A Hind Let Loose / Or, An Historical Representation of the Testimonies of the Church of Scotland for the Interest of Christ. With the True State Thereof in All Its Periods

by Alexander Shields

These things being permitted, I shall come shortly to the purpose, and endeavour to prove this truth, That it is a necessary duty for a community (whether they have the concurrence of the primores, nobles, and representatives or not) to endeavour, in the defence of their religion, lives, laws, and liberties, to resist and repress the usurpation and tyranny of prevailing dominators, using or abusing their power, for subverting religion, invading the liberties, and overturning the fundamental laws of the country. Wherein I shall be but short, because this truth is sufficiently confirmed by all the arguments of the second head; yet I may only hint at many others, and prosecute them in this order. First, I shall produce some arguments from the law of nature and nations. 2dly, From the common practice of all Christian people. 3dly, From express scriptures.

I. The arguments of the first class are very multifarious: I shall reduce them to a few, as compendiously as may be, and only give the strength of them in a syllogistical form, without expatiating, save where the matter requires.

1. The great antagonists of this truth, through the clearness thereof, are forced to assert and grant such particulars, as will by consequence justify this plea. 1. Barclay contra Monarchum, is cited by the Apol. Relat. and Jus Populi asserting 'That if a king will alienate and subject his kingdom, without his subjects consent, or be carried with a hostile mind to the destruction of his people, his kingdom is actually lost, and the people may not only lawfully resist, but also depose him.' Grotius de jure belli, lib. 1. cap. 4. asserts the same, and adds, 'If he but attempt to do so he may be resisted.' The surveyor of Naphtali grants the same, pag. 23, 24. Yea, this hath been granted in open court, by the council of Scotland, That in case of the king's alienating his kingdoms he may be resisted. Hence, 1. If vendition or alienation of kingdoms, or attempts of it, do annul a king's authority, then an alienation of them from Christ, to whom they are devoted by covenant, and selling to antichrist, as is attempted by this king, gives the people a right to resist him; but the former is here conceded: Ergo—(2.) We need say no more to apply the other, that carrying a hostile mind to the destruction of the people does forfeit his kingdom, and gives the people right to resist, than that a papist is always known to carry a hostile mind to the destruction of protestants, and all the designs declared these 27 years have been demonstrative efforts of it. 2. Dr. Ferne acknowledgeth, 'That personal defence is lawful against the sudden, illegal, and inevitable assaults of the king's messengers, or of himself, in so far as to ward off his blows, or hold his hands. As also, he alloweth private persons liberty to deny subsidies and tribute to the prince, when he employeth it to the destruction of the commonwealth.' Hence, (1.) If one may defend himself against the sudden, illegal, and inevitable assaults of the king or his messengers; then may many men, in defence of their lives and liberties, defend themselves against the surprising massacres, the sudden assaults, and much more the devised and deliberate assaults of a tyrant's bloody emissaries, which are illegal and inevitable, as all their furious and bloody onsets have been; but the former is here allowed: therefore,—3. Bodin de Repub. lib. 2. cap. 5. granteth, 'If a king turn tyrant, he may lawfully, at his subjects request, be invaded, resisted, condemned, or slain by a foreign prince.' Hence, if foreign princes may lawfully help a people oppressed by their own sovereign; then people may resist themselves, if they be able and hold in their pains; but the former is here granted: therefore——The consequence cannot be denied, for foreigners have no more power or authority over another sovereign, than the people have themselves. 4. Arnisæus de Author. Princip. c. 2. n. 10. granteth, 'That if the prince proceed extrajudicially, without order of law, by violence, every private man hath power to resist.' So the surveyor of Naphtali, as above, 'Grants so much of a woman's violent resisting attempts against the honour of her chastity, and tending to ensnare her in sin, whereof, her non-resistance makes her guilty.' Hence, (1.) If every extrajudicial violence of a prince may be resisted; then also all contrajudicial violence against law or reason must be opposed, for that is more grievous, and all their violences, wherein they do not act as judges, must be resisted, and that is all together, for in none of them they can act as judges; but the former is here granted: therefore—2. If a woman may defend her chastity against the king, lest her non-resistance make her guilty, (oh, if all women had been of this mind, the country would