Napoleon appears to have reckoned even to the last moment that dislike and jealousy of Prussia would move the South German Governments to separate their interests from hers in the great struggle that was impending, or at least to wait and see how events fell out before finally committing themselves. How—knowing as he did the existence of the secret treaties of 1866, by which Bavaria, Würtemberg, and Baden bound themselves to assist Prussia, if attacked—he could seriously entertain such a hope, it is not easy to understand. The Governments of those States, on this occasion in full sympathy with their subjects, were animated by a hearty indignation at the unwarrantable attack made on Germany and they speedily sent in their adhesions to Prussia. Their military contingents were assigned, under the supreme command of the King of Prussia, to the third of the great armies that were being formed for the protection of German interests. These armies furnished a grand total of 338,000 men, to which enormous force France could for the moment only oppose 200,000. Marshal Lebœuf unfortunately imagined that the Foreign Office had concluded alliances with Austria and Italy, and that a great part of the Prussian army would in consequence be detained on the southern frontier. He was justified to this extent that Austria was willing enough to wound Germany, but yet afraid to strike. Count Beust saw that an immediate participation of Austria in the war would involve the appearance of Russia in the field on the side of King William. He determined therefore to restrict himself for the present to armed mediation in concert with Italy and to that end advised Napoleon III. to place the Italians in possession of Rome. Here were obviously the materials for a triple alliance and affairs were further advanced on the 2nd of August when the Papal States were evacuated by the French Government. Austria and Italy, however, stipulated for the preliminary success of the French troops as a condition of their armed support, in which case they promised to assume a position of armed neutrality, then to demand the exact performance of the treaty of Prague, i.e. the independence of the South German States, and to take the field in the event of refusal by the 15th of September. According to the Duc de Gramont a draft treaty had actually been drawn up, but before it could be signed the French armies had been dispersed.
The Emperor's plan of campaign, as explained in a pamphlet which he drew up while at Wilhelmshöhe, was to draw together 150,000 men from Metz and 100,000 from Strasburg, and with a force of 250,000 men cross the Rhine at Maxan, between Rastadt and Spires, while his rear was covered by the advance of a reserve force of 50,000, under Marshal Canrobert, from Châlons to Metz. Marching towards Dresden, the Emperor hoped to meet and defeat the North German forces, and, being thus interposed between North and South Germany, to intimidate the South German Powers into an attitude of acquiescence while he followed up his advantage against Prussia, and endeavoured to break up the newly cemented and, as he fain would believe, fragile ties that united Prussia to the countries annexed in the last war. If Germany had been unready; if Bismarck had been no more far-seeing than Persigny, and Moltke no more vigilant than Lebœuf; lastly, if the Emperor could have disposed of a hundred thousand more men, the plan might have been promising, perhaps even feasible. But when the Emperor remembered the enormous strength of the Prussian armies in 1866, and reflected that the populations then annexed were instantly brought within the cords of the Prussian military system, it is wonderful (even supposing him to have been under a complete delusion as to the probable conduct of Bavaria and Würtemberg) that he did not see that 250,000 men—on paper—was an utterly inadequate force wherewith to attempt so vast an enterprise as that he meditated.
The 2nd Corps, under General Frossard, was at Forbach, close to the Prussian frontier, just within which, on the river Saar, was the flourishing little town of Saarbrück, held by a battalion of infantry and three squadrons of cavalry belonging to the 8th North German Corps (First Army). General Steinmetz had assumed the command of that army at Coblenz on the 28th of July, and at the beginning of August had concentrated it in a position where it covered Trèves, and guarded against any sudden inroad into the Rhine province on the side of Thionville. On the 2nd of August Frossard received orders to drive the Prussians out of Saarbrück. The action began at 10.30 A.M., and soon afterwards the Emperor, with the Prince Imperial, arrived on the ground from Metz. The Prussians, though greatly outnumbered, held their ground tenaciously, but were gradually pushed out of the villages to the south of Saarbrück, and finally compelled to evacuate the town and retreat to the wooded heights that look down upon it from the north. The French did not attempt to occupy the town, nor to dislodge the enemy from the heights beyond.
