The lord of Argenton, who had obtained auxiliary troops as well from Savoy as from Milan, was received at Florence with open arms. ‘We went to meet him,’ wrote the Milanese ambassadors,[254] ‘with the deputies of the league and many citizens, with the Lord Lorenzo, Lorenzino his cousin, and a troop of armed men for his guard.’ Commines found the city in the midst of preparations for war. He offered the assistance of the king against the Pope’s measures, both spiritual and military. In his memoirs he does not say much of this embassy. ‘The favour of the king was useful to them in some measure, but not so much as I could have wished. I could offer them no army, and had nothing excepting my suite.’[255] Of his journey to Rome and the affairs there, he says not a word. That they were not without fear in high ecclesiastical circles is shown by a letter addressed to the Pope by the Cardinal of Pavia on July 16, from San Lorenzo alle Grotte on the Lake of Bolsena, in which he speaks of the opposition extending within and without Italy, and gives the advice to gain time till the cardinals were again more numerously assembled in Rome. ‘Certain intelligence has reached me that the French king is sending an ambassador to us, a man of high standing in France, who has received peremptory instructions. If the ban against the Florentines be not removed, if the sharers and accomplices in the murder of Giuliano de’ Medici be not punished, and if peace be not restored, the king will have no scruple in pronouncing the withdrawal of obedience, and appealing to the council.’ When the cardinal wrote thus, Commines must have been long in Rome, as he passed through Perugia on July 9, accompanied by the Florentine ambassador Guid’Antonio Vespucci. Of the negotiation with the Pope nothing is known. That Sixtus IV. did not allow himself to be frightened by the king’s threats is shown by the fact that the war began at once. That the circumstances of the Papal States made no unfavourable impression on the ambassador is proved by his remark that the Popes were prudent and well-advised, and the inhabitants of the States would be the happiest people in the world but for the quarrels of the Colonna and the Orsini, for they paid no taxes nor any impositions worthy of consideration. After a few days, Philippe de Commines was again in Florence without having accomplished anything. We shall speak of his later activity further on.
CHAPTER III.
THE CAMPAIGN OF 1478.
When the Florentines saw that war was inevitable, they appointed, on June 13, the magistracy usual in such cases, the Ten of War, among whom, beside Lorenzo de’ Medici, were Tommaso Soderini, Luigi Guicciardini, Bongianni Gianfigliazzi, &c. At first the opinion prevailed that it would be advisable not only to put the frontier in a state of defence on the side of Siena and Umbria, but to make a dangerous diversion for the enemy by an attack on Imola, the city and territory of Girolamo, a plan, however, which they were compelled to abandon by the swift and powerful inroad of the enemy in the Chiana valley. They were not prepared for war, and had to provide for everything in a hurry, and were thus unable to gain an advantage over the enemy. It was to Lombardy that they turned for leaders and men, and also for horses and all materials for war. Among the captains chosen was Niccolo Orsini, Count of Pitigliano, who in later years made himself a name in the service of the Republic of Venice, which he retained even after the defeat at the battle of Ghiaradadda in the war of the League of Cambray; Rodolfo Gonzaga, brother of Federigo, Marquis of Mantua, with two of his sons; and several others. Venice and Milan sent auxiliaries, the former under Galeotto Pico, lord of Mirandola; those of Milan under Gian Jacopo Trivulzio, who, then thirty-seven years old, was destined to become a celebrated leader in the transformation of Italian tactics, Alberto Visconti, and Giovanni Conti. The assistance of Milan was far less than had been hoped for in Florence, owing to her own need. King Ferrante managed to make a formidable diversion for the duchess-regent. Even before the present complication began, he seems to have been gained over by Sforza Maria, Duke of Bari, who had been in Naples since the November of the preceding year, while the Duchess of Calabria took part with her brothers against her sister-in-law, so that when the war against Florence began, the king, with the aid of the exiles, attempted a new enterprise, which we shall soon describe more fully, against Genoa, the weakest point of the territory of Sforza. An enterprise so well begun must have been the cause of very great anxiety and fear to the regent, and made the Florentines tremble for their frontier on the side of Liguria, where Sarzana might be exposed to an attack; and to be prepared for this the Marchesi Gabriello and Leonardo Malaspina were sent thither with a squadron of soldiers.
