1. There may be some arguments offered from the dictates of natural reason, which I shall but only glance at.

1. I premit the consideration of the practice of all nations, even such from whom patterns have been taken for government, and who have had the most polite and purest policy, and have been the severest animadverters upon all extravagants and transgressors of their vocation: yet even among them, for private persons to destroy and rid the commonwealth of such burdens, and vile vermin so pernicious to it, was thought a virtue meriting rather commendation, than a thing to be condemned. I shall not here instance the laudable practices recorded in scripture; these may be seen in their own place. Neither do I speak of ruder nations, among whom this is a relict of reason, not of rudeness, as the Oriental Indians have a custom, whenever any person runs a muck, that is, in a revengeful fury, takes such a quantity of opium, as distracts them into such a rage of mad animosity, that they fear not to assault (which is the common operation of that portion there) and go through destroying whom they can find in their way: then every man arms against him: and is ambitious of the honour of first killing him, which is very rational; for otherwise no man could be safe; and it seems to be as rational, to take the same course with our mad malignant mucks who are drunk with hellish fury, and are running in a rage to destroy the people of God whom they can meet with. But all the nations, where the best policy was established, have been of his mind. In Greece public rewards were enacted to be given, and honours appointed for several cities, to those that should kill tyrants, from the mightiest of them to the meanest; with whom they thought there was no bond of humanity to be kept. Hence, Thebe is usually commended for killing her husband, Timoleon for killing his brother, because they were pernicious and destructive to the commonwealth: which, though it seem not justifiable, because of the breach of relation of natural subjection, yet it shews what sentiments the most politic nations have had of this practice. As also among the Romans, Cassius is commended for killing his son, and Fulvius for killing his own son going to Cataline, and Brutus for killing his kinsmen, having understood they had conspired to introduce tyranny again. Servilius Ahala is commended for killing even in the court Sep. Melius, turning his back and refusing to compear in judgment, and for this was never judged guilty of bloodshed, but thought nobilitate by the slaughter of a tyrant, and all posterity did affirm the same. Cicero, speaking of the slaughter of Cesar, stiles it a famous and divine fact, and put to imitation. Sulpitius Asper, being asked, why he had combined with others against Nero, and thought to have killed him? made this bold reply, 'that he knew not any other way to put a stop to his villanies, and redeem the world from the infection of his example, and the evils which they groaned under by reason of his crimes.' On the contrary, Domitius Corbulo is reprehended by all, for neglecting the safety of mankind, in not putting an end to Nero's cruelty, when he might very easily have done it: and not only was he by the Romans reprehended, but by Tyridates the Persian king, being not all afraid lest it should afterward befal an example unto himself.

When the ministers of Caius Caligula, a most cruel tyrant, were, with the like cruelty, tumultuating for the slaughter of their master, requiring them that killed him to be punished, Valerius Asiaticus the senator cried out aloud, 'I wish I had killed him,' and thereby both composed their clamour, and stopt their rage. 'For there is so great force in an honest deed, (saith Buchanan de jure Regni, relating this passage) that the very lightest shew thereof, being presented to the minds of men, the most furious assaults are allayed, and fury will languish, and madness itself must acknowledge the sovereignty of reason.' The senate of Rome did often approve the fact, tho' done without their order oftentimes by private hands: as upon the slaughter of Commodus, instead of revenging it, they decreed that his carcase should be exposed and torn in pieces. Sometimes they ordered before hand to have it done; as when they condemned Didimus Julianus, they sent a tribune to slay him in the palace: nay, they have gone so far, as in some cases to appoint reward for such as should kill those tyrants that trampled upon their laws, and murdered virtuous and innocent people; as that sentence of the senate against the two Maximini doth witness, Whosoever killeth them deserves a reward. Buchanan as above, rehearsing many instances of this nature, gives reasons of their approveableness; and these I find here and there scattered, in his book, de jure Regni, 1. They that make a prey of the commonwealth, are not joined to us by any civil bond or tie of humanity, but should be accounted the most capital enemies of God and of all men. 2. They are not to be counted as within human society, but transgressors of the limits thereof; which whoso will not enter into, and contain himself within, should be taken and treated as wolves, or other kinds of noisome beasts, which whosoever spares, he preserves them to his own destruction, and of others; and whosoever killeth, doth not only good to himself, but to all others; and therefore doth merit rather reward than to be condemned for it. For if any man, divested of humanity, should degenerate into such cruelty, as he would not meet with other men but for their destruction (as the monsters I am speaking of, could meet with none of the party here treated on, but to this effect) he is not to be called a man, no more than satyrs, apes or bears. 3. It is expressly commanded to cut off wickedness and wicked men, without any exception of rank or degree; and, if kings would abandon the counsels of wicked men, and measure their greatness rather by duties of virtue, than by the impunity of evil deeds, they would not be grieved for the punishment of tyrants, nor think that royal majesty is lessened by their destruction, but rather be glad that it is purged from such a stain of wickedness. 4. What is here to be reprehended? is it the cause of their punishment? That is palpable. Is it the law which adjudges them to punishment? All laws were desired as necessary for repressing tyrants; whosoever doth condemn this, must likewise condemn all the laws of nations. Is it the person executing the laws? Where will any other be found to do it in such circumstances? 5. A lawful war being once undertaken with an enemy for a just cause, it is lawful not only for the whole people to kill that enemy, but for every one of them: every one therefore may kill a tyrant, who is a public enemy, with whom all good men have a perpetual warfare; meaning, if he be habitually tyrannical, and destructive to the people, so that there is no living for good people for him; otherwise, though a man by force or fraud acquire sovereignty, no such violence is to be done to him, providing he use a moderate way in his government, such as Vespasian among the Romans, Hiero in Syracuse. 6. Treason cannot be committed against one who destroys all laws and liberties of the people, and is a pernicious plague to the commonwealth.

