States later, but à propos of shifting the blame on Servia, there is a very significant despatch from Consul‐General White, dated Belgrade, 28th April 1876. “The Prince (of Servia) takes no pains to conceal that, more than ever, he considers a collision with the Porte as within the range of possibilities; but he continues to disclaim at the same time any intention to act as the aggressor. He pointed out to me the other day that the portion of Bosnia which is conterminous to Servia has been entirely free from armed bands since last November, when the Papas Zarko was repulsed into Servia, whilst the insurgents who had within the last few weeks made their appearance on the river Unna between Bihatch, Novi and Kostainitza, were all in proximity to the Austrian frontier, and he defied anyone to show that Servia had been instrumental in fostering insurrection in that department of Bosnia, though he added that such an accusation had been made somewhere, evidently alluding to Austrian Authorities.”[78] The explanation of these apparent mysteries was really simple enough. Servia was reserving herself for Bulgaria, which was within the sphere of her action, as she herself was within the orbit of Russia’s influence, and she had no intention of playing Austria’s game for Austria’s sole benefit.
Unless strongly backed by Russia, Servia knew well enough that Austria, posted in the conterminous province of Bosnia, would be a most awkward neighbour, and render any hope of future independence on her part purely illusory. Turkey’s yoke would be light indeed in comparison to that of Austria, if she were surrounded on three sides by the Kaiserlich. A great deal of the apparent contradiction, see‐sawing and hesitation of this period is to be accounted for by these conflicting inner currents, set in motion by two of the three allied Governments, whose agreement Count Beust was instructed to inform Lord Derby was “entire.” It was entire as regarded Turkey, there was no doubt about that, but there was a very pretty little by‐play going on besides, within the circle of the larger drama. No wonder this state of things created a situation, as Consul Holmes pithily described it, “in which everyone seems to profess precisely what he fails to practise.”
BERLIN NOTE.
Whatever light friction there may have been between Russia and Austria in the Spring of 1876, it seems to have been smoothed over, probably by the intervention of the third disinterested partner in the Alliance; for on Saturday, the 13th May 1876, Lord Odo Russell, the British Ambassador at Berlin, received an invitation from Prince Bismarck to call on him that day in order to meet Count Andrassy and Prince Gortchakoff, together with the Ambassadors of France and Italy; M. de Bülow and Baron Jomini were also present at the interview. “After a few preliminary words from Prince Bismarck, Prince Gortchakoff and Count Andrassy confirmed the cordial understanding that exists between them, and expressed their sincere hope and anxious desire that the Governments of England, France and Italy, who have given their moral support to the attempted pacification of the Herzegovinians, will equally agree to support the further attempts they have now met to concert, in consequence of the alarming state of affairs in Turkey. Baron Jomini was then invited to read the enclosed document to us, and the proposal to which they solicit the co‐operation of the Great Powers.... Prince Gortchakoff observed that he and Count Andrassy would remain till Monday (15th inst.) at Berlin, and that they hoped the Governments of England, France and Italy would be able to express an opinion on the telegraphic summary of their proposal, before they left.”[79]
It is no part of the purport of this book to comment on the procédés of the “three Allied Powers” vis‐à‐vis of the other so‐called Great Powers, England, France and Italy. That is a matter of their interior ménage. We are exclusively concerned with their conduct, severally and collectively, towards Turkey. If it were otherwise, one might have something to say concerning the strangeness and singularity of the proceeding among Great Powers, supposed to stand on a footing of equality, of three of their number convoking the rest to hear a document of the very highest international importance read to them for their assent to it, if possible by telegraph, within two days! But let us proceed with the narrative.
The document referred to, which goes in history by the name of the “Berlin Note,” was a very curious document. It started with the declaration that “the alarming tidings which come from Turkey are of a nature to impel the three Cabinets to draw closer their intimacy. The three Imperial Courts have deemed themselves called upon to concert among themselves measures for averting the dangers of the situation, with the concurrence of the other great Christian Powers.” After referring to the history of the question up to the Andrassy Memorandum, by which the Powers acquire a moral right and an obligation to insist on “pacification,” and enumerating the causes that have prevented the success of that action, and especially the agitation caused by the prolongation of the strife in other parts of the Turkish Dominions, and laying stress on the deplorable events at Salonica, it declares that it is most essential to establish certain guarantees of a nature to insure beyond doubt the loyal and full application of the measures agreed upon between the Powers and the Porte.”
As the first step in this direction, the three Imperial Courts propose to insist with the Porte on a suspension of arms for two months, and to open negotiations between the Porte and the rebel delegates on the basis of the wishes that the latter have formulated, and which may be enumerated as follows:—
(1) That materials for the reconstruction of their houses should be provided the refugees by the Turkish Government.
(2) The appointment of a mixed commission to superintend reforms.