Abú `Alí Júzajání says: “The saint is annihilated in his own state and subsistent in the contemplation of the Truth: he cannot tell anything concerning himself, nor can he rest with anyone except God,” because a man has knowledge only of his own state, and when all his states are annihilated he cannot tell anything about himself; and he cannot rest with anyone else, to whom he might tell his state, because to communicate one’s hidden state to another is to reveal the secret of the Beloved, which cannot be revealed except to the Beloved himself. Moreover, in contemplation it is impossible to regard aught except God: how, then, can he be at rest with mankind? Junayd said: “The saint hath no fear, because fear is the expectation either of some future calamity or of the eventual loss of some object of desire, whereas the saint is the son of his time (ibn waqtihi): he has no future that he should fear anything; and as he hath no fear so he hath no hope, since hope is the expectation either of gaining an object of desire or of being relieved from a misfortune, and this belongs to the future; nor does he grieve, because grief arises from the rigour of time, and how should he feel grief who is in the radiance of satisfaction (riḍá) and the garden of concord (muwáfaqat)?” The vulgar imagine this saying to imply that, inasmuch as the saint feels neither fear nor hope nor grief, he has security (amn) in their place; but he has not security, for security arises from not seeing that which is hidden, and from turning one’s back on “time”; and this (absence of security) is characteristic of those who pay no regard to their humanity (bashariyyat) and are not content with attributes. Fear and hope and security and grief all refer to the interests of the lower soul, and when that is annihilated satisfaction (riḍá) becomes an attribute of Man, and when satisfaction has been attained his states become steadfast (mustaqím) in vision of the Author of states (muḥawwil), and his back is turned on all states. Then saintship is revealed to his heart and its meaning is made clear to his inmost thoughts. Abú `Uthmán Maghribí says: “The saint is sometimes celebrated (mashhúr), but he is not seduced (maftún),” and another says: “The saint is sometimes hidden (mastúr), but he is not celebrated.” Seduction consists in falsehood: inasmuch as the saint must be veracious, and miracles cannot possibly be performed by a liar, it follows that the saint is incapable of being seduced. These two sayings refer to the controversy whether the saint knows himself to be such: if he knows, he is celebrated, and if he does not know, he is seduced; but the explanation of this is tedious. It is related that Ibráhím b. Adham asked a certain man whether he desired to be one of God’s saints, and on his replying “Yes”, said: “Do not covet anything in this world or the next, and devote thyself entirely to God, and turn to God with all thy heart.” To covet this world is to turn away from God for the sake of that which is transitory, and to covet the next world is to turn away from God for the sake of that which is everlasting: that which is transitory perishes and its renunciation becomes naught, but that which is everlasting cannot perish, hence its renunciation also is imperishable. Abú Yazíd was asked: “Who is a saint?” He answered: “That one who is patient under the command and prohibition of God,” because the more a man loves God the more does his heart revere what He commands and the farther is his body from what He forbids. It is related that Abú Yazíd said: “Once I was told that a saint of God was in such and such a town. I set out to visit him. When I arrived at his mosque he came forth from his chamber and spat on the floor of the mosque. I turned back without saluting him, and said to myself: ‘A saint must keep the religious law in order that God may keep him in his spiritual state. Had this man been a saint his respect for the mosque would have prevented him from spitting on its floor, or God would have preserved him from marring the grace vouchsafed to him.’ The same night I dreamed that the Apostle said to me, ‘O Abú Yazíd, the blessing of that which thou hast done is come to thee.’ Next day I attained to this degree which ye behold.” And I have heard that a man who came to visit Shaykh Abú Sa`íd entered the mosque with his left foot foremost. The Shaykh gave orders that he should be dismissed, saying: “He who does not know how to enter the house of the Friend is not suitable for us.” Some heretics who have adopted this perilous doctrine assert that service of God (khidmat) is necessary only while one is becoming a saint, but that after one has become a saint service is abolished. This is clearly wrong. There is no “station” on the way to the Truth where any obligation of service is abolished. I will explain this matter fully in its proper place.
Discourse on the Affirmation of Miracles (karámát).