2. Such is the force of this truth in the case of circumstantiate, that it extorts the acknowledgment of the greatest authors ancient and modern, domestic and foreign, and even of all rational royalists (as Mr. Mitchel lays in his postscript to the forecited letter.) That it is lawful for any private person to kill a tyrant without a title, and to kill tories or open murderers, as devouring beasts, because the good of his action doth not only redound to the person himself, but to the whole commonwealth, and the person acting incurs the danger himself alone.

Tertullian, though a man loyal to excels, says, every man is a soldier inrolled to bear arms against all traitors and public enemies. The ancient ecclesiastical historian, Sozomen, relating the death of Julian, and intimating that he was supposed to have been slain by a Christian soldier, adds, Let none be so rash as to condemn the person that did it, considering he was thus courageous in behalf of God and religion, Sozom. Hist. lib. 6. cap. 2. Barclaius, a great royalist, faith, all antiquity agrees, that tyrants, as public enemies, may, most justly, be attacked and slain, not only by the community but also by every individual person thereof. Grotius de jure belli, lib. i. cap. 4. saith, If any person grasp at dominion by unjust war, or hath no title thereto by consent of the community, and no paction is made with him, nor allegiance granted, but retains possession by violence only, the right of war remains; and therefore it is lawful to attack him as an enemy, who may be killed by any man, and that lawfully. Yea, king James VI. in his remonstrance for the right of kings, says, the public laws make it lawful and free for any private persons to enterprise against an usurper. Divines say the same. Chamier, Tom. 2. lib. 15. cap 12. Sect. 19. All subjects have right to attack tyrants. Alsted. Theolog. Gaf. cap. 17. reg. 9. p. 321. Any private man may and ought to cut off a tyrant, who is an invader, without a title; because in a hostile manner he invades his native country. And, cap. 1. 18. reg. 14. p. 332. 'It is lawful for every private man to kill a tyrant, who unjustly invades the government. But Dr. Ames concerning conscience, Book 3. Chap 31. concerning manslaughter, asserts all that is here pleaded for in express terms, Quest. 4. Whether or no is it lawful for a man to kill another by his own private authority? Ans. Sometimes it is lawful to kill, no public precognition preceeding; but then only, when the cause evidently requires that it should be done, and public authority cannot be got: For in that case, a private man is publicly constitute the minister of justice, as well by the permission of God, as the consent of all men. These propositions carry such evidence in them, that the authors thought it superfluous to confirm them, and sufficient to affirm them. And from any reason that can be adduced to prove any of these assertions, it will be as evident that this truth I plead for, is thereby confirmed, as that itself is thereby strengthened: for it will follow natively, if tyrants, and tyrants without a title, be to be thus dealt with,; then the monsters, of whom the question is, those notorious incendiaries and murdering public enemies, are also to be so served: for either these authors assert the lawfulness of so treating tyrants without a title, because they are tyrants, or because they want a title. If the first be said, then all tyrants are to be so served; and reason would say, and royalists will subscribe, if tyrants that call themselves kings may be so animadverted upon, because of their perniciousness to the commonwealth by their usurped authority, then the subordinate firebrands that are the immediate instruments of that destruction, the inferior emissaries that act it, and actually accomplish it, in murdering innocent people, may be so treated; for their persons are not more sacred than the other, nor more unpunishable. If the second be said, it is lawful to kill them, because they want a title; then it is either because they want a pretended title, or because they want a real and lawful one. The latter is as good as none, and it is proven, Head 2. Arg. 7. that no tyrants can have any. The former cannot be said, for all tyrants will pretend some, at least before they be killed.

