The heroic age of Florence terminated with the first decade of the fourteenth century. The city, at the head of the Tuscan league, which bound together the Anjous and the Guelfs of Rome and Upper Italy, had manfully resisted Henry of Luxemburg, but succumbed to Louis of Bavaria and the Ghibellines, spite of the aid of foreign auxiliaries. At the same time the rulers from Naples, as well as the foreigners who were appointed to enforce established ordinances, were in a certain measure above the law, and in the exercise of arbitrary power. Fortune smiled on none of their undertakings, nor was the State guided to any better state of things by what the poet of the ‘Divine Comedy’ called ‘the new people and the sudden gains.’ Strength in arms began to decline, and an undue preponderance of material interests to prevail. No period of Florentine history is so poor in men distinguished by arms or policy as that which followed the repulse of Henry VII. Material interests even were not adequately protected. For although the springs of gain had yielded copiously, and still continued partially to flow, the cost of war and the taxes pressed with proportionate weight; and in the third decade of the century began the failures of the great banking houses, from which they did not recover for a long time, if they ever did completely. To this must be added distressing losses occasioned by inundations and epidemics. Confusion in the government, due on the one hand to the resentment of the aristocracy, on the other to the ill-feeling of the lower classes, brought matters at length to a crisis in 1342. A foreign adventurer, closely connected with the house of Anjou, Walter de Brienne, Count of Lecce and Duke of Athens, was enabled by the assistance of the lowest class of artisans, and some adherents of the nobler families, to make himself for a short time absolute master of Florence. The tyranny, indeed, was overthrown in the following year by a union of the upper and lower classes, who were not, however, long in falling out again, to the great detriment of the nobility. On the pretext of purging the Guelf party the system of Ammonirism—i.e. exclusion from public offices—was put in practice. It was directed against the decaying nobility on the one hand, and on the other against certain suspected persons in the lower classes. In this way, some thirty years after the expulsion of the Duke, the supreme power was vested in an oligarchy, at the head of which was the Captain of the Guelf faction. They had the whole machinery of government under their control, and were mainly supported by a few families of the wealthier burghers.[4] Among these were the Albizzi, who, originally from Arezzo, having acquired great riches and a high position, stood first in the city of Florence.
Salvestro de’ Medici, who in 1370 had held the office of Gonfalonier, sought to put an end to the tyranny of party when he was again appointed Gonfalonier in the spring of 1378. The reigning faction, though mistrusting him, dared not oppose him, for fear of the multitude, who were in his favour. His attempt to diminish the authority of the Capitano and re-open the way to office to the excluded ones (Ammoniti) brought on a violent insurrection of the common people. This ‘tumulto dei ciompi,’ as it was called, placed Florence for a time under mob-rule, and would have degenerated into the wildest anarchy but for the energy of one poor man, Michele di Lando, the woolcomber, whom the infuriated populace had raised to the chief magistracy, and who, with remarkable instinct, steered the State safely through the storm which threatened its ruin. This state of things lasted three years, during which the all-powerful mob became the tool of designing men, who wreaked their vengeance on the party that had so lately been supreme. The latter, however, in their turn seized the opportunity when the better sort among the populace were disgusted with the tyranny of their fellows, and overthrew the mobocracy, setting up in its place a conservative government, formed of the Optimates, or better citizens, under the lead of the Albizzi. Salvestro de’ Medici, the original author of the revolt, contributed nothing to its suppression. It was, perhaps, beyond his power to do anything. He died in 1388, and the name of the Medici became identical with that of representatives of the interests of the people. Five years later, when the oppressions of the Albizzi had excited general discontent, an armed body of the people marched to the house of Vieri de’ Medici, and asked him to be their leader. He was of the same branch of the family as Salvestro, but he prudently declined the proposed honour, and appeased the revolters.
