Fenianism had its victims in America; in Ireland, as has been seen, its ebullitions were so far bloodless. The day before Christmas-day, which rumour had assigned as the date of a rising, passed off in tranquillity; and the threats and predictions of the national journals were found to be mere waste of words. The conspirators must have been conscious that their proceedings hitherto had been less formidable than ridiculous, and they determined, if they could, to give the authorities some justification for the additional precautions that had been taken.
One of the most strongly marked personalities of the day—that of William Whewell, Master of Trinity College, Cambridge—was taken from English society in the March of this year. Cambridge men all over the world associated for many years their recollections of the University with the well-known form of the Master of Trinity. His towering and stalwart form, flashing eye, strong vibrating voice, the generally menacing and formidable aspect of the man, were external characteristics that deeply impressed every freshman on his arrival, and were never forgotten in after life. Many works on various subjects attested the activity and versatility of his intellect; but it is only those on mathematical and physical problems that possess exceptional value. John Keble, who died at Bournemouth on the 29th of March, in his seventy-fourth year, participated but little in the public life of England. His was not the dignified and conspicuous career of the ecclesiastical luminary of a great city; the press did not circulate the masterpieces of his pulpit eloquence; nor was he a frequenter of missionary or charitable platforms; yet it is probably no exaggeration to say that for thirty years no one man so powerfully influenced the inner life of the Church of England as the vicar of Hursley. The readers of Cardinal Newman's "Apologia" will remember how strikingly this point is brought out by him, how clearly he traces back to the mind of John Keble, rather than to that of any other single man, the germ of the great Tractarian movement, while the "Christian Year" appealed to the devotional necessities of innumerable souls.
CHAPTER XXVII.
THE REIGN OF VICTORIA (continued).
The Schleswig-Holstein Difficulty—Austria favours a Settlement—Bismarck's Terms rejected—His high-handed Proceedings—Convention of Gastein—Bismarck at Biarritz—The Italian Treaty—Question of Disarmament—Fresh Austrian Proposals—Bismarck advocates Federal Reform—La Marmora's Perplexity—He abides by Prussia—Efforts of the Neutral Powers—Failure of the projected Congress—Rupture of the Gastein Convention—The War begins—The rival Strengths—Distribution of the Prussian Armies—Collapse of the Resistance in North Germany—Occupation of Dresden—The Advance of the Prussian Armies—Battle of Küniggrätz—Cession of Venetia—Italian Reverses—The South German Campaign—Occupation of Frankfort—The Defence of Vienna—French Mediation—The Preliminaries of Nikolsburg—Treaty of Prague—Conditions awarded to Bavaria and the Southern States—The Secret Treaties—Their Disclosure—Humiliation of the French Emperor—His pretended Indifference.
WHILE the strife of parties was raging in the lobbies of the House of Commons during the Reform debates of 1866, a warfare of a more decisive kind was in course of preparation in Germany. Its connection with English history, however, being of the slightest, we shall confine ourselves to a brief notice. At the close of 1864 the first symptom of ill-will between the allied Powers that had cut with the sword the Schleswig-Holstein knot made itself apparent. To Austria every day during which the joint occupation was prolonged brought fresh cause of trouble and anxiety. However long she might keep her troops in the duchies, not an acre of soil, she knew well, could ever fall to her share; the expense of the occupation was considerable; and a quarrel with Prussia must instantly, as she clearly foresaw, render her position untenable. Her policy, therefore, was to get the Schleswig-Holstein question settled as soon as possible and settled in the way that would least benefit Prussia, and be most for the advantage of Austria's position in Germany. The Austrian Government thought that they saw their way to such a satisfactory settlement when they observed the continued loyalty and enthusiasm with which the German population of the duchies clung to the Prince whom they regarded as their rightful Duke, and also noted the strength of the desire that animated the Governments of the middle and many of the minor German States to favour the erection of an independent State and disappoint the ambition of Prussia. The Prussian Minister seemed himself to waver in the face of the compact opposition which the disclosure of the designs of Prussia upon the duchies had called forth, though he secured a declaration from the Prussian jurists that the claims of the Augustenburg candidate were invalid. In February, 1865, he sent a despatch to Vienna, in which he expressed the willingness of the King that Schleswig-Holstein should become an independent German State, but upon condition that its military force should be at the disposal of Prussia, and that to the same Power certain fortresses in the duchies, with suitable territory attached to them, should be made over. These proposals were rejected by Count Mensdorff and the German Diet. Bismarck thereupon proceeded to fresh aggressions. Prussia transferred her naval station on the Baltic from Dantzic to Kiel, and declared her intention of fortifying the harbour: the Austrian commissioner protested, and ordered up two Austrian ships of war to Kiel; yet his Government gave way, and Prussia established herself firmly at that important harbour. Bismarck also ejected from Schleswig-Holstein the Prince of Augustenburg. It was clearly seen at Vienna that the plan of joint administration would no longer work: if war was to be staved off, some different modus vivendi must be established in the duchies. But the Minister was moving too fast for his master, accordingly, a meeting was arranged between the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria at Gastein, in Tyrol. Hither came the Sovereigns in August, attended by their chief Ministers; an understanding was speedily arrived at, and the Convention of Gastein was the result.