not have been pestered so with the king's bastards); then may a nation, or any part of it, resist a tyrant's attempt upon the honour of their religion, enticing them to fornication with the mother of harlots, lest their non-resistance make them guilty; but the former is here yielded: therefore,—5. That same Arnisæus, cap. 4. saith, 'Of the former (to wit, he who is called a tyrant in title) it is determined by all without any difficulty, that he may be lawfully repulsed, or if by force he be gotten into the throne, he may warrantably be thence removed, because he hath not any jot of power which is not illegitimate, and unto which resistance is forbidden for the fear of God and for conscience sake, and therefore he is no further to be looked at than as an enemy.' This is so pat and pertinent to the present possessor of the government, that no words can more particularly apply it. 6. Grotius de jure belli, lib. 1. cap. 4. granteth, the law of not resisting does not bind when the danger is most weighty and certain, 'And we do not plead for it in any other case.' And further he says, 'The law of non-resistance seemeth to have flowed from them, who first combined together into society, and from whom such as did command did derive their power: now, if it had been asked of such, whether they would choose to die, rather than in any case to resist the superior by arms? I know not if they would have yielded thereto, unless with this addition, if they could not be resisted but with the greatest perturbation of the commonwealth, and destruction of many innocents. And afterwards he hath these words, nevertheless I scarce dare condemn every one or the lesser part, which may only be done at utmost extremity, notwithstanding respect is to be had to the common good.' From which we need make no inference, the concession is so large, that it answers our case. 7. The surveyor of Naphtali, in the place above cited, 'Grants legal self-defence against the sovereign, by way of plea in court, for safety of a man's person or estate,—as also is the case of most habited, notour and complete tyranny against law, to the destruction of the body of a people, and of all known legal liberties, and the being of religion according to law.—And in case of his not being in his natural and right wits.'—Hence, (1.) If it be lawful to resist the king by a plea in law, for an estate, (yea the law will allow), by actual force, if he come to take possession of it illegally: then it must be lawful for their lives and estates, liberties and religion, to resist him by force, when the legal resistance is not admitted; but the former is yielded here: therefore.—The reason of the connexion is, the municipal law permits the one, and the law of nature and nations (which no municipal law can infringe) will warrant the other: he hath no more right to be both judge and party in this case, more than in the other: and he can no more act as a sovereign in this case, than in the other. (2.) If it be lawful to resist habited, notour, and complete tyranny against law, to the destruction of the body of a people, and of all known legal liberties, and the being of religion, according to law: then we desire no more to conclude the duty of resisting this tyranny exercised this 27 years habitually, which the desolation of many hundred families, the banishment of many hundreds to slavery, the rivers of blood, &c. have made notour to all Scotland at least, and the perversion of all the fundamental laws, and all civil and religious liberties, yea the subversion of every remaining model of our religion, as reformed and covenanted to be preserved, in doctrine, worship, discipline and government, and designs to introduce popery and establish arbitrary government, have made complete; but the former is here granted: therefore—3. If in case of his being out of his wits, he should run upon an innocent man to kill him, or attempt to cut his own throat, it were then lawful to resist him, yea, a sin not to do it; then when in a rage, or deliberately, he is seeking to destroy many hundreds of the people of God, he may be resisted; but the former is clear: therefore—. 4. King James the VI. in his remonstance for the right of kings, against the oration of Cardinal Perron, hath these words, The public laws make it lawful, and free for any private person, to enterprize against an usurper of the kingdom. Then shall it not be duty, to enterprize against a man, who by the laws of the land is not capable of a right to reign, who hath got into the throne by the means of murder, and can pretend no right but that of succession, which I proved to be, none, Head 2. However, we see by these concessions of adversaries, that the absolute subjection they talk of will not hold, nor the prerogative be so uncontroulable in every case, as they would pretend, and that in many cases, the safety of the people hath the supremacy above it; and that also in these cases the people must be judges, whether they may resist or not.

