The matter thus seemed to be settled, but it really was not. For, in the first place, all that the Princess Louise, niece to Christian VIII. and wife of Christian of Glucksburg, could surrender to any one was her right to the succession in Denmark (and possibly in Schleswig); she had no right whatever to the succession in Holstein, because that could only pass to male heirs. Secondly, it was highly questionable in law whether the Princess could execute a valid renunciation of her rights in favour of one who did not stand next in the order of succession to herself, without the consent of those whose right intervened between her and him; but no such consent was ever obtained. Thirdly, the Duke of Augustenburg might with some reason allege that his abandonment of his rights was not made freely, but under compulsion, or else one of his sons (as actually happened) might declare that his father's act did not bind him. Fourthly, even supposing the renunciation of the Duke of Augustenburg and his family to be persevered in, there were other Princes of the Sonderburg line whose rights, at any rate to the Holstein succession, were prior to that of Prince Christian, and who had not renounced those rights. Fifthly, and chiefly, the German Confederation was not a party to the Treaty of London; it was therefore free to resist the arrangement it contained, if it considered the interests of Holstein and the Bund to require it.
Yet, after all, the arrangements provided by the Treaty of London would probably have resulted in a solid settlement, had not the relations between the Danish Government and the German population of the Duchies, during the eleven years following the Treaty of London, become strained and embittered to a dangerous extent. For this result Denmark was chiefly responsible, and it was in flagrant breach of the Treaty of London, by which Denmark was pledged to observe the ancient rights of the Duchies. The majority in the Rigsraad was largely influenced by the views of the Eider Dane party, a set of politicians fanatically bent upon the elevation and extension of the Scandinavian nationality. This party, unable to expel from their minds the feelings of animosity which the war had engendered, regarded the German inhabitants of the Duchies as the population of a conquered country, and resolved, so far as they dared, and in spite of the engagements by which their King was bound to Austria and Prussia, to make them feel and taste their subjection. The protective Danish tariff was extended to both Duchies, their revenue appropriated to the interests of the kingdom; their military establishment, hitherto kept separate from the Danish forces, was incorporated in that army. The best offices in Schleswig were given to Danes. In the churches and schools of Schleswig the Danish language was substituted for the German, even in districts where not one in twenty understood a word of Danish, and the inhabitants were prohibited from employing private German teachers in their families. It is therefore abundantly clear that the engagement, by which Denmark had pledged her word to Austria and Prussia that "the German and Danish nationalities in Schleswig should meet with equal protection," was not kept. Nor can it be reasonably doubted that the engagement—"That all ties of a non-political kind between Holstein and Schleswig should remain intact"—was not faithfully observed. But, in point of form, it was not the breach of either of these engagements, but that of a third, binding Denmark to submit the common Constitution of the monarchy to the previous examination of the four local Diets, which led directly to the Federal execution and all its momentous consequences. The sequence of events was as follows:—A common Constitution for the monarchy was framed in 1854, and having passed the Danish Parliament, was published by Royal Ordinance (October 2nd, 1855), for the Duchies of Holstein, Schleswig, and Lauenburg, without any previous consultation of their Diets. The matter was taken up by the German Federal Diet, which, in 1858, declared that by Federal law the common Constitution proclaimed in 1855 was illegal, so far as Holstein and Lauenburg were concerned, because it had not been assented to by the Legislatures of these States, and decreed a Federal execution in Holstein in case of the non-abrogation of that Constitution. After many endeavours to evade compliance, Denmark (November, 1858) did abrogate the common Constitution, so far as Holstein and Schleswig were concerned. The execution was accordingly stayed (1860), but on the understanding that the king and his Holstein subjects would in concert frame some arrangement by which, in a manner acceptable to them and to the Diet, Holstein might participate in the common Constitution. But on the 30th of March, 1863, the king published, of his own mere motion, a proclamation fixing the future position of Holstein in the monarchy. The ruling idea of this proclamation was, that since Holstein would not come in to the common Constitution on Denmark's terms, and since it was backed up by the Bund in this resolve, it must be allowed to remain outside; while, as between Denmark and Schleswig, the common Constitution of 1855 should still be maintained. The most important clause was this: That, as regarded the common affairs of the monarchy, the legislative power should be exercised by the king and the Holstein Diet conjointly. The effect of the proclamation was—or would have been—the severance of the Danish monarchy into two distinct groups, united by the personal nexus only—the line of intersection falling between Holstein and Schleswig. When this proclamation became known in Germany, it aroused a strenuous spirit of opposition. The Diet, in July, demanded the retractation of the Ordinance of March 30th, and on the Danish Government's refusal to comply, decreed that Federal execution should take place with the due forms. So far from attempting to appease the rising wrath of Germany, the Danish Government made matters worse by issuing (November 18th) a new Constitution for Denmark and Schleswig, intended to complete the scheme of government which the Patent of March 30th had commenced.
