I note that it has been believed by many that the motives of Russia in proposing this conference were none too good,—indeed, that they were possibly perfidious; but, even if this be granted, how does this affect the conduct of Germany? Should it not rather lead Germany to go forward boldly and thoughtfully, to accept the championship of the idea of arbitration, and to take the lead in the whole business here?

Germany, if she will do this, will certainly stand before the whole world as the leading power of Europe; for she can then say to the whole world that she has taken the proposal of Russia au serieux; has supported a thoroughly good plan of arbitration; has done what Russia and France have not been willing to do,—favored the presentation to the conference of a plan providing for the immunity of private property from seizure on the high seas during war,—and that while, as regards the proceedings of the conference, Russia has wished secrecy, Germany has steadily, from the first, promoted frankness and openness.

With these three points in your favor, you can stand before the whole world as the great Continental power which has stood up f or peace as neither Russia nor France has been able to do. On the other hand, if you do not do this, if you put a stumbling-block in the way of arbitration, what results? The other powers will go on and create as good a tribunal as possible, and whatever failure may come will be imputed to Germany and to its Emperor. In any case, whether failure or success may come, the Emperor of Russia will be hailed in all parts of the world as a deliverer and, virtually, as a saint, while there will be a wide-spread outburst of hatred against the German Emperor.

And this will come not alone from the anti-social forces which are hoping that the conference may fail, in order that thereby they may have a new weapon in their hands, but it will also come from the middle and substantial classes of other nations.

It is sure to make the relations between Germany and the United States, which have been of late improving infinitely more bitter than they have ever before been and it is no less sure to provoke the most bitter hatred of the German monarchy in nearly all other nations.

Should his advisers permit so noble and so gifted a sovereign to incur this political storm of obloquy, this convergence of hatred upon him? Should a ruler of such noble ambitions and such admirable powers be exposed to this? I fully believe that he should not, and that his advisers should beg him not to place himself before the world as the antagonist of a plan to which millions upon millions in all parts of the world are devoted.

From the United States come evidences of a feeling wide-spread and deep on this subject beyond anything I have ever known. This very morning I received a prayer set forth by the most conservative of all Protestant religious bodies—namely, the American branch of the Anglican Church—to be said in all churches, begging the Almighty to favor the work of the peace conference; and this is what is going on in various other American churches, and in vast numbers of households. Something of the same sort is true in Great Britain and, perhaps in many parts of the Continent.

Granted that expectations are overwrought, still this fact indicates that here is a feeling which cannot be disregarded.

Moreover, to my certain knowledge, within a month, a leading socialist in France has boasted to one of the members of this conference that it would end in failure; that the monarchs and governments of Europe do not wish to diminish bloodshed; that they would refuse to yield to the desire of the peoples for peace, and that by the resentment thus aroused a new path to victory would be open to socialism.

Grant, too, that this is overstated, still such a declaration is significant.