2. From the law of nature I may argue, 1. If God, the fountain of all power, and author of all right, hath given unto man both the power and the right, of, and reason to manage self-defence, and hath noways interdicted it in his word to be put forth against tyrants; then it is duty to use it against them upon occasion; but the former is true: therefore,—2. If this power and right were restrained in man against the unjust violence of any, it would either be by policy, or grace, or some express prohibition in the word of God; but none of these can be said: therefore.—Policy cannot destroy nature, but is rather cumulative to it; a man entering into a politic incorporation, does not lose the privilege of nature: if one particular nature may defend itself against destroying violence out of society, then must many of these natures combined in society have the same right, and so much the more that their relative duties super-add an obligation of mutual assistance. Grace does not restrain the right of sinless nature, though it restrains corruption: but self-defence is no corruption: Grace makes a man more a man than he was. And nothing can be more dishonourable to the gospel, than that by the law of nature it is lawful to resist tyrants, but we are bound by religion from withstanding their cruelty: the laws of God do not interfere one with another. 3. That law which alloweth comparative re-offending, so as to kill rather than be killed, teacheth resistance: but so the law of nature alloweth, except we be guilty of murder in the culpable omission of self defence. The reason is, because the love of self is nearer and greater, as to temporal life, than the love of our neighbour: that being the measure of this: therefore it obliges rather to kill than be killed, the exigence of necessity so requiring. 4. If nature put no difference between the violence of a tyrant than of another man: then it teaches to resist both alike: but it putteth no difference, but rather aggravates that of a tyrant; being the violence of a man, the injustice of a member of the commonwealth, and the cruelty of a tyrant. And it were absurd to say, we might defend ourselves from the lesser violence, and not from the greater. 5. If particular nature must yield to the good of universal nature; then must one man, though in greatest power, be resisted, rather than the universal commonwealth suffer hurt: but the former is true; for that dictates the necessity of the distracted father to be bound by his own sons, lest all the family be hurt: Ergo the greatest of men or kings, when destructive to the commonwealth, must be resisted; for he is but one man, and so but particular nature. 6. That which is irrational, and reflects upon Providence, as putting men in a worse condition than brutes, is absurd and contrary to the law of nature: but to say, that the brutes have power to defend themselves by resisting what annoys them, and deny this power to men, is irrational and reflects upon Providence, as putting men in a worse condition than brutes: therefore it is absurd, and contrary to the law of nature.

3. From the institution of government I may argue thus: that power and government which is not of God may be resisted: the tyrants power and government, in overturning laws, subverting religion, bringing in idolatry, oppressing subjects, is not of God: Ergo it may be resisted: the major is clear, because that is only the reason why he is not to be resisted, because the ordinance of God is not to be resisted, Rom. xiii. 2. But they that resist a man destroying all the interests of mankind, overturning laws, subverting religion, &c. do not resist the ordinance of God. And if it were not so, this would tend irremedilessly to overthrow all policies, and open a gap to all disorder, injustice, and cruelty, and would give as great encouragement to tyrants to do what they list, as thieves would be encouraged, if they knew nobody would resist them or bring them to punishment.

4. From the original constitution of government by men, it may be argued thus: if people at the first erection of government acted rationally, and did not put themselves in a worse case than before, wherein it was lawful to defend themselves against all injuries, but devolved their rights upon the fiduciary tutory of such, as should remain still in the rank of men, that can do wrong, who had no power but by their gift, consent, and choice, with whom they associated not to their detriment but for their advantage, and determined the form of their government, and time of its continuance, and in what cases they might recur to their primeve liberty, and settled a succession to have course not jure hereditario but jure et vi legis, for good ends; then they did not give away their birth-right of self-defence, and power of resistance, which they had before to withstand the violence, injuries, and oppressions of the men they set over them, when they pervert the form and convert it to tyranny, but did retain a power and privilege to resist and revolt from them, and repel their violence when they should do violence to the constitution, and pervert the ends thereof: but the former is true. Ergo—the minor is cleared, Head. 2. And the connexion is confirmed from this; if the estates of a kingdom give the power to a king, it is their own power in the fountain, and if they give it for their own good, they have power to judge when it is used against themselves, and for their evil; and so power to limit and resist the power that they gave.

5. From the way and manner of erecting governors by compact, the necessity whereof is proven Head 2. Many arguments might be deduced; I shall reduce them to this form: If people must propose conditions unto princes, to be by them acquiesced in and submitted unto at their admission to the government, which thereupon becomes the fundamental laws of the government, and securities for the people's rights and liberties, giving a law claim to the people to pursue the prince, in case of failing in the main and principal thing covenanted, as their own covenanted mandatarius who hath no jus or authority of his own, but what he hath from them, and no more power but what is contained in the conditions, upon which he undertaketh the government; Then when either an usurper will come under no such conditions, or a tyrant doth break all these conditions, which he once accepted, and so become stricto jure no prince, and the people be stricto jure liberated from subjection to him, they may and must defend themselves and their fundamental rights and privileges, religion and laws, and resist the tyranny overturning them: but the former is true, Ergo—The connexion is clear: and the minor is proved Head 2. And at length demonstrated and applied to the government of Charles the Second by Jus Populi. cap. 6. See Arg. 4, 5. Head 2.