On the 7th of December the Diet voted for immediate execution, and entrusted the fulfilment of its mandate to Saxon and Hanoverian troops. Denmark then withdrew the Ordinance of March 30th; but the excitement in Germany had by this time risen to such a point that the execution could no longer be stayed, though its character was somewhat altered. The Danish troops quietly marched out of every town of Holstein just before the Germans marched in. In most places the Danish arms were then taken down, and the Schleswig-Holstein tricolour was hoisted; but the execution was completed without bloodshed, and on the last day of the year the troops of the Bund were facing the Danes along the line of the Eider.
It is now time to ask what part Britain had been taking in the transactions and negotiations that had resulted in so grave a complication. In September, 1862, Lord Russell had proposed, with reference to the dispute between the Bund and Denmark as to the common Constitution, that the schedule of "common affairs" should be greatly curtailed, and that a large part of what had been hitherto deemed such should be placed within the legislative competence of the local Diets. This proposal Denmark had rejected, on the ground that its adoption must inevitably lead either to anarchy or to a return to arbitrary government. Again, in July, 1863, some days after the decree of the Bund ordering execution in Holstein, Lord Palmerston, then Prime Minister, had declared, in his place in Parliament, with reference to the proceedings of the German Powers, that (in certain circumstances) "it would not be with Denmark alone they would have to contend." This public declaration inspired the Danes with a firm confidence that England would come to their assistance in case of need, and doubtless made them resist the demands of Germany more obstinately. The despatches of Lord Russell to Lord Bloomfield at Vienna (July 31st) and to Sir Alexander Malet at Frankfort (September 29th) assume a high—almost a menacing—tone. Taught, however, by their experience of British intervention in favour of Poland, German diplomatists were not disturbed by the vehemence of tone that characterised the despatches from the British Foreign Office. Baron von der Pfordten, the Bavarian Envoy to the Diet, told Sir Alexander Malet one day that "he looked on Earl Russell's despatches as so much waste paper." Still the greater German Powers thought it expedient to proceed with caution; and as Lord Russell, in a Memorandum dated November 24th, 1863, had said that "should it appear that Federal troops had entered the Duchy on international grounds, her Majesty's Government might be obliged to interfere," Austria and Prussia persuaded the Diet to proceed by way of execution, and not, as Bavaria and other States would have wished, by way of "prise de possession"—a formally hostile and therefore international act. Up to the end of 1863, then, although British remonstrances had not met with much attention, the general policy of Great Britain in regard to Denmark had not suffered a defeat.
LORD PALMERSTON. (From a Photograph by Fradelle & Young.)
But even before the execution an event had occurred that aggravated tenfold the difficulties of the situation. Frederic VII., King of Denmark, died suddenly on November 15, 1863. On the next day Prince Frederic of Augustenburg, son of a Duke of Augustenburg who had accepted a sum of money for his forfeited estates from Denmark in 1852, and agreed not to oppose the new succession, issued a proclamation, addressed to the "Schleswig-Holsteiners," in which he claimed the succession to both Duchies. The minor States of Germany were inclined to support him; for an independent German State of Schleswig-Holstein would have been an accession of strength to their party in the Diet, and helped them to stand their ground against their two great overbearing confederates, Austria and Prussia. But by this time Count Bismarck, whose one guiding thought was the aggrandisement of the Prussian monarchy out of all these complications, had decided upon his policy. For some months in 1863 the minor States had carried matters their own way; and Baron von der Pfordten, the Bavarian envoy, the ablest exponent of their policy, was for a time the most powerful man in Germany. But now Bismarck, having secured the cordial support of Austria by guaranteeing, on the part of Prussia, the integrity of her possessions, proceeded to take the initiative. On the 28th of December Prussia and Austria proposed to the Diet that since the new Danish Constitution of the 18th of November amounted to a distinct violation of the pledge given in 1851-2, not to incorporate Schleswig with Denmark, nor to take any steps leading thereto, the Diet should, upon international grounds, order the military occupation of Schleswig, as a material pledge for the fulfilment by Denmark of her engagements. Bismarck had probably satisfied himself that no opposition of a material kind would be offered by England in any circumstances; or else, now that Prussia was firmly allied with Austria, he did not fear such opposition. No action was taken by the Diet on this proposal for the moment, and a few days afterwards it was renewed with greater urgency by the two Governments, on the ground that the 1st of January, 1864, was the day on which the new Constitution was fixed to come into force. The minor States had different views; they wished first to get Duke Frederic firmly enthroned in Holstein, after which they would have proceeded quietly to take up the question of Schleswig. When the proposal came to be voted upon in the Diet (January 14, 1864), a combination of the minor States rejected it by a majority of 11 to 5. The representatives of Austria and Prussia then informed the Diet that their Governments intended to carry out the proposal in spite of the adverse vote.