One other means was tried to withdraw the Milanese regent from the Florentine-Venetian alliance. The Duke of Urbino endeavoured to effect a change of opinion and bring about an alliance with Naples. In a long letter addressed from Gubbio to his agent in Milan, Ser Matteo,[256] he commissioned him to labour for this end with Cecco Simonetta and Gian Jacopo Trivulzio. He was to represent to them that Venice was the natural enemy of Milan, from whom danger was always threatening, and that Lorenzo was a most untrustworthy ally. ‘It cannot please me in the least that Milan relies upon her own strength or the friendship of Lorenzo de’ Medici. For in herself she is not secure, but endangered, and we cannot at all depend on Lorenzo’s friendship. We have always seen, and still see plainly, that he neither desires the peace nor safety of that State. Had he ever wished it, or did he care for it now, he would not have chosen Messer Tommaso Soderini as ambassador immediately on the death of Duke Galeazzo, for the former is a thorough Venetian and more inclined to the Signory of Venice than any one in the council. Lorenzo would not by means of this man have urged so strongly the renewal of the bond between Venice, Milan, and Florence, adding the declaration that the latter state would always go hand in hand with Venice, and objecting to an agreement with the king’s majesty. He would not twice have hindered my appearing in Milan when he was certain that nothing was so dear to my heart as the honour and advantage of that state. He would not have constantly formed plots against the Milanese government with the brothers of the deceased duke and Lord Robert (Sanseverino). He would not have taken the trouble to lull the suspicions of the king, who desired the renewal of the alliance with Milan and Florence, or pretended that it was not the fitting time at present, and that it would be better to wait and see how matters would arrange themselves at Milan. He would not have behaved as he did lately in reference to Lord Robert, by undertaking his defence in Florence, accusing Messer Cecco, seeking to gain the commander over to Florentine pay, and when this failed, recommending him to the Venetians with the same intention (Messer Cecco may be certain of it), so that he may guide affairs there according to his will, as long as men remain in dread of the Turks. Had he known how lovingly the Pope behaved to the serene Duke and Duchess of Milan, he would not have acted towards his Holiness in the manner he did. For he has often stirred up the count (Fortebraccio) against Perugia, and then irritated him against the Sienese, without considering how dangerous it is for that state (Milan) to enkindle war in Italy, especially by an old opponent of the house of Sforza, like Count Carlo, whom he has in a certain way restored from death to life. He would, on the contrary, have preferred the friendship of the king before every other friendship, not only because it is more sincere, but also on account of his relationship and greater power. If Messer Gian Jacopo says that he suspects Lorenzo of sinning against the Holy Ghost, I am of the same opinion, and think that he doubts God’s mercy. As he has most indecorously insulted the king and me, who am, indeed, nothing but a poor nobleman, he will never again trust the former, and has therefore thrown himself into the arms of the Venetians.’ The letter finishes with the proposal that Milan should conclude a secret compact with the king (of Naples) in order to assure himself of his assistance in case of need. The king’s interests were identical with those of the house of Sforza, the rivals of Venice. Only by being in league with Naples could they oppose Florentine machinations with decisive effect. ‘The safest way seems to me not to wait till things have taken a turn that may allow of no alternative. I have repeatedly remarked to Duke Galeazzo that the state of Milan is so composed that with the first buffet of fortune, whether coming from Lodi, or Cremona, or Ghiaradadda or elsewhere, his power may be said to come to an end.’
Feltriers, who knew Tuscan affairs as well as those of his own little country, and who was by no means a man given to violent impulses, explains in a letter the frame of mind which Lorenzo’s policy had produced in King Ferrante and Sixtus IV. even before the late events. The principal matter, Medici’s behaviour and feeling towards Milan, may have been falsely represented. Some facts may have been imagined—and even a certain amount of justification is not to be denied to some of the accusations—and who knows if, as the duke suggests, Lorenzo was not conscious of it himself. However, the letter produced no result, for the insufficient number of troops which came from Milan arose, as we have said, from other causes. Even the preparations of Florence were insufficient. In order to cover the expenses, the Ten levied taxes and borrowed money from the banks, without, however, obtaining what they required. The clergy were exhorted to a contribution of 50,000 gold florins, at which the monasteries broke forth into endless complaints. On the enemy’s side they were ready first, and the promptness with which Siena promoted the designs of the Duke of Calabria, as well as the docility of the Perugians, who, at the Pope’s command,[257] dissolved the compact concluded with Florence, afforded the opponents a great advantage. Alfonso of Calabria led twenty-five squadrons, and five hundred select mercenaries (Provvisionati); Federigo of Montefeltro twenty squadrons of heavy cavalry, each consisting of twenty men-at-arms and forty archers, with the attendants mounted on auxiliary horses. The attack was expected in the Val di Chiana.
This valley is an inland province of Tuscany, stretching from north to south, its length, from the southern slopes of the Casentino above Arezzo, to the southern end of the Lake of Chiusi, some forty miles, and its greatest breadth between the suburbs of Cortona and the Poggia di Sta. Cecilia, where a chain of hills descends along the Sienese valley of Ombrone, about five-and-twenty miles. The Arno, coming from the Casentino, touches the north-western end of this valley, where, instead of pursuing a southward course seemingly prescribed by the nature of the ground, it ‘contemptuously turns its back,’ according to the poet’s expression,[258] on the town of Arezzo, and by a sharp turn, created possibly in old times by an artificial cutting, takes a direction almost parallel to its earlier one and flows towards Florence in the north-westerly direction. At a small distance west of Arezzo it unites with the principal Tuscan branch of the river, which gives its name to the valley watered by it along its whole length, the Chiana or Clanis of the ancients, the original form of which is still an unsolved riddle, for it presents the singular appearance of its course and falls being divided between two larger streams, the Tiber and the Arno, to both of which it bears its waters, the drainage of the flat valley being now facilitated by hydraulic works. It is these works which have entirely altered the appearance of this valley in the present time, and created a flourishing fertile land where, throughout the Middle Ages, the miasma prevailed so terribly that the poet was reminded of its misery in his wanderings through the place of punishment for the makers of discord.[259] When we view the wide plain from the loftily situated Cortona, the horizon of which is bounded by a chain of hills, above which on the south rise the volcanic peak of Radicofani and the immense trachyte mass of Montamiata, a splendidly green and excellently cultivated fertile land lies before us. There are numerous hamlets mostly elevated on the western hills, at the southern end, where two small lakes seem to announce the neighbourhood of the greater Trasimene—Chiusi, Chianciano, Montepulciano, Torrita, Asinalunga, Fojano, Lucignano, Marciano, Monte San Savino. Three states join here: the State of the Church, with its province Umbria; the land of Siena, with the valleys of Orcia and Ombrone; and the Florentine territory, to which by far the greater part of the Val di Chiana belonged. From the most ancient times this Val di Chiana has always been chosen as a battle-field, on account of its situation and uncertain boundary, as well as on account of level suitable for military operations.
About the middle of the fifteenth century, in the Neapolitan war with King Alfonso, this place was celebrated, as also a century later, when Siena fell in the heroic defence of her independence.