6. From the nature of magistracy it may be argued thus, That power which is properly neither parental, nor marital, nor masterly and despotic, over the subjects, persons, and goods, but only fiduciary, and by way of trust, is more to be resisted than that which is properly so; but that power which is properly so, that is parental power, and marital, and masterly, may be resisted in many cases; Therefore, that power which is not so properly, but only fiduciary is more to be resisted. That a king's power over his subjects, is neither parental, nor marital, &c. is proven Head 2. And the major needs no probation. The minor is clear by instances, 1. If children may, in case of necessity, resist the fury of their father, seeking to destroy them; then must private subjects resist the rage and tyranny of princes, seeking to destroy them, and what is dearest to them; for there is no stricter obligation moral between king and people, than between parents and children, nor so strict; and between tyrants and people there is none at all; but the former cannot be denied: Therefore,—2. If wives may lawfully defend themselves against the unjust violence of enraged husbands; then must private subjects have power to resist the furious assaults of enraged tyrants, for there is not so great a tye betwixt them and people, as between man and wife; yea there is none at all; but the former is true: Ergo,—3. If servants may defend themselves against their masters; then must private subjects defend themselves against a tyrant or his emissaries; but the former is true: Ergo,—4. If the king's power be only fiduciary, and by way of pawn, which he hath got to keep; then when that power is manifestly abused, to the hurt of them that intrusted him with it, he ought to be resisted by all whom he undertook to protect; but the former is true: Therefore the latter.

7. From the limited power of princes it may be thus argued: If princes be limited by laws and contracts, and may be resisted by pleas in law, and have no absolute power to do and command what they will, but must be limited both by the laws of God and man, and cannot make what laws they will in prejudice of the people's rights, nor execute the laws made according to their pleasure, nor confer on others a lawless licence to oppress whom they please; then when they turn tyrants, and arrogate a lawless absoluteness, and cross the rules, and transgress the bounds prescribed by God's laws, and man's laws, and make their own lusts a law, and execute the same arbitrarily, they must be resisted by force, when a legal resistance cannot be had, in defence of religion and liberty; but all princes are limited, &c. Therefore,—The minor is proved, Head 2. And the connexion may be thus confirmed in short: That power which is not the ordinance of God may be resisted; but an absolute illimited power, crossing the rules, and transgressing the bounds prescribed by God's law and man's, is not the ordinance of God; Therefore it may be resisted.

8. Further from the rule of government, it may be argued several ways, 1. That power which is contrary to law, evil and tyrannical, can ty none to subjection, but if it oblige to any thing, it ties to resistance; but the power of a king against law, religion, and the interests of the subjects, is a power contrary to law, evil and tyrannical: Therefore,—The major is plain, for wickedness can ty no man, but to resist it; that power which is contrary to law, evil and tyrannical is wickedness. 2. That power, and those acts, which neither king can exercise; nor command, nor others execute, nor any obey, must certainly be resisted: but such is the power and acts that oppress the subjects, and overturn religion and liberty; Therefore—The minor is evident from scriptures condemning oppression and violence, both in them that command, and in them that execute the same, and also them that obey such wicked commands. The major is clear from reason; both because such power and such acts as cannot be commanded, cannot be executed, cannot be obeyed lawfully, are sinful and wicked: and because it cannot be a magistratical power, for that may always be exercised and executed lawfully. And what a man cannot command, the resisting of that he cannot punish; but acts of oppression against law, religion, and liberty, a man cannot command; Ergo, the resisting of these he cannot punish. 3. That government of administration, which is not subordinate to the law and will of God, who hath appointed it, must be resisted; but that government or administration, which undermines or overturns religion and liberty, is not subordinate to the law and will of God; Therefore—The major is clear; for nothing but what is the ordinance of God, subordinate to his law and will, is irresistible, Rom. xiii. 2. The assumption is undeniable.