On July 11, the enemy crossed the Florentine frontiers, and encamped two miles below Montepulciano.[260] This lofty town was safe from sudden attack, but the surrounding country had to suffer heavily from the troops, who destroyed the mills, drove away the cattle, and made numerous prisoners, spreading terror around. The principal force of the Florentines encamped farther north, between Arbia and Chiana. Scarcely had the news of a foreign inroad reached Florence, when a trumpeter of the Duke of Calabria brought a brief from Sixtus IV., dated July 7, and addressed to the Republic. The Pope declared that for a long time he had been unable to endure the insults offered by Lorenzo de’ Medici to the Holy See, and that at last he had resolved on war, in order to liberate Florence from a despotism which would make it impossible for him to devote himself to the crusade conjointly with the other princes, who had already once before been prevented by this man’s fault. He hoped, therefore, that the Republic would take reasonable measures; he demanded nothing from her but that Lorenzo should be removed, with whom alone he was at enmity. Only the cessation of such shameful servitude was the goal towards which he strove; and only from these measures could he or any clear-sighted person expect safety. Lorenzo knew the prevailing feeling too well to be seriously alarmed at a move which sought to check him personally. But he was obliged to bring the matter to instant decision. After the brief had been read aloud in the Senate, he begged to be allowed to speak to the people. Before an assembly of citizens called together in the palace, he declared he was ready to make any sacrifice whereby the safety of the State could be purchased, either by his banishment or death, as their interests had always been as near to his heart as they had been dear to his father and grandfather. He would not go over the past nor seek to justify himself or accuse others, as the Republic had already sufficiently displayed her sentiments on these points. But he could not refrain from remarking that it was strange that the vicegerent of Christ should think it right at such a time of anxiety and care to show hatred to a single man by inflicting ruinous war on a peaceful and flourishing neighbour. In such a condition of things he did not know if his gratitude towards heaven for the affection shown him should be greater, or sorrow for the variously threatening ills which without his fault had already befallen them. He hoped that the assistance of God, and the activity and prudence of numerous citizens, would help the Republic to save her honour and preserve her fame. If his life would better serve the attainment of this end than his exile or death, he offered it and his family and possessions willingly and joyfully. As we can easily understand, all declared themselves of one accord with him. The result of the Pope’s letter was that all Florence declared that it regarded Lorenzo’s cause as its own, and gave the threatened man a guard of twelve men to protect his person.
Several great canonists and others learned in the law were questioned as to the validity and effect of the Papal censures, and gave their opinion that the Republic, by appealing to the future council, was, notwithstanding the interdict, justified in letting divine service be celebrated in the city and territory as before. The storm raged high; the Pope and the Florentines mutually excited one another. On June 20, the bull with which Lorenzo and the Republic were threatened was enforced; commerce with them, and service under their flag were forbidden.[261] A letter written on July 21 by the Signoria to the Pope[262] contains expressions which scarcely keep within the limits of deference to the head of the Church, making accusations against the Senate, and appealing to the protection of the French king. It was not calculated to soften Sixtus IV. Neither did it stop here. The uncontrolled passion of the Pope and that total want of moderation which made him seize the weapons of the world in order to attack his enemies and enkindle a terrible war, affected not only the Florentine laity, but the clergy also. Again was repeated what had been experienced a century before under the reign of the last Pope of Avignon, that is to say, a part of the clergy took part with the state. A synod in Sta. Maria del Fiore was to investigate the facts of the case, and the question of right in the Pazzi affair, and publish its decision. Whether the assembly really took place is questionable; a rambling document from the hand of Gentile, Bishop of Arezzo, the head of the clerical opposition to the Pope, certainly would lead us to suppose that the synod was convened.[263] But the tone of this composition is so violent, the accusations against Sixtus IV. are so immoderately passionate, exaggerated, and irreverent, the temper is so unworthy a society of clericals and sons of the Church assembled for a serious deliberation, that we must, for the honour of the Tuscan clergy, believe that we have here a sample of individual invective merely. The signature ‘Given in our cathedral of Sta. Reparata on July 23, 1478,’ which only befitted the Archbishop of Florence, Rinaldo Orsini, whose name is not mentioned in this confused epistle, confirms this supposition. In any case, such a declaration in a cause which it was to defend would do far more harm than good. That even the mere mention of the council, and especially of the council of Bâle, embittered and disturbed the Pope, is shown from the impression made upon him by a subsequent and most unimportant attempt to revive once more that ecclesiastical assembly, the constant terror of the successor of Eugenius IV., to kindle its ashes into flame, and effect on the other side of the Alps an opposition to the unspiritual tendencies of the Holy See which became more and more apparent. The official defence which the Republic caused to be drawn up by their chancellor, Bartolommeo Scala, on August 10, seems dignified and moderate beside such attacks. The principal contents are the declarations of Montesecco, which the composer of the letter above mentioned had also seen, and which are followed by a short account, limited to facts, of the events at Florence; while the assistance of the Emperor Frederick III. and King Louis XI. is appealed to against the threatened violence. The emperor is especially reminded that it concerns his most faithful city of Florence and her people, always devoted to his sacred majesty.
