Finding, as the result of its pressing representations since the first announcement of the candidature, that the Prussian Government declined all responsibility in regard to it, and professed to consider it as a matter that only concerned the King of Prussia in his capacity of head of the Hohenzollern family, the French Government instructed M. Benedetti to seek an interview with the King, who was then at Ems, and obtain from him an explicit disavowal of all share in the project. "We are in great haste," wrote Gramont, "for we must gain the start in case of an unsatisfactory reply, and commence the movements of the troops on Saturday in order to enter upon the campaign in a fortnight." M. Benedetti accordingly went to Ems, where he obtained an interview with the King on the 10th of July. At first, the King of Prussia said that he had certainly consented to the Prince of Hohenzollern's accepting the crown of Spain; and that having given his consent, it would be difficult for him to withdraw it. Two days later, the Prince's renunciation was known at Paris, and it became then a serious question with the French Government what course it should take. By the peremptory and unusual language that they had employed in the tribune, they had excited the passions and raised the expectations of the people to an extraordinary height, so that merely to accept the renunciation of the candidature appeared too lame and poor a conclusion to the tumult they had raised. The Duc de Gramont accordingly explained to Lord Lyons, on the 13th of July, that while the withdrawal of the candidature put an end to all question with Spain, from Prussia France had obtained literally nothing. M. Benedetti was ordered again to wait on the King and procure from him a guarantee that the project of raising his kinsman to the Spanish throne should not be renewed. The exact terms of the French demand, according to a memorandum placed by the Duc de Gramont in the hands of Lord Lyons, were these: "We ask of the King of Prussia to forbid the Prince of Hohenzollern to alter his present resolution. If he does so, the whole matter is at an end." M. Benedetti saw the King again at Ems, on the 13th, and endeavoured to obtain from him the assurance for the future required by the French Government. But to this the King, although M. Benedetti insisted warmly, and hinted at the serious consequences that might follow upon a refusal, declined to consent. Later in the day Benedetti sent to request another interview; but the King sent word that, as his mind was made up, and he had no other answer to give than that which he had given in the morning, it would be useless to re-open the question. This message—which seems to have been sent naturally and with perfect sincerity and in which M. Benedetti himself, as his despatches prove, saw no discourtesy—was so magnified and distorted as to create, on the minds of all who received the intelligence, the impression of an already consummated rupture. From Berlin the incident was officially telegraphed to most of the European Courts to the following effect—that M. Benedetti had accosted the King in the Kurgarten at Ems, and preferred his last extravagant demand; and that the King had thereupon turned round and ordered an aide-de-camp to tell M. Benedetti that there was no reply and that he would not receive him again.
In France the rumour flew that the King had affronted the French Ambassador and the ardour for war rose to fever heat. Immense crowds of Parisians gathered on the Boulevards (July 14th), singing the "Marseillaise" and eagerly discussing the chances of war. Three meetings of the Council of Ministers were held that day. At the first the peace party had the upper hand, but the voice of the Empress prevailed and at the third meeting, held shortly after midnight, the vote was given for war. At Berlin, on the same day, the King was received, on his return from Ems, by the acclamations of an immense multitude of persons, all animated by stern and enthusiastic resolution. On the next day occurred the memorable scene in the French Chambers which left no doubt remaining that the die was cast, and that the terrible eventuality of a war between France and Prussia was close at hand. The Duc de Gramont in the Senate, and M. Ollivier in the Corps Législatif, communicated a Ministerial message, in which it was stated that the King had refused to give the engagement required by France; that, notwithstanding this, in consequence of their desire for peace, they did not break off the negotiations; but that they had learned, to their surprise, that the King had refused to receive M. Benedetti and had communicated the fact officially to his Cabinet. "In these circumstances, we should have forgotten our dignity and also our prudence, had we not made preparations. We have prepared to maintain the war which is offered to us, leaving to each that portion of the responsibility that devolves upon him."
