[266] Metaph., VII., xiii., p. 1039, a, 4.
[267] De An., III., ii., p. 426, a, 20; 425, b, 25 ff. What Aristotle means by saying that the εἶναι of object and sensation is not the same, appears from a passage in his tract on Memory (p. 450, b, 20), where he employs the illustration of a portrait and its original, which are the same, although their εἶναι is different.
[268] Metaph., IV., v., sub fin.
[269] De An., III., iv., sub fin.
[270] De An., II., ii., p. 414, a, 20.
[271] De An., III., i., p. 425, a, 13.
[272] See Zeller pp. 602-606, where the whole subject is thoroughly discussed.
[273] Anal. Pr., I., i., sub in.; ii., sub in.; Top., I., viii., Bekker (in the Tauchnitz ed., vi.).
[274] Anal. Pr., I., xxiii., 41, a, 11 (in the Tauchnitz ed., xxii., 8).
[275] This point is well brought out in F. A. Lange’s Logische Untersuchungen.