After receiving the Florentine answer on July 21, the Pope addressed an autograph letter to the Duke of Urbino, in which he remarked that the tone and contents of the answer had not alarmed him, but had only shown that God, to punish his enemies for their sins, had deprived them of their understanding. His cause was just. He demanded nothing but the punishment of Lorenzo, who had behaved inimically towards God and His church, and ungratefully to the Pope, who relied upon the duke’s valour and devotion, and that of the Neapolitan prince. He had answered the Venetians, God would chastise them if they acted wrongly. He had sent Nuncios to the emperor, the Kings of France, Spain and Hungary, to justify himself. The bull was printed; everyone would know of it. French ambassadors were announced, and he hoped that God would inspire him with a proper answer. They threatened disobedience and schism; it would be as God wished; it would at all events serve some purpose, if he, the duke, would write to the King of England, King Ferrante, his ally, and Louis XI.[264]
They did not content themselves with writing; the Pope must have perceived that a dangerous contest had begun. Guid’Antonio Vespucci was sent to Rome in order to show that they would not submit to the interdict. The government reckoned on support from the French side; not one of the Italian allies joined the demonstration. Donato Acciaiuoli, who still resided at home, received a commission to repair to France to keep the king favourably inclined. He had never really recovered from the excitement which the events in Rome had caused him, and undertook the commission very unwillingly. As Vespucci was to thank the Perugians, who seemed to wish to join the Florentines again, for their friendliness, Acciaiuoli received a command to negotiate in Milan regarding further action in common. Scarcely arrived, he fell ill, and died on August 28. It was a heavy loss for the Republic, who honoured his memory, as Florence possessed few abler or more respected citizens. The moment when he arrived in Milan was not a fortunate one, for the revolution had already taken place in Genoa, which immediately produced a reaction on the Tuscan war, as a part of the troops in Tuscany were called home. King Ferrante had managed the matter more cleverly. Not only, as was easy for him, did he stir up the brothers Sforza and Roberto Sanseverino against Genoa, but succeeded in reconciling for the moment the chief of the great parties in the city to one another; and meanwhile he won over Prospero Adorno, who governed Genoa for the duchess, in order to bring thither the former doge, Lodovico Fregoso, who lay in wait at Piombino. The Milanese garrison held out with difficulty against the city, which had declared itself free, and had received from Naples artillery, munitions, and men. The Duke of Atri, Giulio Acquaviva, sailed from thence on July 22, and when a Milanese army approached, it was completely defeated on August 7 by Sanseverino. So far all things had prospered according to King Ferrante’s wish. But the quarrels which never ceased to divide the nobility came to the aid of the regent, who, in order not to leave the city in the hands of her brothers-in-law and their faction, secretly negotiated with Battista, one of the Fregosi, and caused Castelletto, still garrisoned by her troops, to surrender to him, on which he took possession of the city, which proclaimed him doge, and if not subject to Milan, was as little dependent on Naples.[265]
Meanwhile the campaign had begun in a manner which showed beforehand that, even without decisive battles, the Florentine territory would be ruined. The enemy was three times as strong as the Florentines, who were unprovided in many ways, but whose most serious deficiency at the beginning of the war was that they had no captain-general, and consequently failed in unity of leadership and a plan of war. The troops were in a bad condition. The reports sent to Milan by Gian Jacopo Trivulzio show a sad picture of the circumstances. Having set out from Milan with a hundred men-at-arms, he had come by Pontemoli into Tuscany, and at length reached the Aretine territory. There, at Olmo, three miles from Arezzo, at the entrance to the Chiana valley, where the roads divide to Cortona and Siena over Monte Sansavino, he halted and awaited the Florentine army. His people produced a favourable impression on the Florentine commissaries, but not so those of the allies on him. ‘The Florentine troops,’ he writes on July 16,[266] ‘passed in such a wretched state that I was disgusted—without order or connection, the different troops mingled together, so that I could not distinguish them, one squadron half a mile distant from the other.’ In the camp there was similar disorder; only a few infantry, and those badly armed, and no sappers and miners. Besides this, insufficient means for provisioning, so that the Milanese condottiere complained that the government only seemed to think of their own advantage, and not of the welfare of the troops. No prices were fixed; they opened door and house to the usurers, and sought by the taxation of imported provisions to procure money, instead of providing for the first necessities. Under such circumstances, it availed little that illustrious men arrived in the camp, among them Ghiberto da Correggio and Teodoro Trivulzio, Gian Jacopo’s cousin, and, like him, afterwards Marshal of France. The two commissaries of the army, Luigi and Jacopo Guicciardini, with whom the Venetian ambassadors Giovanni Emo and Bernardo Bembo were associated, could not hide the want of united military guidance, a want which remained perceptible even when a commission of four captains was entrusted with the representation for the time of the captain-general. These were the Count of Pitigliano, Galeotto Pico, Gian Jacopo Trivulzio, Alberto Visconti.