Averardo, styled Bicci, was the founder of the line that came to be talked of in the world. Little more is known of him than that in 1357 he was employed on behalf of the Republic in the Mugello. His grandfather, of the same name, was Gonfalonier in 1314, when Florence, to escape from the pressure of the Ghibellines, submitted to the Anjous. He was, it is said, the first of the family that amassed wealth by trade, and laid the basis of that prosperity which was a potent factor in the political transactions of his successors. The real splendour of the family, however, began with his son Giovanni d’Averardo, commonly called Giovanni di Bicci, who was born in 1360, and was in the bloom of manhood when the Albizzi held undisputed sway over Florence. The position of the Medici was a difficult one, for the favour they enjoyed among the people exposed them to the suspicion and dislike of the upper class. An attempt made in 1397 to restrict the power of Maso degli Albizzi, head of his family and of the State, ended in the exile and execution of the ringleaders, among whom were found some of the Medici. The prudence and foresight which Giovanni exhibited not only preserved his authority among his friends, but extorted respect from his opponents.
There were stirring times in Giovanni’s maturer years. The government of the conservative party was burdensome on the people and their friends, who were heavily taxed, but it was a successful government in the conduct of foreign affairs, and in the production of public works at home. Florence increased in political importance. The war against the Visconti of Milan, who were extending their power, and aiming at the establishment of a kingdom in Italy, was very costly and not always fortunate to the Guelf republic. Among the vicissitudes undergone by the latter was the defeat of their German champion, King Ruprecht of the Palatinate, whom they had summoned across the Alps. Nevertheless, the ultimate issue was favourable to Florence, which at this time enjoyed a brilliant and comparatively quiet existence. The death of Gian Galeazzo Visconti, in 1402, relieved her of an enemy who had already set foot in Tuscany, and in 1406 she took possession of Pisa, which, weakened by centuries of war and internal commotion, surrendered after an heroic resistance. With varying fortune, Florence made war against Ladislaus, King of Naples, with whom expired in 1414 the male branch of that house of Anjou with whom she had once been so closely allied. She also extended her political influence to Umbria, took Cortona in 1411, and, ten years later, Livorno. With all this her trade and manufactures expanded and matured, increasing her resources and preparing her for other emergencies. The republic which had been the most steadfast friend of the Holy See, was in bitter dispute with it during the later period of the Avignon Papacy. Actively desirous for the restoration of ecclesiastical unity, Florence, in the midst of the great schism, witnessed in her newly acquired territory of Pisa an attempt to reunite the adherents of both Popes, the one at Avignon and the one at Rome. The attempt was a failure, and only added to the confusion by setting up a third Pope, but it gave occasion to the next General Council of Constance, which brought the rupture to a close in 1417.
Notwithstanding so large a military expenditure the wealth of the republic continued to flourish. There was a discrepancy, indeed, in the account of private wealth and public revenue. Two hundred thousand gold guilders were promised for Pisa, sixty thousand were paid to King Ladislaus for Cortona, and a hundred thousand to the Genoese for Livorno. In this way the balance of income and revenue was seriously disturbed. An attempt was made in 1411 to avoid the risks of large grants of money by increasing the number of courts that had to consider the projects of law laid before the Signory. In the fourteenth century was manifested the canker in the finances of Florence that was never quite eradicated. It is true the income of 1328 amounted to more than 300,000 gold guilders, while the regular expenditure was only 40,000, showing a surplus of more than 260,000. The sum was raised in great part by the excise or other indirect taxes, detailed statistical accounts of which still exist.[5] This surplus was so far inadequate to meet the oppressive military expenditure, the pay of the Anjou and other leaders hired by the republic, the cost of fortifications, the purchase of new territory, and the outlay on public works, that by degrees a considerable State debt was contracted, which we hear of under the name of Monte Comune. The growth of this debt is made intelligible by the fact that in the twenty-nine years from 1377 to 1406, eleven and a half million guilders were spent in war, while the sojourn of Duke Charles of Calabria in the city, cost 900,000, and that of the Duke of Athens 400,000. In the wealth of families great changes had taken place. The fourteenth century exhibited remarkable peculiarities in the matter of private property. Shortly before the middle of the century, the insolvency of England had brought to the ground most of the Florentine bankers, some of them for ever. Immediately after that, famine and the Black Death produced a change, which was intensified by the measures taken against the families of those nobles and the ruling party who were hated or suspected. Most of the old families became poor, while a crowd of small folks grew into importance; and the haste to grow rich, infinitely greater than it was in the time of the author of the ‘Divine Comedy,’ whose admonishing voice we have heard, augmented the recklessness and corruption which greatly contributed to the great revolution of 1378. In spite of considerable fluctuation an aristocracy of wealth was formed consisting chiefly of members of the seven great guilds, in whose hands, after the close of the thirteenth century, lay the government of the State. The guilds of the money-changers and of the woolstaplers were the principal, for the first gave the law to all foreign banks, the last, to which smaller societies were subject, governed all foreign markets.
