Fig. 14.—Receiving and Transmitting Data
for Firing Gas Shell while Wearing Gas Masks.
Battlefield of the Argonne, October, 1918.
No Equipment for Gas Troops. About the first of December a cablegram was received from the United States stating that due to lack of equipment the various regiments of special engineers recently authorized, including the 30th (Gas and Flame) would not be organized until the spring of 1918. An urgent cablegram was then sent calling attention to the fact that gas troops were not service of supply troops but first line fighting troops, and consequently that they should be raised and trained in time to take the field with the first Americans going into the line. At this same time the 30th regiment was given early priority by the General Staff, A. E. F., on the priority lists for troop shipments from the United States. The raising of the first two companies was then continued under Colonel Atkisson at the American University in Washington.
About January 15 word was received that the Headquarters of the regiment and the Headquarters of the First Battalion together with Companies A and B of the 30th Engineers (later the First Gas Regiment) were expected to arrive very soon. Some months prior General Foulkes, Chief of the British Gas Service in the field, had stated that he would be glad to have the gas troops assigned to him for training. It was agreed that the training should include operations in the front line for a time to enable the American Gas Troops to carry on gas operations independently of anyone else and with entire safety to themselves and the rest of the Army.
Due to the fact that the British were occupying their gas school, the British General Headquarters were a little reluctant to take the American troops Feb. 1. However, General Foulkes made room for the American troops by moving his own troops out. He then placed his best officers in charge of their training and at all times did everything in his power to help the American Gas Troops learn the gas game and get sufficient supplies to operate with. Colonel Hartley, Assistant to General Foulkes, also did everything he could to help the American Gas Service. These two officers did more than any other foreign officers in France to enable the Chemical Warfare Service to make the success it did.
Second Battle of the Marne. The Chief of the Gas Service, following a visit to the British Gas Headquarters, and the Headquarters of the American 2d Corps then operating with the British, arrived on the evening of July 17, 1918, at 1st Corps Headquarters at La Ferte sous Jouarre about 10 miles southeast of Château-Thierry.
Two companies of the First Gas Regiment would have been ready in 48 hours to put off a projector attack against an excellent target just west of Belleau Wood had not the 2d battle of the Marne opened when it did. It is said that General Foch had kept this special attack so secret that the First American Corps Commander knew it less than 48 hours prior to the hour set for its beginning. Certainly the Chief of the Gas Service knew nothing of it until about 9:00 p.m., the night of July 17th. Consequently the gas attack was not made. At that time so little was known of the usefulness of gas troops that they were started on road work. At Colonel Atkisson’s suggestion that gas troops could clean out machine gun nests, he was asked to visit the First Corps headquarters and take up his suggestion vigorously with the First Corps Staff.
Attacking Machine Gun Nests. Thereupon the Gas troops were allowed to try attacking machine gun nests with phosphorus and thermite. This work proved so satisfactory that not long afterwards the General Staff authorized an increase in gas troops from 18 companies to 54 companies, to be formed into three regiments of two battalions each. The 6 companies in France did excellent work with smoke and thermite during all the second battle of the Marne to the Vesle river, where by means of smoke screens they made possible the crossing of that river and the gaining of a foothold on the north or German side.
With the assembling of American troops in the sector near Verdun in September, 1918, the gas troops were all collected there with the exception of one or two companies and took a very active part in the capture of the St. Mihiel salient. It was at this battle that the Chemical Warfare Service really began to handle offensive gas operations in the way they should be handled. Plans were drawn for the use of gas and smoke by artillery and gas troops both. The use of high explosives in Liven’s bombs was also planned. Those plans were properly co-ordinated with all the other arms of the service in making the attack. Gas was to be used not alone by gas troops but by the artillery. Plans were made so that the different kinds of gases would be used where they would do the most good. While these plans and their execution were far from perfect, they marked a tremendous advance and demonstrated to everyone the possibilities that lay in gas and smoke both with artillery and with gas troops.
Following the attack on the St. Mihiel salient, came the battle of the Argonne, where plans were drawn as before, using the added knowledge gained at St. Mihiel. The work was accordingly more satisfactory. However, the attempt to cover the entire American front of nine divisions with only six companies proved too great a task. Practically all gas troops were put in the front line the morning of the attack. Due to weather conditions they used mostly phosphorus and thermite with 4 inch Stokes’ mortars. Having learned how useful these were in taking machine gun nests, plans were made to have them keep right up with the Infantry. This they did in a remarkable manner considering the weight of the Stokes’ mortar and the base plates and also that each Stokes’ mortar bomb weighed about 25 pounds. There were cases where they carried these mortars and bombs for miles on their backs, while in other cases they used pack animals.