Very soon after the United States declared war against the Central Powers, a commission was sent abroad to study the various phases of warfare as carried on by the Allies, and as far as possible by the enemy. Certain members of this commission gave attention to chemical warfare. One of those who did this was Professor Hulett of Princeton University. He, with certain General Staff officers, gathered what information they could in England and France concerning the gases used and methods of manufacturing them, and to a very slight extent the methods of projecting those gases upon the enemy. Some attention was paid to gas masks, but there being nobody on the General Staff, or anywhere else in the Regular Army, whose duty it was to look out particularly for chemical warfare materials, these studies produced no results.
As has already been stated, the Medical Department started the manufacture of masks, and the Bureau of Mines, under the leadership of the Director, Mr. Manning, began studies upon poisonous gases and the methods of manufacturing them just before or shortly after war was declared.
Nevertheless, although American troops left for France in May, 1917, it was not until the end of August—the 17th to be exact—that definite action was taken toward establishing a Chemical Warfare Service, or, as it was then known, a Gas Service in the American Expeditionary Forces. On that date a cablegram was sent to the United States to the effect that it was desired to make Lieut. Col. Amos A. Fries, Corps of Engineers, Chief of the Gas Service, and requesting that no assignments to the regiment of gas troops authorized in the United States be made which would conflict with this appointment. On August 22d, Lieut. Col. Fries entered upon his duties as Chief of the Gas Service.
There were then in France about 30 miles from the German lines, some 12,000 American troops without any gas masks or training whatever in Chemical Warfare. Immediate steps were taken to teach the wearing of the masks, and English and French gas masks were obtained for them at the earliest possible moment. At the same time efforts were made to obtain officer personnel for the C. W. S., and to have sent to France a laboratory for making such emergency researches, experiments, and testing as might become necessary. From that time to the end of the war the C. W. S. continued to develop on broad lines covering research, development, and manufacture; the filling of shell and other containers with poisonous gases, smoke and incendiary materials; the purchase of gas masks and other protective devices, as well as the handling and supply of these materials in the field; the training of the Army in chemical warfare methods, both in offense and defense; and the organization, equipment and operation of special gas troops.
This gave an ideal organization whereby research was linked with the closest possible ties to the firing line, and where the necessities of the firing line were brought home to the supply and manufacturing branches and to the development and research elements of the Service instantly and with a force that could not have been obtained in any other manner. The success of the C. W. S. in the field and at home was due to this complete organization. To the Commander-in-Chief, General Pershing, is due the credit for authorizing this organization and for backing it up whenever occasion demanded. Other details of this work will be considered under the following heads: Administrative; Training; Chemical Warfare Troops; Supply; Technical; Intelligence; and Medical.
Administrative Duties
The duties of administration covered those necessary for a general control of research, of supply, of training, and the operation of special gas troops. At first the Chief of the Gas Service comprised the whole of the Service since he was without personnel, material, rules, regulations, or anything else of a chemical warfare nature.
The experience in getting together this organization should be sufficient to insure that the United States will never place on any other man’s shoulders the burden of organizing a new and powerful service in the midst of war, 4,000 miles from home, without precedent, material, or anything else on which to base action. It is true the Americans had available the experience of the English and the French, and it should be said to the credit of both of these nations that they gave of their experience, their time, and their material with the greatest freedom and willingness, but just as Americans are Americans and were Americans in 1917, just so the methods of the French and English or of the enemy were not entirely suitable to American conditions.
If there is any one thing needed in the training of U. S. Army leaders of today and for the future, it is vision—vision that can foresee the size of a conflict and make preparations accordingly. We do not mean vision that will order, as happened in some cases, ten times as much material as could possibly be used by even 5,000,000 troops, but the sort of vision that could foresee in the fall of 1917 that 2,000,000 men might be needed in France and then make preparations to get materials there for those troops by the time they arrived.
In order to cover the early formative period of the C. W. S. in France and to show some of the difficulties encountered, the following running account is given of some of the early happenings without regard to the subdivisions under which they might properly be considered.