Giovanni di Bicci was one of those who knew how to avail himself skilfully of the favourable opportunities offered by the conclusion of peace at the beginning of the fifteenth century. At the time of the Council of Constance, which agitated the world to an unusual degree, all the great monetary affairs in which Italy was concerned passed through Giovanni’s hands. He is said to have gained enormous sums of money, which were increased when the acquisition of Livorno afforded an advantageous outlet to the commerce of Florence. The advantage would have been lasting, but for the war with Milan, which broke out a few years later, and caused grave troubles. If Giovanni gained much, he was generous with his gains. Where need was, he showed no stint, and for public works his contribution was always ready. Having promised a chapel and sacristy for San Lorenzo, when the enlargement of the whole church was taken in hand (1419) he prompted Filippo Brunelleschi to design a grand plan for its entire reconstruction, which was begun in 1421, and in which the Medici and seven other families took an especial interest. Giovanni, though he did not seek offices in the State, never refused any to which he was called. He conducted negotiations with Ladislaus, King of Naples, went to congratulate Alexander V. on his election as Pope by the Council of Pisa, and accompanied Martin V. when the latter, on his return from Constance, passed through Florence to Rome. Giovanni was elected to the office of Podestà in Pistoja, and in 1421 was chosen Gonfalonier in Florence. The choice was not quite agreeable to the ruling party, for popular traditions were associated with the name of Medici, and Giovanni stood so high in the favour of the multitude that he could, if he had wished, easily have stirred up an insurrection against the oligarchy. Niccolo Uzzano, a prudent and moderate man, who, after Maso degli Albizzi’s death in 1417, shared with Rinaldo the leadership of the conservative party, opposed the election of Giovanni, but did not push his opposition to extremes, for he saw there was a struggle coming on. Giovanni, on his side, made no attempt during his term of office at anything that would disturb the peace.
Ere long external causes placed the party in danger. The antagonism between Florence and Milan could not be removed by mere treaties of peace. Gian Galeazzo’s only remaining son, Filippo Maria, was treading in his father’s steps. He had not only recovered the dominion which, at his father’s death, fell to pieces, but had added Genoa to it. He now stretched out his hand to the Romagna, where he came into collision with the interests of Florence, for the small gentry of that province, hitherto in connection with the republic, were in danger of being subjected to the will of a powerful and ambitious neighbour. Out of this arose the war of 1423, which was far from being successful. As in earlier times, the Florentine forces in 1424 were unable to cope with the Milanese, whom they encountered, first in the Romagna and afterwards in their own territory. The fault lay not so much in the men and their officers as in the absurd system of directing the movement of troops by a committee of civilians, called the Board of War, seated at home. Rinaldo degli Albizzi succeeded in calming the agitation of the people after the severe defeat of Zagonara on July 24th, but the damage done to his party only increased the ascendancy of Giovanni di Bicci. At the beginning of the war he had advised that the Duke of Milan should not be followed into the Romagna, but should be waited for on this side of the Apennines, but his advice was overruled.
