For several weeks after the treaty between Prussia and Italy had been signed, continual diplomatic fencing was maintained on the part of the two Governments. First there were criminations and recriminations on the question of priority of armaments. On the 6th of April a note from the Prussian Foreign Office was sent to Vienna, insisting on the magnitude of the Austrian preparations, which could not be adequately accounted for by the alleged apprehension of disturbances in Bohemia, and ending with the declaration that nothing was farther from the views of the King than an offensive war. Yet only two days after this, as we have seen, the alliance was concluded with Italy. Nevertheless, there was a basis of truth in the statement as to the King of Prussia's inclinations: he was, in truth, earnestly, almost superstitiously, averse from being the first to resort to arms; and Bismarck had infinite trouble to bring his royal master up to the point of commencing the war. Accordingly the negotiations were conducted in a conciliatory tone. The real feelings of Count Bismarck we learn from a telegram from Count Barral, the Italian Minister at Berlin, sent on the previous day to the Italian Premier, General La Marmora, and published by the latter in his remarkable work, entitled, "A Little More Light on the Political and Military Events of the Year 1866." Count Barral telegraphed, "The impression of the General [Govone] and myself is, that Bismarck is disappointed by the Austrian proposition, and visibly discouraged by the new pacific phase upon which the conflict is about to enter." But now Count Mensdorff found himself in a difficulty. The attitude of the Italian army on the frontiers of Venetia was believed at Vienna to have grown so menacing that it was impossible for Austria to replace matters on a peace footing in Venetia, short of a positive understanding with Italy similar to that which seemed on the point of being concluded with Prussia. We have the distinct assurance of General La Marmora, in the work just quoted, that at this time Italy had made no concentrations of troops whatever—had, in fact, taken no warlike step of any kind. But he admits that the impression to the contrary which prevailed at Vienna was a bonâ fide one, and accounts for its existence in a very curious manner. It was, he thinks, the British Government—the warm and importunate advocate of European peace—which, misled by reports from English diplomatic agents in Italy, who had imagined some inconsiderable movements of troops that were really directed against brigands to be part of a scheme for concentrating the Italian army near the frontier, had conveyed, of course, with the most friendly intentions, this false information to the Austrian Cabinet. However this may have been, the effect of the erroneous persuasion as to Italian armaments, which Austria had taken up, in overclouding the prospects of peace was soon apparent.
THE BATTLE OF KONIGGRÄTZ. (See p. [427].)
Besides disarmament, two other important subjects were debated in the correspondence between Austria and Prussia in these critical weeks. One related to Schleswig-Holstein, the other to the reform of the Confederation. Anxious to withdraw from her hazardous position in the duchies, but to make her withdrawal in such a way as would augment her popularity with the minor German States, Austria invited the Prussian Government, in a note dated April 26th, to make in the Diet a joint declaration that the two Powers would cede the rights acquired by them under the Treaty of Vienna to that claimant of the sovereignty of the duchies whom the Diet recognised as having a predominant right to the succession. Although some collateral offers, such as that Prussia should have full and permanent possession of certain strategic points in the duchies, at Kiel and elsewhere, were added to the main proposal, in order to make it more palatable to the condominant Power, Count Mensdorff probably expected a refusal, and he was not disappointed. Count Bismarck, in his reply (May 7th), professed in the strongest terms Prussia's intention to adhere faithfully to the Treaty of Vienna and the Gastein Convention, but maintained that by those instruments the intervention of any third party, not excepting the Diet, in the affairs of the duchies was precluded. The note went on to say that Prussia, while repudiating the interference of any third party, was always ready to treat with Austria as to the conditions on which she would be disposed to cede her share of the rights accruing to her by the Treaty of Vienna. King William's hesitation was fast disappearing.