Forty-eight hours after the French made this unmeaning demonstration at Saarbrück, the concentration of the German armies was completed, and their heavy masses were ready to be moved down to and across the French frontier. To the Third Army was given the honour of striking the first blow—doubtless because in it were arrayed the contingents from the South German States, and Prussia desired that France and the world should be convinced without delay of the futility of all calculations that took German dissension for their basis. On the 3rd of August the Crown Prince sent orders from Spires to his corps commanders to advance upon Weissenburg, just across the Alsatian frontier. At this point MacMahon had stationed his second division, commanded by General Abel Douay, in order to cover his communications with the 5th Corps, under De Failly, which was stationed round Bitche. Douay's force, which did not exceed 12,000 men, was left absolutely without reinforcements. The French were outnumbered, probably two to one, but they had a very strong position, and their field guns and chassepôts scattered destruction through the German lines as they slowly forced their way up the height. At one o'clock the assailants were in possession of the castle of Geissberg, near the top of the hill. The leading brigade attacked from the eastward; the other, edging round to the left, and scaling the southern face of the hill, threatened to cut off the French from their line of retreat. Douay had been killed early in the action, and the officer who succeeded to the command, judging that further resistance was unadvisable, ordered a retirement.
On the day after the affair at Saarbrück the Emperor was exceedingly unwell, and the physicians would not allow him to quit his room. It was probably from a sense of great weakness that he came to the resolution of divesting himself of a portion of the responsibility of command, by appointing Marshal Bazaine to the command of the three corps (2nd, 3rd, and 4th) that formed the left wing of the Army of the Rhine, and Marshal MacMahon to that of the 1st; 5th, and 7th Corps, forming its right wing. This was carried out on the 5th, till which day Bazaine remained in ignorance of the Emperor's plan of campaign. The three corps that this order placed at the disposal of MacMahon—namely, his own at Strasburg and Hagenau, De Failly's at Bitche, and Félix Douay's at Belfort—would, if united, have formed an army of about 80,000 men. He wished to effect a concentration, but was overruled by the Emperor, who feared the political consequences of a retreat. Accordingly, in the course of the 5th, MacMahon drew up his army along the high ground to the west of the Sauer. In the first line were the three divisions of his own corps that had not yet been engaged; in the second line he placed the troops who had been beaten at Weissenburg, a division of the 7th Corps that had come up from Belfort and two brigades of cavalry, one of which consisted of two fine regiments of cuirassiers. De Failly was expected with his corps in the course of the day. On the 5th of August, the Crown Prince, still holding the 1st Bavarian Corps in reserve, moved the main body of his army, marching in four columns as before, from the Lauter towards the Sauer. At the headquarters of the Crown Prince no thought was entertained of fighting a battle on the next day, during which the Prince intended to have remained quietly at Sulz. But early on the morning of the 6th of August the impetuosity of the divisional commanders brought on a general battle, after the Germans had suffered severely for their rashness. Soon after twelve, the Crown Prince, finding that the troops already on the field were hotly engaged, and that the French showed no signs of an intention to retreat, determined to bring his whole force into action, in order to deal a crushing blow to an enemy whose greatly inferior numbers could not expect from any quarter to be adequately reinforced. A long cannonade ensued, to which the French, who were deficient in artillery, could not make an effective reply. Then Kirchbach ordered the advanced guard to storm Wörth, which was done about 12.30, and the victorious troops advanced up the hills on the left bank of the Sauer. Soon, however, they were brought to a stand by a biting fire from the French position and made no progress for a long time. A great artillery duel went on for hours on the centre and right of the line. About 11 A.M. the French right had made a forward movement across the Sauer, and drove the Germans out of Gunstett, but were unable to hold it long. Fresh troops continually coming up, General Bose moved his corps across the Sauer in support of Kirchbach; the Würtembergers also joined in this advance, and turning towards the north, after crossing the river, Prussians and Würtembergers steadily pressed forward, and took from the French the village of Elsasshausen about two o'clock; but the resistance was stubborn and the loss proportionately heavy. It was while the Germans were advancing by Elsasshausen that Michel's brigade, composed of two regiments of cuirassiers, made its celebrated but useless charge. With wild fury these devoted horsemen charged into the advancing masses, but the rapid discharges of the needle-gun smote and crushed their ranks, and not more than 150 unwounded men remained after the battle in the whole brigade. Froschweiler, the village to the north of Elsasshausen, attacked both from the south and from the east, was taken at 3.30. MacMahon, outnumbered and beaten, was now compelled to retreat. Keeping his centre and left pretty well together, he fell back on Niederbronn, where he found a division of De Failly's corps, which, through some telegraphic mistake, had not arrived in time to take part in the battle. These fresh troops checked the German pursuit. The French right, demoralised by defeat, and losing almost all its organisation, fled in headlong flight towards Hagenau and Strasburg.