You must know that miracles may be vouchsafed to a saint so long as he does not infringe the obligations of the religious law. Both parties of the orthodox Moslems agree on this point, nor is it intellectually impossible, because such miracles are a species of that which is predestined by God, and their manifestation does not contradict any principle of the religious law, nor, on the other hand, is it repugnant to the mind to conceive them as a genus. A miracle is a token of a saint’s veracity, and it cannot be manifested to an impostor except as a sign that his pretensions are false. It is an extraordinary act (fi`lí náqiḍ-i `ádat), performed while he is still subject to the obligations of religion; and whoever is able, through knowledge given him by God, to distinguish by the method of deduction what is true from what is false, he too is a saint. Some Sunnís maintain that miracles are established, but not to the degree of an evidentiary miracle (mu`jizat[[120]]): they do not admit, for example, that prayers may be answered and fulfilled, and so forth, contrary to custom. I ask in reply: “What do you consider wrong in the performance by a true saint, while he is subject to religious obligations, of an act which violates custom?” If they say that it is not a species of that which is predestined by God, this statement is erroneous; and if they say that it is a species of that which is predestined, but that its performance by a true saint involves the annulment of prophecy and the denial of special privileges to the prophets, this assertion also is inadmissible, since the saint is specially distinguished by miracles (karámát) and the prophet by evidentiary miracles (mu`jizát); and inasmuch as the saint is a saint and the prophet is a prophet, there is no likeness between them to justify such precaution. The pre-eminence of the prophets depends on their exalted rank and on their being preserved from the defilement of sin, not on miracles or evidentiary miracles or acts which violate custom. All the prophets are equal so far as they all have the power of working such miracles (i`jáz), but some are superior to others in degree. Since, then, notwithstanding this equality in regard to their actions, some prophets are superior to others, why should not miracles (karámát) which violate custom be vouchsafed also to the saints, although the prophets are superior to them? And since, in the case of the prophets, an act which violates custom does not cause one of them to be more exalted or more specially privileged than another, so, in the case of the saints, a similar act does not cause a saint to be more specially privileged than a prophet, i.e. the saints do not become like in kind (hamsán) to the prophets. This proof will clear away, for reasonable men, any difficulties that this matter may have presented to them. “But suppose,” it may be said, “that a saint whose miracles violate custom should claim to be a prophet.” I reply that this is impossible, because saintship involves veracity, and he who tells a falsehood is no saint. Moreover, a saint who pretends to prophesy casts an imputation on (the genuineness of) evidentiary miracles, which is infidelity. Miracles (karámát) are vouchsafed only to a pious believer, and falsehood is impiety. That being so, the miracles of the saint confirm the evidence of the prophet. There is no difficulty in reconciling the two classes of miracles. The apostle establishes his prophecy by establishing the reality of evidentiary miracles, while the saint, by the miracles which he performs, establishes both the prophecy of the apostle and his own saintship. Therefore the veracious saint says the same thing as the veracious prophet. The miracles of the former are identical with the evidentiary miracles of the latter. A believer, seeing the miracles of a saint, has more faith in the veracity of the prophet, not more doubt, because there is no contradiction between the claims made by them. Similarly, in law, when a number of heirs are agreed in their claim, if one of them establishes his claim the claim of the others is established; but not so if their claims are contradictory. Hence, when a prophet adduces evidentiary miracles as evidence that his prophecy is genuine, and when his claim is confirmed by a saint, it is impossible that any difficulty should arise.
Discourse on the difference between Evidentiary Miracles (mu`jizát) and Miracles (karámát).
