Still there can be no doubt that Government felt a real reluctance to abandon Denmark to its fate; and if France had shown any zeal in the matter, it seems not improbable that intervention would have gone the length of material assistance. But the French Emperor had been not a little mortified by Lord Russell's abrupt and decided rejection of his proposal for a general Congress of Powers, made in the autumn of 1863. That proposal, starting from the assumption that the Treaties of 1815 were "upon almost all points destroyed, modified, misunderstood, or menaced," urged the expediency of a joint endeavour, on the part of the nations of Europe, "to regulate the present and secure the future in a Congress." No other European Power, great or small, had absolutely rejected the Emperor's proposal; most had assented to it on the condition of a previous definition of the subjects that should be laid before the Congress; but Lord Russell's unconditional refusal had caused the scheme to fall through. The feeling of mortification thence arising in the mind of the French Emperor led him to view the diplomatic efforts of Great Britain on behalf of Denmark with coldness, and her proposal for a limited Conference on Danish affairs with little favour. Still France, like Great Britain, was bound by the Treaty of 1720, and the fidelity of the Danes to the first Napoleon, and the sufferings which they had undergone in his cause, constituted a moral claim that ought not to have been lightly disregarded. But the Emperor was also deeply mortified by the refusal of Great Britain to interfere on behalf of Poland; accordingly, when Lord Clarendon went to Paris, he was informed, without much circumlocution, that France did not intend to stir in the matter of assisting the helpless Danes.
It may, however, be questioned whether, considering the small number of troops that England could bring into the field, there was any chance of a material intervention being successful in the face of the numerous battalions of two great military monarchies. Had both Austria and Prussia entered into the design of despoiling Denmark with equal heartiness, it may be admitted that material intervention on our part, though it might have retarded, would not have prevented, the catastrophe. But this was not the case; the Austrian Government was acting in the matter rather from a jealous disinclination to allow Prussia to take the lead and decide by herself questions in which German feeling was so deeply engaged, than because it desired to turn Denmark out of a Duchy which had been linked to it for 800 years. It is also nearly certain that Russia and Sweden, whose people sided most warmly with Denmark, would have immediately joined us had we resolved upon giving material aid. Both Russell and Palmerston wished to risk the chance, but their colleagues declined to countenance the step. Accordingly no action was attempted, though Palmerston made what he called "a notch off his own bat" by informing the Austrian Minister, Count Apponyi, that if the Austrian fleet sailed along the British coast and went to the assistance of the Prussians in the Baltic, he, for one, would not endure such an affront. Even this threat produced a strenuous remonstrance from Lord Granville.
The exertions of the Foreign Secretary to procure the consent of the belligerents and other great Powers to a Conference were at last crowned with a certain measure of success. Austria and Prussia agreed to the Conference but without an armistice. The first meeting was held on the 25th of April, and the prime immediate object of the plenipotentiaries of the non-belligerent Powers was to obtain a suspension of hostilities. Denmark at first insisted that during the armistice her fleets should be allowed to maintain the blockade of the German ports, as an equivalent for the military occupation of the Duchies; but to this the German Powers would not consent. Ultimately Denmark, pressed by Lord Russell, consented to give up the blockade, and an armistice was arranged to last from the 12th of May to the 12th of June. It is painful to trace the course of the negotiations that followed, and their complete futility may dispense us from the task of doing so at any considerable length. It soon became clear that the German Powers deemed the Treaty of 1852 to have been cancelled by the outbreak of war, and the envoy of the Diet declared that Germany would not consent to the re-union of the Duchies to Denmark under any conditions whatever. Austria and Prussia proposed that Schleswig and Holstein should form an independent single State, under the sovereignty of Prince Frederick of Augustenburg; but such a solution the Danish Plenipotentiaries declared to be wholly inadmissible. Lord Russell then brought forward the English proposal, which was that Holstein, Lauenburg, and the southern part of Schleswig, as far as the Schlei and the line of the Dannewerke, should be separated from the Danish monarchy. This arrangement, to the principle of which the Danish Plenipotentiaries acceded, would have left Denmark in possession of about three-fourths of the Duchy of Schleswig. The negotiations being now placed upon the basis of a partition of territory, the neutral Powers obtained with great difficulty the extension of the armistice from the 12th to the 26th of June. Austria and Prussia agreed to a partition, but insisted that the line of demarcation should be traced from Apenrade to Tondern, thus leaving less than half of the Duchy to Denmark, and depriving her of the purely Danish island of Alsen. Denmark would not yield this, and Prussia and Austria would concede no more. On the 18th of June, eight days before the expiration of the armistice, Lord Russell proposed that the question of boundary should be referred to the arbitration of a friendly Power, but to this neither belligerent would consent. Finally, the French Plenipotentiary proposed that the method of plébiscite, or popular vote, should be resorted to, and that the votes of the communes in Schleswig should be taken on the question whether they preferred continued union with Denmark or separation. The Danish Envoy, M. de Quaade, positively negatived this proposal, which was also extremely unpleasing to Austria, in whose Italian dominions the application of the principle of the plébiscite would have instantly terminated her rule. Thus the debates of the Conference came to an end, having produced no result.