On the day following the battle, MacMahon reached Saverne, on the Strasburg-Paris railway, and proceeded to despatch his troops to Nancy and Châlons. His only course now was to reorganise his army at the camp of Châlons, while Bazaine, with his portion of the Army of the Rhine, detained the enemy round Metz. De Failly, prevented from marching towards Metz by the rapid advance of the First and Second German Armies into French territory, in consequence of the success we are about to describe, fell back from Bitche in a southerly direction, struck the Strasburg-Paris railway, and brought his corps to join MacMahon. The remainder of the 7th Corps was brought up to Châlons soon afterwards from Belfort. The Crown Prince, before crossing the Vosges in pursuit of MacMahon, detached General Werder with the Baden division to invest and besiege Strasburg. General Beyer, the divisional commander, summoned General Uhrich, the governor of the fortress, to surrender, but of course with no result. The town was then invested (August 10th) and several regiments of Prussian Landwehr were presently added to the besieging force.
A second disaster happened on the same day as the battle of Wörth. On the previous day, General Frossard, commanding the 2nd Corps, withdrew his troops from the valley of the Saar to the heights of Spicheren, where his right rested on a difficult wooded country; on his left was the little town of Forbach and the railway to Metz. General Kameke, commanding a division of the 7th Corps (First Army), pushed troops over the Saar at Saarbrück on the morning of the 6th, who came into action with the French batteries on the Rothe Berg (a hill jutting out from the Spicheren plateau) about 11.30 A.M. From that time the battle raged with varying success all through the day till nightfall. Von Göben came up and took the command about three o'clock; about five the Prussians carried the greater part of the heights of Spicheren, though at a terrible cost of life. On the other hand, the French left, between six and seven, advanced along the railway from Stiring and drove back the Germans nearly to the Saar. The bravery of the French in this battle was conspicuous; the losses they inflicted on the Germans were far heavier than those they themselves suffered; and there seems little reason to doubt that with more clear-sightedness and determination on the part of Frossard, and more energetic co-operation on the part of Bazaine (who was at St. Avold with the 3rd Corps, about fifteen miles from Spicheren), or, perhaps, on the part of Bazaine's lieutenants, the Germans would have been repulsed with heavy loss. Frossard does not appear to have held the plateau with a sufficient force; and in a critical period of the action, when German reinforcements were coming up from all sides, he telegraphed to Bazaine, asking him to send him a regiment! It was not till towards six o'clock that he telegraphed to Bazaine to assist him with all the forces at his disposal; but it was then too late. The French were sadly demoralised by their defeat. Frossard retired upon Saargemund, and thence, with what was left of his corps, joined the army that Bazaine was collecting near Metz.
On that fatal Sunday (August 7th) the full truth concerning Wörth and Forbach was known at Paris. A telegram from the Emperor was published, admitting that the army had suffered reverses, but feebly adding, "Tout peut se rétablir" ("All may yet be regained"). An indescribable ferment agitated all minds and hearts. The cry in the streets was for a levée en masse, and the word "déchéance" ("deposition") was often heard. The Corps Législatif met on the 9th of August. Jules Favre and the party of the Left urged the Emperor's recall from the army, and the appointment of a committee with full power for the conduct of war. Ollivier, who showed little sense of the terrible gravity of the situation, spoke in defence of the Ministry, but his speech was received with vehement interruptions and loud denials, and the majority cared not now to screen him from the attacks of the Left. A middle course was taken. The Empress sent for the Count de Palikao (August 10th), and requested him to form a Ministry. He was in command of the military centre of Lyons when summoned to Paris by the Empress. He succeeded in forming a Ministry, in which Magne took charge of the Department of Finance; the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, of Foreign Affairs; and Palikao himself became the Minister of War. Vigorous measures were instantly taken to make timely preparation for the worst, in case the armies still in the field should not be able to prevent the Germans from marching upon Paris. General Trochu, a brave and honest soldier, but a little too rigid and positive in his opinions, was appointed to the command of the forces of Paris; a new war loan of one thousand millions of francs was set on foot; the ranks of the National Guard and Mobiles were filled; and great efforts were made to bring into Paris as large a supply of provisions as possible from the surrounding country.
After Forbach there was nothing to hinder the Germans from pushing forward their armies into France. The First and Second Armies, facing to the westward, marched in the direction of Metz—Steinmetz keeping to the north, and Prince Frederick Charles to the south, of the railway connecting Metz with Saarbrück. Bazaine on his part was doing his utmost to re-form and augment the French army round Metz. He was now possessed of uncontrolled authority; for Count Palikao, though he would not consent to Jules Favre's motion for the recall of the Emperor to Paris, lest the excited populace should rise and put a sudden end to the dynasty, wisely yielded on the main point, and prevailed upon the Emperor to resign the chief command.
