8. Hence, seeing they are no other than public enemies, unjustly invading, pursuing, and seeking them to destroy them: what arguments will prove the lawfulness of resistance, and the necessity of self-defence, in the immediate defence of life, as well as remote, will also prove the lawfulness of taking all advantages upon them: for if it be lawful to kill an enemy in his immediate assault, to prevent his killing of them, when there is no other way of preserving themselves from his fury; then it must be lawful also in his remote but still incessant pursuit, to prevent his murdering them by killing him, when there is no other way to escape in a case of extreme necessity. But that this was the case of that poor people, witnesses can best prove it; and I dare appeal to two sorts of them that know it best, that is, all the pursuers, and all the pursued.

9. This is founded, and follows upon the 4th article of the Solemn League and covenant: where we are bound with all faithfulness to endeavour the discovery, of all such as have been, or shall be incendiaries, malignants or evil instruments,——that they may be brought to public trial, and receive condign punishment. Now, as this obliges to the orderly and ordinary way of prosecuting them when there is access to public judicatories: so when there is none either this article obliges to no endeavour at all; (which cannot be, for it is moral duty to endeavour the punishment of such) or else it must oblige to this extraordinary action and execution of judgment, if to any at all. Especially considering, how, in the sense of the short comings of this duty, it is renewed in the solemn acknowledgement of sins, and engagement to duties, that we shall be so far from conniving at malignity, injustice, &c., that we shall——take a more effectual course, than heretofore, in our respective places and callings, for punishing and suppressing these evils.——Certainly we were called to one way of prosecuting this obligation then, when it was first engaged into, and to another now, when our capacity and circumstances are so materially and formally altered: if the effectual course then was by public authority; then now when that is wanting, there must be some obligation to take some effectual course still, that may suit our places and callings, which will certainly comprehend this extraordinary way of suppressing those evils, by preventing their growth in curbing the instruments, and executing judgment upon them, in a case of extreme necessity, which will suit with all places, and all callings.

II. From the scriptures, these arguments are offered,

First, Some approven examples, and imitable in the like circumstances, will clear and confirm the lawfulness of this extraordinary work of judgment executed by private persons, upon notorious incendiaries, firebrands, and murderers, guilty of death by the law of God,

1. Moses spied an Egyptian smiting an Hebrew, one of his brethren; and he looked this way, and that way, and when he saw that there was no man, he slew the Egyptian, and hid him in the sand, Exod. ii. 11, 12. Here is an uncondemned example: whereof the actor who was the relater did not condemn himself, though he condemns himself for faults that seem less odious; yea, in effect, he is rather condemned by Stephen the Martyr, Acts vii. And though it be extraordinary, in that it was done by private authority, not by a judge, as it was objected to him the second day: yet it was not unimitable; because that action, though heroical, whereof the ground was ordinary, the rule moral, the circumstances commonly incident, the management directed by human prudence, cannot be unimitable; but such was this action, though heroical. The ground was ordinary, spying his brother in hazard, whose murder he would have prevented. The rule was moral, being according to that moral precept in rescuing our brother in hazard, Prov. xxiv. 11, 12. The circumstances were incident in a case of extreme necessity, which he managed very prudently, looking this way, and that way, and hiding him in the sand. Therefore it may be imitated in the like case. It signifies nothing to say that he was moved by the Spirit of God thereto: for unto every righteous performance the motion of the Spirit of God is requisite. This impulse that Moses had and others after-mentioned, was nothing but a greater measure of that assisting grace, which the extraordinariness of the case, and the difficulties therein occurring did call for; but the interveening of such motions, do not alter the rule, so as to make the action unimitable. Impulses are not the rule of duty, either under an ordinary or extraordinary exigence; but when they are subsequent and subservient both to the rule of duty, and to a man's call in his present circumstances, they clearly determine to the species of an heroic enterprise; in so much that it is not only the particular deed that we are to heed for our imitation, but we are to emulate the grace and principle of zeal which produced it, and is thereby so conspicuously relucent for our upstirring to acts in like manner, as God may give opportunity, as is observed by the true non-conformist, Dial. 7. pag. 392, &c.