By this convention, dated August 14th, 1865, it was agreed that the joint occupation should cease; that—although the right of sovereignty of either Power over both duchies, as acquired by the Treaty of Vienna, remained inviolate—Austria should for the future confine her troops and officials to Holstein, and Prussia hers to Schleswig; that the Powers would propose to the Diet to erect Rendsburg into a Federal fortress; that the duchies should join the Zollverein, or German Customs-union; and that the Emperor of Austria should cede to the King of Prussia his sovereign rights over Lauenburg, acquired by the before-cited Treaty of Vienna, in exchange for the sum of 2,500,000 Danish rix-thalers. The Prussian Chambers, the members of which were still for the most part favourable to the Augustenburg claim, disliked this convention, and let it be understood that they would not vote the money required for the purchase of Lauenburg; but the King of Prussia paid the stipulated sum out of his private purse, and the convention was carried into effect without delay, Austrian troops withdrawing from Schleswig, and Prussian troops withdrawing from Holstein. General Manteuffel was appointed Prussian Governor of Schleswig, and Austria placed General von Gablenz in the similar post in Holstein.
Bismarck was still determined on war. One point alone was doubtful and disquieting—what would France do in the event of war breaking out between Prussia and Austria, especially if Italy took part in the contest? Count Bismarck resolved to seek an interview with Napoleon, in order, if possible, to gain some security that France would be neutral. What passed in the interviews between him and Napoleon at Biarritz is variously stated; but the result proved that the success of the Prussian statesman was complete. On his return through Paris, Bismarck saw the Italian Minister, the Chevalier Nigra, and told him that war between Prussia and Austria was inevitable. "He showed himself full of confidence that France would not be hostile to it;" and so deeply had he reflected on all the conditions of the political problem, so keenly did he realise the importance to Prussia of the Italian alliance, in distracting the attention and dividing the forces of Austria, that he playfully said to Nigra that "if Italy did not exist, it would be necessary to invent her." The French Emperor is supposed to have approved of the project of alliance between Prussia and Italy; and it is certain that he looked forward with pleasure to the severance of Venetia from the Austrian Empire as one result of the anticipated war. But how was France to be indemnified if she observed a friendly neutrality? There can be no doubt that Bismarck, in spite of his later denials, held out such hopes of territorial extension for France, either on the side of the Rhine, or in the form of an annexation of Luxemburg or some part of Belgium, to be actively aided by Prussia, as induced the French Emperor to regard the Prussian programme with favour and hopeful anticipation, and readily to give the desired promise of neutrality. Napoleon would the less care to exact a distinct promise from Bismarck in regard to territorial indemnification, because he, like the rest of Europe at the time, did not share in the superb confidence which the negotiator expressed of the ability of Prussia to overpower Austria; he must have reckoned on the war lasting for a considerable time, with mutually exhaustive results, in which case France might play the part of a mediator, and, while performing that dignified office, not lose sight of her own interests in the general re-adjustment.
Step by step, as though by an inevitable destiny, or unalterable concatenation of events, the fatal hour drew on. At the end of March General Govone was in Berlin, charged by the Italian Prime Minister, General La Marmora, with the duty of negotiating a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, with Prussia. That Italy would forego the opportunity which a rupture between Prussia and Austria afforded her of obtaining by force the Venetian territories of the latter Power, was hardly to be expected; for such a chance, once let slip, might never occur again. But to Prussia also the alliance of Italy was of the highest importance. With her vast superiority of population, Austria, could her military force have been wholly concentrated against Prussia, though she might have lost battles, could not have been crushed and compelled to yield; such a consummation was only rendered possible by the division and dilution of her strength necessitated by the attack of Italy upon Venetia. Could even Austria have been content to cede Venetia itself, and take Venetia's money value, she might have rid herself of her Transalpine foe and employed her whole strength in Bohemia. Secret overtures had been made at Vienna by the Italian Premier, in the autumn of 1865, for the cession of Venetia by purchase; but the Emperor conceived his military and ancestral honour to be involved and absolutely rejected the proposal. On April 8th the treaty of alliance between Prussia and Italy was signed at Berlin. Prussia, under it, reserved to herself the right of declaring war within three months, in which case Italy bound herself to attack Austria; but Prussia did not bind herself to declare war in Germany, or to help the Italians on their own ground, if Austria attacked Italy. Each Power bound itself not to make peace separately from the other, and to continue the war till Italy had gained Venetia and Prussia secured a corresponding augmentation of territory in Germany. Already—between March 29th and 31st—orders had been issued for the mobilisation of the whole Prussian army, and the necessary movements were effected with extraordinary celerity. Austria, though she had commenced her preparations earlier, was soon distanced by her opponent, and, when the war broke out, her arrangements were still far from complete. The King of Italy published a decree on the 25th of March, increasing the Italian army by 100,000 men.