The other subject discussed was the reform of the Confederation. The Prussian Envoy proposed in the Diet on the 9th of April that, within a period to be precisely fixed, the Diet should decree the convocation of a National Assembly to be elected by universal and direct suffrage, for the purpose of receiving and deliberating on the proposals of the German Governments for the reform of the Confederation. This proposition, which caused great surprise and excitement in Germany, was referred by a Dietal vote of the 21st of April to a committee of nine; at the same time the Diet requested Prussia to state the nature of the proposals which it intended to submit to the Assembly when convened. Count Bismarck sharply replied (April 27) that the determination of the date at which such a Parliament or Assembly should meet was of the essence of the Prussian proposition; the modes of procedure habitual to the Diet would, he knew, lead to the indefinite adjournment and final miscarriage of the project; however, he would bring under the notice of the committee such information as would show to what regions of political life the Prussian proposals would extend. This promise he redeemed on the 11th of May by laying before the Committee of the Diet the heads of the changes that Prussia deemed necessary. These included the completion of the central power by means of a freely elected German Parliament, the concession to the central power so reorganised of a wide legislative competency, the removal of all fetters on German trade, an improved military system, and the formation of a German navy. Bavaria, as chief of the secondary States, acceded to the proposal on condition that both parties should disarm. Promises were given, but as Austria declined to discontinue her preparations against Italy, Bismarck was able to charge her with insincerity.
Italy, though she had enlarged her army, had not made any distinctly warlike preparations before the appearance of General La Marmora's circular of the 27th of April. From that time war was looked upon as inevitable; and in order to enlist the national feeling more fully in its favour, a decree was published at Florence on May 8th ordering the formation of twenty volunteer battalions, to be placed under the immediate command of Garibaldi. But the Italian Premier was in sore perplexity. He thoroughly distrusted Bismarck, whom he thought quite capable of patching up a peace with Austria and leaving Italy in the lurch, and he had received tempting offers from Paris. On the 5th of May General La Marmora received a telegram in cipher from Paris, of which the first words were, "Decipher for yourself." After he had done so, he found the purport of the telegram (which was from the Chevalier Nigra) to be this—that Austria was willing to cede Venetia to the Emperor Napoleon, who would at once transfer it to the King of Italy, on condition that she should be left free to recoup herself at the expense of Prussia. La Marmora telegraphed back that his first impression was that it was a question of honour and good faith for Italy not to break her engagements with Prussia. Again (May 6th) came the tempting voice from Paris, saying that the Emperor had told Nigra that Prince Metternich was formally authorised to sign the cession of Venetia in exchange for a simple promise of neutrality. If his resolution had been momentarily shaken, other telegrams soon arrived, of a nature to confirm him in it. On May 6th Count Barral telegraphed that he had been just informed by Count Bismarck that the Prussian army might now be regarded as entirely mobilised; and on the 9th Nigra telegraphed from Paris that Govone had just arrived from Berlin, and was under the full conviction that Prussia had absolutely decided to draw the sword, at latest, towards the beginning of June, and would, in any case, declare war if Italy were attacked. Setting against the risks of war the odium which the acceptance of the French proposal, involving as it did a direct breach of faith with Prussia, would bring down upon the young Italian kingdom, and the painful and inconvenient consequences that might ensue from Italy's debt of obligation to France being so greatly extended, the Italian Premier wisely determined to be true to his first faith; and the project for the cession of Venetia to France vanished for the present into space.
The efforts of neutral and friendly Powers were, of course, not wanting to the cause of peace. From the beginning of May the project of a Congress of the five great Powers, together with Italy and the German Confederation, to discuss the three European questions of the most urgent interest—the cession of Venetia, the fate of Schleswig-Holstein, and the reform of the German Confederation—had found favour with the Emperor Napoleon. Russia had cordially accepted the scheme, and Britain also was favourable to it, though with a proviso that marks the progress which Lord Russell, through sad experience and many failures, had made in his diplomatic education. For, although the actual Foreign Minister at this time was the Earl of Clarendon, yet the empressement with which the British Government, at the outset of the negotiations, volunteered a statement that its interference would in no possible circumstances be carried beyond the limits of persuasion, evidently bespeaks the hand of the Minister whose previous attempts at a dictatorial intervention had failed so disastrously. The Marquis d'Azeglio telegraphed on May 11th from London, that "England accepted the Congress in principle, and also the bases which France proposed with reference to the three urgent questions, but refused categorically to bind herself to impose any decision of the kind otherwise than by persuasion."