2. When Israel joined himself unto Baal-Peor, the Lord said unto Moses, 'Take all the heads of the people, and hang them up before the Lord against the sun, that the fierce anger of the Lord may be turned away from Israel.' And Moses said unto the judges, 'Slay every one his men that were joined unto Ball-Peor.' And when Zimri brought the Midianitish Cozbi in the sight of Moses, and in the sight of all the congregation, who were weeping before the door of the tabernacle; and when Phineas saw it, he rose up,——and took the javelin in his hand, and he went after the men of Israel into the tent, and thrust both of them through,——So the plague was stayed,——And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, 'Phineas hath turned away my wrath from the children of Israel, while he was zealous for my sake among them,——I give unto him my covenant of peace,——because he was zealous for his God, and made an atonement for the children of Israel.' Numb. xxv. 3.-13. This action is here much commended, and recorded to his commendation, Psal. cvi. 30, 31. Then stood up Phinehas, and executed judgment, and so the plague was stayed; and that was counted to him for righteousness, unto all generations; that is,——Into justice of the deed before men, who otherwise might have put a bad construction upon it, as rash, out of season, committed against a magistrate by a private person, too cruel by cutting them off from repentance; but God esteemed it as extraordinary just. Pool's Synops. Critic. in Locum. It is certain, this action was some way extraordinary; because Phinehas was not a magistrate, nor one of the judges whom Moses commanded to slay every one his men, ver. 5. Otherwise, if this had been only an ordinary execution of the judgment by the authority of Moses, Phinehas' action would not have been taken so much notice of, nor so signally rewarded; but here it is noted as a singular act of zeal, which it could not have been, if it was only an ordinary execution of the magistrate's command: yet, though this action was signally heroical, proceeding from a principle of pure zeal for God, and prompted by a powerful motion of the Spirit of God to that extraordinary execution of judgment: it is notwithstanding imitable in the like circumstances. For, the matter is ordinary, being neither preternatural, nor supernatural, but just and necessary. The end was ordinary, to turn away the wrath of God, which all were obliged to endeavour. The principle was ordinary, (though at the time he had an extraordinary measure of it) being zealous for the Lord, as all were obliged to be. The rule was ordinary, to wit, the command of slaying every man that was joined to Baal Peor, ver. 5. only this was extraordinary, that the zeal of God called him to his heroical action, though he was not a magistrate, in this extraordinary exigent, to avert the wrath of God; which was neither by Moses's command, nor by the judges obedience, turned away only by Phinehas' act of another nature, and his zeal appearing therein, and prompting him thereto, the Lord was appeased, and the plague slayed. In which fervour of zeal, transporting him to the omission of the ordinary solemnities of judgment, the Spirit of the Lord places the righteousness and praise of the action. Yet the same call and motion of zeal might have impowered others to do the like: the text speaks of no other call he had, but that of zeal, ver. 11, 12, 13. yea, another was obliged to do the same, upon the ground of that moral command, Deut. xiii. 6.-9. having the ground of God's ordinary judgment, which commandeth the idolater to die the death; and therefore to be imitate of all that prefer the true honour and glory of God to the affection of flesh and wicked princes, as Mr. Knox affirmeth in his conference with Lethingtoun, rehearsed before, per. 3. Further, let it be enquired, What makes it unimitable? Certainly it was not so, because he had the motion and direction of God's Spirit; for men have that to all duties. It was not, because he was raised and stirred up of God to do it; for God may raise up spirits to imitable actions. It was not, because he had an extraordinary call, for men have an extraordinary call, to imitable actions, as the apostles had to preach. We grant these actions are extraordinary and unimitable; which, first, do deviate from the rule of common virtue, and transcend all rules of common reason and divine word; but this was not such, but an heroic act of zeal and fortitude: Next these actions, which are contrary to a moral ordinary command are unimitable, as the Israelites robbing the Egyptians, borrowing, and not paying again, Abraham's offering his son Isaac; but this was not such: next those actions, which are done upon some special mandate of God, and are not within the compass of ordinary obedience to the ordinary rule, are unimitable; but is not such: as also miraculous actions, and such as are done by the extraordinary inspiration of the Spirit of God, as Elias's killing the captains with their fifties by fire from heaven; but none can reckon this among these. See Jus Populi at length discussing this point, and pleading for the suitableness of this action, cap. 20. If therefore the Lord did not only raise up this Phinehas to that particular act of justice, but also so warrant and accept him therein, and reward him therefore, upon the account of his zeal, when there was a godly and zealous magistrate, able, and whom we cannot without breach of charity presume, but also willing to execute justice; how much more may it be pleaded, that the Lord, who is the same yesterday, to day and forever, will not only pour out of that same spirit upon others; but also when he gives it, both allow them, though they be but private persons, and also call them, being otherwise in a physical and probable capacity to do these things in an extremely necessitous, and otherwise irrecoverable state of the church, to which in a more intire condition he doth not call them? And particularly, when there is not only the like or worse provocations, the like necessity of execution of justice and of reformation, for the turning away of wrath, and removing of judgments, that was in Phinehas's case, but also, when the supreme civil magistrate, the nobles of the kingdom, and other inferior rulers, are not only unwilling to do their duty, but so far corrupted and perverted, that they are become the authors and patronizers of these abominations, Naph. prior Edit. p. 23.