The Ministerial announcement produced an indescribable ferment in the Legislative Body. The majority applauded vehemently every expression that had a warlike sound; but there were a few sober-minded and independent men on the Opposition benches who endeavoured to gain a hearing,—who demanded that the despatches on which the action of the Government was founded should be laid before the Chamber,—who declared that since the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidature they could see no sufficient cause for war. Among these objectors the most prominent was M. Thiers. His remonstrances were met by passionate cries and invectives. "Offend me, insult me," he cried; "I am ready to endure anything to spare the blood of my countrymen, which you are ready to shed so imprudently. You will not reflect for a moment; you will not demand the contents of the despatches, upon which your judgment ought to be founded." "Keep your advice, we do not require it," exclaimed the violent Imperialist, M. Jérôme David. The sitting concluded with the vote of a credit of fifty millions of francs for extraordinary military expenses, as demanded by the Government, by a majority of 245 to 10 voices. On the next day, the Senate, with its President, M. Rouher, at their head, waited upon the Emperor with an address, conceived in the worst French taste, and marked by that appalling disregard of moral considerations which led a noble country into such terrible misfortunes. "Your Majesty," he said, "draws the sword, and the country is with you, trembling with indignation at the excesses that an ambition over-excited by one day's good fortune was sure, sooner or later, to produce." As a matter of fact the war was popular in some sixteen only of the eighty-seven Departments of France.
All through the period of nine days that intervened between the announcement of the French Government on the 15th of July and the speech made by the Duc de Gramont on the 6th, the British Government had laboured heartily and indefatigably for the preservation of peace. All was, however, in vain. The French Ministry had, by the needless publicity and empressement which they had imported into the affair, raised such a tempest of passion and excitement, that soon neither they nor the Parisian public were in a condition to listen to reason. On the other hand, Count Bismarck, while remaining perfectly cool, was not disposed to take extraordinary pains to avert a struggle which he believed to be sooner or later inevitable, and which he was too well informed as to the comparative armaments of the two countries to view with apprehension.
The same spirit of rivalry and combativeness that impelled Count Bismarck in 1866, against the traditions of his country and the declarations of his whole life, to employ revolutionary agencies against Austria because they furnished him with a convenient weapon, now induced him, in contempt of the usages of men of honour and the bienséances of diplomacy, to bring forth from some secret drawer in the Prussian Foreign Office a document that he rightly thought was calculated seriously to damage France and the Emperor in the judgment of the neutral States. On the 25th of July there appeared in the Times what purported to be a textual copy of a project for a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between France and Prussia. The paper containing it was communicated to the Times from the Prussian Foreign Office and was stated to be in the handwriting of M. Benedetti. The Emperor and the King agreed to the following bases: That France should recognise all the Prussian acquisitions of 1866, and should engage not to oppose the incorporation of the South German States, with the exception of Austria, in the North German Confederation; and that the King, on his part, would facilitate for France the acquisition of Luxemburg by means of an indemnity to be paid to the King of Holland, and would also "lend, if need were, the support of his arms for the conquest of Belgium." At the reading of this audacious proposal, a sentiment of stupefaction came upon the English mind, succeeded by a feeling of lively indignation. But as further correspondence developed accurately what had occurred, the case against France assumed a less unfavourable aspect. On the 29th of July the Duc de Gramont transmitted to London a letter from Benedetti, containing the following explanation of the circumstances. In the first place, he pointed out, that, if the project was a villainy, there were evidently two parties to it; on the very face of the document it was manifest that Prussia was not more averse from entertaining the question of the absorption of Belgium than was France. Secondly, whereas Count Bismarck had stated that this was but one of many such schemes with which he was continually being pestered by the French Ambassador, Benedetti asserted that since 1866 he had had no communications with the Prussian Chancellor upon any matter of the kind; but that in that year, and particularly while the negotiations for the Treaty of Prague were going on, Bismarck, fearful lest France should be provoked by the annexation of Hanover, Frankfort, etc., to Prussia, laid several proposals of this nature before him and discussed them with apparent seriousness. On one such occasion, wishing to put the substance of the conversation in a tangible shape, Benedetti wrote, almost under the direction of Count Bismarck, the rough draft now made public by the Prussian Government; Bismarck took it from him, saying he would show it to the King; after that Benedetti saw and thought no more of it. But when the project was submitted to the Emperor, Benedetti added, he at once rejected it; and he believed that it was also rejected by the King of Prussia.
