Professor John R. Commons of the University of Wisconsin, writing in 1907, quotes the San Francisco Bulletin as saying:
“It is not possible to speak in measured terms of the thing that goes by the name of legislature in this State. It has of late years been the vilest deliberative body in the world. The assemblage has become one of bandits instead of law-makers. Everything within its grasp for years has been for sale. The commissions to high office which it confers are the outward and visible signs of felony rather than of careful and wise selection.” (Proportional Representation, p. 1.)
The author himself says:
“Every State in the Union can furnish examples more or less approaching to this. Statements almost as extreme are made regarding Congress. Great corporations and syndicates seeking legislative favors are known to control the acts of both branches. The patriotic ability and even the personal character of members are widely distrusted and denounced. These outcries are not made only in a spirit of partisanship, but respectable party papers denounce unsparingly legislatures and councils whose majorities are of their own political complexion. The people at large join in the attack. When statements so extreme as that given above are made by reputable papers and citizens, it is not surprising that the people at large have come thoroughly to distrust their law-makers. Charges of corruption and bribery are so abundant as to be taken as a matter of course. The honored historical name of alderman has frequently become a stigma of suspicion and disgrace.” (Idem, p. 2.)
The same malign control by bosses and rings heretofore so often referred to is directly responsible for this sad condition of affairs.
“Thus it would happen not infrequently that a state legislature almost equally divided between the two parties would not have one member in twenty or one in fifty whose nomination and election had not been agreeable to forces behind the two machines, and whose legislative action could not be counted upon by those who held the party reins.... It is probably within the bounds of truth to say that there is not one of our states which has not to a very considerable extent come under the baneful influence of this system, by means of which the political life of the people is dominated and exploited for private ends by rich working corporations in alliance with professional party politicians.” (Shaw, Political Problems, pp. 148, 149.)
Professor Reinsch in his work hereinbefore referred to (American Legislatures) gives an extended account of the means and methods of legislative bribery through the lobby, resulting in “commercial governments” and a situation where “any business man can get what he wants at a reasonable price.” He describes the “boss” as the fruit and flower of the system, his absolute authority, his endless tenure of power, and the degrading influence of the machine. The reader will find in this work much of interest on the subject of corrupt state legislation which cannot be reproduced here.
The legislative evil record still continues to be made. The tree and the fruit are the same year after year. In the session of 1919 forty-six bills affecting New York City which passed both houses of the New York Legislature were so flagrantly bad as to require and receive vetoes. The Citizens Union of New York reported that twenty-eight additional noxious city bills actually became laws. Allowing an equal grist for the rest of the state and we have a total of one hundred and forty-eight mischievous measures which passed both houses in one session. Of the work of this very recent session of the New York Legislature, the New York Evening Post, a very respectable paper, says (August 11, 1919),
“Despite the influence of the Governor and the efforts of the legislative leaders, log-rolling, trading, and dickering continued as usual. Carelessness and sloppiness were characteristic of the session. In his veto messages the Governor called attention of the members to this matter. Again and again bills slipped through one house or the other in such shape that they had to be recalled and repassed.”
Charges against congressmen and state legislators of accepting bribes have been frequently made, and instances are given in this book of public exposures in consequence. Some years ago the writer was informed by a leading politician that the truth far exceeded public rumor, and his information elsewhere obtained leads him to believe that this offense has been common. Bryce says in substance that bribery in Congress is confined to say five per cent of the whole number; that it is more common in the legislatures of a few states; that it is rare among the chief state officials and state judges; that the influence of other considerations than money prevails among legislators to a somewhat larger extent; that one may roughly conjecture that from fifteen to twenty per cent of the members of Congress, or of an average state legislature, could thus be reached, and that the jobbery or misuse of a public position for the benefit of individuals is common in large cities. That is to say, about twenty members of each Congress are for sale for cash, and from sixty to eighty can be bought for “other considerations.” According to Bryce, and he is probably very conservative, one can calculate that about one thousand, all told, members of Congress and the various state legislatures sitting at one time are absolutely corrupt. (American Commonwealth, Vol. II, p. 164.) Looking through the pages of Bryce’s great work, one meets casual references to noted instances of such improprieties; as for instance, secret influences brought to bear upon legislatures in reference to the Granger laws; improper relations between railroads and legislators, amounting to secret control of the legislatures by the railroads, and to blackmailing of the railroads by the legislatures; thus requiring the presence of adroit railway agents at the state capitals, well supplied with money, to defeat legislative attacks made by blackmailers, or the tools of rival roads. (American Commonwealth, Chap. CIII.)