Inasmuch as it has been shown that neither class of miracles can be wrought by an impostor, we must now distinguish more clearly between them. Mu`jizát involve publicity and karámát secrecy, because the result of the former is to affect others, while the latter are peculiar to the person by whom they are performed. Again, the doer of mu`jizát is quite sure that he has wrought an extraordinary miracle, whereas the doer of karámát cannot be sure whether he has really wrought a miracle or whether he is insensibly deceived (istidráj). He who performs mu`jizát has authority over the law, and in arranging it he denies or affirms, according as God commands him, that he is insensibly deceived.[[121]] On the other hand, he who performs karámát has no choice but to resign himself (to God’s will) and to accept the ordinances that are laid upon him, because the karámát of a saint are never in any way incompatible with the law laid down by a prophet. It may be said: “If evidentiary miracles are the proof of a prophet’s veracity, and if nevertheless you assert that miracles of the same kind may be performed by one who is not a prophet, then they become ordinary events (mu`tád): therefore your proof of the reality of mu`jizát annuls your argument establishing the reality of karámát.” I reply: “This is not the case. The karámat of a saint is identical with, and displays the same evidence as, the mu`jizat of a prophet: the quality of i`jáz (inimitability) exhibited in the one instance does not impair the same quality in the other instance.” When the infidels put Khubayb on the gallows at Mecca, the Apostle, who was then seated in the mosque at Medína, saw him and told the Companions what was being done to him. God also lifted the veil from the eyes of Khubayb, so that he saw the Apostle and cried, “Peace be with thee!” and God caused the Apostle to hear his salutation, and caused Khubayb to hear the Apostle’s answer. Now, the fact that the Apostle at Medína saw Khubayb at Mecca was an evidentiary miracle, and the fact that Khubayb at Mecca saw the Apostle at Medína was likewise an extraordinary act. Accordingly there is no difference between absence in time and absence in space; for Khubayb’s miracle (karámat) was wrought when he was absent from the Apostle in space, and the miracles of later days were wrought by those who were absent from the Apostle in time. This is a clear distinction and a manifest proof that karámát cannot possibly be in contradiction with i`jáz (miracles performed by a prophet). Karámát are not established unless they bear testimony to the truth of one who has performed a mu`jizat, and they are not vouchsafed except to a pious believer who bears such testimony. Karámát of Moslems are an extraordinary miracle (mu`jizat) of the Apostle, for as his law is permanent so must his proof (ḥujjat) also be permanent. The saints are witnesses to the truth of the Apostle’s mission, and it is impossible that a miracle (karámat) should be wrought by an unbeliever (bégána).
On this topic a story is related of Ibráhím Khawwáṣ, which is very apposite here. Ibráhím said: “I went down into the desert in my usual state of detachment from worldly things (tajríd). After I had gone some distance a man appeared and begged me to let him be my companion. I looked at him and was conscious of a feeling of repugnance. He said to me: ‘O Ibráhím, do not be vexed. I am a Christian, and one of the Ṣábians among them. I have come from the confines of Rúm in the hope of being thy companion.’ When I knew that he was an unbeliever, I regained my equanimity, and felt it more easy to take him as my companion and to fulfil my obligations towards him. I said: ‘O monk, I fear that thou wilt suffer from want of meat and drink, for I have nothing with me.’ ‘O Ibráhím,’ said he, ‘is thy fame in the world so great, and art thou still concerned about meat and drink?’ I marvelled at his boldness and accepted him as my companion in order to test his claim. After journeying seven days and nights we were overtaken by thirst. He stopped and cried: ‘O Ibráhím, they trumpet thy praise throughout the world. Now let me see what privileges of intimacy (gustákhíhá) thou hast in this court (i.e. to what extent thou art a favourite with God), for I can endure no more.’ I laid my head on the earth and cried: ‘O Lord, do not shame me before this unbeliever, who thinks well of me!’ When I raised my head I saw a dish on which were placed two loaves of bread and two cups of water. We ate and drank and went on our way. After seven days had passed I resolved to test him ere he should again put me to the proof. ‘O monk,’ I said, ‘now it is thy turn. Let me see the fruits of thy mortification.’ He laid his head on the earth and muttered something. Immediately a dish appeared containing four loaves and four cups of water. I was amazed and grieved, and I despaired of my state. ‘This has appeared,’ I said, ‘for the sake of an unbeliever: how can I eat or drink thereof?’ He bade me taste, but I refused, saying, ‘Thou art not worthy of this, and it is not in harmony with thy spiritual condition. If I regard it as a miracle (karámat), miracles are not vouchsafed to unbelievers; and if I regard it as a contribution (ma`únat) from thee, I must suspect thee of being an impostor.’ He said: ‘Taste, O Ibráhím! I give thee joy of two things: firstly, of my conversion to Islam (here he uttered the profession of faith), and secondly, of the great honour in which thou art held by God.’ ‘How so?’ I asked. He answered: ‘I have no miraculous powers, but my shame on account of thee made me lay my head on the earth and beg God to give me two loaves and two cups of water if the religion of Muḥammad is true, and two more loaves and cups if Ibráhím Khawwáṣ is one of God’s saints.’” Then Ibráhím ate and drank, and the man who had been a monk rose to eminence in Islam.