The remainder of this melancholy history may be told in a few words. Hostilities recommenced, and on the 29th of June the Prussians forced their way across the narrow sound which divides the island of Alsen from the mainland, and stormed with great gallantry the fieldworks that had been thrown up on the opposite shore. The Prussians carried the position, but the greater part of the Danes made good their escape out of the island. The strong fortress of Fredericia had previously been abandoned; the Prussians were preparing to cross to Fünen; and now nothing remained for the Danes, isolated as they were and without hope of aid, but to submit. Negotiations were opened immediately at Vienna, and on the 1st of August the preliminaries of peace were signed, and embodied in the following October in a formal treaty—the Treaty of Vienna. Denmark ceded Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg, without reserve, to the Emperor of Austria and King of Prussia. Though thus compelled to ratify her own spoliation, the brave little kingdom came out of the struggle with honour, and with an undiminished right to the respect of Europe: it were much to be wished that of all the neutral Powers that looked on and did nothing the same could be said. During the second spell of war Russell made several applications to the Emperor of the French to induce him to interfere in concert with England. At one moment Napoleon wavered, but when Russell discovered that his projects embraced the liberation of Venetia and the conquest of the left bank of the Rhine, he as abruptly withdrew his overtures. Accordingly the war ended in the complete humiliation of British diplomacy. But Prussia declined to surrender the Duchies to the Augustenburg candidate, much to the indignation of the German Diet, and it was clear that another appeal to arms must occur before the spoils could be divided.
THE FIGHT BETWEEN THE "ALABAMA" AND THE "KEARSARGE." (See p. [361].)
Meanwhile, stirring events were in progress in the New World. In Mexico the Archduke Maximilian, having in an evil hour accepted the fatal gift of Napoleon, assumed the Imperial crown, and, aided by French bayonets, proceeded to put down the resistance of the Juarists. But clearly his position was tenable only whilst the expeditionary corps remained, and the American Republic was occupied by its internal dissensions. There, however, the end was in sight, thanks to the overwhelming resources of the North. It is true that the Confederates snatched marked successes in the outlying districts of the vast territory, but in Virginia Grant made good his threat—"I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all the summer," and, though Lee's masterly disposal of his forces thwarted the advance upon Richmond and the capture of Petersburg, the Confederate strength was being rapidly drained. In Western Virginia Grant's subordinate, Sheridan, easily held his own against Early and then proceeded to lay waste the territory. Meanwhile Sherman was executing his famous march into Georgia, by which he cut his way through the heart of the enemy's territory, and divided it in twain by a broad belt of wasted country. His progress was facilitated by the substitution of the rash Hood for the cautious Johnston, and, thanks to the incapacity of that general, Savannah, one of the most important towns in the Confederacy, was Sherman's before the end of the year. The naval transactions comprised an action between the notorious Alabama and the Kearsarge, which resulted in the former being sunk off Cherbourg, while the capture of the Mobile forts closed one of the few harbours still open to blockade-runners. The re-election of President Lincoln for a further term of office showed that the North was not going to blench when the supreme crisis was at hand.
An unpleasant incident occurred in the autumn, which, but for the firm and moderate attitude of Mr. Lincoln, might easily have involved us in a serious difficulty with the United States. A considerable number of Confederate refugees had gradually gathered in Canada, men rendered desperate by the wreck of their property and the misfortunes of their country. Some twenty-five of these men, in the month of October, crossed the border into the State of Vermont, and entering the little town of St. Albans in the dead of night attacked and plundered the bank, shooting dead several of the townspeople, and escaping back into Canada. They were soon arrested by the Canadian authorities and the money was recovered. The case being an important one, it was removed from the jurisdiction of the magistrates of St. John's to that of the Supreme Court at Montreal and a writ of habeas corpus was refused. The American Consul, Mr. Edmonds, was instructed to demand their extradition, but this was refused on legal grounds and an investigation was instituted into the affair under the Ashburton Treaty. In the end Judge Coursol decided that his court had no jurisdiction in the case and ordered the release of the raiders from custody. The Canadian Government wisely resolved that so flagrant a miscarriage of justice should not be permitted; in fact, their law advisers gave it as their opinion that the Judge's decision was bad in law; and accordingly warrants were issued for the reapprehension of the criminals. But the news of the Judge's decision, releasing the raiders, had reached New York before the subsequent conduct of the Canadian Government was announced, and it aroused, not unnaturally, great excitement and indignation. However, in his message to the new Congress (December 6, 1864) Mr. Lincoln expressly stated that the colonial authorities of Canada were not deemed to be internationally unjust or unfriendly towards the United States; but that, on the contrary, there was every reason to expect that, with the approval of the home Government, they would take the necessary measures to prevent new excursions across the border. These anticipations were fully justified by the subsequent conduct of the Canadian Government. A strong force of militia was stationed at various points along the frontier, several of the raiders were arrested under the warrant for their re-apprehension, the Court at Montreal reversed its former decision and declared that it had jurisdiction, those captured were tried anew, and at least one of them was adjudged on the evidence to be guilty of robbery and ordered to be given up to the United States.