3. But though some of these great authors neither give their reasons for what they assert, nor do they extend it to all tyrants that tyrannize by virtue of their pretended authority, yet it will not be difficult to prove, that all, great and small, that murder, destroy, and tyrannize over poor people, are to be punished, though they pretend authority for what they do. And hence, if all tyrants, murderers and destroyers of mankind ought to be punished; then when it cannot be done by public authority, it may be done by private; but all tyrants, murderers and destroyers of mankind ought to be punished: Therefore—. The minor is manifest from the general commands of shedding the blood of every man that sheds it, Gen. ix. 6. of putting to death whosoever killeth any person, Numb. xxxv. 30, 31. of respecting no man's person in judgment, Deut. i. 17. And universally all penal laws are general without exception of any; for under that reduplication of criminal transgressing those laws, under that general sanction, they are to be judged; which admits of no partial respect: for if the greatest of men be murderers, they are not to be considered as great, but as murderers; just as the meanest are to be considered as mean or poor, but as murderers. But I need not insist on this, being sufficiently proved, Head 2. Arg. 9. and throughout that Head, proving that tyrants can have no authority: and, if they have no authority, then authority (which they have not) cannot exempt them from punishment. The connexion of the major proposition may be thus urged: when this judgment cannot be executed by public authority, either it must be done by private authority, in case of extreme necessity, or not at all: for there is no medium, but either to do it by public authority, or private: if not at all, then the land must remain still defiled with blood, and cannot be cleansed, Numb. xxxv. 33. Then the fierce anger of the Lord cannot be averted, Numb. xxxv. 4. for without this executing of judgment, he will not turn it away, Jer. v. 1. Then must murderers be encouraged, by their impunity, to make havoc of all according to their lust, besides that poor handful who cannot escape their prey, as their case is circumstantiate. Besides, this is point black contrary to these general commands, which say peremptorily, the murderer shall be put to death; but this supposed case, when public authority will not or cannot put them to death, says, they shall not be put to death. In this case then I demand, whether their impunity is necessary, because they must not be put to death? or because they cannot be put to death? To say the latter, were an untruth; for private persons can do it, when they get access, which is possible: if the former, then it is clearly contradictory to the commands, which say, they must be put to death, excepting no case, but when they cannot be put to death. If it be said, they must not be put to death, because the law obliges only public authority to execute judgment: to this I reply, 1. I trust to make the contrary appear from scripture by and by. 2. If the law obliges none but those in public authority to execute judgment, then when there is no judgment execute, it must be the sin of none but those in public authority; and if it be only their sin, how comes others to be threatened and punished for this, that judgment is not executed? If they must only stand by, and be spectators of their omissions unconcerned, what shall they do to evite this wrath? shall they exhort them, or witness against them? But that more than all this is required, is proved before several times, where this argument of people's being punished for the sin of their rulers hath been touched. 3. Then when there is no authority, it must be no sin at all that judgment is not executed, because it is the sin of none; it cannot be sin, except it be the sin of some. 4. What if those in public authority be the murderers? Who shall put them to death? By what authority shall judgment be execute upon them? Whether public or private? public it cannot be; for there is no formal public authority above the supreme, who are supposed the party to be punished; if it be the radical authority of the people, which is the thing we plead for, then it is but private, as that of one party against the other: the people are the party grieved, and so cannot be judges: at best then, this will be extrajudicial executing of judgment. And if the people may do it upon the greatest of tyrants, then a part of them who are in greatest hazard may save themselves from those of lesser note, by putting them to death: for if all the people have right to punish universal tyrants, because they are destroyers of all; then a part hath right to punish particular tyrants, because they are destroyers of them, when they cannot have access to public authority, nor the concurrence of the whole body.