Now, this violation of custom, although attached to the karámat of a saint, is identical with the evidentiary miracles which are wrought by prophets, but it is rare that in a prophet’s absence an evidence should be vouchsafed to another person, or that in the presence of a saint some portion of his miraculous powers should be transferred to another person. In fact, the end of saintship is only the beginning of prophecy. That monk was one of the hidden (saints), like Pharaoh’s magicians. Ibráhím confirmed the Prophet’s power to violate custom, and his companion also was endeavouring both to confirm prophecy and to glorify saintship; a purpose which God in His eternal providence fulfilled. This is a clear difference between karámat and i`jáz. The manifestation of miracles to the saints is a second miracle, for they ought to be kept secret, not intentionally divulged. My Shaykh used to say that if a saint reveals his saintship and claims to be a saint, the soundness of his spiritual state is not impaired thereby, but if he takes pains to obtain publicity he is led astray by self-conceit.
Discourse on the performance of miracles belonging to the evidentiary class by those who pretend to godship.
The Shaykhs of this sect and all orthodox Moslems are agreed that an extraordinary act resembling a prophetic miracle (mu`jizat) may be performed by an unbeliever, in order that by means of his performance he may be shown beyond doubt to be an impostor. Thus, for example, Pharaoh lived four hundred years without once falling ill; and when he climbed up to any high ground the water followed him, and stopped when he stopped, and moved when he moved. Nevertheless, intelligent men did not hesitate to deny his pretensions to godship, inasmuch as every intelligent person acknowledges that God is not incarnate (mujassam) and composite (murakkab). You will judge by analogy the wondrous acts related of Shaddád, who was the lord of Iram, and Nimrod. Similarly, we are told on trustworthy authority that in the last days Dajjál will come and will claim godship, and that two mountains will go with him, one on his right hand and the other on his left; and that the mountain on his right hand will be the place of felicity, and the mountain on his left hand will be the place of torment; and that he will call the people to himself and will punish those who refuse to join him. But though he should perform a hundredfold amount of such extraordinary acts, no intelligent person would doubt the falsity of his claim, for it is well known that God does not sit on an ass and is not blind. Such things fall under the principle of Divine deception (istidráj). So, again, one who falsely pretends to be an apostle may perform an extraordinary act, which proves him an impostor, just as a similar act performed by a true apostle proves him genuine. But no such act can be performed if there be any possibility of doubt or any difficulty in distinguishing the true claimant from the impostor, for in that case the principle of allegiance (bay`at) would be nullified. It is possible, moreover, that something of the same kind as a miracle (karámat) may be performed by a pretender to saintship who, although his conduct is bad, is blameless in his religion, inasmuch as by that miraculous act he confirms the truth of the Apostle and manifests the grace of God vouchsafed to him and does not attribute the act in question to his own power. One who speaks the truth, without evidence, in the fundamental matter of faith (ímán), will always speak the truth, with evidence and firm belief, in the matter of saintship, because his belief is of the same quality as the belief of the saint; and though his actions do not square with his belief, his claim of saintship is not demonstrably contradicted by his evil conduct, any more than his claim of faith could be. In fact, miracles (karámát) and saintship are Divine gifts, not things acquired by Man, so that human actions (kasb) cannot become the cause of Divine guidance.
I have already said that the saints are not preserved from sin (ma`ṣúm), for sinlessness belongs to the prophets, but they are protected (maḥfúẕ) from any evil that involves the denial of their saintship; and the denial of saintship, after it has come into being, depends on something inconsistent with faith, namely, apostasy (riddat): it does not depend on sin. This is the doctrine of Muḥammad b. `Alí Ḥakím of Tirmidh, and also of Junayd, Abu ´l-Ḥasan Núrí, Ḥárith Muḥásibí, and many other mystics (ahl-i ḥaqá´iq). But those who attach importance to conduct (ahl-i mu`ámalát), like Sahl b. `Abdalláh of Tustar, Abú Sulaymán Dárání, Ḥamdún Qaṣṣár, and others, maintain that saintship involves unceasing obedience (ṭá`at), and that when a great sin (kabíra) occurs to the mind of a saint he is deposed from his saintship. Now, as I have stated before, there is a consensus of opinion (ijmá`) among Moslems that a great sin does not put anyone outside the pale of faith; and one saintship (wiláyat) is no better than another. Therefore, since the saintship of knowledge of God (ma`rifat), which is the foundation of all miracles vouchsafed by Divine grace (karámathá), is not lost through sin, it is impossible that what is inferior to that in excellence and grace (karámat) should disappear because of sin. The controversy among the Shaykhs on this matter has run to great length, and I do not intend to record it here.