[276] Anal. Pr., I., xxxi.; Anal. Post., II., v.
[277] Metaph., IV., iii., sub in.
[278] Anal. Post., I., x.
[279] ‘Die Wissenschaft soll die Erscheinungen aus ihren Gründen erklären, welche näher in den allgemeinen Ursachen und Gesetzen zu suchen sind’ (Zeller, p. 203). ‘Induction is the method of proceeding from particular instances to general laws’ (Wallace, p. 13). ‘It seems to have been his [Aristotle’s] idea that after gathering facts up to a certain point, a flash of intuition would supervene, telling us “This is a law”’ (Grant, p. 68). Apropos of the discussion whence this last passage is extracted, we may observe that Sir A. Grant is quite mistaken in saying that Aristotle ‘omits to provide for verification.’ Aristotle is, on the contrary, most anxious to show that his theories agree with all the known facts. See in particular his memorable declaration (De Gen. An., III., x., p. 760, b, 27), that facts are more to be trusted than reasonings.
The emphasis laid by Aristotle on concepts as distinguished from laws is noticed by J. H. v. Kirchmann, in his German translation of the Metaphysics, p. 13.
[280] De An., III., vi., sub in., taken together with Anal. Post., I., vi.
[281] Anal. Post., I., xxxiv.; II., ii.
[282] Anal. Post., II., xii., p. 95, a, 36.
[283] Wallace’s Outlines, p. 14.
[284] Ibid., Preface, pp. viii.-ix.