3. When the children of Israel served Eglon the king of Moab, and they cried unto the Lord, he raised them up a deliverer, Ehud the son of Gera, who made a dagger, and brought a present unto Eglon, and put forth his left hand, and took the dagger from his right thigh, and thrust it into his belly, Judg. iii. 21. That this action was approven will not be doubted, since the Lord raised him up as a deliverer who by this heroical action commenced it; ond since it was a message from God, and that it was extraordinary, were ridiculous to deny: for sure this was not the judicial action of a magistrate, neither was Ehud a magistrate at this time, but only the messenger of the people sent with a present. Yet it is imitable in the like case, as from hence many grave authors concluded the lawfulness of killing a tyrant without a title.

4. When the Lord discomfitted the host of Jabin, and Sifera his captain fled into the house of Heber the Kenite, Jael Heber's wife took a nail of the tent, and went softly unto him, and smote the nail into his temples, Judg, iv. 21. of which the prophetess Deborah says, chap. v. 24. "Blessed above women shall Jael the wife of Heber the Kenite be above women in the tent." Yet not only was Jael no magistrate, but in subjection to and at peace with Jabin, though she killed his captain. But there was no injustice here, when he was declared a public enemy, the war was just, he was an oppressor of the people of God, it became Jael, as a member of the commonwealth, to betray and cut off the common enemy. Therefore Jael had sinned, if she had not killed him. Martyr and others cited in Pool. Synops. Critic. upon the place, albeit that author himself, in his English annotations, does cut the knot, instead of loosing it, in denying Deborah's song to be divinely inspired in its first composure, but only recorded as a history by divine inspiration, as other historical passages not approven, only because this heroic fact of Jael is there recommended, which is too bold an attempt upon this part of the holy canon of the scripture: whence we see what inconveniences they are driven to, that deny this principle of natural justice, the lawfulness of cutting off public enemies, to procure the deliverance of the Lord's people. Hence, If it be lawful for private persons, under subjection to, and at peace with the public enemies of the Lord's people to take all advantages to break their yoke, and deliver the oppressed from their bondage, by killing their oppressors; it must be much more lawful for such as acknowledge no such subjection or agreement, to attempt the same in extreme necessity; but the former is true: therefore the latter.

5. When Samson married the Timnite, and obliged himself by compact, to give them thirty sheets and thirty change of garments, upon their solving his riddle, the Spirit of the Lord came upon him, and he went down to Askelon, and slew thirty men of them, and took their spoil, Judg. xiv. 19. And afterwards, when he lost his wife by the cruelty and treachery of those Philistines, he said unto them, 'Though you have done this, yet will I be avenged of you, and after that I will cease. And he smote them hip and thigh with a great slaughter,' chap. xv. 7, 8. And when the Jews, who acknowledged the Philistines for rulers, came to Etam to expostulate with him, all the satisfaction he gave them was to avouch, that as they had done unto him, so he had done unto them, and to kill a thousand more of them, ver. 11. &c. These were extraordinary heroic facts, not only because they flowed from an extraordinary power wherewith he was endued, and from an extraordinary motion and call; but because of his avenging his own private injuries for the public good, in a way both of fortitude and prudence, without a declared war, provoking the enemies against himself, and diverting from the people, and converting against himself, all their fury, in which also he acted as a type of Christ; and also because he acted not as a magistrate at this time, for by whom was he called or counted a magistrate? not by the Philistines, nor by the men of Judah, for they tell him that the Philistines were their lords, and they bound him and delivered him up to them: yet in his private capacity, in that extraordinary exigence, he avenged himself and his country against his public enemies, by a clandestine war, which is imitable in the like case, when a prevailing faction of murdering enemies domineer over and destroy the people of God, and there is no other way to be delivered from them; for his ground was moral, because they were public enemies, to whom he might do as they did to him. Hence, if saints sometimes, in cases of necessity, may do unto their public enemies, as they have done unto them, in prosecuting a war not declared against them; then much more may they do so in cases of necessity, to deliver themselves from their murdering violence, when a war is declared; but here is an example of the former: ergo

6. When these same Philistines again invaded and over-ran the land in the time of Saul, Jonathan his son, and his armour bearer, fell upon the garrison of these uncircumcised, and killed them, 1 Sam. xiv. 6. 13. This was an heroic action, without public authority; for he told not his father, ver. 1. And singular indeed, in respect of the effect, and were a tempting of the Lord, for so few to assault such a multitude, as it were to imitate Samson in his exploits; but in this respect, these actions are unimitable in consideration of prudence, not of conscience, or as to the lawfulness of the thing: their ground was moral, to cut off public enemies. Hence, If it be lawful to fall upon a garrison of public enemies, oppressing the country, then it must be lawful to fall upon one or two, that are the ring leaders of public enemies, and main promoters of their destruction, that are as pernicious, and have no more right or power, than the Philistines; but such is the case of those about whom the question is.