Whatever might be the exact balance of truth between the conflicting statements, the painful impression was left on the minds of English statesmen, that neither France nor Prussia would have much scruple about destroying the independence of Belgium; and that, if that independence were worth preserving, from the point of view both of the honour and of the interests of Great Britain, new guarantees for its maintenance had become necessary. It is a pleasure to record the manly stand taken on this question by Lord Russell (which was in marked contrast with his abandonment of Denmark, in 1864), when (August 2nd) the subject came up in the House of Lords. Britain's duty, he said, was clear. "It is not a question of three courses. There is but one course and one path—namely, the course of honour and the path of honour—that we ought to pursue. We are bound to defend Belgium. I am told that that may lead us into danger. Now, in the first place, I deny that any great danger would exist if this country manfully declared her intention to perform all her engagements and not to shrink from their performance." After saying that all these intrigues arose from the doubt that prevailed on the Continent whether Britain would adhere to her treaty engagements, he proceeded: "I am persuaded that if it is once manfully declared that England means to stand by her treaties, to perform her engagements—that her honour and her interests would allow nothing else—such a declaration would check the greater part of these intrigues, and that neither France nor Prussia would wish to add a second enemy to the formidable foe which each has to meet."
Being strongly urged forward by the expressions of opinion delivered both in and out of Parliament, Mr. Gladstone's Government acted on this critical occasion both promptly and skilfully. Earl Granville prepared the text of a treaty guaranteeing the independence of Belgium during the continuance of the war and twelve months afterwards, and proposed its acceptance, simultaneously, but separately, to the two belligerent Powers. The substantial proviso of the treaty was to this effect: "His Majesty [Emperor of the French, or King of Prussia] having declared that, in spite of the state of war existing between [France and North Germany], he is determined to respect the neutrality of Belgium as long as it shall be respected by [North Germany, or France], her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland declares, on her part, that if, during the continuance of hostilities, the [North German, or French] armies should violate that neutrality, she will be prepared to co-operate with [his Imperial Majesty, or his Prussian Majesty] with the view of defending, in such manner as shall be mutually agreed upon, by employing to that end her naval and military forces, and of maintaining, in conjunction with [his Imperial Majesty, or his Prussian Majesty], then and afterwards, the independence and neutrality of Belgium." The other contracting Power agreed to co-operate with Great Britain for the accomplishment of the same end. The treaty was to be in force during the continuance of the war between France and Germany, and for a term of twelve months after the ratification of any treaty of peace concluded between those Powers; after which time, the independence and neutrality of Belgium would continue, so far as the high contracting parties were respectively concerned, to be maintained, as heretofore, in accordance with the first article of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April, 1839. This treaty was accepted and signed by Prussia immediately, and by France also, after a little hesitation. Its provisions slumbered indeed, but there is no reason to suppose that they were without effect. Had there been no such treaty, it is possible that, during the operations near the Belgian frontier which terminated in the capitulation of Sedan, the neutrality of the Belgian territory would have been forcibly violated by one or the other belligerent; the area over which the devastating effects of war were experienced would have been extended; and serious political complications, from which it would have been difficult for any one of the great Powers to hold aloof, must infallibly have supervened.
So much heat and haste had been apparent in the proceedings of the French Government since the first rise of the Hohenzollern incident that it was generally expected that very few days would pass after the formal declaration of war (July 19th) before the French Army of the North would be arrayed along the frontier of Rhenish Prussia, ready to take the field in overwhelming force. But day followed day and nothing decisive was done. It appears that the arrangements for mobilisation—especially in what relates to transport—were found to be extremely defective. In truth, the military system of France was rotten and honeycombed with abuses; wherever unexpected pressure was applied, it gave way. In the subordinate posts there were many excellent and honourable men—it needs but to mention such names as MacMahon, Trochu, and Vinoy to establish the fact—but the real power lay with the Emperor and his personal friends or favourites. He is said, after the first great disaster had occurred, to have had continually on his lips the words, "I have been deceived." Doubtless he had been deceived; "cooked" reports had been submitted to him; money received for substitutes, instead of being so applied, had gone no one knew where, and the regiments were disgracefully attenuated in consequence; jobbery and corruption, extending into every department, made every service on which the usefulness of soldiers depends less efficient by many degrees than it ought to have been. Thus it happened that it was not till quite the end of the month that a respectable French force was collected at the frontier, and it was in sore stress for provisions. Meanwhile, the Prussians silently mustered three powerful armies behind the Rhine, intending to fall with an irresistible onset, when the fitting moment should arrive, on the heedless and vainglorious foe. The Emperor left Paris on the 28th of July, accompanied by his son Louis, and assumed the chief command of the army at Metz on the following day.
COUNT VON (AFTERWARDS PRINCE) BISMARCK.