Yielding to the advice of Lord Russell, the Danes had offered no resistance to the execution; but when—probably after hearing of the proposal made to the Diet by Austria and Prussia on the 28th of December—the Foreign Secretary sent Lord Wodehouse to Copenhagen to induce the Danish Government to revoke the Constitution of the 18th of November, the mission was ineffectual. In a despatch of the 31st of December Lord Russell proposed to the Diet that a conference of representatives of the Powers who signed the Treaty of London, together with a representative of the Bund, should meet and take into their consideration the points in dispute between Denmark and Germany; and that in the meantime, and until the conference had finished its labours, the status quo should be maintained. The proposal was received with cold disapproval by most of the members of the Diet, and Sir Alexander Malet wrote, a few days afterwards (January 8th, 1864), "there is an absolute persuasion that England will not interfere materially, and our counsels, regarded as unfriendly, have no weight."
Prussia and Austria, having announced their intention of acting independently of the Diet, carried out their plans with energy and celerity. The Danes saw the gathering storm, yet made no sign of yielding. The truth is, Denmark reckoned with tolerable confidence on receiving material aid from the Western Powers, particularly from England; and this hope was encouraged by the knowledge that Earl Russell was indefatigable in writing to, and sounding the intentions of, nearly every Court in Europe, and that in a despatch to Paris he had spoken of "material assistance" to Denmark to prevent her dismemberment. The Danes also placed considerable reliance on the strength of the Dannewerke, an immense system of earthworks, strengthened by forts, but it was carried on the 5th of February. Retreating northwards, the Danes concentrated under the guns of the fortress of Fredericia, on the borders of Schleswig and Jutland, and behind the lines of Düppel, which command the approach to the island of Alsen. On the 7th of February Wrangel, commander of the Austro-Prussian army, issued a proclamation announcing that Austrian and Prussian commissioners would administer the civil government of Schleswig, and ordered that the German language should be thenceforth used in all branches of the administration. The fortified lines of Düppel were stubbornly defended by the Danes, and their gradual reduction was not effected without severe loss to the assailants. On the 18th of April the last remaining bastions were stormed, and the Prussians became masters of the place. The main body of the Danish army, or rather garrison, retreated into Jutland, leaving a pretty strong force to occupy Alsen. Fredericia, which had been expected to offer a serious resistance, was evacuated soon after the fall of Düppel, the garrison crossing over into Fünen. The Prussians, satisfied with having taken Düppel, made for the present no attempt upon Alsen, and there was a pause in the strife.
The only expedient which seems to have occurred to Earl Russell was to write (February 10th) to Berlin, urging that the belligerents—the war having lasted exactly ten days—should agree to an armistice! The request was, it need hardly be added, ineffectual. But now the Danish Government took measures formally to remind Lord Russell of the obligations under which England lay. M. Torben Bille, the Danish Minister in London, in a despatch, dated February 11th, 1864, stated that his Government indulged the hope that Earl Russell appreciated the steps which Denmark had taken with a view to the maintenance of peace, seeing that these steps had been taken by the Danish Government on the pressing advice of the Cabinet of London; that, however, the pacific desires of Denmark had been frustrated by the ambition of Austria and Prussia, and war had actually broken out; that in this war Denmark, if unaided, must eventually be crushed by the overwhelming numerical superiority of her opponents; that it was necessary, therefore, that, while there was yet time, the Powers friendly to Denmark should come to her aid, "and among those Powers there is none which the Danish Government address with more confidence than England." This was a categorical request, and the chilling reply which it elicited from Lord Russell must have been a bitter mortification to the overmatched and harassed Danes. After admitting generally that Denmark had followed the advice of the British Government, without which that Government "could not have given even its good offices to Denmark to prevent, if possible, the outbreak of hostilities," Lord Russell remarked that, as to "the request that friendly Powers should come to the assistance of Denmark, her Majesty's Government could only say that every step they might think it right to take in the further progress of this unhappy contest could only be taken after full consideration and communication with France and Russia." Such a reply plainly foreshadowed that Great Britain did not intend to fulfil her engagements if other Powers did not fulfil theirs.