Popular misgovernment in the United States

by Alfred Byron Cruikshank

The same writer states that the more intelligent class have withdrawn from legislative duties; that it is increasingly difficult to get able men to go to Congress, and almost impossible to get them to consent to go to the state legislature. He might have added that it would be impossible for them to get the favor of the parties or the machines so as to be elected. He describes a great part of the actual legislation as absolutely absurd. He tells of the vicious practice of log-rolling, that is, the exchange between individual members of Congress and of the legislature of support of one bad measure in return for the support of another equally bad. He tells how inferior and shiftless men are sent to the legislature in order that they may get the salary to help them through the winter. He complains of the immense legislative output which in these days is about twenty thousand new laws each year. He describes how corporations are at the mercy of state bosses who manipulate the legislature, and therefore have it in their power to raise their taxes, or in the case of gas or railroad companies to lower their charges or to cause annoying and harassing investigations of their affairs. To avoid this oppression the corporations are, of course, ready to pay blackmail in the shape of campaign contributions to the bosses, some part of which probably remains in the pockets of the boss, but a large part of which goes into a fund to purchase and control the lower classes of voters. As a result large corporations are in the habit of employing an agent to remain at the state capitol during the session, so as to be on hand to forestall these schemes by paying in advance. From another writer:

“The majority of our legislatures are either constituted or controlled by men who either cannot or dare not discuss the measures proposed by them. They maintain silence against all reason and vote submissively in obedience to a ‘boss’ or they open their mouths only to obstruct legislation and to make a ‘strike.’” (Democracy, Hyslop, p. 127.)

This is from Professor Lecky:

“A distrust of the servants and representatives of the people is everywhere manifest. A long and bitter experience has convinced the people that legislators will roll up the State debt unless positively forbidden to go beyond a certain figure; that they will suffer railroads to parallel each other, corporations to consolidate, common carriers to discriminate, city councils to sell valuable franchises to street-car companies and telephone companies, unless the State constitution expressly declares that such things shall not be. So far has this system of prohibition been carried, that many legislatures are not allowed to enact any private or special legislation; are not allowed to relieve individuals or corporations from obligations to the State; are not allowed to pass a bill in which any member is interested, or to loan the credit of the State, or to consider money bills in the last hours of the session.” (Democracy and Liberty, Vol. I., p. 103.)

In 1910 in a speech in Chicago Roosevelt said of the Illinois Legislature, referring to recent disclosures, that it “was guilty of the foulest and basest corruption.” (New Nationalism, p. 111.)

Referring to the Gas Ring misgovernment in Philadelphia in and prior to 1870, Bryce says:

“The Pennsylvania House of Representatives was notoriously a tainted body, and the Senate no better, or perhaps worse. The Philadelphia politicians, partly by their command of the Philadelphia members, partly by the other inducements at their command, were able to stop all proceedings in the legislature hostile to themselves, and did in fact, as will appear presently, frequently balk the efforts which the reformers made in that quarter.” (American Commonwealth, Vol. II, p. 412.)

Bryce describes the condition of the California state government in 1877:

“Both in the country and in the city there was disgust with politics and politicians. The legislature was composed almost wholly either of office-seekers from the city or of petty country lawyers, needy and narrow-minded men. Those who had virtue enough not to be ‘got at’ by the great corporations, had not intelligence enough to know how to resist their devices. It was a common saying in the State that each successive legislature was worse than its predecessor. The meeting of the representatives of the people was seen with anxiety, their departure with relief. Some opprobrious epithet was bestowed upon each. One was, ‘the legislature of a thousand drinks’; another, ‘the legislature of a thousand steals.’ County government was little better; city government was even worse.”

And later, writing in 1894, he says there is no improvement in that State. (American Commonwealth, Vol. II, pp. 430 and 441.) No wonder that by its state constitution California has felt itself obliged to disable its legislature by prohibiting to it thirty-three different classes of state legislation.