The enemy had quitted Montepulciano and turned northward, with the evident intention of gaining the road to Florence. Without venturing a battle, the Florentines slowly retreated, at first towards Arezzo, then, as they saw the enemy take the direction to Siena, to cover the Elsa valley, in which they set up their camp on the Poggio Imperiale on a broad and flat hill overlooking the whole district by Poggibonzi, which once bore the old castle destroyed by the Guelphs, where the Emperor Henry VII. spent the last years of his life. Without being molested, the enemy took in the meantime several small places situated in the neighbouring province of Chianti, some of which offered a gallant resistance. The open country suffered dreadfully from the destruction of the mills and of such provisions as the soldiers could not carry away. The havock made in the Sienese territory and an attempt of the Florentines to win over Perugia so exasperated the Pope as to make him publish, from the Orsini castle of Bracciano, on August 10, a new and stronger bull against the Republic. It was on the same day that Commines paid a visit to the Florentine head-quarters at Poggibonzi.[267] Here at last they got a captain-general, Ercole d’Este, Duke of Ferrara. Though son-in-law to the King of Naples he accepted the command of the Florentine and Milanese troops, and arrived at Florence on September 8. The Venetians were displeased at this choice, and had protested against it in Milan and Florence without avail. On the same day with the duke the Marquis of Saluzzo had arrived, with nearly two hundred foot, at Pisa. It was high time. The duke stayed four days in the city, which received him with great distinction, and presented him with the house of Renato de’ Pazzi, the most innocent victim of the conspiracy. On the 13th he set out for the camp. Before the staff of command was delivered to him, which was done for the Republic by Lorenzo, for Milan by Gian Jacopo Trivulzio, the stars were consulted by an astrologer according to the fashion of the times, and the afternoon of September 27 declared favourable. It might have been expected that a more active prosecution of the war would now begin. But the new captain-general ventured as little as his predecessors to attack the enemy, notwithstanding his augmented forces; and when the former considering an advance upon Florence unadvisable, gave up his position in Chianti, and, turning again to the Chiana valley, began the siege of Monte San Savino, it needed the most express commands of Florence to persuade Ercole d’Este to break up his head-quarters and approach the enemy.
The slowness of his movements and the numerous difficulties that were raised showed how little he was disposed to advance. When the armies had approached one another the Royalists proposed a truce of several days, which the duke gladly accepted, and when the truce was over, Monte San Savino capitulated on November 8. From its protected situation and the easy provisioning of the place it was not unimportant, and the Florentines felt the loss severely. For as at the same time an attempt to reconquer Castellina by surprise failed on account of the unskilful leadership of the army, the Chiana valley and the Chianti were exposed to the devastations of the enemy, and reprisals on the Sienese domain afforded but slight consolation. They were not without anxiety either for other parts of the territory. In Pistoja a project was discovered to give the town into King Ferrante’s hands, who longed to compete with the Florentines with the help of the Genoese and to take possession of their trading ships. Lucca was not considered safe either; Piero Capponi represented here the interests of the Republic. So ended the year 1478, a fruitful but unhappy year. The war had consumed much money, ruined the country people in flourishing districts, much injured a number of villages, and produced not one warlike deed.
Things could not continue thus. If Milan and Venice did not fulfil their duty to their allies better, Florence, which was in such a bad military condition and had the war in her territory, could not offer resistance to her enemies. Bernardo Bembo, a respected and business-like man whom the Republic of Venice had sent as their permanent representative, might well see the situation of affairs without being able to cause a more energetic interposition, for they were always negotiating with the Pope, while the Papal and Neapolitan troops made daily progress. Tommaso Soderini went to Venice to represent to the Republic the state of affairs. Girolamo Morelli did the same in Milan. The Florentines proposed to attack the King of Naples by invading his shores and summoning the Angevins once more to Italy, and at the same time to disturb the Pope in his own states in Romagna as well as in Umbria. But in Milan, however good the will might be, little was to be gained, because of their own embarrassments. The Swiss, misled by Papal and Neapolitan intrigues which broke the treaties confirmed at Galeazzo Maria’s death, marched once more against the frontiers of the Alps, overran Bellinzona, and defeated the ducal troops. At the same time, on account of Genoese affairs and disturbances in the reigning families which will soon be mentioned, the Venetians were opposed to the removal of the war to Romagna. The other projects seemed too complicated and uncertain. After long negotiation, it was agreed that the Marquis of Mantua should strengthen the army of the Duke of Ferrara and that Roberto Malatesta of Rimini, who had dissolved his connection with the Church and passed over to the service of Florence, should make a strong diversion in the territory of Perugia with Carlo Fortebraccio. At the same time, the treaties with Louis XI. had arrived at a conclusion which, though not all that could be wished by the allies, certainly promoted their cause.