4. Let these murderers and incendiaries be considered, either as a part of the community with them whom they murder and destroy, or not; if they be a part, and do belong to the same community (which is not granted in this case, yet let it be given) then when the safety of the whole, or better part, cannot consist with the sparing or preserving of a single man, especially such an one as prejudges all, and destroys that better part; he is rather to be cut off, than the whole or the better part be endangered: for the cutting off of a contagious member that destroys the rest of the body, is well warranted by nature, because the safety of the whole is to be preferred to the safety of a part, especially a destructive part: but now, who shall cut it off? since it must be cut off, otherwise a greater part of the body will be presently consumed, and the whole endangered. It is sure the physician's duty; but what if he will not, or cannot, or there be no physician? then any that can may and must; yea, one member may, in that case, cut off another. So, when either the magistrate will not, or dare not, or does not, or there is none to do this necessary work of justice, for the preservation of the community; any member of it may rather prevent the destruction of the whole, or a greater part, by destroying the murdering and destructive member, than suffer himself and others to be unavoidably destroyed by his being spared. If they be not within, or belonging to that society, then they may be dealt with, and carried towards as public enemies and strangers, and all advantages may be taken of them in cases of necessity, as men would do, if invaded by Turks or Tartars.

5. Let it be considered, what men might have done in such a case before government was erected, if there had been some public and notour murderers still preying upon some sort of men. Certainly then private persons (as all are in that case) might kill them to prevent future destruction. Hence, if this was lawful before government was established, it cannot be unlawful when people cannot have the benefit of the government, when the government that is, instead of giving redress to the grieved and oppressed, does allow and impower them to destroy them: otherwise people might be better without government than with it; for then they might prevent their murderers by cutting them off. But so it is that this was lawful before government was established: for let it be adverted, that the scripture seems to insinuate such a case before the flood. Cain, after he murdered his brother, feared that every man that found him should slay him. Gen. iv. 14. If he had reason to fear this, as certainly he had, if the Lord had not removed that, by prorogueing the execution of vengeance upon him, for his greater punishment, and the world's more lasting instruction, and by setting a mark upon him, and inhibiting, under a severe threatning, any to touch him; then every man that should have killed him was the magistrate, (which were ridiculous) or every man was every, and any private person universally, which might have killed him, if this inhibition had not past upon it. Ainsworth upon the place saith, 'That among the ancient Romans, every one might kill without a challenge, any man that was cursed for some public crime.' And cites Dionys. Halicarnas. l. 2. And so Cain spoke this from a dictate of nature and a guilty conscience.

6. At the erection of government, though the people resign the formal power of life and death, and punishing criminals, over to the governor constitute by them; yet, as they retain the radical power and right virtually, so when either the magistrates neglect their duty of vindicating the innocent, and punishing their destroyers, or impower murderers to prey upon them; in that case, they may resume the exercise of it, to destroy their destroyers, when there is no other way of preventing or escaping their destructions; because extreme remedies ought to be applied to extreme diseases. In an extraordinary exigent, when Ahab and Jezebel did undo the church of God, Elias, with the people's help, killed all Baal's priests, against and without the king's will; in this case, it is evident the people resumed their power, as Lex Rex saith, quest. 9. p. 63. There must be a court of necessity, no less than a court of justice, when it is in this extremity, as if they had no ruler, as that same learned author saith, quest. 24. pag. 213. If then the people may resume that power in cases of necessity, which they resigned to the magistrate; then a part may resume it, when a part only is in that necessity, and all may claim an interest in the resumption, that had an interest in the resignation.

7. Especially upon the dissolution of a government when people are under a necessity to revolt from it, and so are reduced to their primitive liberty, they may then resume all that power they had before the resignation, and exert it in extraordinary exigents of necessity. If then a people that have no magistrates at all may take order with their destroyers then must they have the same power under a lawful revolt. As the ten tribes, if they had not exceeded in severity against Adoram, Rehoboam's collector, had just cause to take order with that usurper's emissary, if he came to oppress them; but if he had come to murder them, then certainly it was duty to put him to death, and could not be censured at all, as it is not in the history, 1 Kings xii. 18. But so it is that the people pursued by these murderers, some of which in their extreme exigencies they put to death; have for these several years maintained a declared revolt from the present government, and have denied all subjection to it upon the grounds vindicated, Head 2. And there they must be considered as reduced to their primeve liberty, and their pursuers as their public enemies, to whom they are no otherwise related than if they were Turks, whom none will deny it lawful to kill, if they invade the land to destroy the inhabitants.