Chemical warfare

by Amos A. Fries; Clarence J. West

Finally about March 1, in accordance with the strong recommendations of these men, Fries reported to General Pershing in person that the manufacture of gas as well as the filling of shell in France was inadvisable from every point of view and accordingly he recommended that gas manufacture and shell filling in France be given up. General Pershing strongly approved the recommendation and a cablegram was at once sent to the United States to that effect. The main reason for this action was the lack of chlorine, since chlorine was the principal ingredient of nearly all poisonous gases then in use. Chlorine takes, besides salt, electric power and lots of it. Electric power requires coal or water power. Neither of the latter sources were available in France. This question was gone into very thoroughly. The only place where power might have been developed was in a remote spot near Spain, and the outlook there was such that it appeared impossible to begin the manufacture of chlorine under two years. On the other hand the shipment of chlorine from the United States required from 75 per cent to 100 per cent of the tonnage required to ship the manufactured gases themselves, to say nothing of the labor, raw materials, and the machinery that would have had to be shipped in order to manufacture gas in France.

Mustard Gas. As previously stated Mustard Gas was first used by the Germans against the British at Ypres on the nights of July 11 and 12, 1917. It was not used much against the French until more than two months later. Indeed, gas was never used by the Germans to the same extent against the French as against the English. There are probably two reasons for this; first, the Germans had a deeper hatred for the British than the French; second, the British morale was higher than the French in 1917, and the German thought that if he could break down this British morale, he could win the war.

The first attack came as a surprise and accordingly got an unusually large number of casualties. As previously stated the casualties numbered about 20,000 in about six weeks. This number was considered so serious that the beginning of the series of attacks against Ypres in the fall of 1917, was delayed by the British for 10 days or two weeks until they could study better how to avoid such great losses from mustard gas. While the composition of the gas was known within two or three days, as well as the laboratory method by which it was first manufactured by Victor Meyer in 1886, it took some 11 months to develop reliable and practical methods of manufacturing it on a large scale. The Inter-allied Gas Conference in September, 1917, gave a great deal of attention to mustard gas and methods of combating it both from the view point of prevention and of curing those gassed by it.

Just following the close of that conference a cable was sent to the United States asking the possibility of manufacturing ethylene chlorhydrin, the principal element in the manufacture of mustard gas by the only process then known. Later, that is about the middle of October, a cablegram was sent urging investigation into the manufacture of this gas. It is believed a great deal of time might have been saved had the policy of undue secrecy not been adopted by the British and others before the Americans entered the war. In fact we were only told in whispers the formula for mustard gas, and where a description of it could be found in German chemistries. This was arrant nonsense since if the Germans had gotten all mustard gas information then in the hands of the British they would have received far less information than they already possessed on mustard gas.

Fig. 17.—“Who Said Gas?”

Whether the information sent to the United States on mustard gas ultimately proved of any great value is an open question since the methods adopted in the United States were very greatly superior to those used in England and in France. It probably helped by suggestion rather than by actual details of design. Anyhow it all emphasizes the difficulties encountered in war when so vital a substance as mustard gas must be investigated after the enemy has begun using it on a large scale.

Delay of British Masks. As December 1 approached, and as nothing further had been heard of the order for 300,000 British Respirators placed about the middle of October, a telegram was sent to England asking if deliveries would be made as required in the order for the masks. This order required the first 75,000 to be delivered December 1, 1917. In reply it was stated that the British could not furnish these masks, and that they understood that the Americans were just beginning a large output of masks in the United States. An exchange of cablegrams with the United States showed that no masks could be expected from there for 3 to 5 months. Moreover it became increasingly evident that the Americans were going into the battle line sooner than at first contemplated. Another cablegram was then sent to England urging the delivery of these masks. The reply was to the effect that the English Government could not deliver the masks because they did not have enough for their own use. This situation was very serious. Unless the order for 300,000 masks placed with the British could be filled, we were facing the necessity of sending American troops into the front line with only the French M-2 mask. While the M-2 mask was then the only mask used by the French, it was well known to afford practically no protection against the high concentrations of phosgene obtained from cloud or projector attacks. And it was just such attacks as these that our men would encounter in the front line during training. Accordingly arrangements were made for a hurried trip to England.

Colonel Harrison of the British Royal Engineers was in charge of the British manufacture of masks and it is desired here to express appreciation of his uniform courtesy and great helpfulness. He exhibited their methods and facilities and assured us they could meet any requirements of ours for masks up to a half million, or even more if necessary, provided they were given time to establish additional facilities. Finally after a further exchange of cables the masks were obtained.

During December, 1917 and January, 1918, when every effort was being made to hurry a lot of masks from Havre—Havre being the British supply base in France from which the masks were issued to the United States, the severe cold and snow had so disorganized French traffic that it was extremely difficult to get cars moving at all. In an effort to get the masks, priority of shipment was obtained and two or three officers were assigned to convoy the cars. Notwithstanding convoying, one carload of 4,000 masks, mainly threes and fours, became lost and only turned up five weeks later. To make matters worse the British were sending us very many more of the small sized No. 2 masks than we could use. The loss of this carload of 4,000 number threes and fours was all but a tragedy. Indeed, in order to get the First Brigade of the First Division equipped in time it was necessary to take a large number of masks already issued to men of the Second Brigade. These masks were first thoroughly washed and disinfected and then re-issued.