In the beginning of 1426 Florence succeeded in forming an alliance with Venice, which, though a rival in mercantile interests, was as sensitive about the encroachments of Milan in the north as was the sister republic about his encroachments in the centre of the peninsula. The lords of Ferrara, Mantua, and others joined the alliance. The disasters of the war and increase of expenditure gave rise to much dissatisfaction, more loudly expressed among the higher than by the lower classes, the fear of whom led the administration to press their fiscal measures most heavily on the richer citizens. Rinaldo degli Albizzi thought to effect a change by weakening the democratic element in the Council. At a meeting of the heads of his party in the Church of Sto. Stefano, near the old bridge, he proposed that the number of lesser guilds should be reduced one half, and the votes of the smaller citizens diminished correspondingly. Changes in the relative numbers of the guilds had always been the means employed by either party for securing political preponderance; for the relative position of the parties was not strong enough to make manœuvres of this kind superfluous. Besides the twenty-one guilds, there was a number of smaller corporations representing branches of the different trades. No less than twenty-five such societies were the offspring of the largest of the guilds, that of the woolstaplers. They had their delegates too, but were dependent on the greater guilds, who represented them in the State. On one occasion, in 1300, the representatives of seventy-two companies, were gathered together in council. The Duke of Athens, who relied on the lower classes, made the smaller companies independent, and put their consuls on a level with the others, but this did not last. The same thing happened at the insurrection of 1378, but the members of the small companies were again unable to keep their independence long. The diminution of the small companies, proposed by Rinaldo degli Albizzi, was at this time a question of some delicacy. Nicolò da Uzzano remarked that before anything was proposed against the people it would be advisable to come to an understanding with their friends. On this Rinaldo conferred with Giovanni di Bicci, whom, of course, he found opposed to the innovation. Had he wished to see a new insurrection he might have agreed to the project, but his native prudence had increased with years. Anyhow, he reaped this advantage, that, as the matter could not remain secret, to him would be ascribed the merit of thwarting a scheme intended for the oppression of the lower classes. Ere long they had to face another great undertaking.
The distribution of the public burdens among individual contributors was for a long time connected with serious evils, that were the more conspicuous in proportion to the severity of the taxation. The scale was furnished by the estimo or assessment of real and personal property,[6] which was in use as early as the eleventh century, and resembled the colletta that prevailed in the Two Sicilies after the time of King Roger. The tax-system of Florence, where Neapolitan rulers had often exercised power, bore the mark of Southern Italy. At the time of its fullest application, when the Anjou Viceroys were supreme the estimo attached to land, capital and personal income. It extended from the city to the country, where its operation was regulated in districts. The framework underwent frequent revisions in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, particularly in the latter, when the example of Naples increased the rigour of the fiscal authorities and gave rise to frequent complaints and petitions for a reform of the taxation. The arbitrium was often called into play before 1346, when the Government of the Duke of Athens ordered a register of all estates. The estimo was the standard on which the public loans were based. These, with the excise and other indirect taxes—which, in the palmy days of commerce, were very productive—served to cover the public expenditure. Loans were made in the first half of the thirteenth century, and before its close the taille was introduced by the Viceroy of Anjou for the maintenance of the French and other mercenaries. There were two methods of raising a loan. By the first, the treasurers of the commune made an agreement with one or more of the great banking-houses, who, on an assignment of the custom duties to them, advanced the money and distributed the loan among their customers and friends.[7] By the second method, the government itself announced the loan and allotted it to the citizens according to their income, as recorded on the estimo, the security being in this case also the customs duties for a certain definite period. Instead of a percentage the contributors received a monopoly of salt, with the privilege of selling it to the retail dealers at an enhanced price.
As the necessities of the State increased, other sources of revenue were looked for. In 1343 the hearth or fire tax was adopted (fumanti or focatico). Before that attempts had been made to tax the clergy. In the war against Mastino della Scala, Lord of Verona, which ended in 1339, the loans amounted to 350,000 gold guilders, and exceeded the annual revenue from the excise by 50,000 guilders. The accumulation of the debt after the expulsion of the Duke of Athens necessitated the continuance of the monte comune, already mentioned, for the administration of the public debt. In the previous century, when payment of the debt due to the citizens became impossible, a ‘great book’ was opened, which in the course of forty years was superseded. During the war of 1325, against Castruccio Castracane, resort was had to similar means for raising money, and the Republic, being unable to pay the debt without borrowing again, established the monte comune. The interest paid was at the rate of five per cent., though at other times it reached as high as twenty-five.[8]