it is supposed, the judge is absent, when he is the party that does the wrong. And he that does the wrong, as such, is inferior to the innocent. 4. Let God be judge, and all the world, taking cognizance of the evidence of their respective manifestos of the state of their cause.

6. We condemn rising to revenge private injuries; whereby the land may be involved in blood for some petty wrongs done to some persons, great or small; and abhor revengeful usurping of the magistrate's sword, to avenge ourselves for personal injuries. As David's killing of Saul would have been, 1 Sam. xxiv. 10. 12. 13, 1 Sam. xxvi. 9, 10. To object which, in this case, were very impertinent: for it would have been an act of offence in a remote defence: if Saul had been immediately assaulting him, it could not be denied to be lawful: and it would have been an act of private revenge for a personal injury, and a sinful preventing of God's promise of David's succession, by a scandalous assassination. But it is clear, then David was resisting him, and that is enough for us; and he supposes he might descend into battle, and perish, 1 Sam. xxvi. 10. not excluding, but that he might perish in battle against himself resisting him. We are commanded indeed not to resist evil, but whosoever shall smite us on the one cheek, to turn to him the other also, Matth. v. 39. and to recompence to no man evil for evil, Rom. xii. 17. But this doth not condemn self defence, or resisting tyrants violently, endangering our lives, laws, religion, and liberties, but only resistance by way of private revenge and retaliation, and enjoin patience, when the clear call and dispensation do inevitably call unto suffering; but not to give way to all violence and sacrilege, to the subverting of religion and righteousness. These texts do no more condemn private persons retaliating the magistrate, than magistrates retaliating private persons, unless magistrates be exempted from this precept, and consequently be not among Christ's followers: yea, they do no more forbid private persons, to resist the unjust violence of magistrates, than to resist the unjust violence of private persons. That objection from our Lord's reproving Peter, Matth. xxvi. 52. Put up thy sword, for all they that take the sword, shall perish by the sword, hath no weight here: for this condemns only making use of the sword, either by way of private revenge, or usurping the use of it without authority, (and so condemns all tyrants) which private subjects do not want to defend themselves, their religion and liberty; or using it without necessity, which was not in Peter's case, both because Christ was able to defend himself, and because he was willing to deliver up himself. Pool's Synops. Critic. in Locum. Christ could easily have defended himself, but he would not; and therefore there was no necessity for Peter's rashness; it condemns also a rash precipitating and preventing the call of God to acts of resistance; but otherwise it is plain, it was not Peter's fault to defend his master, but a necessary duty. The reason, our Lord gives for that inhibition at that time, was twofold; one expressed Matth. xixvi. 52. For they that take the sword, &c. Which do not belong to Peter, as if Peter were hereby threatened; but to those that were coming to take Christ, they usurped the sword of tyranical violence, and therefore are threatened with destruction, by the sword of the Romans: so is that commination to be understood of antichrist, and the tyrants that serve him, Rev. xiii. 13. He that killeth with the sword must be killed with the sword, which is a terrible word against persecutors. The reason is, John xviii. 11.——The cup which my Father hath given me, shall I not drink? Which clearly refels that objection of Christ's non-resistance. To which it is answered, That suffering was the end of his voluntary suscepted humiliation, and his errand to the world, appointed by the Father, and undertaken by himself, which is not our practice: though it be true, that even in his sufferings he left us an ensample that we should follow his steps, 1 Pet. ii. 21. In many things, as he was a martyr, his sufferings were the purest rule and example for us to follow, both for the matter, and frame of spirit, submission, patience, constancy, meekness, &c. but not as he was our sponsor, and after the same manner, for then it were unlawful for us to flee, as well as to resist, because he would not flee at that time.

7. As we are not for rising in arms for trifles of our own things, or small injuries done to ourselves, but in a case of necessity for the preservation of our lives, religion, laws, and liberties, when all that are dear to us, as men and as Christians, are in hazard: so we are not for rising up in arms, to force the magistrates to be of our religion, but to defend our religion against his force. We do not think it the way that Christ hath appointed, to propagate religion by arms: let persecutors and limbs of antichrist take that to them; but we think it a privilege which Christ hath allowed us to defend and preserve our religion by arms: especially, when it hath been established by the laws of the land, and become a land right, and the dearest and most precious right and interest we have to contend for. It is true faith Christ, John xviii. 36. 'My kingdom is not of this world; if my kingdom were of this world, then would my servants fight that I should not be delivered to the Jews.' But this objection will not conclude, that Christ's kingdom is not to be defended and preserved by resistance, of all that would impiously and sacrilegiously spoil us of it in this world, because it is not of this world: for then all were obliged to suffer it to be run down, by slaves of hell and satan, and antichrist's vassals, papists and malignants: yea, magistrates were not to fight for it, for they are among his servants, if they be Christians. But the good confession he witnesses here before Pilate, is, that he hath a kingdom, which, as it is not in opposition to any cesarean majesty; so it must not be usurped upon by any king of clay, but is specially distinct from all the kingdoms of the world, and subordinate to no earthly power, being of a spiritual nature; whereof this is a demonstration, and sufficient security for earthly kingdoms, that his servants, as such, that is, as Christians, and as ministers, were not appointed by him to propagate it by arms, nor to deliver him their king at that time, because he would not suffer his glorious design of redemption to be any longer retarded: but this doth not say, but though they are not to propagate it as Christians, and as ministers, by carnal weapons, yet they may preserve it with such weapons as men. Hence that old saying may be vindicated, prayers and tears are the arms of the church. I grant they are so, the only best prevailing arms, and without which all others would be ineffectual, and that they (together with preaching and church discipline, &c.) are the only ecclesiastical or spiritual arms of a church as a church; but the members thereof are also men, and as men they may use the same weapons that others do, and ye my flock, the flock of my pasture, are men, saith the Lord, Ezek. xxxiii. 31. Yea, from this I shall take an argument; if it be lawful for private subjects, without the concurrence of parliaments, to resist a tyrant by prayers and tears; then it is lawful also to resist him by violence, but the former is true, as our adversaries grant by this objection, and I have proved it to be duty to pray against tyrants, Head 2. Ergo—. The connection is founded upon these reasons, 1. This personal resistance by violence, is as consistent with that command, Rom. xiii. 1. 2. 'Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers—whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God;' as resistance by prayer is with that, 1 Tim. ii. 1, 2. I exhort—that—supplications—be made—for kings, and for all that are in authority. If the prince be good, the one is as unlawful as the other; and a sinful resistance of the ordinance of God (to pray against him) no less than the other (to fight against him.) Therefore when he becomes a tyrant, and destroyer of the Lord's inheritance, and an apostate, as I may not pray for him except conditionally, but against him as an enemy of Christ; so I may also fight against him as such. 2. As adversaries themselves will grant, that resistance by prayers and tears is more powerful and effectual than the other; so the laws of the land make the one treasonable as well as the other; and that deservedly, when the prince is doing his duty; but when he turneth tyrant, neither can justly be condemned.