Some time elapsed before the three mediating Powers could arrive at a precise understanding as to the form in which the Congress should be proposed to Prussia and Austria. Of the three topics for discussion, the first was described by France as "the cession of Venetia;" this was afterwards modified to "the question of Venetia"; but even in this form the Russian Government considered that there was something in the phrase wounding to the susceptibilities of Austria, and obtained the consent of France to the substitution of the words, "difference between Austria and Italy." Everything at last appeared to be in train; it was arranged that the Congress should be held in Paris, and that the principal Ministers for Foreign Affairs in the different States should attend it. Bismarck, knowing the settled resolve of the Emperor Napoleon to facilitate and promote the cession of Venetia to Italy, was not disposed to refuse the invitation to the Congress; he said to those around him that it would end in nothing and that they would simply adjourn from the Congress-chamber to the battle-field; and he told Count Barral (May 26th) that the Congress was a vain simulacrum, and that he saw no human power capable of preventing war. Yet even Bismarck, three days later, was confounded by the insistance with which France appeared to labour to avert war, and said to Barral, in a tone of deep dissatisfaction, "The Emperor of the French now wishes for peace at any price." To go to war against the will of France was, as Bismarck had before admitted to Govone, hardly within the bounds of possibility. An unfriendly neutrality west of the Rhine would have compelled a concentration of Prussian troops in Westphalia and Rhineland which would have left her too weak to contend with Austria in Saxony or Bohemia. On the 28th of May, notes, couched in almost identical terms, from the Governments of France, Britain, and Russia, communicated to the Powers at variance the proposal of the mediating Courts for the convocation of a Congress. Count Bismarck, while stipulating that the proceedings should be brief, and that the opening of the Congress should not be delayed if the representatives of the Confederation were not nominated in time, accepted the proposal for Prussia, but he took an opportunity of declaring to the French Ambassador, M. Benedetti, in vehement and impassioned tones, that the position of affairs was become intolerable and must be brought to a close at all risks. Italy also agreed to the Congress, as well she might, knowing the settled opinion and desire of the Emperor Napoleon with regard to the cession of Venetia. For Austria, the desirable course was not so clear. If she rejected the Congress, she alienated the good opinion of the neutral Powers. Yet if she accepted it, she knew that she could expect no good from its deliberations. The Chevalier Nigra wrote to La Marmora, on the 24th of May, that the French Foreign Minister, Drouyn de Lhuys, had assured him that it was "well understood between the three neutral Powers that the Congress should discuss the cession of Venetia." Beyond question the existence of this "understanding" was known at Vienna; the Austrian statesmen knew that they would enter a Congress the members of which had already made up their minds on the one subject of discussion that vitally affected her interests and her honour. It is true that Austria had a month before offered to cede Venetia; but at that time she reckoned on compensation. If Italy could be induced by the cession to stand neutral, Austria hoped to overrun and annex Silesia. Yet to refuse the Congress absolutely was not to be thought of. Austria, therefore, hit upon a middle course; she professed a readiness to send a plenipotentiary to the Congress, but only on condition that no combination should be discussed which would result in an extension of territory for any one of the States invited. Such a limitation—especially when the preconceived views of the neutral Powers are remembered—was felt on all sides to render the project of a Congress nugatory, and it was accordingly dropped.
Simultaneously Austria invited the Diet to take the affairs of Schleswig-Holstein under its direction, and convoked the Holstein estates. In reply Count Bismarck sent a despatch, on June 3rd, to Vienna, renewing the protest that had been made by the Prussian Envoy in the Diet against the infraction by Austria of the Convention of Gastein, and declaring that Prussia now considered herself justified in reverting to the basis of the Treaty of Vienna, and that the Government had consequently placed the defence of its condominate rights in the hands of General Manteuffel. At the same time, the Prussian Minister addressed a circular to the Prussian representatives at all foreign Courts, accusing Austria of giving direct provocations to Prussia, with the manifest intention of settling the matters in dispute by an appeal to arms. This circular was couched in terms of the bitterest invective and sufficiently indicated that all prospect of accommodation was renounced. Already General von Gablenz had retreated from Holstein before Manteuffel into Hanover. Thereupon Austria demanded from the Diet the mobilisation of the Federal armies, whereupon the Prussian representative, declaring the union dissolved, withdrew from Frankfort, after handing in his plan of reform. Diplomatic relations between Austria and Prussia were suspended on June 12th; on the 15th Bismarck requested Hanover, Saxony, and Hesse-Cassel to disarm. They declined and the war began.