In connection with this famous Memorandum, it is interesting to note an interpolation that took place in the Hungarian Diet on 11th March with respect to it. In answer to Deputy Pollit, Mr Tisza, the Minister President, stated “in the answer to the question as to whether the Hungarian Government approves of the intervention, there is no question of intervention, but only of good advice, which had been given in concert with the European Powers, and which had been accepted in the most friendly manner by the Porte.... In answer to the question as to the action of Hungary if the pacification was not effected, and if Servia intervened, such an eventuality was most improbable ... but in that case the policy of the Empire would be guided by the interests of Europe.... With reference to the question of the refugees, the Empire had not disregarded the interests of humanity ... as was shown by the subvention amounting to nearly 1,000,000 florins which had been already given to them.... The speaker concluded by expressing a hope that the House would accept his explanation.” If they did, they were easily satisfied, these Hungarian Deputies. Not a word about the capital question of shutting the frontier to the rebels. Servia, too, was arming to the teeth, and was to declare war on Turkey three months later.
We shall see the literal fulfilment of this prediction. Bosnia was the first to follow suit with the Herzegovina. On the 8th February 1876, Sir H. Elliot writes to Lord Derby: “The Porte is much disturbed by the unsatisfactory account received from the Governor‐General of Bosnia, who has applied for fresh troops. Bands supposed to consist of old Grenzers are stated to have passed the Save from Austria at four different points, but have been repulsed. The body which invaded Bosnia is stated to have consisted of 400 or 500 men all well‐armed. Much excitement is said to prevail on both sides of the Servian frontier, and apprehensions are entertained of an aggression from that quarter. Reschid Pasha tells me that Count Zichy has given him, on the part of Count Andrassy, the strongest assurance ... that measures shall be adopted to prevent the recurrence of such acts, and has promised ... that those who have taken part in them shall be disarmed and internés.”[71]
It would be difficult to carry intentional bad faith further. All this time, notes and memorandums were flying about the Chancelleries of Europe to force the Porte to give guarantees for suppressing an insurrection which was being organised and fed by bands “all well‐armed” across a friendly frontier, its suppression being thus rendered materially impossible. As well might one try to extinguish a conflagration, over an unlimited area, that was being continually fed by petroleum springs, the sources of which could not be got at. Nor let it be supposed that to guard such a line of frontier was impossible. The rebels had it all their own way. And so had the Diplomatists of the “Allied Courts of Berlin, Vienna, and St Petersburg.” Russian Committees were joining their efforts to Austrian.
On the 14th February 1876, Sir H. Elliot writes to Lord Derby: “The accounts of the encouragement given to the insurgents at Ragusa greatly exceeds all that I was prepared for. The Russian Consulate is the open resort of the insurgent chiefs; their correspondence is sent to the Consul, who is a party to all their projects, and associates himself intimately with them. He does not appear to make any attempt to conceal the part he is playing, for on the occasion of the death of the chief Maxima, in one of the late encounters, the Russian flag at the Consulate was hoisted at half‐mast, and M. Jomini himself joined the funeral procession.
“Some of the wounded when asked why they continue the struggle when the Porte is ready to grant all their demands, have answered plainly that they are bound to go on as long as they are told by Russia to do so. The assurances given at St Petersburg of the wish of the Imperial Government that the insurgents would lay down their arms, must naturally go for nothing as long as its official Representative, with whom they are in communication, encourages them to go on.”[72] Pretty plain speaking this! and Austria that continued the “exequatur” to a foreign Consul, acting thus on its territory towards a friendly Power. So gross and palpable was this assistance given by Austria to the insurgents, whilst pretending all the time to be so keenly anxious for its suppression, that Lord Derby thought it necessary on the 10th March 1876, to give the following instructions to Sir A. Buchanan, the English Ambassador at Vienna: “I have to inform Your Excellency that it has come to the knowledge of Her Majesty’s Government, through Her Majesty’s Ambassador at Constantinople, that the Porte had received information that a severe fight took place on the Dalmatian frontier on the 4th inst., and that on the following day, the combat was renewed by a force said to be 700 strong, who came from Austrian territory with large supplies of ammunition, and that this having occurred so immediately after the assurances of the Austro‐Hungarian Government that their frontier would be officially guarded, has caused great discouragement to the Turkish Government, and it is feared that the effect of it in Montenegro will be very mischievous, and I have therefore to request Your Excellency to call the serious attention of the Imperial Government to this matter.”[73] But these remonstrances, which were evidently sincere and well‐meaning, had not the very slightest effect at Vienna. The Hungarian Chancellor was always ready to give any amount of assurances and promises to the credulous Sir A. Buchanan. On the 3rd April 1876, Sir H. Elliot was obliged to write again: “I learn that the Porte has received information of the passage of considerable bands said to be accompanied by two pieces of artillery from Dalmatia and Croatia, into the north‐western district of Bosnia.”[74] And further, on the next day, 4th April, he writes: “A telegram from the Governor‐General of Bosnia, which has been read to me by Reschid Pasha, gives a very alarming account of the state of things in that province. Armed bands are passing freely from the Austrian territory, and there are symptoms indicating a probable insurrection of the populations along the rivers Save and Una. The Governor‐General states that he has been unable to re‐establish the line of telegraph along the Save, as the workmen are continually fired at from the Austrian bank of the river, and his remonstrances addressed to the Austrian authorities have been unattended to.”[75] The reason why Austria was not content to confine her operations to Herzegovina, but had extended them to Bosnia, was clear. The Porte was succeeding, in spite of all difficulties, in pacifying the former, and as the Berlin note was being drawn up at Berlin for the three “Allied Powers” and would be presented in a month, such a precipitation would derange all their plans.
The following despatch of Sir H. Elliot of 7th April 1876 clearly indicates this state of things. “The enclosed report from Mr Sandison of the account received at the Porte from Haidar Effendi (the Turkish Commissioner) gives a very serious aspect to the state of affairs in Bosnia. It is evident that the Austro‐Hungarian Government have failed lamentably in their engagement to guard their own frontier, and by means of well‐armed bands coming from their territory, a formidable insurrection has been excited in districts which have hitherto remained quiet. Although the news received from the Herzegovina is good, and gave hopes of a pacification, it would be too much to expect that the movement in Bosnia should not produce its effect in the districts which have been so long in insurrection.”[76]
In the month of May we arrived at another stage of the business. It is time that diplomacy should register another point of “terrain acquis.” On the 4th May 1876 Lord Derby, writing to Sir A. Buchanan, says: “The Austrian Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and placed in my hands for perusal a despatch which he had received from his Government. The purport of the despatch was to state that there is an entire agreement between the Governments of Austria, Germany and Russia as to affairs in the East, and that any reports that may have been circulated to the contrary are simple inventions.”[77]
The purport of making this communication could be no other than a warning to all whom it may concern, that they could join or not join the “European Concert,” as they thought proper. It would make no difference to the European Concert. It was a notice certainly calculated to open the eyes, even of the blind, to what was going on.
As the fact of armed bands could not be disputed, it was obviously the interest of Austria to endeavour to throw the blame on others, Montenegro and Servia especially. We shall come to these little